TELOS

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TELOS

a quarterly journal of radical thought

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INTRODUCTION

News of Gouldner's unexpected death in Madrid on December 15 reached our office as this issue was about to go to press. Compounded with the loss of Farber and Pachter -- about whom there was sufficient time to write tributes -- this latest shock adds considerably to making the season a sad one. Personally and professionally close to many of us in *Telos*, Gouldner leaves a void impossible to fill. By the time the next issue comes out, we hope to have an appropriate tribute for him. In the meantime, we can only hope to preserve that intellectual tradition to which all three were major contributors.

Continuing his earlier analysis in *Telos* 41, Rittersporn's "Stalin in 1938: Political Defeat Behind Rhetorical Apotheisis" further advances the controversial thesis that the Stalin revolution of the 1930s really was the work of the middle-level and upper-level *apparatchiks* and not of the "all-powerful" first secretary. Challenging the conventional wisdom concerning this period, Rittersporn's analysis shreds the myth of an omnipotent Stalinist cult of personality and reveals how the young Stalinists of the 1930s sacrificed the old Bolsheviks, the welfare of the workers and peasantry and the political institutions of the 1920s to assure the hegemony of the appratus in the industrializing Soviet state.

Following on Rittersporn's consideration of the Soviet state's brutal formation, Castoriadis' "Facing the War" decries the current Moscow antics as the Russians apparently prepare for the final military onslaught against the West. Characterizing the Soviet Union, much like Prussia was once described, as an army with a state rather than a state with an army, Castoriadis defines Moscow's *raison d'état* as offensive military conquest both to evince its own theory of the objective "correlation of forces and to sustain the apparatus' loosening grip on the crumbling multinational Soviet empire. Written as a grim warning to Western societies, Castoriadis concludes that Western military and political decision-makers must stop seeing global competition with the USSR as a Clausewitzian strategic game in order to recognize the Soviet design for complete domination.

Antonio Carlo's "The Crisis of the State in the Thirties" systematically reviews both American and European debates on the restructuring of capitalist industry, social consumption and government administration in the U.S. and Western Europe. By tracing out Roosevelt's efforts to build an organized capitalism in the U.S. as well as the German and Italian efforts to achieve the same effect under fascism, Carlo maintains each of these efforts failed to solve the inherent contradictions and crisis tendencies in industrial capitalism. Instead, the deficit-driven economic boom brought on by World War II and the subsequent maintenance of national security industries temporarily saved capitalism from the final crisis. With the ensuing economic growth, the problem of the chickens came home to roost in the 1970s. Here, Carlo argues, the problems had only been postponed and not solved. While this kind of economic analysis still had much to recommend it, Carlo does not recognize that the postponement of the crisis also has changed its nature. The old left approach toward fighting capital and its exploitation of workers simply does not wash any longer.

As the papers presented at the recent conference on "the crisis of the left" suggest, the Western left does not have a really adequate answer for the structural crisis of capitalism. Instead, as Piccone and D'Amico maintain, the left has ceased to be a meaningful alternative to the existing order. Because of its inability to address and cope with the ecological costs of industrial capitalism, Luke claims that the left, much like the existing system, basically has resigned itself to seek uncritically abundance for

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all -- only this time, under its socialist planning. Still, in the last analysis, it does not come up with a qualitatively new ecological relation between nature and society. The popular political choice then becomes one between the Hoover Institution's or Tom Hayden's intricate planned agenda for the 1980s. Significant differences crop up in their respective positions on ownership, control and direction. Yet the Hoover crew's new, tough capitalism or Hayden's new benevolent version are alternative packages for different blocs of consumers still faced with the old capitalist content.

Breines' contribution argues that the old new left successfully diverted the new left's concerns with new sensitivity, the environment and culture, and tied it to traditional left concerns. But, in being unable to satisfy these demands, much of the left remains, as Jacoby maintains, open to any new trendy movement or idea seemingly able to aid the working class.

Clearly, the crisis of the state and the left in the 1980s evades the simpler categories of the 1930s and demands new approaches to deal with the new problems raised in government, industry and society. All of these contributions, particularly the conference papers, tie into and sustain theoretical discussions begun in the past few issues of *Telos* which we will attempt to continue in the future. A word of thanks, of course, is due to the Kansas *Telos* Group which, despite its organizing rhetoric, so far has not been able to politically organize much more than a few graduate students and faculty members at the University of Kansas. It did, however, successfully put together an excellent conference and showed all who came the best of Kansas hospitality.

The fortunes of Hegel's philosophy have been uneven -- to say the least. Practically dead in Germany during the second part of the 19th century, Hegelianism flourished again in Italy, Poland, Russia and England, only to be sent back to the academic attic by positivist Marxism, logical empiricism and other philosophical fads at the beginning of the century (with a few exceptions, such as Italy, where Croce and Gentile kept neo-Hegelianism predominant up to the end of World War II). With the second centenary of Hegel's death there has been a renewed interest in Hegel -- at least in English, for in France, the mood is definitely in the opposite direction. In the first of three long and rather exhaustive discussions, Schmidt here attempts to survey most of this new literature and draw a balance sheet. Since Hegelian philosophical syntheses seem to reappear at critical transitional junctures (the French Revolution, the transtion from entrepreneurial to organized capitalism, etc). maybe this renewed interest is a symptom of a broader cultural renovation in embryo. Consequently, the new Hegel revival in the U.S. is a phenomenon worthy of careful monitoring.

Kogawa's discussion of Adorno's strategy of hibernation takes a less optimistic approach. Against recent efforts to contrapose Benjamin's vision of a "universalized secular illumination" to Adorno's more pessimistic analysis, Kogawa argues for the continuing viability of the Adornean strategy. The culture industry is far from weakening and its recent diversification of themes may be paving the way to an even more sophisticated form of cultural hegemony. Within such a context, Höfener's defense of Adorno against his critics is all the more relevant. The critique of collective insanity not only must itself appear insane, but throws into question the very distinction between sanity and insanity.

In the review section, Murray Bookchin takes on Gorz's effort to blend ecological themes within traditional Marxist theory. Reiterating his well-known anarchist critique of Marxism, Bookchin points out how Marxist instrumental reason cannot adequately tackle the problem other than by instrumentalizing the politicizing possibilities offered by the ecological crisis. Very sympathetic to Kolakowski's

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concerns, Miller evaluates his monumental three-volume history of Marxism and discusses its critical reception so far. Dissatisfied with an earlier review of Mlynar's book on the 1968 Czech events because of the reviewer's failure to see through Mlynar's Magdalena-like metamorphosis after he lost power, Svitak offers an alternative, much more severe evaluation of the book. With sadness, we also publish in this issue one of Henry Pachter's very last writings, where he provides us once again with a glimpse of the breadth of his knowledge by reviewing three recent works about that turn-of-the-century central Europe out of which he himself came. Craven, Finocchiaro and Roelofs complete the section with critical reviews of Berger's last book on art criticism, Sassoon's pedantic and vacuous summary of Gramsci's politics, and Ganassi-Agger's excellent comparative study of city planning and the prospects of self-management.

Tim Luke and Paul Piccone

BOOKS FROM TELOS PRESS

ESSAYS ON METHOD IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LITERATURE by Lucien Goldmann

Translated and Edited by William Q. Boelhower

A series of previously untranslated key essays by Goldmann dealing with methodology in the sociology of literature. Through the use of these essays, Boelhower provides an analysis of Goldmann's heuristic categories of the sociology of literature. Boelhower's lengthy introduction sets these categories against more recent work in the sociology of literature.

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FOR SOCIALISM *by Gustav Landauer*

INTRODUCTION by Tim Luke and Russell Berman

From his protest against Bebel's exclusion of the anarchists from the Second International in 1893 until his murder in 1919 by the reactionary troops' suppression of the Bavarian revolution, Landauer remained a tireless critic of all forms of bureaucratism and an advocate of a decentralized, libertarian socialism. A friend of Buber, Landauer had a great influence on the anarcho-socialist trends of the early Zionist movement and the development of the *Kibbutz*.

Translated by David J. Parent Cloth: $12.00. Paper: $3.00

Pannekoek and the Workers' Councils

Edited by Serge Bricianer

Introduction by John Gerber. This collection of writings by Pannekoek presents for the first time in English many of his works, which, with their libertarian vision of socialism, have been routinely ignored in the official histories of European social democracy. Widely regarded as one of the most important founders of council communism, Pannekoek's work has only recently begun to receive the attention it deserves.

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STALIN IN 1938: POLITICAL DEFEAT BEHIND THE RHETORICAL APOTHEOSIS[1]

by Gabor Rittersporn

An almost universally accepted axiom of every interpretation of recent Soviet history, whatever its theoretical or ideological premises, is the concept of "Stalinism" — a concept describing a period of 15 years of domination by the arbitrary and omnipotent will of a bloody dictator. Most Sovietologists agree that during the Great Purge of 1936-1938, Stalin succeeded in eliminating his last adversaries and in extending an almost total hegemony over the Soviet state and society. This concept of "Stalinism," though rarely defined precisely and often reduced to a vague synonym of "autocracy" or "tyranny," came to describe everything that happened in the USSR during the last fifteen years of Stalin's life. But it also came to stand for any manifestation of authoritarianism within the Soviet sphere, as well as the activities of political formations associated with communism around the world. It came to designate more a type of political organization and practice than the nature of the system established under the Russian state-party which concentrates the management of essential activities in an integrated apparatus.

Sovietologists are right to stress the significance of the 1936-1938 events, both for the history of the USSR and for Stalin's career. But, misled by a ritual invocation of Stalin's name to legitimate every political initiative, they never suspect that, behind the phenomena, aims other than Stalin's can be sought; and they too quickly identify the particulars of the regime's internal mechanisms with his irresistable will. Thus, studies on Soviet history customarily attribute to Stalin himself plans and ventures undertaken in his name, without asking whether they fit coherently within a homogeneous strategy.

On closer examination, however, these initiatives display numerous contradictions. If the abundant yet scantily utilized available materials are studied, it turns out that, despite his important role, Stalin was far from capable of always dictating the course of events in the thirties. In the last analysis, his personal position emerged from the Great Purge more shattered than strengthened. A close reading of the data — one that might be accurately described in terms of "conflict theory," shows that the purge was not a punitive enterprise inflicted victoriously from above, but primarily an intense internal struggle within the state apparatus resulting from the need to ensure the functioning of the uncontrollable administrative, economic and political machinery. This struggle involved antagonistic strategies at the center of the apparatus, of which "genuine Stalinism" was just one — and in fact unsuccessful — variant.

Thus, Stalin's Stalinism must be distinguished from "verbal Stalinism" — the official account that obsessively appealed to a single authority to

1. Originally in *Libre,* n. 6 (Fall 1979), pp. 99-164. Translated by David J. Parent.

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legitimate what in reality could be diametrically opposed political initiatives. The practice, current during this period, of appealing to Stalin's infallible genius did not reflect his omnipotence and could easily have resulted from the need to hide internal conflicts. Moreover, it was after Stalin had suffered a political defeat — a defeat that is the object of this study — that systematic recourse to his name and authority reached a peak. The real importance of Stalin's role at the summit of the Soviet apparatus cannot be deduced from the enormous place he occupies in the regime's official self-image, which very effectively hides more than it reveals. The success of this camouflage is illustrated by the trend in academic studies that prefers to analyze the leadership's own account rather than underlying socio-political realities.

The collectivization of agriculture and industrialization had unforeseen and contradictory effects on the Soviet state apparatus. The last forums of independent social action having been annihilated, the apparatus had become the uncontested master of all decisions relative to the system's development and reproduction. In addition, and in line with a secular historical tendency, the political and administrative functions within the apparatus became fused. This identification eliminated every distinction between plan and practice, definition and implementation, political control and civic — and not simply economic — activity. Thus the state-party was constituted as the exclusive organ for responding to all problems that might come up within the immense breadth of the socio-political body, including those problems resulting from the nature of its functioning as the only apparatus of direction. For, although in principle all-powerful, this all-encompassing apparatus soon proved incapable of mastering its own internal mechanisms.[2]

The crucial historical factor here is the impossibility, even for the staunchest advocates of an undivided central control, of directly naming the real reasons for the chronic malfunctioning of governmental mechanisms. Consequently, it became necessary to attribute them to the corruption of cadres of a social origin "alien" to the working class (in a first period), or to the "subversive" plots of old opponents from the 1920s. In both cases, this allowed recalcitrant cadres to divert purges to inoffensive scapegoats.

This fault in the denunciatory logic, quickly perceived by those promoting the "centralist line," seems to have led them to momentarily stop the offensive during the first months of 1936. However, the attempt at rationalizing control without evoking "enemy plots" having proved sterile, after a brief calm the problem was exacerbated during the summer of 1936 with a rupture between "centralist" and "centrifugal" tendencies and in the sudden "rediscovery" of the "subversive" plots of old opponents.

2. I have developed elsewhere the analytic framework for dealing with the tensions that soon arose between the apparatus' "center" and the "periphery" and, correlatively, between the advocates and opponents of instituting a strict control — tensions which, after two years of "incubation," erupted into the virulent struggles of the 1936-1938 period. Cf. my "Social Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR (1936-38)," in *Telos*, n. 41 (Fall 1979), pp. 87-105. Cf. also my "Société et Appareil d'Etat Sovietiques 1936-1938: Contradictions et Interferences," in *Annales E.S.C.*, n. 4 (1979).

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What was evidently at stake in the first of the "Great Trials"[3] between August 1936 and February 1937 was the attempt to define and fix the stereotyped portrait of the victim. In reality there was one trial and two counter trials. The first, that of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Smirnov and other ex-members of the left opposition, was aimed at the former Trotskyist, traitor to the nation, conspiring to assassinate the country's leaders. The other two (the Novosibirsk trial and the second great Moscow trial, whose best-known accused were Pjatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov) were directed against the cadre as "saboteur" disrupting the apparatus and inclined toward retaliatory measures against workers. The first trial, called by the partisans of a lenient treatment for the derelict cadres, managed for a moment to direct the fire onto the meager remnants of the old left opposition. The two others, used as a response by the advocates of a radical cleansing of the methods of direction, sought in the face of considerable difficulties to get hold of institutional controls, in an attempt to reassert their command over the situation — above all, in the police and in the party.

Thus, characteristically, local party organs were first ordered to report to regional authorities and from there to the Central Committee only in the fall of 1936,[4] at a time when conflicts within the apparatus put in doubt the credibility of communicated information. The police (NKVD) were allied with local cadres who arbitrarily interpreted the center's directives by arresting and condemning whomever they pleased.[5] Under these conditions, how could state-party organs be expected to unseat the "great lords," as Stalin had called them during the 17th Party Congress in 1934?[6] That is why the advocates of a "centralist line" focused their efforts elsewhere: during the February-March 1937 central committee's plenary session they voted to hold a reelection of all party administrators from the cells to regional administrations and to directors of the republics, within three months and, for the first time, by secret ballot. The militants were officially encouraged to criticize their superiors, reject any candidate and, something unprecedented, to depose officials — including appointees by higher agencies, even the Central

3. Cf. my "Conflicts Sociaux et Politiques en U.R.S.S. 1936-1938," thesis presented at the University of Paris in 1976, pp. 95-99. Cf. also "Trotskisty-Vrediteli...," in *Pravda*, November 20, 1936; "Process...," *ibid.*, p. 3, and *Pravda*, November 23, 1936, p. 2; *Report of the Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center* (Moscow, 1937).

4. *Partijnoe Stroitelstve*, n. 20 (1936), p. 37.

5. *Ugolovno-Processual'nyj Kodeks R.S.F.S.R.* (Moscow, 1937), pp. 141-142, 147; documents from *The Smolensk Archives*, preserved at the library of Harvard University, vol. 178, pp. 134-135; *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo*, n. 25 (1934), p. 47; *Dopolnenija k Kodeksam* (Moscow, 1937), p. 38; *The Smolensk Archives*, vol. 103, pp. 174, 176-177, 179, 181-182; "Na Plenume Verh. Suda," Part 1, collection of governmental laws, in *Pravda*, September 21, 1937.

6. In his report, Stalin criticized incompetent functionaries, but especially directors who had had "well-known records in the past, people who have become great lords, people who considered the laws of the party and the Soviet state's laws not to apply to them, but to imbeciles. [They]...do not consider their obligation to carry out party and government decisions and...so ruin the foundations of party and state discipline. They hope that the Soviet power will not touch them because of their record. These infatuated great lords think they are irreplaceable and that they can violate the decisions of the directing organs with impunity." Cf. *XVII. S'ezd VKP (b)*

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Committee.[7] Almost immediately, a number of electoral meetings became forums for open conflict between leaders and led, thereby forcing concessions out of the "centralist" tendency. In this manner the cadres in office managed to dissuade the protesters, sometimes in ways that were hardly peaceful, and to generally bring about their own reelection. The situation took an abrupt turn toward the end of the elections when, deciding to use the "confidence" the party masses had just shown them, the proponents of lenient treatment for administrative cadres risked a dangerous counterattack. As usual, through a reinterpretation of what constituted the "enemy," they called on their camp to "unmask saboteurs" endangering party unity. But the retreat of their adversaries was only tactical. In effect, the discovery that some "Trotskyists," "Bukharinists," and "spies" had succeeded in "deceiving the militants" by being re-elected to administrative bodies marked the start of a new campaign by the "centralizers" provoked by those who defended the cadres.

The spectacular "discovery" of a group of conspirators, traitors, and spies, in the Red Army's general staff, and the death sentences they received behind closed doors (according to a procedure prescribed by an obscure decree, *de facto* no longer in force, the "law of Dec. 1, 1934,") was the work of "radicals." Probably, these are the same men who instituted a generalized blackmail within the state-party's collective organs; the obligation, under threat of police retaliation, to expel from the party and denounce to the NKVD every severely compromised functionary — including those of the NKVD.

Of course, a mere redefinition of the rights and obligations of the various party organs or of the rules governing the "fight against enemies" was not enough to break down the resistance of cadres. Complex maneuvers were needed to launch the new campaign with the country's different regions and larger administration. Where the incumbent administrators did not want to reinstitute the purge, it was necessary to provoke ruptures among the leading cadres of the formerly unified administrators. Some of the most important functionaries had to be prodded into taking the lead in the denunciations. This was often achieved only after a series of attacks, threats and promises on the part of the radicals or as a result of the Central Committee's direct intervention. Powerful cliques perpetuated themselves at the sectorial and above all the regional level, and the partisans of strict control could not conduct a simultaneous attack in all parts of the country and all of its institutions. Though started in mid-June of 1937, the new campaign reached most of the republics only by mid-September.

During the elections, a major effort was made by regional authorities to protect the candidates "invested" by the apparatus.[8] Protection was to be given

(Moscow, 1934), p. 34; see also *KPSS v Rezoljucijah i Resenijah s'ezdov, Konferendij i Plenumov CK*, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1971), p. 153.

7. "Podgotovka Partorganizacij k Vyboram...," in *Pravda*, p. 1; *The Smolensk Archives*, vol. III, p. 62; *The Smolensk Archives*, vol. 252, p. 51.

8. "Besposcadno gromit'...," in *Pravda*, June 5, 1937, p. 1; P. Sincov, "Dela

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to either "their" apparatus, the loyal personnel that the regional leaders brought with them when transferred, or the "indigenous" cadres who had been functioning in the same place and were implicated in almost every type of activity now being denounced as "subversive machinations."[9] Among the latter, more than 3,000 secretaries in local administrations, whose removal by members of the party organization was statutorily impossible until the spring of 1937, were henceforth considered potential accomplices in all kinds of "hostile maneuvers." So many little despots with their cliques, they were capable of terrorizing or blackmailing the best of the local party members according to the needs of the moment.[10] Above them stood the first secretaries of 89 regional administrations who were often members or assistants of the Central Committee. They behaved like overlords: their names were immortalized by different toponyms, their portraits adorned public places in their "fiefdoms," their statements were cited respectfully on great occasions, and even their children were able to terrorize their teachers with impunity.[11]

Of course, it was not easy to depose such potentates or to convince them to follow the promoters of the radical line. Even after the new campaign was launched in a particular region, the tangled network of complicities, loyalties, animosities and responsibilities made it difficult to touch certain people, let alone deal with the real causes of the apparatus' chronic malfunctioning.[12] Of particular significance are the minutes of several series of meetings within the leadership of a district as well as within the regional Department of Finances, the regional court, a police station and a construction site; meetings where, sometimes under tumultuous circumstances, the cases of a number of "enemies" and their "acolytes" (both conscious and involuntary) were examined, resulting in their expulsion.[13]

These assemblies were preceded by a plenary session of the regional leadership under the direct pressure of those who momentarily had the upper hand in the Central Committee.[14] Lower echelon meetings began prudently

Krasnojarskogo Krajkoma," *Pravda*, July 24, 1937, p. 1; Lzivye Kljatvy. . .," *Pravda*, September 2, 1937, p. 3; A. Aleksandrovskij, "Sobr. Partaktiva Taskenta," *Pravda*, September 11, 1937, p. 6; M. Kotljarov, "Dela Vragov Armjanskogo Naroda," *Pravda*, September 28, 1937, p. 2; *Bolshevik*, n. 13 (1937), pp. 76, 79; *Bolshevik*, n. 14 (1937), pp. 5-8; *Bolshevik*, n. 16 (1937), p. 64; *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo*, n. 15 (1937), pp. 42-43.

9. "Ne Uscemljat' Prav Clena Partiil," *Pravda*, March 7, 1937, p. 1; I.V. Stalin, *Socinenija*, t. 1 (XIV), R. McNeal, ed. (Stanford, 1967), pp. 230-231.

10. On the behavior of a typical local secretary, see *The Smolensk Archives*, vol. III, pp. 2-66.

11. P. Sincov, "Porocnoe Vospitanie," *Pravda*, May 9, 1937, p. 6; "Lzivye. . .," *art.cit.*, *Pravda*, September 2, 1937, p. 3; *The Smolensk Archives*, vol. 103, pp. 127, 134; *The Smolensk Archives*, vol. 111, p. 58; *The Smolensk Archives*, vol 321, p. 91.

12. News releases enable us to follow the propagation of the new offensive only sporadically. *The Smolensk Archives*, however, yield invaluable materials that show clearly the orientation that the "radical" initiative of the summer of 1937 finally took.

13. Thus, one such trial resulted in the expulsion of the first secretary, the president of the Soviet and the chief of police of one district. In other cases, the victims were two municipal Soviets, the vice-president and some magistrates of the regional court.

14. In one of these assemblies, Kaganovic himself finally "discovered" the "systematic subversive work" of the first secretary of the region, Rumjancev, an old Bolshevik and member of the Central Committee, and of many of his collaborators.

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with eloquent prosecution speeches against regional dignitaries who had just been "unmasked" so that all "hostile plots" could be attributed to them. But the new regional authorities were hounded by "radicals" from the center, so that they in turn tried to intimidate their subordinates. They finally understood that they had to clear themselves by sacrificing a few of their colleagues who were most deeply implicated, unpopular or vulnerable. This gave rise to the collective revelation of all sorts of "enemies," among cadres with dubious associations or political pasts, or among persons whose posts *a priori* left them open to suspicion of having participated in "subversive intrigues." As the documents show, each time higher authorities pressed them to "unmask" those responsible for the malfunctioning of their administration, they expelled others, often with considerable remorse.

Among these "subversive elements" there may have been numerous persons who were probably implicated in the disorganization of governmental mechanisms. Yet, all cadres had, in some way or other, something to do with the "hostile plots," if only by way of personal or official connections with their supposed authors, or through some unclear point in the latter's biography, or in that of their associates or ancestors. It became permissible to use any of these excuses when it was absolutely necessary to find a "well camouflaged secret agent." It also became necessary to discover ever new subversives since obviously the apparatus was teeming with them. The situation was complicated by the fact that admission to the party had been practically suspended since 1933 and, according to the statutes, party leaders had to have a certain degree of seniority. No newly promoted man could thus be above suspicion. This made it all the easier to find people to expel at the slightest pressure from higher bodies.

A chaotic struggle of each against all thus became inevitable. Terrified top functionaries began bombarding their subordinates with orders demanding explicitly, under threat of expulsion from the party or of prosecution, the performance of tasks that had, for example, proved impossible in the past.[15] It is unlikely that this dangerous "radicalization" of administrative methods could ever have removed all obstacles to the regular functioning of the apparatus or increased the administrators' skills. In fact, it forced each echelon to apply the same methods on lower echelons.

Thus, wanting to display "exemplary vigilance" and enthusiastic participation in the "struggle against enemies," cadres began to unmask all sorts of "subversive elements" among subordinates in the very agencies or administrative units they directed.[16] For example, toward the fall of 1937 a local police chief (RONKVD) of the Smolensk region, on trial for having cooperated with his district's party leadership in their manipulations, defended himself by recalling that his commissariat had arrested "a hundred and twenty criminal and anti-Soviet elements. . . ." To be sure, not everyone could present

15. *Ti Smolensk Archives*, vol. 238, pp.279-282, 315, 316; see also *The Smolensk Archives*, vol. 111, p. 177.

16. Cf. *The Smolensk Archives*, vol. 322, p. 64.

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such an exemplary record. But it was always possible to denounce almost anyone to the party or the NKVD — both of which were quickly inundated with countless denunciations[17] — or to purge the institutions under one's own jurisdiction. The crimes attributed to six persons dismissed from a local tax office is typical: five of them had the misfortune of either having been acquainted with "suspects" or expelled from the party in the distant past; and the sixth, the office cleaning woman, was declared "an enemy of the kolkhoz system having close relations with the church." Persons with "dubious" pasts were purged from the factories and kolkhozes, and one peasant was found guilty owing to his "religious convictions and his long beard."[18]

The punishment of some hated potentates inevitably aroused malicious joy in ordinary citizens or, respectively, a certain sympathy toward those who wanted energetic measures against unpopular bosses. Yet, the deflective maneuvers from above soon threatened to nullify the propaganda effect of the "radical offensive." Unlike the reelection campaign within the party, this offensive no longer involved the militants' participation. Most expulsion meetings took place within administrations or in cells of administrative, economic or political agencies, whose members were almost always party cadres. Rank and file members, whose indignant attacks threatened to transform the spring elections into open social conflict, were excluded from these meetings. Leadership personnel, under these conditions, had at their disposal a supplementary margin in which to maneuver. It is not surprising that the promoters of the crusade against the "enemies" found themselves progressively isolated, as can be seen by certain warnings in Pravda.[19] Despite the spreading of the offensive throughout the country, it soon became clear that the confusion no longer spared even the top leadership.

The first signs of this are seen in the remarkable indecisiveness concerning punitive legislation. It seems that the juridical agencies hesitated in applying the "law of December 1934" (the law used in the trial of the Red Army officer

17. M. Kol'cov, "O Izerazoblaciteljah i Klevetnikah," *Pravda,* January 17, 1938, p. 2; "Res. Plenuma C.K. V.K.P. (b) Delat' Dostoeniem...," *Pravda,* January 22, 1938, p. 1; P. Licov, "Vjazemskie Perestrahovsciki," *Pravda,* January 26, 1938, p. 2; "Bol's.stil' Raboty...," Pravda', February 7, 1938, p. 1; N. Kuzovkin, "'Razoblacitel' Gronskij," *Pravda,* April 8, 1938, p. 6; "Na Kievskoj Obl. Partkonf.," *Pravda,* June 3, 1938, p. 3; P. Grinev, "Rk.ne Bor'juscejsja s Klevetnikami," *Pravda,* August 31, 1938, p. 2; *Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporjazenij Raboce Krestjanskovo Pravitelstva* (1938), p. 116; *XVII. S'ezd V.K.P.(b)* (Moscow, 1939), p. 595.

18. *Ibid.,* pp. 13, 24, 35, 68-69; N. Kuzovkin, "Prestupnoe Otnosenie k Kolhozniku," *Pravda,* June 21, 1938, p. 4. Cf. also *The Smolensk Archives,* vol. 516, p. 9.

19. "It is astonishing that many party organizations...have drawn no lessons from recent events.... Everything that is defective and rotten in the party apparatus must be removed. The petty bourgeois swamp that had developed in certain organizations...must be swept out. We have a good number of functionaries who are not able to unmask and annihilate the enemies resolutely and totally.... It is impossible to keep such people in the party apparatus.... In a number of places new people are promoted slowly and timidly...by continuing to prefer the circle of trusted people, the circle of the narrow 'little family,'" in "Smellee Vydvigat' Molodye Partkadry," *Pravda,* August 17, 1937. "The Bolshevik's moral obligation whether in the party or outside...is...to exterminate the enemies of the people, the diversionists, the spies and their accomplices.... Socialist humanism entails intransigence, an unrelenting struggle free of all petty bourgeois sentimentalism toward the enemies of the Revolution," in "Moral'nyj Oblik Bol'sevika," *Pravda,* September 20, 1937, p. 1.

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corps), since a decree of the central executive committee on September 14, 1937 had extended its scope beyond its original application solely to cases of conspiracy and terrorism.[20] In its new formulation, the law became applicable to all cases of "sabotage and counterrevolutionary diversion." It provided for the filing of charges the day before the trial, prohibited any appeals and sanctioned the "execution of capital punishment (by firing squad) immediately after the condemned person's appeal for pardon had been refused."[21]

Less than three weeks later, another decree by the same supreme organ somewhat contradicting the energetic measures of the "September 14 law" was passed concerning the same subject. It must have been considered very important, for it was even published in the daily press. Dated October 2 and superceeding existing legislation whereby those guilty of espionage, sabotage and diversion had to be sentenced either to a maximum of ten years in prison or to death, the new decree sanctioned prison sentences of up to 25 years "for the future struggle against crimes of this kind and in order to reserve to the court the discretion to condemn the guilty parties not only to capital punishment (by firing squad) but also to imprisonment for more prolonged periods."[22] Since a 1936 decree had already legalized the imprisonment of "persons convicted of the most dangerous crimes,"[23] it is likely that the enactment of the new "law of October 2" was at least partly precipitated by the excessive zeal of certain judiciary bodies in applying the decree of September 14, who were concerned to avoid potential accusations of "petty bourgeois sentimentalism" or "lack of intransigence."

Other signs lead one to think that there was a lack of unanimity in high places concerning the punishment of "enemies." A new edition of the penal code published in November 1937 but, according to its subtitle, comprising only changes made prior to June 1, contained the September 14 decree.[24] In December, however, another official collection of laws appeared which, as its subtitle stated, contained all additions to laws prior to October 15. Actually, it even included a decree of October 17 but made no mention of the "September 14 law."[25] Again it should be pointed out that, at least in theory, no law could be applied before its ratification by the executive central committees of the federated and autonomous republics. But the September 14 decree was ratified in the Russian Federation, the most important republic, only five months after its enactment.[26]

The indecisiveness concerning punitive legislation is not the only indication of controversy within the country's leadership. While all summer long

20. "O Vnesenii Izmenenij v Dejstvujuscie U.P.K. Sojuznyh Resp.," *Pravda*, December 5, 1934, p. 1; *Ugolvno-Processual'nyj Kodeks R.S.F.S.R.* (Moscow, 1956), p. 118.
21. *Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporjazenij Raboce Krestjanskovo Pravitelstva* (1937), p. 557.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 613-614; *Pravda*, October 3, 1937, p. 3.
23. *Ugolovnyj Kodeks R.S.F.S.R.* (Moscow, 1953), p. 83.
24. *Ugolvno-Processual'nyj Kodeks R.S.F.S.R.* (Moscow, 1937), p. 187.
25. *Dopolnenija k Kodeksam, doc.cit.*, p. 5.
26. *Ugolvno-Processual'nyj Kodeks R.S.F.S.R.* (Moscow, 1956), p. 119; *Ugolvnyj Kodeks R.S.F.S.R.* (Moscow, 1953), p. 91.

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articles in the central press were unanimous in their appeals for an uncompromising struggle against the "enemies," during the first weeks of autumn attentive readers could detect the appearance of conflicting views. It had to do with the "struggle against saboteurs" in industry and transportation which, according to most viewpoints, had to be vigorously pursued.[27] Suddenly, instead of the usual invitations to "liquidate the consequences of sabotage," an editorial in *Pravda* announced something very different from the "radical" appeals: a "pardon" to the administrators of heavy industry in case of significant improvements in their branch, which had been in complete disarray since the beginning of the purges.[28] A few days later, the Moscow party leadership, in one of the country's most heavily industrialized regions, decided to reintroduce the Stakhanovist movement. It decreed that the new campaign should contribute to the rationalization of production and to the strengthening of management and discipline in the factories.[29]

The original introduction of the Stakhanovist movement during the first months of 1936 was the last "peaceful" test of strength within the apparatus. Far from achieving the promoters' original plan to put both management and employees to work and under discipline, it had resulted in the disorganization of the national economy, the intensification of the conflicts within the state-party and the uncontrollable proliferation of arbitrary acts and anti-labor measures,[30] of which it had become, in a sense, the symbol. Thus, the first futile efforts to revitalize the campaign, coupled with the announcement of elections in the spring of 1937, were soon denounced by the "radicals" as "subversive maneuvers."[31] It is not surprising that, shortly after the enactment of the Moscow decree, *Pravda* denounced as "sabotage" the concealment of mediocre work results in the factories behind the doctored records of some Stakhanovist stars.[32]

Four days later, however, another *Pravda* editorial saw no reason to object to the sudden new outbreak of Stakhanovist enthusiasm on the part of the local Moscow leadership. Quite the contrary, praising the recent reorganization of light industry, the article stressed that the introduction of work in three shifts as well as the revision of norms and wage increases for certain

27. "Vypusk Avtomasin Za 2, Sentjabrja," *Pravda*, September 4, 1937, p. 6; "Navesti Porjadok v Avtozavodah" *Pravda*, September 5, 1937, p. 6; "O Rukovodstve Glavuglja i Ego Apparate," *Pravda*, September 13, 1937, p. 1; "K Cemu Privodit Vzaimnaja Amnistija," *Pravda*, September 27, 1937, p. 3; A. Samojlov and N. Bezrukov, "O 'Milliarderah'...," *Pravda*, October 7, 1937, p. 3; A. Samojlov, "Prisli Novye Direktora," *Pravda*, October 8, 1937, p. 3.

28. "Bol's Resenije Orgvoprosov," *Pravda*, August 25, 1937, p. 1; for the confusion in other branches, cf. for example "Vagonov v Sutki," *Pravda*, October 6, 1937, p. 1; "Vstretim Vybory...," *Pravda*, October 25, 1937, n. 16, p. 19.

29. *Bor'ba Partii za Socialisticeskuju Rekonstrukciju 1933-1937* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 477-478.

30. Cf. my "Héros du Travail et Commandants de la Production: La Campagne Stakhanoviste et les Stratégies Fractionnelles en U.R.S.S. (1935-1936)," in *Recherches*, n. 32-33 (1978).

31. *Bolshevik*, nos. 5-6 (1937), pp. 38-39; Stalin, *op.cit.*, pp. 216-217.

32. "Dostojno Vstretim XX. Godovscinu Oktjabrja," *Pravda*, September 13, 1937, p. 1.

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categories of workers, including engineers and technicians — all potential "saboteurs" — would provide new impetus to the Stakhanovist movement.[33] Not a word was said of the "radical" panacea: the firing of management personnel and the hunt for "enemies." Instead, the text shows that, in this instance, the modification of the management principles of an entire industrial branch was decided by the Council of People's Commissars, i.e., the government alone, without the usual endorsement of the Central Committee.

Though vehement calls for energetic disciplinary measures against the industrial administrators continued, the new interpretation of the slogan "to liquidate the consequences of sabotage" began to appear even in articles containing "radical" proposals.[34] But obviously, this reinterpretation was irreconcilable with an all-out "struggle against enemies." How could those who had to reorganize production and combat "petty bourgeois attitudes toward work" attributed to workers (who were actually encouraged to disobedience and absenteeism owing to fear of the cadres taking unpopular measures)[35] have done so under the permanent threat of being "unmasked" as subversive agents?

The very possibility of an amnesty was the real stake in the struggle between advocates and opponents of a new Stakhanovist campaign, and nothing shows better the solidity of the pro-Stakhanovist position than the fact that its supporters were backed by the government and the Moscow region's party leadership. Recruited, no doubt, from among the last remnants of the highly placed cadre defenders, who were probably spared by having temporarily rallied to promoters of the "hard line," recruited also from among those "radicals" who recognized the impasse and ultimate failure of the purging campaign, they tried to turn the chaos to their advantage. The fact that they could not sketch out their position before the chain reaction of purge meetings was unleashed in the last recalcitrant regions is perhaps evidence of the strategic advantages maintained by their adversaries. Yet, the advocates of lenient treatment for the cadres felt sufficiently strong to sponsor yet another campaign — one that could succeed only with the concurrence of the regional and local party apparatus. This campaign centered on the elections to both houses of the Supreme Soviet.[36] These could not have been organized without granting some relief to functionaries. The decision of the October plenary session of the Central Committee to prescribe elections for December 12 thus meant that the "amnesty" champions had won. This was, to be sure, only a tactical success, for the promotion of a new candidate member to the Politburo during the course of the same meeting indicates a precarious balance of forces. The new member was the head of the NKVD, N.I. Ezov, whose apparatus was

33. "Zabota Partii o Nuzdah Naselenija," *Pravda*, September 17, 1937, p. 1.

34. Cf. for example, *Bolshevik*, n. 19 (1937), p. 5.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-7. On ever bolder workers' insubordination, cf. "Navesti Porgadok...," *Pravda*, April 29, 1937, p. 1; D. Vadimov, "V Donbasse Sabotirujut Bor'bu s Progulami," *Pravda*, May 23, 1937, p. 6; "Bol's.samokrit. I Trudovaja Disciplina," *Pravda*, June 24, 1937, p. 1; "Ugol'siki i Metallurgi...," *Pravda*, August 14, 1937, p. 1; "Esce Raz...," *Pravda*, August 21, 1937, p. 2; "Bol's.resenie...," *Pravda*, August 25, 1937, p. 1; A. Vinnikov, "Proizvoditel' Nost' Truda, Normy Vyrabotki i Zarplaty," *Pravda*, October 5, 1937, p. 2; *Bolshevik*, n. 16 (1937), p. 19; *Bolshevik*, n. 19 (1937), p. 7.

36. Cf. the editorials of October 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 in *Pravda*, p. 1.

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serving to fulfill more ambiguous functions throughout the course of the increasingly contradictory attempts to remedy the state-party disorder. Nonetheless, one should not underestimate the importance of the fact that the opponents of the "radicals" succeeded in having a nationwide initiative ratified.

The electoral campaign was actually quite uninteresting. It revealed nothing more than the hysterical confusion and panic characteristic of the great majority of cadres. The complex maneuvers of the two opposing factions threatened the breathing spell that the elections were supposed to provide for the apparatus. In fact, even candidacy did not entail immunity.[37] Of the 1143 registered candidates (one per electoral district), 54 simply disappeared on election day and were replaced, without explanation, by unknowns. Among these missing candidates were one of the government's vice-presidents, eleven regional secretaries, ten presidents of regional Soviets and eight highly placed army officers. It would be futile to try to reconstruct the causes for most of these dismissals. Available sources recount only the complicated context of the strategic operations or, at best, provide an idea of the general tenor of the conjunctural accusations against this or that dignitary. There was ample opportunity for both sides to harvest the heads of their adversaries, and the piling up of several initiatives and actions, quickly thwarted, diverted or recuperated at all levels of the administration, was such as to obscure the true ins and outs of most of the semi-personal clashes. What the sources do indicate, however, are the contours of the maneuvers which finally led to the crisis "resolution." They constitute, it is true, only a tiny part of the immense iceberg of chaotic manipulations, submerged in the ocean of documents frozen in the Soviet archives.[38] But they reveal the relation of forces within the state-party's summit at a moment when — and this is rare in Soviet history — the gravity of the crisis' stakes forced the majority of leaders to openly choose sides.

Nothing is easier than to mistake Stalin's true role in the internal struggles of the apparatus. The fact that his name was invariably invoked by all those who needed to legitimate whatever tortuous maneuver, gives the impression that he was the initiator of most of these actions throughout the country. A close examination of available sources, however, shows this to be false. Far from having been the prime mover of the increasingly convulsive passage to civil war within the state-party, Stalin was merely the leading figure of one of the conflicting tendencies, and sometimes in quite a disadvantageous position.

Immediately following the June 1936 plenary session, the "enemies," who had not been mentioned for about six months, were suddenly "rediscovered," and the first "open hostilities" exploded within the apparatus. The

37. The man in question, Ezov, was the head of the NKVD, whose apparatus had been engaged in equivocal functions throughout the increasingly contradictory efforts to remedy disorders in the state-party.

38. *Bjulleten' Oppozicii*, n. 62-63, a monthly publication of the Trotskyist opposition (Paris, 1938), pp. 21-22.

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official communique, published the day after the session, stated that Stalin had spoken on two occasions: first, to report on the drafting of a new constitution and, second, as the author of "critical recommendations" during a particularly thorny discussion concerning the rehabilitation of persons wrongly expelled from the party during the three purges from 1933 to 1936.[39] In the course of this discussion, he probably stressed the purges' tendency to eliminate scapegoats rather than the real "enemies" who now had to be fought. While the weeks following this crucial plenary session were marked by a spectacular hunt for old oppositionists and by the first "Great Moscow Trial," they also saw an unsuccessful attempt to mobilize the population for a "national discussion" of local problems to aid in the drafting of the Constitution.[40]

Thus, the advocates of the erring cadres succeeded in taking the initiative right after the June 1936 plenary session. As they undoubtedly would have had recourse to the official authority *par excellence* had his speeches legitimated an all-out attack on ex-opponents, it can be inferred from the failure to publish these two texts of Stalin that he proposed something altogether different. These speeches remained unpublished even when the "radicals" succeeded in taking the upper hand, and they were never mentioned in what followed. This seems to indicate that by mid-autumn of 1937, the "Leader's" initial suggestions had already lost their relevance for his faction, i.e., the advocates of a strict control of cadres. But it is not accidental that the official communique mentioned the two speeches: those who had them mentioned no doubt intended to exploit them. Clearly, they were champions of the "radical line," but the initiative taken by their adversaries prevented them from using their chief's proposals. The abortive "national discussion" had probably something to do with these texts. But what finally made every subsequent reference to Stalin's speeches useless or impossible was probably the sudden "rediscovery of the enemies," — an operation that began three days after publication of the communique.[41] It is therefore not impossible that Stalin's report and "critical recommendations" contained a radically different program from the one launched suddenly, before that contained in Stalin's speech could be exposed. Once the die was cast, the "radicals" had no choice but to adopt their adversaries' slogans and methods: to reinterpret the term "enemy," to begin "their" trials and to seek to mobilize allies under disastrously ambiguous slogans. Everything leads one to believe that their conception of "enemies" and of the requisite strategy for combatting them was, at bottom, far from the one

39. *The Smolensk Archives* contain extremely few documents on the last trimester of 1937 and practically nothing on the previous period.

40. "Informacionnoe Soobscenie. . . ," in *Pravda,* June 5, 1936, p. 1; *Bolshevik*, n. 13 (1936), p. 9; *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo*, n. 15 (1936), p. 36; *The Smolensk Archives,* vol. 384, p. 277; cf. also P.S. Popovic. "Voprosy Organizacionno-Partijno n Raboty v Gody Vtoro j Pjatiletke," in *Iz Istorii Bor'by Partii za Postroenie Socializma v SSSR* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 266-267. This report must not be confused with the famous speech concerning the new Constitution, delivered in November, 1936.

41. For the first mention of "enemies" formerly in the opposition, cf. "Protiv Zaznajstva i Samoouspokoennosti," in *Pravda,* June 8, 1936, p. 1.

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that their rival's stratagems forced them to adopt. With the necessary transformations implemented, their leader, in two famous diatribes delivered at the plenary session of March 1937, ranted about the "struggle against the enemies of the people," the "spies," the "saboteurs on foreign pay" and their protectors in the party apparatus. He did not often speak in public and the publication of his works was equally rare. So it is not surprising that he made no statement for more than eight months after this important session. Yet it seems strange that when he broke this silence in a public speech at the end of October, the press merely summarized the short talk delivered before 400 notable leaders of heavy industry. Even more strange, the few statements reported were in sharp disagreement with the official interpretation furnished by a *Pravda* editorial.

Announcing in advance that his address would be "original and unusual," Stalin spoke of the management cadres of industry: "In general, it must be said of leading cadres that, unfortunately, they do not always understand to what height history has elevated them within the Soviet system. They do not always understand that to be leading cadres in the Soviet economy, under our conditions, is a great honor and a great esteem: a great confidence of the working class, the people. In the old days, the days of capitalism, economic leaders, all directors, managers, supervisors, foremen, were considered capitalists watchdogs. The people hated them as enemies, for they believed that they directed the economy in the interests of the capitalists. However, in our Soviet system, the economic leaders have every possibility of enjoying the confidence and affection of the people, for they direct the economy not for the profits of a handful of capitalists, but in the interests of the working class, in the interest of the entire people. That is why the title of manager is a high title and to be a manager in our Soviet conditions is a great honor in the eyes of the people. The confidence of the people in leading cadres is a great thing, comrades. Managers come and go, but the people remain. Only the people is immortal. Everything else is transitory. That is why it is necessary to appreciate the people's confidence."[42]

The part of Stalin's speech quoted by the press makes it evident that Stalin had spoken in the name of those who were not altogether happy with the activity of the incumbent leading cadres. Thus, it is all the more remarkable that the same number of *Pravda* in which the speech was reported dedicated an editorial to the speech under the following headline: "The Soviet Manager has the Confidence of the People." The editorial states: "The enterprises are on the whole purged of hostile agents.... Success now depends mainly on the work of the economic commanders.... The manager, under Soviet conditions, receives a great honor — he has the confidence of the working class, of all the people.... The weakness of one-man management, the conciliatory attitude towards the violation of work discipline, and the disarray in the economic management, all this is at the expense of the workers' and peasants' socialist state... The duty of all honest Soviet managers is to

42. Stalin, *op.cit.*, pp. 253-254.

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draw serious lessons from the denunciation and extirpation of enemies. If they do all their work with Bolshevik effectiveness and political vigilance, if they are a perspicacious sentinel for the socialist economy, checking cadres, courageously promoting young, talented, politically reliable people — then the existence of fascist mercenaries will become impossible.... The Soviet government and the party provide massive support to managers, giving them enormous power and doing everything possible to strengthen their authority."[43]

While Stalin stated that the incumbent leading cadres did not necessarily deserve the "confidence of the people," the interpretation of his speech maintained that they did and even indicated that the "enemies" still concealed in the industrial hierarchy were located at lower echelons. According to the editorial, it was necessary to set management straight, to rely on young uncompromised specialists, and to reenforce work discipline. Thus, the position of cadres was to be restored. Stalin's speech constituted a new attack on the authority of the managing directors, however "momentary," whereas his interpreters pleaded for stability and tried to assure the incumbent leading cadres that the central leadership was endeavouring to take the measures necessary for reestablishing their dangerously shaken authority. Soon after this first open expression of a serious difference of opinion at the top, there appeared a series of contradictory statements even more clearly revealing a tug-of-war at the top. According to certain official statements, the "enemies" had already been annihilated, the current managers were worthy of confidence, and if there were still "hostile acts," they were no longer attributable to the cadres' "subversive work." Quite the contrary, their competent cooperation was necessary to eliminate the disorder from which these accidents resulted.[44] Other statements, however, attracted attention to a systematic "subversive activity" and emphasized that "the unrelenting extirpation of remaining saboteur-elements" was the "necessary condition" for the vitality of the national economy. They emphasized that "enemies" could exist even among leading functionaries and that their work ought to be judged from the viewpoint of their political qualities and, above all, in terms of their "vigilance."[45]

Others insisted on the possibility of repairing the economy by revitalizing the Stakhanovist movement; administrative and technical cadres were exhorted to take the lead in the Stakhanovist upsurge to assure labor discipline."[46] This was not without opposition, as a *Pravda* editorial testifies: "The rotten theory that Stakhanovists alone can overcome sabotage has been launched by the

43. "Sovetskij Hozjajstvennik Oblecen Doveriem Naroda," *Pravda,* October 31, 137, p. 1.

44. "Vstretim Vybory...," *Pravda,* October 25, 1937, p. 1; "Sov. Hozjajstvennik...," *Pravda,* October 31, 1937, p. 1; "Strana Zdet ot Metallurgov Bol'sevistskih del," *Pravda,* November 1, 1937, p. 1; *Bolshevik,* n. 22 (1937), p. 14.

45. "Stahanovskoe Dvizenie Rastet i Pobezdaet," *Pravda,* November 14, 1937, p. 1; "Nasej Rodine Nuzno Bol'se Medil," *Pravda,* November 27, 1937, p. 1; "Plan Moguscestva Strany...," *Pravda,* November 30, 1937, p. 1.

46. "Vstretim Vybory...," *Pravda,* October 25, 1937, p. 1. "Stalinskaja Dekada Stahanovskih Rekordov," *Pravda,* October 25, 1937, p. 1. "Stalinskaja Dekada Stahanovskih Rekordov," *Pravda,* December 3, 1937, p. 1; *Bolshevik,* n. 22 (1937), p. 14.

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enemy in the hope of weakening vigilance and diverting the relentless attack of the dictatorship of the working class from the saboteurs."[47] Yet, despite such warnings, other editorials and articles called for the launching of a new "movement of Stakhanovist records," and the government and its head, Molotov, recommended Stakhanovism as a remedy for lack of labor discipline and organization.[48]

Short of a stop to the "struggle against the enemies," no attempt at "partial rehabilitation" offered sufficient guarantees to the cadres. Thus, some signal in this direction had to be given. Profiting from the electoral campaign, some highly placed leaders, members of the Central Committee and the Politburo (Molotov, Kaganövich, Zdhanov, Voroshilov, Andreev, Chabar, Khrushchev and Malenkov) announced a program equivalent to a "partial amnesty." They advocated this program, no doubt while organizing their forces; and nothing shows better how strong their positions had become than the fact that the electoral address of the Central Committee incorporated their essential features.

Evidently, the "partial amnesty platform" could be propagated only within the framework of the official terminology of the "fight against saboteurs." Moreover, it is the manifestly discordant electoral speeches of a handful of leaders which attracted attention to the novelty of the propositions put foreward within the packaging of yet another purge. But the reach of these propositions stands out no less clearly, for the majority of the electoral speeches stated that the "enemies" had already been defeated, and the head of the government went so far as to declare that they had been "totally crushed."[49] Even if a few "camouflaged enemies" were still in hiding, they were completely isolated from the Soviet people united around the party and the government. Thus only insignificant remnants ought to be discovered and punished by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). The heroic vigilance of this agency and the competent management of its head, Ezov, nick-named "the people's favorite," received unanimous praise from the "amnesty" proponents. As for the tasks of the future, they stressed the need to strengthen the national economy. But they especially sought to show the role that the state apparatus ought to play in view of the imminent danger of war, something never mentioned till then. The primary duty was thus to strengthen the entire state apparatus.[50]

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47. "Stahanovskoe Dvizenie Rastet i Pobezdaet," *Pravda,* November 13, 1937, p. 1.

48. "Stalinskaja Dekada...," *Pravda,* December 3, 1937, p. 1; "Obrascenie...," *Pravda,* December 18, 1937, p. 1; "Zasedanie S.N.K. S.S.S.R.," *Pravda,* November 12, 1937, p. 4; *Bolshevik,* n. 22 (1937), p. 14.

49. "Ob Izbiratel'nom Bloke...," *Pravda,* December 9, 1937, p. 1.

50. "Na Predvybornom Mitinge...," (Rec t. N.S. Hrusceva), *Pravda,* December 2, 1937, p. 2; "Rec Kandidata... t. G.M. Malenkova," *Pravda,* December 4, 1937, p. 3; "Obrascenie C.K. V.K.P.(b)..., *Pravda,* December 7, 1937, p. 1; "Rec t. K.E. Vorosilova," *Pravda,* December 8, 1937, p. 1; "Rec t. V.J. Cubarja," *ibid.,* p. 2; "Ob Izibiratel'nom Bloke...," *Pravda,* December 9, 1937, pp. 1-2; "Rec t. L.M. Kaganovica," *Pravda,* December 10, 1937, pp. 1-2; "Rec t. A.A. Zdanova," *Pravda,* December 11, 1937, p. 1; "Rec t. A.A. Andreeva," *ibid.,* p. 3; "Rec Marsala S.S.S.R., t. A.I. Egorova et Rec t. A.N. Poskrebyseva," *ibid.,* p. 4.

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The novelty of this "partial amnesty platform" consisted in its promoters' indirect pleading for an end to the purge. Since the consolidation of the apparatus was declared the central task, logically its functionaries had to be secure in their positions and encouraged to go about their daily work, instead of "unmasking saboteurs." "Vigilance" thus ceased to be the criterion of the cadres' political trustworthiness, especially since the duty of "extirpating the remaining enemies" was, for the first time, assigned exclusively to the police. For the majority of cadres, it is likely that the "platform" promised a return to the pre-1936 status quo, with all its possibilities of free maneuvering.

The will to stop the purge campaign and to transfer its functions to the police translates into a new image of the "enemy" in the speeches of the "partial amnesty" advocates. This image had served previously to popularize, orient and justify more or less public campaigns; by indicating that the "hostile elements" were hidden among the functionaries of the state apparatus, the image became both urgent and concrete. On the contrary, the speeches of the advocates of a "police purge" — i.e., a real end to the purge — put forth the vague picture of "Trotskyist-Bukharinist spies" in the pay of foreign powers, cornered, isolated and especially without traits that would make it possible to locate them in Soviet society. These speeches are characterized not only by the absence of concrete descriptions of the "enemies," but also by careful omission of any allusion to defects, however minimal, in the state apparatus.

Conversely, it follows that the few central leaders whose electoral speeches contained reminders of defects in the apparatus, a more concrete image of the "enemy," as well as the suggestion that one use other than police methods to eliminate them, spoke in the name of other basic options. It seems that the opposing faction tried to prevent the publication of their proposals, but these were nonetheless quite visible because they were so different from the almost uniform texts of the "partial amnesty" champions. It is on this monotonous backdrop that, for example, the allusion to the deputies' revocability — a theme that no "moderate" orator would evoke — strikes a notable discord in the electoral address of M.F. Skirjatov, the vice-president of the Party Control Commission. Similarly, a suggestion by Kalinin, President of the Central Executive Committee (chief of state), clearly contained a "dissident" note with respect to the "police purge": "Well, comrades, having enormous successes in our construction, we must not forget... the indispensable increase of vigilance.... There are more enemies than you suppose.... Without a doubt we are struggling against the enemies.... I have a great deal of information showing that in the factories workers are helping to unmask and unmasking these enemies. But, comrades, in discovering the first, the second and the third enemy, it is impossible to say that the last enemy has been caught.... The enemies have to be opposed by an organized, powerful proletarian vigilance of the broadest masses — from factory workers to housewives. The enemy must be made to feel the heat, must feel a hostile atmosphere wherever he goes. The creation of such an atmosphere, the

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struggle against enemies, vigilance — this is one of the forms of socialist construction."[51]

Contrary to the line of the opposing camp, the chief of state was speaking for a group for whom there was something incomparably more important than a police crackdown on practically vanquished "hostile elements." They seemed to want to broaden the internal conflict of the apparatus into a sort of generalized, even permanently institutionalized social conflict. Certainly, the repercussions of such a mobilization could have been dangerous for, if carried to an extreme, it would have implied a very concrete definition of "enemy" — a definition that would have risked exposing the organic connection between most of the "hostile activities" and the socio-political relations and mechanisms that victimized the masses. And yet, in spite of this pitfall, it seems that there was once again an attempt to actualize this image of the "enemy." The press published word by word the text of the central leaders' electoral speeches. It therefore cannot be an accident that the passage in which the main and most competent specialist in the hunt for "enemies," the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, painted the picture of the "hostile elements" was practically suppressed in the newspapers. While all the rest of his speech was printed word for word, this probably crucial part of the text was replaced by a summary in the spirit of the "moderate" line. "Then analyzing the history of the party's struggle against the Trotskyist-Zinovievist-Bukharinist gang, Comrade Ezov gives a profound characterization of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist gang in the service of the bourgeoisie. . . ."[52] Had the head of the NKVD limited himself to repeating the platitudes of the "amnesty" advocates, the press probably would not have resorted to such revealing censorship. One is thus led to believe that the passage "purged" from the speech of N.I. Ezov (whose exemplary vigilance otherwise received much praise from the campaign's orators) contained a description of the "enemies" quite different from the stereotype substituted in its place.

This truncated text appeared on the last day of the electoral campaign, and its mutilation somehow symbolizes the consolidation of the stop-the-purge positions and the isolation of the most radical champions of the radical disciplining of the apparatus. Yet, the latter still had considerable strength and their cause did not seem definitively lost. One proof is that Stalin at the same moment rallied to their minority opinion. Speaking on December 11, the same day that Ezov's mutilated speech appeared, the supposedly most powerful man among USSR leaders had to do his best to ward off his adversaries' threat of censorship. Accordingly, it was out of the question for him to enter into an open polemic with their thesis. Nonetheless, his electoral address was an important maneuver in the crisis. After evoking, ironically, how unsurpassably instructive his colleagues' speeches had been, Stalin came to the point. He praised the USSR's electoral system where, unlike capitalist

51. "Rec t. M.I. Kalinina," *Pravda,* November 27, 1937, p. 2.

52. "Rec t. N.I. Ezova," *Pravda,* December 11, 1937, p. 2; see also *Izvestija,* December 11, 1937, p. 1.

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countries, the leaders were "men of the people," and finally he dealt with the problem troubling the divided apparatus of the state-party: "Now, comrades, I would like to give you a piece of advice, the advice of the parliamentary candidate to his electors. . . . In capitalist countries, there are certain original [and] I would say quite strange relations between candidates and voters. During elections the candidates make advances to the voters; immediately after the elections, when the candidates have become deputies, the relations change radically. Instead of deputies depending on voters, they suddenly are completely independent. . . . [The deputies] can move from one camp to the other; he can get involved in certain machinations of a not entirely acceptable nature; he can do whatever sommersaults he wants to — he is independent. Can such relations be considered normal? By no means, comrades. Our Constitution has taken this circumstance into consideration by promulgating a law giving the voters the right to recall their delegates before their term ends if they begin to play tricks, if they leave the correct path, if they forget their dependence on the people, the voters. . . . The deputy must realize that he is the people's servant, its envoy to the Supreme Soviet, and he is obliged to hold to the line stipulated by the mandate he received from the people. If he leaves the [correct] path, the voters have the right to demand new elections, and they have the right to blackball him (*laughter, applause*). This is an excellent law. My advice, the advice of a parliamentary candidate to his electors, is to remember this right of electors — this right to recall deputies before their term is up — to follow their deputies, control them, and if they venture to leave the correct path, to hunt them out and demand new elections. The government is obliged to prescribe new elections. My advice is to remember this law and use it when required. One last time, more advice from a parliamentary candidate to his electors. Speaking in general, what is required of the deputies if, amongst all possible requirements, one considers only the most elementary requirements? The voters, the people, must demand that their deputies be up to their duties, that in their work they do not descend to the level of philistine politicians, that they be on guard like Leninist politicians, that as politicians they be as clear and determined as Lenin (*applause*); that they be as intrepid in combat and as relentless towards enemies of the people as Lenin was (*applause*); that they be free of all panic, of anything resembling panic, when matters begin to get complicated and danger appears on the horizon — that they be free of anything resembling panic as Lenin was (*applause*); that they be as wise and self-controlled in the resolution of complicated problems requiring a thorough orientation and examination of all advantages and disadvantages, as Lenin was (*applause*); that they be as sincere and honest as Lenin was (*applause*); that they love the people as much as Lenin did (*applause*). Can it be said that all parliamentary candidates are politicians of this type? I would say not. There are all kinds of people in the world, and all kinds of politicians. There are people about whom one cannot say who they are, whether they are good or bad, courageous or cowardly, whether they will stick with the people to the end, or whether they are the people's enemies. There are such people, and

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there are such politicians. They exist among us, among the Bolsheviks. As you well know, comrades, every flock has its black sheep (*laughter, applause*). . . . Our people correctly say of such murky people and politicians. . . 'neither a candle for God, nor a poker for the devil' (*general laughter, applause*). I cannot say with all assurance that among the parliamentary candidates — and of course, I must excuse myself a thousand times over in front of them — and among our politicians, there is no one who recalls the philistine politician because of their character or physiognomy about whom the people say: 'neither a candle for God, nor a poker for the devil' (*laughter, applause*). I would like you, comrades, to influence systematically your deputies, to make them understand that they are to have the great image of Lenin before them, and are to initiate Lenin in everything. . . . Accordingly, it is the obligation and right of the voters to keep their deputies under control, and to make them understand that they are never to descend to the level of philistine politicians. . . ."[53]

In spreading an idea that had not been proposed by any "moderate" speech, i.e., that there could be improper candidates and that they should be recalled in the future, Stalin implied that it was not accidental that this essential point had escaped the attention of the most illustrious orators of the electoral campaign. Moreover, he suggested that the candidacy of a cadre, i.e., someone whose post assured him *ex officio* of candidacy, provides no guarantee of political integrity. Stalin did not hide the fact that he was speaking at the difficult moment when certain politicians, and he was undoubtedly thinking of the apparently few opponents to "amnesty," were inclined to panic, when it was a moment full of "dangers on the horizon," it is clear that his appeal to mobilize the masses in order to control their deputies, and very likely, in one manner of another, all their leaders, was not merely a demagogic platitude.

If it had just been a question of pure and simple demagoguery, at least a few of the speakers who pleaded for "amnesty" would have used this theme to show the advantages of the Soviet system, elaborated at length as a matter of course. But the themes of Stalin's electoral address were not admitted to the regularly invoked treasury of maxims: in fact they were never subsequently quoted. The day after the election, a *Pravda* editorial still stressed the constitutional right of the people to recall their deputies.[54] Sometime later, the proponents of the "police purge" monopolized the official interpretation of Stalin's speech, speaking of an eventual dismissal of incompetent deputies without mentioning the legal possibility of voter intervention.[55]

So it is probably that the remnants of the faction that wanted to submit the apparatus to strict controls at whatever costs had opposed the "police purge platform" with a "mass mobilization program." This "program" probably restrained the champions of "amnesty" from making too much noise about voters' constitutional right to recall deputies — a right which did not exist in practice, but which their adversaries were trying to use in order to mount a

53. Stalin, *op.cit.*,. pp. 256-257, and pp. 261-264.
54. "Vsenarodnyj Prazdnik," *Pravda,* December 13, 1937, p. 1.
55. "Blok Kommunistov i Bespartijnyh Nepobedim!," *Pravda,* December 15, 1937, p. 1.

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counter-offensive. This was a desperate attempt, for nothing guaranteed that the promoters of "popular control" would have been able to master the outbreak of discontent which might have followed, or prevent the masses from attacking the apparatus as such, instead of criticizing only some of its functionaries. The "mobilization program" thus involved the danger of open political confrontation between leaders and led, and global questioning of the system — something that even the most bitter enemies of "amnesty" could not have wished. What the most determined advocates of the purge wanted was a cleansing of the apparatus, and not its destruction, so that it was the party organs themselves that were to implement this project. It was the local party administrations that were to organize and direct the future activity of the electoral propagandists, systematically informing and mobilizing the masses.[56] But, of course, the apparatus functionaries could have no interest in organizing a movement to blackball them. It was impossible, in fact, to launch the new campaign, all the more so as the electoral propagandists did not prove to be very enthusiastic, their primary concern during the electoral period being not to commit any "suspicious ideological errors."[57]

Despite their tactical disadvantage, the opponents of the "police purge" tried to expand their "program" beyond the elections and began to openly denounce the "platform" of the opposite faction: "Political philistines, people of turgid and amorphous character, are accomplices of the enemy. They do not fight against the enemies; they do not unmask them; they do not call the masses to this battle, but hide behind the hypocritical platitude that this is the exclusive duty of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs."[58] But the "accomplices of the enemy" were busy constantly trying to prove that the discovery of "carefully masked spies" was a police matter *par excellence.*

Though many leading cadres had been arrested especially since summer, the press made no mention of their fate. It is certainly not fortuitous, therefore, that the only information concerning a trial of high functionaries divulged after the case of the Red Army leaders, appeared during the controversy around the merits of the "police purge." The eight accused in this trial were all sentenced to death behind closed doors for high treason, espionage, diversion, and terrorist conspiracy. Among their numbers were Enukidze, a former secretary of the central executive committee and one of the oldest Bolsheviks, Sheboldaev and Orahelashvili, formerly of the regional leadership, and Karahan, a famous diplomat.[59] The "political philistines" drew the conclusion for the public: "By playing their double game in the manner of actors, and by masking their ferocious character with whatever means are available, the Trotskyist and Bukharinist traitors resort to the basest and most vile methods against our people.... Under the direction of the party's faithful son, Comrade Ezov, Bolshevik of the Stalin school, the Soviet intelligence service has

56. "Ne Oslabljat' a Usilivat's Massovuju Rabotu," *Pravda,* December 27, 1937, p. 1.

57. "Vozglavit' Rastuscuju Aktivnost' Mass," *Pravda,* October 3, 1937, p. 1; *Bolshevik,* n. 1 (1938), pp. 84-85; *The Smolensk Archives,* vol. 238, pp. 318-319.

58. *Bolshevik,* n. 23-24 (1937), p. 45.

59. M. Frinovskij, "Na Straze Zavoevanij Socializma," *Pravda,* December 19, 1937, p. 3; "V Voennoj Kollegii Verh. Suda S.S.S.R.," *ibid.,* p. 5.

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untangled this dirty knot in which enemies of every stamp are to be found.... The whole country is proud that our party has experienced punitive agencies to annihilate relentlessly spies, saboteurs, diversionists and other enemies of the Soviet people, both in the present and in the future."[60]

In a tense atmosphere of statements and counter-statements concerning the NKVD's role, a solemn reunion was organized to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the creation of the police organizations. The reunion was convoked with extreme haste: *Pravda* announced it only on December 20, the very day it took place, and its communiqué reveals that all the invitations were still not sent as the newspaper was coming off the press.[61] But it is not these circumstances alone which show that more was at stake in this meeting than the mere celebration of an anniversary, and that its convocation had not been the object of a unanimous decision. The main speaker of the evening was Mikoyan, member of the Politburo and People's Commissar for the Food Industry. Yet, while the newspapers reproduced the text of all other speakers, those of a high police functionary and several Stakhanovists who merely repeated some rather unenlightening slogans, only a brief summary of his speech was published.[62] Whereas in all previous campaigns the food industry had never been seriously criticized, now, on the eve of the commemorative reunion, and without any other central organ of the economic leadership being rebuked, allusions were made to "dubious elements" and "hostile maneuvers" in the censored speaker's Commissariat.[63]

Written in the style of the "police purge" promoters, the summary of Mikoyan's speech does not permit the reconstruction of any of its original proposals. The fact that even the arranged version mentioned the speaker's special attention to interpreting Stalin's electoral address, indicates that he had tried to repeat or clarify the arguments of the most intransigent opponents of "amnesty." "Comrade Mikoyan recalls the duties that the party, the government and Comrade Stalin require of state functionaries. Comrade Stalin stated these needs on December 11, at the meeting of the voters of Stalin's electoral district.... To be a genuine politician, to be intransigent towards enemies, wise and free in deciding serious questions, sincere and honest as Lenin was and as Stalin is, to love his people as Lenin loved them and as Stalin loves them."[64] If no more was at stake than this, it is quite probably that the Soviet press would not have drawn back from publishing one more set of stereotypes. This unmistakable censorship shows the importance of the challenge that the original proposals of this speech and the commemorative reunion itself constituted for the proponents of "amnesty," though the fact that they felt strong enough to confront it shows, at the same time, to what extent their positions were becoming solidified.

60. "Na Strah Vragam, Na Slavu Nasej Rodinel," *Pravda*, 20-12-1937, p. 1.
61. *Pravda*, December 20, 1937, p. 3.
62. *Pravda*, December 21, 1937, pp. 1-2. See also *Izvestija*, December 21, 1937, pp. 1-2.
63. A. Samojlov, Pora Rascistit' Apparata Glavhleba," *Pravda*, December 19, 1937, p. 6; A. Samojlov, "B. Glavcae Neblagopolucno," *Pravda*, December 22, 1937, p. 4.
64. "Doklad T. Mikojana," *Pravda*, December 21, 1937, p. 1. See also *Iavestija*, December 21, 1937, p. 1.

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After having profited from the electoral campaign to disseminate their theses, they even risked an initiative whose outcome looked promising. Shortly before the anniversary of the Soviet police, the Moscow region's party leadership announced that, "ceding to the workers' demands," it would launch a "Stalinian month of Stakhanovist records in January."[65] The promoters of this decision were clearly challenging previous warnings that had denounced efforts to revive the campaign as "subversive machinations." What's more, the Moscow leadership put the accent on the spectacular aspect of Stakhanovism, on the individual records with negligible or even disastrous economic effects, and on the "star system," hated by the badly paid average worker. For them, it was not a question of returning to the main idea of the movement, but of continuing the ostensibly enthusiastic performance that had already served to allow its diversion in 1936. The cadres immediately understood that the Moscow initiative was just a pretext to mobilize forces favorable to strengthening the apparatus and hence "amnesty," and the "Stakhanovist fever" quickly gripped the country. By starting to organize local "record months" a great number of cadres carried on a referendum for the "moderate program."[66] At the same time, it became evident that this enterprise enjoyed the protection of the People's Council of Commissars, whose permanent economic commission, convened under Molotov's presidence, recommended that industry imitate the example of a new Stakhanovist star, Gudov.[67]

However, even if they had to fight a rearguard battle, the adversaries of "amnesty" had not yet given up their project of "popular mobilization." Their imprint was stamped on reports of "subversive practices" in the administration of industry and constantly revealed in the press, as well as in *Pravda* editorials, that the factory of the "record man" whose example ought to have been followed during the "Stakhanovist month" was itself unable to fulfill the plan.[68] At the same time, undoubtedly due to their "radical maneuvers," certain instructions concerning the organization of the "movement for records" proposed something that the enthusiastic propaganda of the press generally refrained from exploiting: periodic meetings in general assemblies in the factories where workers were to evaluate the management's work and decide on measures to "liquidate the consequences of sabotage."[69]

The counter-mobilization of the most adamant purgers threatened to intensify the confusion so much that the champions of "amnesty" had to agree to a compromise. So, on December 29, a decree of the Central Committee condemned the campaign for seeking only records and ordered the

65. "Stahanovskaja Vstreca Tretej Stalinoskoj Pjatiletki," *Pravda,* December 18, 1937, p. 1.

66. Cf. the rubric "Nakanune Stalinskovo Mesjaca Stahanovskih Rekordov," pp. 1 and 2 of *Pravda,* between December 18 and 28, 1937, with the news items sent from all parts of the country.

68. "V Ekonomiceskom Sovete pri S.N.K. S.S.S.R.," *Pravda,* December 28, 1937, p. 3.

68. "O Zapasnyh Castjah...," *Pravda,* December 27, 1937, p. 3; "Sila Stahanovskogo Dvizenija v Ego Massovosti," *Pravda,* December 28, 1937, p. 1; M. Krugov "Metal i Grafik," *Pravda,* December 29, 1937, p. 3

69. *The Smolensk Archives,* vol. 238, pp. 379-380.

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"Stakhanovist month" to be organized only in Moscow and in March instead of January.[70] No "Stakhanovist month" took place in 1938 in Moscow or anywhere else. But if the stopping of the mobilization of the cadres is evidence that the advocates of the purge had still not yet definitely lost the initiative, this was their last important success.

The first indication of change was a Central Committee decree[71] forbidding party organs from arbitrarily replacing managers of enterprises, and *Pravda* enjoining local and regional party leaders to support the "Bolshevik measures of production commanders" and to concern themselves, above all, with the requirements of the economic plans.[72]

The saboteurs seemed to have disappeared. Without any oratory jousting, the most important speeches of the newly elected Supreme Soviet affirmed that the "enemies" had been annihilated and that the guarantee against their reappearance resided in the heroic activities of the NKVD.[73] Some speakers criticized the mediocre work of government agencies, particularly the Peoples' Commissariat of Justice. Krylenko, its head, received no portfolio in the new Council of Peoples' Commissars.[74] Here was a leader whose recent reelection must have indicated the people's confidence, but whose apparatus had been called upon to play a very contradictory role during the crisis. Later, he disappeared without a trace, while his dismissal was hailed in an editorial as the accomplishment of the will of the voters[75] — who thus learned that their right to elect and "blackball" their deputies was as illusory as ever.

The proponents of "amnesty" thus clearly gained the upper hand after the "plebiscite" of cadres in favor of the Stakhanovist records. But even if their adversaries could no longer control the march of events, they had not yet laid down their arms. They could still count on the support of all those who had distinguished themselves in the "denunciation of enemies." Their number was undoubtedly considerable. To be credible and practical, the endorsement of "amnesty" therefore had to neutralize this group with a sort of declaration of war against those guilty of excesses, as well as the rehabilitation of at least a number of the victims. However, there could be no question of punishing every zealous activist (or of exonerating all those unduly purged) without casting doubt upon the correctness of all political actions taken since 1936, legalizing uncontrollable acts of vengeance, and above all, without fatally discrediting the country's leadership in whose name the most contradictory measures had been taken and were still to be taken. Nor could there be any question of resurrecting the disobedience, deceit and excesses of the cadres — the

70. "Po Povodu Obrascenija Stahanovcev...," *Pravda,* December 29, 1937, p. 1.

71. *Ugolovnyj Kodeks R.S.F.S.R.* (Moscow, 1953), p. 91.

72. "O Nepravil'nom Postanovlenii...," *Pravda,* January 4, 1938, p. 1; "Ne Podmenjat'...," *Pravda,* January 6, 1938, p. 1; "Strana Trebuet...," *Pravda,* January 11, 1937, p. 1.

73. Rec deputata S.V. Kosiora, Rec deputata L.I. Mirzojana, Rec deputata N.A. Bulganina, *Pravda,* November 16, 1938 p. 3.

74. Rec deputata A.A. Zdanova, *Pravda,* January 18, 1937, pp. 2-3; Rec deputata M.D. Bagirova and Rec deputata S.V. Kosiora, *ibid.,* p. 2.

75. "Na Straze Interesov Naroda," *Pravda,* January 18, 1938, p. 1.

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"manipulations of subversive agents" — about which the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs was now forewarned. Just the same, there was no guarantee that the "selective police purge" could discover and eliminate those responsible for even the most outrageous excesses, any more than it was likely to end intrinsic government malfunction. Previous experience had shown that it was not very difficult to avoid the mechanisms of central control agencies and that it was not at all impossible to avert even the strictest police measures.

Even the most acclaimed specialist of the "struggle against enemies," the chief of the NKVD, had some doubts as to the purging virtues of his apparatus. The last open belligerent acts with respect to "amnesty" took place under his authority. It occurred in connection with a decree of the Party Control Commission, supreme organ of punishment and appeal for the militants, of which Ezov was president. Appearing around mid-January, this document condemned the practice of summarily expelling members without any previous examination of the accusations, and recommended that any appeals or revisions in the case of those excluded, as well as decisions in the more important cases of "hostile elements," take place publicly with the participation of the basic organizations concerned.[76] It is not without significance that it was by reproaching the investigative practices of the Moscow regional administration, sponsor of the most demonstrative "amnesty" campaigns, that the Control Commission drew attention to the inadmissability of unjust mass expulsions. Nor is it simply accidental that while in the past the Control Commission's most important documents had been specially approved by the Central Committee,[77] the January 1938 decree was not countersigned. By proposing public scrutiny of disciplinary cases and continuing to proclaim the "struggle against enemies," the decree contained elements of the "mobilization program" rendering it unacceptable to the advocates of the "police purge," who clearly already had the upper hand within the central direction.

Indeed, almost simultaneously with the Control Commission's document, a plenary session of the Central Committee announced "partial amnesty" and a "selective police purge." Meeting intermittently between January 11 and 20, the central party organ found that only 41.8% of its members elected by the 17th Congress were still around.[78] A number of these "survivors" were to disappear in the course of the following months.[79] It can be supposed that, even if this session's decisions had been made unanimously, some of the "escapees" would have had to answer for their "radical manipulations." It is, however, no less probable that the victors were ready to pardon the "radicals" who had sincerely capitulated, as the success of the "dissident" action for Kalinin, Mikoyan and Skirjatov, and in some way for Stalin himself,

76. *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo*, n. 2 (1938), pp. 62-64.

77. Cf. for example, *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo*, n. 19 (1934), p. 47; *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo*, n. 24 (1934), p. 46; *Pravda*, March 17, 1936, pp. 2-3.

78. Cf. *Bjulleten'oppozicii, loc.cit.*

79. In March 1939, the 18th Congress reelected only 22.5% of the members of the outgoing Central Committee. Cf. L.B. Shapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1960), pp. 520, 526.

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perhaps indicates. Completely disarmed as they had been, the "radicals" could sometimes find pretexts to avenge themselves on some compromised "moderates" and to eliminate people like Cubar, Kosior, Ejhe or Mirzoyan.

Lack of reliable information on the leaders' maneuvers renders any analysis based on what we know of their individual fortunes precarious. But two changes in the composition of the Politburo by the plenary session of January 1938 help clarify the extent of the reversal.[80] The first secretary of the Moscow region, Khrushchev, was made candidate member of the Politburo, undoubtedly symbolizing the reward due the boldest champions of "amnesty" and the consolidation of their position. Then, hardly a week after the plenum, Khrushchev was named to head the Republic of the Ukraine, one of the most important regions of the country.[81] Meanwhile, the demotion of a deputy member, Postysev, promised little solace to the zealots of the purge campaign. Originally the first secretary of the Ukraine, Postysev had been denounced as protector of "hostile elements" at the beginning of 1937 and transferred to a less eminent post at the head of the Kujbisev Region. His leadership subsequently distinguished itself by notorious excesses during the last months of the year.[82] The evolution of his career was typical and evidently cast a bad light on the determined purge advocates by showing how the ostentatious "intransigence" of a number of their members was motivated by the desire to hide their own "complicity with the enemy."

But it is not personnel changes, always of uncertain significance, which indicate that programs of "amnesty" and of "police purge" were endorsed, but rather a decree promulgated by the plenary session. After having recalled that the Central Committee had often cautioned against arbitrary expulsion from the party, the document condemned the practice by regional and local authorities of large scale purges without attentive examination of the accuseds' dossiers. In a manner uncommon for documents of this type, the decree enumerated a large number of cases to demonstrate the range of excesses before arriving at the conclusion that "careerists" and especially "disguised enemies" provoked the majority of unjust punitive actions against the militants, their associates and their friends.[83] "A number of our party organizations and their leading members have still not managed to recognize the skillfully camouflaged enemy.... An obdurate traitor of this type habitually makes the most noise, hastens to 'unmask' as many people as possible and does all this to hide his own crimes from the party and to distract the party's attention from the real enemies of the people. Vile and two-faced, the disguised enemy of this type does his best to create a climate of excessive distrust in the party organizations, a climate where any member who takes up the defense of a slandered communist is immediately accused of lacking

80. For personnel changes decided by this session, see "Informacionnoe Soobscenie...," in *Pravda*, January 19, 1938, p. 1.

81. "Plenum CKKP(b)U," *Pravda*, January 29, 1938, p. 1.

82. Stalin, *op.cit.*, pp. 240-242; *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo*, n. 9 (1937), p. 43; "XIII. S'ezd DP(b)U," *Pravda*, May 30, 1937, p. 2; "Po-Bol'sevistski Vypolnit' Resenija...," *Pravda*, January 19, 1938, p. 1; *Bolshevik*, n. 3 (1938), p. 18; *KPSS v Rezoljucijah...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 306-307.

83. For the decree text, see *KPSS v Rezoljucijah...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 303-312.

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vigilance.... Instead of revealing and unmasking the provocations of the disguised enemy of this type, the party organization and their leaders often let him command, allowing him to slander honest communists with impunity while they themselves go the route of large scale arbitrary expulsions.... Moreover, even after the discovery of enemies within the party who have slandered honest communists, our party leaders often do not take steps to rehabilitate those who were unduly expelled. It is high time that all our party organizations and their leaders unmasked the disguised enemy who has infiltrated our ranks, who tries to conserve his position within the party and hides his hostility behind a false outcry for vigilance in order to continue his vile and treacherous work."

But this lecture on "careerists," "enemies" and their misdeeds was not meant to direct the militants into seeking out those responsible for abuses. The decree not only ordered a halt to the gratuitous large-scale expulsions, the rehabilitation of excluded party members, the pursuit of leading cadres "who did not execute the directives of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who excluded candidate members and members of the CPSU without careful verification of the relevant materials, and who assented to arbitrary acts against party members" and the restoration of rights to unduly punished persons — it also ordered that all this become the duty of the regional leadership alone. The measure consisted in assigning the task of cleansing the apparatus to authorities that normally met behind closed doors. And yet the exact criteria that were to serve as a basis for exonerating people or punishing the troublemakers were not precise. However, by clearly stating that the effectiveness and political integrity of the governing agencies and individual cadres no longer depended on their "vigilance" and the "discovery of enemies," but on an immediate end to the denunciations and the purging of certain of the most seriously compromised purgers, the decimated Central Committee showed itself disposed to granting amnesty to the vast majority of survivors of the internal conflicts in the apparatus. What is more, in principle it promised to rehabilitate completely all the scapegoats of the "struggle against enemies" within the party. This no doubt raised the hopes of tens of thousands of victims — although at the same time it must have been a new source of anxiety for a number of zealous combatants.

The accounts of the plenary session's decision published in the press did not resemble the oratorical jousting that flared up regularly after every official stand during the preceding months. There was no appeal to militants to denounce "careerists" and "camouflaged enemies," and no attempt at mobilization. The only notable difference in opinions about the decree consisted in certain editorial statements that there were still "enemies" even in the highest echelons of the apparatus, while others recalled that it was up to all present leaders to take the lead in the "extermination of the remnants of hostile elements."[84] Some of the defeated advocates of "mobilization" probably used

84. "Po-Bol'sevistski Vypolnit'...," *Pravda*, January 19, 1938, p. 1; "Resenija Plenuma...," *Pravda*, February 1, 1938, p. 1; "Besposcadno Razoblacat'...," *Pravda*, February 3, 1938, p. 1.

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this latter approach to try to turn the verdict against less important informers, but there is no indication that their efforts got very far.

The plenary session's decree was promulgated at a time when the chaos and panic that had worsened since the summer of 1937 were threatening to paralyze the functioning of the state apparatus. A hysterical anxiety must have presided over the actions of a number of cadres, for example, in Kiev, where almost half of the members of the party had been denounced, necessitating the organization of special commissions to deal with the deluge of accusations.[85] Fearing accusations of complicity if their choices turned out to be wrong, those in authority no longer dared to fill the posts of "unmasked" cadre, for no candidate seemed worthy of confidence any more.[86] Thus in stating that "the Soviet manager, who enjoys the confidence and affection of the people, must work not because of fear, but because of conscience," the Peoples' Commissar of Heavy Industry had specific orders to name cadres for each vacant seat in the administration of his branch.[87] Fearing to imitate "enemies," authorities no longer dared to take steps to oversee lagging workers' discipline.[88] Instead, they had become accustomed to denounce the "suspicious manipulations" of their colleagues as soon as the slightest problem arose.[89]

As for the party agencies, their first reaction to the January decree is epitomized by the decision of a regional leadership to circulate a list of functionaries "in office for a long time" — hence having a political past, hence potentially suspect — who had to be removed.[90] According to the spirit of the plenary session's decisions, the investigation of the cases of expelled persons and of "camouflaged enemies" was supposed to be carried out very discreetly, in a quasi-police manner. So it is not surprising that the press published little information on this subject. But the little material available clearly shows that party organs began such procedures quite timidly and that certain local and regional leaders did their best to sabotage them.[91] The first rehabilitated members frightened the militants, who carefully avoided any contact with them, while a district secretary's decision to reprimand with a warning all reintegrated members no doubt is an eloquent

85. "Resenija Plenuma. .," *Pravda,* January 22, 1938, p. 1; *XVIII. S'ezd..., op.cit.*, p. 595.

86. *Vlast' Sovetov* (bi-montly of the Executive Central Committee of the Russian Federation), n. 1 (1938), pp. 26-27; *ibid.*, n. 2, pp. 51-52; P. Lidov, "Vjazemskie Perestrahovsciki," *Pravda,* January 26, 1938, p. 2; D. Voroncihin, "Antigosudarstvennaja Praktiva...," *Pravda,* February 12, 1938, p. 6.

87. "O Vypolnenii Proizv. Plana NKTP na 1938 g.," *Pravda,* January 30, 1938, p. 3.

88. "Podniat' Disciplinu...," *Pravda,* January 24, 1938, p. 1; I. Pavlovskij, "V Rtisceve net Trudovoj Discipliny," *Pravda,* January 26, 1938, p. 6; "Nacalo Pod'ema...," *Pravda,* February 8, 1938, p. 1; Bol'sie i Pocetnye Zadaci...," *Pravda,* February 9, 1938, p. 1; "Vsesojuznoe Sovescanie...," *Pravda,* March 23, 1938, p. 3.

89. *Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporjazenij Raboce Krestjanskovo Pravitelstva S.S.S.R.*, Part I (1938), p. 116.

90. L. Perevozkin, "Plody Bumaznogo Rekovodstva," *Pravda,* March 2, 1938, p. 2.

91. V. Vel'mickij, "Bezdusie i Bjurokratizm...," *Pravda,* February 5, 1938, p. 2; "Bol'sevistskij Stil' Raboty...," *Pravda,* February 7, 1938, p. 1; L. Perevozkin, "Bezogovorocno Vypolnit'...," *Pravda,* March 16, 1938, p. 4; A. Kozlov, "V Kurske ne Vypolnajajut Resenij Plenuma...," *Pravda,* March 26, 1938, p. 2; M. Domracev, "Bjurokraticeskoe Otnosenie...," *Pravda,* March 27, 1938, p. 2; *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo,* n. 7 (1938), p. 54.

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illustration of the dilemma of leading cadres who wanted to prove their unflagging vigilance.[92] The disorder was so great that the press no longer dared treat the "dangerous" problem these persons posed, and the Central Committee had to pass a decree ordering regional newspapers to report what was going on in party organizations.[93]

Urgent measures became imperative to strengthen confidence in party policy. It was evident that this policy had been fumbling, to say the least, since the fall of 1937, and now the apparatus had to be convinced that "partial amnesty" was not just one more maneuver in the chaotic chain reaction of measures and counter-measures that had characterized the long crisis at the summit, i.e., a passing strategem full of new dangers for those who took it too seriously. It must have been reassuring that no trace of counter-programs could be detected in official measures or in the media. But the task of putting an end to the confusion required more of the defeated faction than silent consent to their former adversaries' actions. It was indispensable for them to lay down their arms openly. Naturally the thankless duty of publicly supporting the theses of ex-"political philistines" fell to Stalin, the most illustrious champion of the "mobilization of the masses." It probably was not easy to convince him to make a statement in favor of "amnesty." This may explain the rather unusual way in which he finally sided with the program against which he had previously fought. However, despite his esoteric way of speaking on an apparently remote ideological problem, Stalin's declared position was unequivocal.

Four weeks after the plenary session, Stalin published a letter replying to Ivanov — a cadre charged with the ideological work of a local Komsomol organ. Questioning the "Supreme Leader" on the validity of his 1926 statement that a definitive victory for socialism was impossible as long as world capitalism existed, Ivanov had complained that after he had defended this thesis, the regional secretary of the Communist Youth Movement accused him of Trotskyism and was about to expel him from the organization.[94] In his reply, Stalin said that his old thesis was still valid and declared that even if the program of building socialism had triumphed, despite the intrigues of "Trotsky, Zinoviev [and] Kamenev, who later became spies and agents of fascism," the ambition of capitalist powers surrounding the USSR was to restore the old regime. "Only hidden enemies who want to mask their hostility behind bragging and who attempt to demobilize the people can deny the danger of military intervention and the efforts at restoration as long as the surrounding capitalist world exists.... All our people must be kept in a mobilized state in view of the danger of military attack, so that no 'eventuality' and no strategem of our external enemies can take us by surprise...." Stalin further reassured Ivanov: "It is clear from your

92. "Individual nyj Podhod...," *Pravda,* February 19, 1938, p. 1; J. Litovcenko, "Posle Reabilitacii," *Pravda,* February 27, 1938, p. 3.

93. *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo,* n. 7 (1938), p. 55; "Sire i Lucse Osvescat' Partijnuju Zizn'," *Pravda,* March 21, 1938, p. 1.

94. "Pis'mo t. Ivanova i Otvet t. Stalina," *Pravda,* February 14, 1938, p. 3.

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letter that Comrade Urozhenko (the regional Komsomol secretary) holds other ideas that are not totally Leninist. It turns out that he affirms that 'we are now in possession of the definitive victory of socialism and of a complete guarantee against intervention and the restoration of capitalism.' Without any doubt, Comrade Urozhenko's thesis can be explained only by a misunderstanding of the surrounding reality. . .or by the empty boasting of a presumptuous young bureaucrat. . . . Even if they are subjectively faithful to our cause, people like Comrade Urozhenko are objectively dangerous, for whether they will it or not (and it is the same!) they numb our people with their boasting, demobilize the workers and peasants, and help the enemy to take us by surprise in case of international complications. As for the fact, Comrade Ivanov, that you might be 'dismissed' from your work as propagandist and your membership in the Comsomol be put in question, there is no reason for you to be afraid. If the members of the Regional Committee of the Union of Young Communists really want to resemble Prishibeev, Chekov's non-commissioned officer, we cannot doubt that they will lose. Prishibeev's types are not liked in our country."[95]

Whereas in his electoral speech, Stalin had done his best to show that the social and political order was threatened by an internal "enemy," his "Reply to Ivanov" confirmed his adversaries' thesis that the main cause for worry was the impending war. He went further than the promoters of "amnesty" in declaring that all "danger of restoration" came from abroad. The "mobilization of the masses" advocated in the December speech had been an allusion to the need for a certain institutional, or at least regular, control of the apparatus by the population. This time, instead, "mobilization" had a purely military meaning. It was no longer a question of collectively fighting internal "enemies" and still less "enemies of the people" within the state-party. Even if the small local official was reassured that arbitrary leaders would not escape well-deserved punishment, he was not encouraged to take action against them.

The official interpretation, this time uncontested, of the "Supreme Leader's" declaration was: "Every internal enemy is an external enemy, for he counts on foreign support, on fascist intelligence services. The party and the Soviet government have accomplished an enormous task in purging our country of enemies of the people: felons, Trotskyist and Bukharinist traitors, overt and covert fascist agents. But as long as the surrounding capitalist world exists, there will be attempts to reconstruct the network of spies destroyed by the heroic agents of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs."[96]

Apparently, however, the "Reply to Ivanov" did not satisfy some of the promoters of the "police purge." Since the declaration touched upon certain, probably disputed, problems of foreign policy, it may have generated some controversy. Nor can it be excluded that the latter was only the first step in a complex maneuver, the result of which would have been a noticeable decrease of the authority of the recalcitrant "Supreme Leader," if not his

95. Stalin, *op.cit.*, pp. 267-268, 270-273.
96. "Na Osnove Stalinskoj Konstitucii," *Pravda*, February 15, 1938, p. 1.

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forced retirement. Another letter signed by Stalin four days after the "Reply to Ivanov" but not published until 15 years later indicates the existence of such a plan. As practically all letters sent by Stalin were very quickly published, this letter probably never reached the publisher of children's books to which it had been addressed: "I am categorically against the publication of *Stories about Stalin's Childhood.* This book abounds in a mass of factual improbabilities, alterations, exaggerations and unmerited praise. The author is led astray by lovers of fables, by impostors (even by impostors 'in good faith'), by flatterers... But this is not the essential point. The essential point is that the book tends to instill in the consciousness of Soviet children (and of people in general) the cult of personalities, of leaders, of infallible heroes. This is dangerous, harmful. The theory of 'heroes' and masses is not a Bolshevist theory.... Every such book...will harm our common Bolshevist cause. I recommend burning the book. J. Stalin." [97]

It is quite likely that this letter would have been made available, even popularized, as early as 1938 if it had been written for the sole demagogic end of showing the exemplary modesty of the ritually adulated "Supreme Leader." On the other hand, it is improbable that Stalin himself would have personally taken the initiative to censure the ocean of panegyrics that sang his glory in all parts of the country and in all its languages. So, if this letter attacked the manuscript of an unimportant publishing house, it is no doubt because it had been especially submitted to Stalin for "his" opinion — an opinion that he could have applied just as well to any issue of any newspaper. The insignificance of the institution involved and the fact that the author was not even named indicate that the real target was not the press, not public policy concerning publishing, or the literary world. If Stalin's "protest" never saw the light at that time, it is precisely because those who had dictated it and those who judged its publication to be ultimately inopportune aimed at more than demonstrating the modesty of the supposedly almighty Leader. Everything points to the conclusion that certain champions of "amnesty" sought to launch, even then, a campaign against the "anti-Bolshevik cult of infallible personalities." [98] However, the most far-sighted of Stalin's adversaries feared the uncontrollable effects of questioning the regime's "trademark" and recognized that all things considered, it would not be easy to do without the security of a universal legitimating reference.

Of course, the "Reply to Ivanov" by itself could not dissipate the uncertainty within the apparatus. But its publication marks the beginning of a period of normalization that lasted about a year. During this period, most initiatives of the central administration consisted in reassuring the cadres and strengthening the authority of the apparatus, despite the "selective police purge" that remained a source of worries and tensions. Paradoxically, even the last "Great Moscow Trial" of March 1938 was a move in favor of the

97. Stalin, *op.cit.*, pp. 1, 51, 70-73, 132, 135, 403-405, 274.

98. A decree of the Central Committee, on November, 1938, condemned the "anti-Bolshevist" views professed by certain "pseudo-theoreticians" on the role of the individual in history and based itself on the same arguments as Stalin's letter. Cf. *KPSS v Rezoljucijah...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 317-318.

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normalization process, to the extent that its main lessons had nothing to do with the political preoccupations of the moment. For, besides the already "traditional" accusations of espionage, diversion and terrorism, the most important accused, notably Bukharin, Rykov, Krestinskiy and Rakovskiy, were condemned for nebulous cases of conspiracy whose origins supposedly went back to pre-revolutionary times.[99] At the same time, the case of Ezov's predecessor as head of the NKVD, Jagoda, who was convicted of assassinating high dignitaries undoubtedly symbolized a desire to punish some of those responsible for police excesses. The trial commentaries emphasized that the crimes of the most illustrious plaintiffs had been motivated by their oppositional past.[100] This was geared to reassure the vast majority of recently promoted cadres, who had joined the party after the great factional struggles.

The process of reconstructing and consolidating the state-party revealed that the new authorities could not act any differently than their "unmasked" predecessors; they did their best to surround themselves with their own men, who were at times seriously compromised, and frequently resorted to all sorts of "hostile maneuvers." But the chaos made it impossible to imagine any major punitive action. Quite the contrary, the apparatus had to close ranks in view of the masses' lack of discipline, so that mobilization of cadres to implement Draconian legal arrangements to ensure order in factories and collective farms capped normalization.[101] Under these conditions, the "police purge" dealt mainly with the most obvious perpetrators of excesses, although even among them, a number of "camouflaged enemies" were able to escape

99. *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites* (Moscow, 1938), pp. 110-117, 144-147, 314-322, 393-512, 788-789, 798. The accusations against Bukharin and Rykov, the last major directors of an ancient current of opposition not to have been condemned, symbolized the completion of the "struggle against enemies." During the months following October, 1917, Rykov belonged, for some time, to the "Bolsheviks of the right" who wished the participation of all socialist parties in the government, while Bukharin played the leading role in an ephemeral faction of the extreme left. Though both loyal to the "general line" in the 1920s and allied with Stalin's faction against the Trotskyists, in 1928 they assumed leadership of those who opposed the methods of collectivization and the strategy of industrialization. They were expelled from the Politburo (Bukharin in 1929, Rykov in 1930) and dismissed from their most important posts (Bukharin had been director of the Comintern, Rykov had been head of the government), but they remained members and then deputy members of the Central Committee, and they ended by expressing self-criticism before the 17th Congress. Their names were cited as possible accomplices during the first "Great Moscow Trial," but a communique of the public prosecutor of the USSR announced a few weeks later that an inquest had failed to establish their guilt (*Pravda,* September 10, 1936, p. 2). Nonetheless, the Bukharinists had begun to be denounced as "enemies" beginning around December, 1936, and the plenary session of February-March, 1937 of the Central Committee excluded them from the party (*Pravda,* March 6, 1937). Since this session launched the "radical" action of party elections, it is probably that the investigation of the ex-opposition leaders of the right was a sort of concession made to the "moderates." At the same time, though they had recanted them in 1934, their views on collectivization and industrialization probably continued to be shared by a certain number of "survivors" of the conflicts of 1936-1938, and their trial could thus constitute a warning against any temptation to "deviate toward the right." But it is especially the image of the old oppositionist, inevitably a traitor, diversionist and spy, that was activated in the trial of March, 1938, i.e., the working image of the "enemy" promulgated by the advocates of "amnesty."

100. *Bolshevik,* n. 5 (1938), pp. 2-3, 8-9.

101. *KPSS v Rezoljucijah . . ., op.cit.,* pp. 324-332, 399; *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo,* n. 2 (1939), p. 51, and n. 3, p. 64.

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punishment. Yet some sporadic but very carefully placed news items indicated that while some overzealous members of the judiciary agency and the police were being purged, the emergency laws against "saboteurs" were no longer in force. At the same time, a great number of persons expelled inappropriately from the party were rehabilitated. The most recent edition of the official history of the party speaks of 142,000 rehabilitations, a very high number considering that 373,963 members were expelled during the years 1936-1938.[102] Certain sources mention regions where about 40 percent or even more of those expelled were reintegrated, but probably a number of the revisions concerned cases prior to 1936.

As for Stalin, the ambiguity of his situation speaks volumes about the uncertainty of the apparatus during the period of normalization. Three months after having signed his "protest" against the "personality cult," he gave an address to university professors. Instead of eulogizing the regime's scientific conquests, he emphasized the need to break with traditions and the scientific import of the exploits of "practical people" like Stakhanov. He warned that Lenin's "scientific discovery" of the inevitability of the "victory of socialism in Russia" was ridiculed by the most revered scientists of his time.[103] These were allusions and warnings that certainly had little to do with science or Stakhanov. But the maneuvers and counter-maneuvers of the "amnesty" period, and the "selective police purge" had occurred so far from any publicity that the more than Byzantine undertones of his declarations had little chance of being understood. Yet it seems likely that Stalin sought to break the monopoly of the advocates of amnesty over the media and certainly over the most important political actions of the period, and it seems that his efforts worried his adversaries. It would be otherwise hard to explain why two speeches he gave during the fall were never published. Although his last theoretical contribution on dialectical materialism (the famous fourth chapter of the *Brief Course of the History of the CPSU*)[104] received toward mid-September all the honors due to a scientific event, the press did not bother to reproduce the words he addressed, a few days later, to the directors of the automobile industry. Probably this had been a short speech, of which we know nothing except that it existed.[105] Likewise, toward the end of October, the press practically ignored a speech he gave during a reception in honor of valiant women pilots. From the few lines that *Pravda* discreetly devoted to the

102. G. Solodij, "Beznakazannye Klevetniki," *Pravda,* August 26, 1938, p. 2; N. Ivanenko, "Resitel'no Borot'sja s Klevetnikami," *Pravda,* September 20, 1938, p. 2; G. Solodij, "Kak v Kirgizii Vypolnjajut Resenija...," *Pravda,* October 18, 1938, p. 2; B. Zolotov, "Neobosnovannye Iskljucenija," *Pravda,* November 5, 1938, p. 2; V. Makarov, "Kto Vozglavljaet Partkollegiju...," *Pravda,* December 7, 1938, p. 3; D. Voroncihin, "Kak v Kurske...," *Pravda,* December 20, 1938, p. 2; *XVIII. S'ezd..., op.cit.,* pp. 523-524; *Istorija KPSS,* t. 5, kn. 1 (Moscow, 1970), p. 21; A.L. Unger, "Stalin's Renewal of the Leading Stratum" *Soviet Studies,* vol. XX, p. 326; and N. Ivanenko, "Resitel'no Borot'sja...," *Pravda,* September 20, 1938, p. 2; *Partijnoe Stroitelstvo,* n. 5 (1939), p. 32; *XVIII. S'ezd..., op.cit.,* p. 563.

103. Stalin, *op.cit.,* pp. 276-277.

104. See *Pravda,* September 12, 1938.

105. "Osmotr Novyh Avtomobilej v Kremle," *Pravda,* September 24, 1938, p. 1; I. Loksutov, "Novye Avtomobili," *ibid.,* p. 3.

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occasion, it is evident that Stalin spoke about the value of human life.[106] His remarks might have been topical, for in the following weeks, the first secretary of Moscow, Ugarov, the head of Komsomol, Kosarev, and the most celebrated ex-specialist in discovering "enemies," Ezov, were eliminated.[107]

Nonetheless, during the final act of the normalization period, at the 18th Party Congress that met in March 1939, Stalin espoused the views of his critics. With them he held that the "destroyed enemies" had just been old oppositionists who had inevitably become secret agents of foreign powers.[108] Although he condemned the errors committed during the purge and promised that there would be no further purge in the party, basically he argued that it had succeeded and he refrained from imitating those who now attributed all excesses to manipulations by "carefully camouflaged saboteurs."[109] This was practically the only "deviation" he allowed himself. His obstinate return to the thorny point raised at the preceding Congress, i.e., the need to implement control mechanisms which would guarantee the execution of decisions of state-party governing organs arose from no "dissident" wish. Past experience had abundantly proven the need for an effective control system, so all important speakers had to broach this subject.[110] But Stalin's proposals subsequently approved by the delegates, which aimed at instituting a highly centralized system for nominating and supervising all cadres,[111] were not fundamentally new, compared with the previous order of the "struggle against enemies." Nothing guaranteed that the conflicts resulting in the "denunciation of enemies" would cease to trouble the state-party.

These conflicts would, in fact, persist and lead to other, sometimes violent confrontations for the last fourteen years of the "Stalin era." But after March 1939 Stalin would never again speak of them, at least not before the general public. He would not speak publicly or publish any work for more than two years after the 18th Congress, until July 1941, two weeks after the German attack. Although the years 1939-1941 were marked by tensions within the state apparatus, the immense efforts demanded by national defense once again served to tighten the cadres' ranks. It is with this unity dictated by extreme necessity as a backdrop that Stalin pronounced nine speeches during the war and four short speeches during the spring of 1945. They all dealt with military, diplomatic and patriotic subjects. It was in February 1946 that he spoke in public for the last time on the war experiences, foreign policy and the regime's economic progress. The two other short speeches he gave before his

106. "Priem v Kremle Geroiceskogo Ekipaza Samoleta 'Rodina'," *Pravda*, October 28, 1938, p. 1.

107. For the circumstances of their disappearance, see my "Conflits Sociaux et Politiques en URSS," *op.cit.*, pp. 347-349.

108. Stalin, *op.cit.*, pp. 368, 370, 372, 381; *XVIII. S'ezd...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 71-83, 403, 477-478, 534.

109. Stalin, *op.cit.*, pp. 373-374; *XVIII. S'ezd...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 89, 176, 517, 519, 520-521, 529.

110. *XVIII. S'ezd...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 106-108, 143, 186, 224, 266, 429-530, 557-558.

111. Stalin, *op.cit.*, pp. 379, 400; *XVIII. S'ezd...*, *op.cit.*, p. 528; *KPSS v Rezoljucijah...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 371-373.

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death dealt with international politics. A certain number of written statements were published after March 1939, all dealing with international relations. And his works, at least all those that were published, are extravagant pieces of pedantry on Clausewitz's military art, on linguistics, and on a projected manual of political economy.

The Soviet state-party was not to be the theater of mobilization and counter-mobilization, in a manner comparable to the "Great Purge," until 1952. Stalin's most illustrious colleagues also rarely spoke out, except in worn-out slogans. But occasionally, some of them launched initiatives or denounced those of their colleagues,[112] never failing to pay tribute to Stalin, who remained singularly silent on the great problems of the state-party. Some of his published works, however, are ambiguous. Published early in 1947, one year after its composition as dated, his letter on military science denounced the servile repetition of maxims from the classics of Marxism-Leninism, complained against the "personality cult," deplored (quite timidly) the facility with which specialists are accused of "lacking party spirit," and called for a critical reevaluation of all authorities' precepts.[113] The critique of the obsequious invocation of infallible authorities reappears in texts written for the linguistics debate carried on in the summer of 1950 in *Pravda*.[114] One of these letters was written to intervene in this discussion, while the others reply to questions asked by some of the readers of the first text. In addition to ideological problems, particularly those concerning the linguistic epiphenomena of revolutionary changes, indignation against the unimpugned arbitrariness of one, almost omnipotent school of linguists motivates his intervention and the first of his replies, while the others, published a bit later, deal only with theoretical questions. Stalin's linguistic works, in fact, had no effect outside scientific circles. But the circumstances of this affair make it doubtful that the "Supreme Leader's" ambition was to claim to be an eminent authority in linguistics. Since the summer of 1946, vehement discussions and political campaigns had occurred in literary, theatrical, musical and film circles as well as in philosophy, economics, history, and the biological and physical sciences.[115] These discussions and campaigns would have provided many excellent opportunities for Stalin to assume the role of incontestable authority in all the arts and sciences. All these fields had their dominant cliques and it surely ought not to have escaped a number of readers of the first "linguistic texts" that it was the same in practically all fields and at all levels of economic, administrative and political activities. Why the Byzantine allusions to the subject of linguistics —

112. G.V. Rauch, *Geschichte des Bolschewistischen Russland* (Frankfurt, 1963), pp. 422-423; R.W. Pethybridge, *A History of Postwar Russia* (London, 1966), pp. 49-57; Schapiro, *op.cit.*, pp. 507, 519.

113. Stalin, *op.cit.*, t. 3 (XVI), pp. 29-34.

144. Cf. *Pravda*, August 2, 1950.

115. A. Werth, *Russia: The Post-War Years* (London, 1971), pp. 197-216; B. Moore, Jr., *Terror and Progress in the USSR* (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 114-153; D. Joravsky, *The Lysenko Affair* (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 97-157; Rauch, *op.cit.*, pp. 398-401, 420; Schapiro, *op.cit.*, pp. 529-533.

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especially since, shortly before their publication, an electoral campaign took place during which all the regime's dignitaries gave speeches except for the unanimously acclaimed author of *Marxism and Linguistics?*[116]

Though the problem of tyrannical cliques was not broached openly, it is the underlying theme of the most violent diatribes that accompany the preparatory works of the 19th Congress in 1952, and which end in a series of spectacular actions and counter-actions at the end of 1952 and in 1953 — strategic operations which continue, in ever renewed forms, practically until the 1960s. Launched in 1951 in some remote regions, the appeals, slogans and war cries, which prepare for the first Congress to be held since 1939, exhort to self-criticism, ask that the higher echelons pay attention to critique emanating from the party's lower ranks, condemn the procedure of promoting cadres by the sole criterion of friendship ties, and denounce the lack of discipline among leading functionaries.[117] Shortly before the Congress one began to hear warnings against the lack of vigilance and the possible infiltration of "imperialist agents" within the party.[118] It was at this moment, at the Congress' opening, that Stalin's last works were made public.[119]

But those who had hoped that the "Supreme Leader" would clear up an increasingly entangled situation were to remain unsatisfied. The works were documents written, for the most part, during the winter and spring of 1952, dealing, sometimes quite confusedly, with questions of a hardly topical nature, raised by the preparation of a manual of political economy. These texts, known under the title of *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, allowed a number of speakers at the Congress to devote themselves solely to celebrating the scientific event, while others touched on the thorny questions of "self-criticism," the selection of cadres, discipline, and "vigilance."[120] Contrary to a long tradition dating from the 1920s, it was not Stalin who presented the Central Committee's report, nor did Stalin intervene in the course of the deliberations. Only at the end of the Congress did he give a short speech, the last public address of his life, on international questions.[121] And he died, in March 1953, without openly taking part in ongoing conflicts.

Stalin's disappearance from the open confrontations of the Soviet state-party does not necessarily mean that he did not participate at all in the apparatus' internal conflicts after 1939. But the outcome of his actions during 1936-1938 gives us no cause to think that his postwar efforts were more successful than his efforts during the "Great Purge."

The "real Stalinism" of the 1930s, namely the tendency represented by Stalin himself, provided two possible answers to the pressing need to assure a regular functioning of governmental mechanisms: the creation of institutional correctives based on the functionaries' collective responsibility,

116. Cf. *Pravda* between March 3 and March 11, 1950.

117. R. Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR* (London, 1961), pp. 129-153; G.D. Embree, *The Soviet Union Between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses* (The Hague, 1949), p. 5; *Pravda*, between September 4 and October 2, 1952.

120. G. Brunner, *Das Parteistatut der K.P.d.S.U. 1903-1961* (Cologne, 1965), p. 38; Schapiro, *op.cit.*, p. 521; Embree, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

121. Stalin, *op.cit.*, t. 3 (XVI), pp. 312-315.

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and, more important, mobilization of those outside the leading circles of the party to control the state apparatus. But as sincere as was the intention to institutionalize a sort of control by the party masses or even by the non-party masses, followers of "real Stalinism" did not seek to create mass organs for managing state affairs. Far from it: they just wanted to guarantee a controllable operation of the apparatus, to eliminate dilatory and unpopular "centrifugal" practices among the cadres, and to reduce the tensions between the state-party and the rest of society. This implied the perfecting and refinement of the main pillar of the system — the apparatus — and not its destruction. So much so that they were ready to retreat as soon as they saw themselves incapable of influencing by means of the state-party the masses that they had been trying to mobilize.

No less interested in regulating the functioning of management than the "real Stalinists," the most clear-sighted of their adversaries recognized that, even if the apparatus' activities escaped control, its political monopoly, which the control strategies were meant to strengthen, was basically incompatible with every intervention by elements outside the leadership or the party. A number of them were recruited among the politicians who were originally part of the "Stalinist" camp; others were the most capable among the defenders of "centrifugal" practices, i.e., those who had managed to survive the attack against "enemies." The experiences of 1936-37 proved to them that keeping intact the state-party's monopoly and the unity of its forces in the face of the rest of society had to take precedence even over assuming a uniform and controllable functioning of the apparatus that would have won popular consent. Thus, they were led to adopt "anti-Stalinist" positions during the decisive confrontations of the "Great Purge." But the problem that had been at the root of the 1936-37 conflicts, the impossibility of controlling the apparatus, could not be resolved: it continued to haunt the party and to cause rifts in the victorious camp.

The "real Stalinism" of the 1930s, being part of the contradictory realities of the time, represented a very different strategy from the policy that came to be imposed around 1938-39. Consequently, it seems paradoxical that, while a number of its partisans were originally strong defenders of the prerogatives of cadres, others who first supported them, went over without too much difficulty to the opposite camp. But the paradox is only apparent. Far from being manifestations of contingent incoherence, the chaotic and massive about-faces of the actors in the purge campaigns were obeying the same logic that in the last analysis necessarily governed every personal or collective choice of the cadres: to protect the apparatus and their positions within it, and to shelter both from all challenges. This fundamental preoccupation, the care to preserve intact the monopoly of the state-party has never ceased being the common denominator of all strategies and counter-strategies of the "Great Purge," and inevitably renders them interchangeable. Despite its notable differences from the tendency that emerged victorious, "true Stalinism" embodied the same political project as the current that defeated it. Therefore, no judgment of political value distinguishes it from its opposition other than the accuracy of

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historical terminology. The term "Stalinism" has become over the last 50 years a rather comfortable password, allowing one to class extremely heterogeneous phenomena under a single vague category. Indeed, it is an integral part of the most diverse political vocabularies and mentalities. It would thus be presumptuous to hope that pedantic, empirical research could erase such a standard word from our vocabulary. But, if we have succeeded in showing that the concept of "Stalinism" as currently used hardly constitutes an efficient tool for the comprehension of Soviet realities, and that the latter can, nonetheless, be apprehended and deciphered from specific but relatively abundant materials, and to a large extent, by means of ordinary historical methods — then our efforts will not have been in vain.

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FACING THE WAR*

by Cornelius Castoriadis

The following reflections have their origin in a conjunction of several events: the Russian invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; the popular uprising and the toppling of the Iranian regime followed by a combination of anarchy and crude theocracy; the Vietnamese conquest of Cambodia which followed the extermination of half of the Cambodian population by "their own" rulers; the installation of governments supported and maintained by the Russians in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Southern Yemen; the "energy crisis"; accelerated inflation; the foundering of what had up till now appeared to be the tranquil course of modern capitalism.

With the possible exception of the resurgence of religion as a social and political factor in Iran, none of these events by themselves present significant novelty. Nonetheless, the historical terrain has been rudely modified (at least our image of this terrain, though at the boundary they amount to the same thing). The summation, or better the synergy, the multiplication and reciprocal exponention of these events and their effects, demonstrates a renewed and aggravated crisis of the world system of domination — following a phase of relative stability between 1953 and 1973. The effect that these events will have on the socio-historic base of the era is inestimable: growing wear of the social fabric and the decomposition of the mechanisms of social direction in the Western countries of modern capitalism; internal impasse of Russian bureaucratic society and the *acceleration* of its imperialist expansion; inability of capitalism to transform and truly assimilate the immense regions of the Third World — Islamic countries, India, Africa — and the crises which result.

Once again, the instability and internal problems of the world system of domination is such that we find ourselves in the shadow of a world war. It is not a question of making "predictions" on the proximity, remoteness or the further indefinite postponement of such a war. The reader who sees the following as a "prediction" gives it a completely opposite meaning. It is a matter of *orienting* oneself in a situation in which the prospect of war has once again become a decisive ingredient which includes the real possibility and probability of an open confrontation of the two superpowers — the two super gangs. This possibility in turn becomes an active factor in actual developments. For the present, and no doubt in the coming years, the world situation is not thinkable without taking into account, first and foremost, the prospect of war.

We can do nothing about the evolution of the present situation, which only makes sense in reference to war, be it proximate or deferred. Nor can we do anything about the attitude of the great numbers of people, here and there — on the other side of the iron curtain — who alone could stop this process. What depends on us, in the face of this threatening cataclysm, is to contribute

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to the survival of the most vigorous and numerous seeds of a critical spirit, of lucidity, of liberty and of responsibility. For this, and in face of the concert of mystifications that has already risen in pitch — this pitch is still nothing in face of what awaits us in coming years — and is coming from all sides, it is above all a question of seeing clearly.[1]

1. This text was written in January-February 1980. The second part, scheduled to appear in Fall, 1980, eventually will be published with this as a book.

I did not write this as a university thesis, and I did not wish to excessively enlarge the text and multiply the references or secondary discussions in relation to the main text. I could have produced dozens, if not hundreds, of citations. I felt it would be superfluous for me to do so, since I refer to obvious facts that one is forced to assume are known to all those who follow the daily press with even a minimal attention. If, for example, in regard to the discourse evoked in the text on the installation of new tactical nuclear arms in Europe, someone asked: what are the Pershing missiles, the SS-22s and the Backfires — since discussions of these apparatuses and their respective capabilities have filled the columns of the papers for months — or: what makes you say it will take several years for their installation — since it is a matter of official declaration published everywhere — I do not consider it incumbent on myself to fill this kind of information lack. More subtle is the case of the philosopher who has vaguely heard mention of an object named the MiG 25, but would not know if this airplane outclasses the corresponding American plane, and throughout not being able to understand that its existence and its production in series, laterally and in amount implies a society *absolutely different* from what we have analyzed for 35 years as the "civilian" Russian society. This lack of technological information or sociological imagination is something I cannot supply. But I do not believe that there is a line of partition here between "informed people" or specialists, and others. The effects of the will not to see are prodigious. One can be a "political" journalist (I have met some) and not take into account — or want to take into account — the total inability of the NATO forces in Europe to stop a Russian offensive of classic means. Now, the fact that the NATO forces stationed in Europe have always been, and after 30 years remain, incapable of accomplishing the "classic" mission assigned to them in theory: delaying a Russian offensive long enough to allow an American mobilization and the transport of United States units to Europe (a task that would actually take several months!) — this fact is recognized and proclaimed officially and regularly by those responsible year after year. (And that by itself suffices to support the argument of the major portion of this text.)

It is obvious that this text is an "article of opinion," and I do not see how it could be otherwise for a text approaching these issues. Now, we could bury our heads in the sand (the temptation to do so is certainly very strong: the idea of possible war is disturbing to the highest degree). One takes the risk — though it actually is not one, since one takes one anyway, even in saying: it is not really so serious, or even: the situation is highly enigmatic — in forming an opinion before the events, to the best of one's information and judgment, and expressing it. Political life is *necessarily* based on opinion, the *doxa*. There is no science of the things to come and future "possibilities." But without a "view" of things to come there is no possible position or political activity. Philosophy, the ontology of history or the thought of historical being in general as it is, is not my aim here.

In short — the most difficult point — all opinions are certainly not equal, *and* there is no existing *a priori* procedure to decide between them. There is a native and irreducible faculty of mind, analogous to the Kantian faculty of judgment, but even closer to the Aristotelean *phronesis*, badly translated by the Latin *prudentia*; let's call it the faculty to orient oneself in history (as already in life). The ability to discern in the chaos of things, information, tendencies, possibilities, arguments, reasoning, objection and counter objections, what matters and what does not matter, what is very probable and what is only slightly so, the fact that has acquired or could acquire decisive importance and the one that can be neglected or subordinated — this is an aptitude that all possess to a greater or lesser degree of importance, which is certainly considerably developed with experience, interest, collision with things, the possibility of free discussion, but which is not reducible to "rational" procedures. Modern Greek expresses it in saying that someone "knows what it is about." Proust himself consecrated several beautiful lines, in regard to the diagnosis of a great doctor, the intuition of a military leader, the flair of a detective. The faculty of judgment is the ability to subsume the case under the rule: but someone who, in front of a patient, mentally enumerates all the diseases he studied, is not and will never

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Of course, it takes two to make a war. But it does not follow that the character and "responsibility" of the two parties in a conflict is necessarily the same. Nor does the designation of an aggressor, the assigning of the initiative and immediate responsibility in the launching of the war decide the question of the respective rights and wrongs, or of the political position to adopt in face of the conflict.

It is necessary to emphasize from the start that, confronted with these questions, the habitual modes of thought are of no help: they rather form a screen. In particular, traditional "left" ideology, with its empty, shabby, worn-out sempiternal schemas clearly operates here to mask reality. The Russian invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 (which would have resulted in wars if it were not for the overwhelming material disproportion between the aggressor and the victim), the territorial conquest and the *de facto* annexation (because that is what it is) of Cambodia by Vietnam, is condemned or "explained" for good or for bad, following the particular catechism that one professes. We hear the same pseudo-theory of "the motors of war," the same appeal to the "economic" pseudo-analysis, the same conclusion: war is inevitable when it is made by the (private) capitalists and it is an accident when it is made by the Russians.

Now the first fact in need of consideration and explanation is: of the two superpowers that confront each other, only Russia is pursuing, and actually *is able to* carry out an offensive politics. It was not finance capital that sent the Cubans to Ethiopia, the falling rate of profit that led the Vietnamese to Cambodia, the devalorization of capital that obliged the Russians to invade Afghanistan. And it certainly was not the necessity to defend Russia — it being "defended" as well as it could necessarily and possibly be from the time of its acquisition of the H-bomb and its corresponding delivery systems, that is, for over 25 years — which ceaselessly pushed the Kremlin to augment and accumulate terrestrial weapons of war (the domain in which it possessed overwhelming superiority from the start, and which continues to grow), to construct a navy that rivals the Americans', and to begin to gain a superiority in nuclear armaments. This politics was followed, and this gigantic accumulation of armaments was made with considerable efficiency in a country which is still not even close to succeeding in satisfying what have come to be called the "elementary" needs of the population, where the totality of the civilian economy is in a lamentable state, where agriculture — previously exported for millenia — does not succeed in feeding the population. The alternative, wheat or the H-bomb, was completely and categorically decided upon by the Kremlin some time ago.

A parenthesis is necessary here. The "mounting" Russian armament expenditures are not, and evidently cannot, be known (contrary to the armament expenditures of the so-called "Western" countries). There are several reasons for this, of which it will suffice to merely mention the first: the

be a doctor. And whoever, in regard to the problems discussed in this text, objects that I have not spoken of China or Japan is someone "who does not know what it is about."

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official Russian budget is meaningless in all respects, and in the absence of any margin of public control no one can know what part of the military expenses are concealed in the budgets of different administrations, ministries, etc. That is just one of the many secondary benefits for a truly democratic regime that is based on the authentic expression of popular will in a single party which receives 99.99% of the votes at all the elections. The exercise of estimating these expenditures to which the "Western" experts permanently devote themselves to (the conclusions, moreover, being frequently changed) is futile. Not only are their bases completely uncertain, the effort is *conceptually* impossible. For example: even comparing the GNP of France and the U.S. in "real terms" — or of the France of 1979 to the France of 1975 — poses problems which in principle are rigorously insoluble. Without entering into technical details, simply indicating that the method most frequently followed by the "Western" experts in making their comparisons — estimating how much it would cost the U.S. to produce the same quantity of armaments, to maintain the same number of men under arms, etc. — runs into the same problem. Two systematic differences appear here (recognized and "theoretically" taken into account): the maintenance of a Russian soldier costs far less than the maintenance of an American soldier; the production of all technological products, even the most simple, must cost much more in Russia than in the U.S. But how much more? The discussion is futile if it aims at comparing the military potentials, because in any case, its point of departure must be presenting these military potentials (in terms of "objects" or real entities) as known. If one knows that the Russians have 2000 ICBMs of approximately so much power, and the Americans have 1000 of which such a proportion are "mirved" (with multiple warheads), that is a pertinent fact, not their respective costs in dollars or rubles. It is the same for global comparisons: what one party or the other spends in "dollars" contributes nothing to knowing whether two supplementary American aircraft carriers balance four supplementary Russian armoured divisions.

The only thing that counts here are the use values: quantities and qualities. The "summation" of these use values (the transformation of these vectors into scalars) will not be made before the hour of truth. What is actually well known, that is, from the "quantitative" point of view, is the overwhelming superiority of the Russians in the domain of "conventional" war, and their equal or superior nuclear power to that of the Americans. As for quality, the results of the Yom Kippur War (individual anti-tank weapons, aircraft, etc.), as well as their space program, permits no thought of inferiority.

Lets close the parenthesis and ask ourselves the following question: how is it that, in a country that — leaving aside the problem of agriculture — has not succeeded in provisioning its stores with eyeglass frames nor blue jeans, that must have recourse to foreign (capitalist) firms to set up auto factories, Pepsi-Cola, foundries, to obtain petroleum drilling equipment, etc. — how then, in such a country, can one dispose of the technological and productive means necessary to establish an arsenal and an armament industry with a global

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output superior to that of the U.S.? There is only one possible response. It is evident that — and in view of the results it is a tautology — there is not one Russia, but two. There is not a Russian "economy" and "production," there are two. There is a Russian "civilian" life with its production and economy, and a Russian "military" life with its production and economy. It is to the first, and the first only — "civilian" Russia — that the perfectly justified recognition of the distinctions between several sectors relate:[2] the "official" planned sector (which stocks the stores with inferior, unusable or nonexistent merchandise), the sector reserved for the private consumption of the bureaucracy (special shops, etc.), the "free" sector recognized or tolerated (market of certain agricultural products, for example), and the black market. As for the other, it is constituted by the systematic skimming of all the best resources of all categories — evidently, in the first place, human resources — in all the areas of interest for the military apparatus. It is not difficult to imagine how they are able to do this: suppose that in France the first 30% of the students who finish at the head of the entry examination or final tests of the "prestige schools" were drafted and enrolled into a caste provided with all kinds of privileges, with a standard of living several times higher than they would have elsewhere. The "material" products themselves are only a secondary question since the army possesses its special foundries, its special electronic factories and even cloth manufacturers, or they can simply carefully choose the products that pass their tests for quality from "general" production — leaving aside the rest, that is to say the junk, for the "civilian sector." At any rate, it is only a question of *proportion*: the army has no need of its own fields of wheat or cotton — and the armament factories are evidently under its direct and total control. Inversely, this skimming aggravates the chronic debility of the "civilian" economy, which is essentially the result of the resistance of the producers and the profound irrationalities inherent in bureaucratic management.

This is not a matter of Kremlinology, a generally ridiculous and, at best, a futile enterprise. I am not saying that the military clique actually has a greater influence in the Politbureau than any other, for it is not a matter of military cliques, but of the army as a social body. It is a question of sociological conclusions that almost inevitably lead to this factual statement: Russia has become the primary world military power with all that that presupposes industrially and technologically at the same time that it has not succeeded in collecting the crop at times of already insufficient wheat harvests. We see practically two separate worlds, except that the second furnishes raw material — coal as well as infantry — to the first. Society and economy operate as if they were perfectly divided into two parts. Everything operates as if the "military society" formed a *separate society* within a "general" Russian society (and obviously to a degree qualitatively different than of the military *establishments* in "Western" countries). Given what the army as social body

2. For example, see the article of G. Duchene, "L'officiel et le parallele dans l'economie sovietique," *Libre*, 7, pp. 151-188.

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succeeds in extracting from Russian society, and what is "costs," the question becomes: to what degree is Russian society — as we have thought for decades — still a society dominated by the bureaucracy, whose active center, whose heart and soul is the party-state; and to what degree is it not already, or in the process of becoming, a stratocracy (*stratos*=army), the army as social body assuming, by the intermediary of the upper echelons, the direction and orientation of society?

What the army extracts from society and what it costs: in this regard the discussion of "military expenditures" in economic terms makes sense (as already stated, it does not compare the international military potentials). Keeping in mind the qualifications and reservations formulated above — which cannot be sufficiently emphasized — the best possible estimate, in terms of size, is that the total Russian military expenditures must represent a proportion of the social product three times greater than that of the U.S.; something in the order of 15% of the social product in the Russian case, against something in the order of 5% in the case of the U.S. (taking the absolute difference in the production of the two countires into account, one could note that it is such proportions which assure an approximate equality of the "value" of their expenditures). To understand what this means one must keep in mind that a modern economy in a country of strong growth (for example Germany, France of Italy in the period 1950-1973) does not devote more than 10% of its social product to net investment, i.e., to the accumulation of its capital, to the production of means of production above and beyond the replacement of worn-out or obsolete means, which are the precise conditions of this growth (that, again, "qualitatively" and in terms of size, without forgetting all the reservations raised by the measurability of the social product, the concept of "net" investment as soon as there is a technical change, etc.). However, the "growth" (certainly in the capitalist sense of the term — but it has never operated in any other way in Russia, i.e., "catch up to and surpass America") of the Russian economy, to a great extent, has been "sacrificed" to the army. These quantitative considerations are reinforced if one keeps in mind the "qualitative" effects of the skimming of which I spoke above: it is not 15 engineers out of 100 that the army drafts; it is the 15 "best."[3]

3. I must emphasize and remind the inattentive reader that my argument is *not* based on the proportions of military expenditures. These may soon reach 20 percent of the gross national product of the United States without, in itself, changing the "nature" of American society. The economic dimension is *only* invoked here to show that there is a systematic *option* taken and followed, that this option is very expensive, and it remains incomprehensible if it is not placed among the more general and political "options" internally as well as externally. These, in their turn, significantly contribute to forming Russian society. It is useless to state that when I speak of "options" I am hardly thinking of a punctual and "rational" decision as is taken in a game of chess.

My argument is based on the qualitative difference — which can only be challenged in the most blatant bad faith — of the effective functioning and production of the "military society" and the "civilian society" of Russia. One does not buy MiG 25s, SS-22s, Backfires and Soyezes in the supermarkets in either Moscow or New York. But what is bought in New York supermarkets is qualitatively closer to what is produced for the Army, and *grosso modo* functions or fails to

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Now evidently such a choice is not without cost, neither in its presuppositions, nor in its internal or external implications and consequences. Thirty years after the end of its "reconstruction," Russia has still not *succeeded* in becoming a "society of consumption" (a transition that countries as poor and as badly managed as Spain or Greece have accomplished in a dozen years). If the "Western" countries can maintain liberal regimes, without Gulag and without ideas, it is — although not solely — because they can furnish the population with "commodities" in increasing quantities each year (which evidently poses the question of the stability of these regimes, if a halt of this growth is prolonged). From the viewpoint of the ruling stratum, a politics which continues to accent repression rather than a blossoming of consumption is evidently not the only possible, nor even in theory, the most advantageous one.

Certainly, we are not in the realm of "rational" choices, and I would be the last one to underestimate the profound irrationalities, the insurmountable "active" inertias that, in more than any other contemporary social regime, dominate the Russian bureaucratic totalitarian system from one end to the other. I have already written on several occasions[4] that a transition towards a more "supple" bureaucratic regime in Russia, though theoretically possible, is nonetheless practically inconceivable. In the final analysis, Russia, much more than other societies, is an immense avalanche which rolls by the force of its own weight and the slope of the terrain, which no one — neither an

function to the same degree. While in Russia a well-known qualitative chasm, daily attested to by *official* Russian periodicals, separates the two sectors. This is the reason why the idea of Russian military *over-stockage* — the Russian military chiefs learned from experience in the 1941-44 war to accumulate as many weapons as possible in times of peace, knowing that their production and replacement in time of war is very difficult — without being false, does not respond to the question, does not explain the *explicandum*: that in one of the sectors, the "military" sector, everything seems to function with near perfection, and in the other, the "civilian" sector, everything remains chaotic and debilitated.

One cannot present a factory that manufactures MiG 25s *by itself*. Such a factory is only *materially* possible as one element of an almost complete *subgroup*, a "sub-matrix" of production, which, moreover, is almost completely self contained (except for several inputs of primary materials); constituted by dozens if not hundreds of functioning "branches," all at a level *completely* different from the civilian industry. It is known how a typical Russian factory functions. One can be categorically certain — from the point of view of output — that those factories producing military goods, and everything that it demands, must *not* function like that. And, to cite only one of the innumerable implications of that fact, this also signifies that in these factories there is a completely different attitude on the part of *workers*. How this is achieved, even if it is only by means of higher salaries and other privileges, is still another question to be explored.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to understand that what is in question is not the Russians' capacity to "invent" (or to "reinvent" or to "copy" or "steal" from the Americans) this or that product. Nowadays, it is known that the necessary information to build an atomic bomb is public, and that a physics student could build one by artisanal means if he possessed a small quantity of fissionable material. What is in question is the industrial production of an enormous mass of products of applied high technology that actually function.

These considerations also show that invoking counter examples, Nazi Germany for instance, is futile. Certainly Hitler raised considerably the armament expenditures after 1933, but to equip the *Wehrmacht* he had no need to do more than simply reorient a part of German industry to other final products without changing anything else.

4. In the last place in "The Social Regime in Russia," *Telos*, 38, pp. 32-47.

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individual, nor a ruling body — can lead or direct.

This does not prevent one from discerning constants in this movement, and the question arises with insistence: what is the factor, which for decades has in a coherent, consistent and uninterrupted manner allowed the army to absorb the best part of the country's resources, the part which by now would have made the difference between the actual state of civil penury and the state of a moderately prosperous modern economy? How and why has the "party" been able to systematically make *such* an effective *ex post facto* choice? How is it that there has never been a fraction at the heart of the "party" proposing and imposing a more "political" politics? (Even the Khrushchev episode does not escape this schema; it was Khrushchev who installed Russian missiles in Cuba).

The most plausible response to that question is: because such a fraction would not have had, and has not had, any chance. And it has not, because for sometime the effective power over decisive orientations has belonged to the army, to the heads of the military bureaucratic apparatus. (This was surely not the case under Stalin, for example).

In a totalitarian regime of the Russian type, *given its present situation*, what could prevent those who have the instruments and effective means of power in their hands — the army — from having *the* power itself? In the absence of a political life, of a demonstratable public opinion, of institutional controls, of *effective* legal regulation of the accession to and succession of the supreme posts, what could be a counter force to the real force of the army? On what could the power of the party rest?

Surely the power of the party has never rested on anything but the imaginary, in the fullest sense of the term. I will return to this question in all its most important aspects later. It is a question of the imaginary in its most apparent and general sense: as it is embodied and instrumentalized in and by Terror on one side, by Ideology on the other.

What could be more horribly "real" than the Terror, and the Russian Terror above all, the tens of millions of cadavers, the decades passed in the Gulag? Certainly, but what were the *necessary* conditions of the Terror? One of its bases, the most important, was demonstrating to millions of people that they could not, that it was not possible to resist it. How this *representation* came to be and to prevail, what it was rooted in, is not our issue here. But Solzhenitsyn and other dissidents have said and repeated what we have known for some time, at least since La Boetie. In sum, the Terror would not have been "inevitable" if everyone had not, in some manner, concurred: that alone made it inevitable. On the other hand, why was it Stalin who arrested and executed Yagoda, or Yezhov, etc., and not the inverse? Why was it that the other members of the Politbureau executed Beria during its session, and not a squad of Beria's men who arrested these members before the session of the Politbureau started? As much as the most primitive of primitives believes in his fetish, so much did Yagoda believe that Stalin was untouchable. Yet Brezhnev showed in practice, in 1964, that Khrushchev was not

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untouchable.[5] In short: the party could only have wielded the Terror if everyone believed the party wielded the Terror.

Now the Terror no longer exists in that form, at any rate, it no longer is what it was.

And from now on Ideology no longer exists either. For some time the vulgar catechisms of Stalin (or Mao) have been able to play a social and historic role independently of their "intrinsic" quality. They still do so, but elsewhere: in Africa or Latin America. The fact is that they no longer do so in Russia; no one believes in them, the party bureaucracy no more than the rest of the population. Russian society has become — or is tending to become — a *cynical* society.[6] The party is more than a simple collection of self-co-opted careerists. It is, and must always claim to be, Everything — and it is practically Nothing. In one sense, it proclaims its own death, and it does so in many ways, as the day from Brezhnev's mouth it proclaimed: don't wait for anything else, there is no other "socialism" before us, the only socialism is that which exists here and now, in Russia "socialism is really existing." Briefly, there is no other "historic future" than this appalling present.

The party, always "functionally" a parasite, proclaims itself historic parasite. It has "accomplished its historic task," lead Russia to socialism — that is to say, produced this lame and miserable industrialization. The "function" it retains — the "direction" of society — it accomplishes as poorly as possible, and does so in full view and knowledge of the entire world. For the nth time, at the end of last year, Brezhnev was obliged to publicly proclaim that almost nothing had gone right; the economy had stagnated, productivity also, that all the measures taken, repealed, retaken, had been in vain.

The only "Ideology" that remains, or can remain, living in Russia is Grand Russian Chauvinism. The only imaginary which retains a historical efficacy is this nationalist — or imperial — imaginary. This imaginary does not need the party, except as a mask, and above all, as an instrument of propaganda and action for international penetration. Its organic vehicle is the army. The army, in opposition to the party — which remains incapable of resolving the question of its "leadership" — is an essentially *stable* structure, which combines, since it has rid itself of the pernicious interferences of the party, the stability and regularity of a military-bureaucratic apparatus of the traditional type, with the traits and the "practice" of a modern bureaucracy dedicated to the task of its self-adaptation and modification. The army is the *only truly modern sector* of Russian society — and the only sector which functions effectively.

Everything indicates that it is no longer possible to speak of Russia as a society dominated by that creation of Lenin perfected by Stalin, the totalitarian party-state. Everything points to the fact that it will be

5. I emphasized this aspect — a constant feature of tyrannical regimes, as admirably portrayed by Shakespeare, particularly in "Richard II," in "la chute de Khrouchtchev," in *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, 38 (October 1964).

6. Cf. "The Social Regime in Russia."

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increasingly necessary to consider Russian society as a *stratocracy*, where the social body of the army is the ultimate instance of real domination (and not only the ultimate guarantee of established order, internally and externally) — which, for innumerable historical and immediate reasons must and will preserve the existence of the party as a mask and as an instrument (both indispensible and deplorable). Its main role increasingly becomes, on the one hand, to manage and sub-contract the "non-military" society in the margins left by the army's demands, and on the other, to be the internal, but above all external *Propagandastaffel* of the General Headquarters of the Russian army. Not being able to conquer the world in the name of Christ, the Czar, or holy Russia, it is infinitely more plausible and effective to do so — as its press-agent Marchais says — in the name of "class struggle on the world scale."

At this stage in Russian society, where the former mode of totalitarianism (Stalinist) has crumbled, the army appears as the only effective force that can continue to hold society together.

Tattooed on the foreheads of the zeks in the Gulag are the words, "slaves of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." Perhaps the time has come to decipher on the brow of all the citizens of the Soviet Union another tattoo written in invisible ink, "Serf of the Grand Army of the Russian Empire."[7]

7. *On the Army as a social body and "military society"*: One can see the brows of the sociologists crease: what is a social body (*corps social*), where have you defined that concept — this type of discussion does not interest me. It is said in French *esprit de corps, corps de metier*, etc. In Russia, it is a matter of — at least, such is my thesis, and if one wants to discuss it it is necessary to understand it — a new social historical reality. Those people who when they hear the word army think of condottieres, lancequentests or of court officers, won't understand very much. In what category can the Russian army of 1980 be placed? In the category of "the Russian army of 1980."This is where the question must be *approached*: the *reality* of what a great *modern* army is (of which in fact there are only one and a half existing examples: the Russian and the American, the latter not really being "deployed"). This is not a matter of officers and soldiers. It is an immense techno-industrial bureaucracy, in which the techno-industrial side is more and more emphasized. To be a "good officer" is not to watch over the impeccable state of the company kits, nor to lead the soldiers into combat, revolver in hand. It is to participate as a specialist in a function of technical qualification in the management of an immense *multi-trust*, which encompasses innumerable activities that must be constantly co-ordinated. In Russia, there must be something on the order of 20 million active people (perhaps 15, perhaps 25, certainly not 1 and certainly not 100 million) integrated into this multi-trust. (I am evidently not speaking of soldiers.) According to *Le Monde* (March 7, 1980) there are 100,000 chemical warfare *specialists*: *nothing but* chemical warfare! (an industry that consumes very little labor-power on the side of production). It makes no difference if the figure is replaced by 50,000 or 150,000. To discuss this reality in terms of a "professional army" or not is to show that one has not understood the question at all. The 18th and 19th centuries are over. The distinction between professional army and an army of conscripts, etc., is now passed. As to the second point: this social body, this "army" that is a multi-trust in Russia, and moreover in view of what the country is, is not and could not be simply another sector juxtaposed to the others. It is a sub-society, a society apart, a "military society" (certainly in the widest sense of the term "military"), which is not the case in the United States. Why? Because in Russia it is qualitatively different than the rest of society. Because it is the *only* — I repeat, the *only* — *modern* sector of this bankrupt society. It is the only one that is *functionally efficient*, and, more and more, the *only* one that is "ideologically" (or imaginarily) efficient, being the natural and organic incarnation of ideology and Grand Russian imperial nationalist imaginary, whereas the ideology of the Party becomes less and less significant. (If, and as much as, the "image of Stalin" is actually put back into circulation, it must be understood that it functions in the succession of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great:

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Power Relations and the Relevant Disequilibrium

Whether one accepts this interpretation, or whether one remains limited to its more obvious implications: the CPSU is completely and profoundly engaged *in sacrificing all other objectives* to a politics of international military superiority, whose consequences will remain the same for the present and into the future. Russia is engaged in a constant process of directly or indirectly expanding its domination, in which the phases of "detente" are only tactical manoeuvres of "obligatory" pauses.

The events of the last years show — and undoubtably the most important in this regard are the events in Africa, not Afghanistan — that this process has entered a critical phase. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan is not important "in itself" (I speak solely, be it understood, in terms of *Realpolitik*) because the Russians already reigned in Kabul. It is important as a sign, and moreover, a challenge. (It is ridiculous to talk of a "miscalculation" of the Russians, not that they didn't commit one, and a grave one, but because it is perfectly well known that they discounted the strong American reaction). It shows that the Russians have decided to continue their expansion each time the occasion presents itself — and moreover, to show, be it by massacring 10 million Afghans, that their domination (direct or by the intermediary of their local lackeys) once established is *absolutely irrevocable.* The constant demonstration of the irreversibility of Russo-communist domination once it is established is a life or death question for the Russian regime: it has taken the place of the assurances formerly furnished by the "laws of history" as to the inevitability of "socialism" (no doubt, dialectically, the Russian tanks are only a moment and instrument of the Reason of History and its laws).

The necessary preconditions of this politics is that the Russians know that they have the benefit of a considerable superiority in power-relations, and they know that the Americans know it as well.

The ridiculous discourse (which is rarely innocent) on the "encirclement" of Russia, the agony and insecurity of the tenants of the Kremlin, etc., like the ravings of the amateur and professional strategists relative to the "balance of terror," the M.A.D. (mutual assured destruction), etc., masks the blatant facts of the situation, which are immediately apparent to any non-prejudiced individual, namely:

1. That on all levels short of total nuclear war there does not exist, nor has

the figure of the supposed vanquisher in the "Great Patriotic War" and founder of Russian world power — not that of the author of *Historical and Dialectical Materialism.*

For 50 years the Party tried to organize and modernize society — it failed lamentably, and says so. In one domain it did not fail: the military domain. How and why did this miracle occur? I say that the Russian army — military society — has made itself what it is over the last 30 years: it has in reality *unencumbered* itself of the Party's grip, of its interferences, of its false statistics, of its appointments based solely on membership to this clan or political clique, etc. Not that such phenomena do not exist in the army: they do, as in all bureaucratic systems. But to a degree that is qualitatively different. The Party only survives by the perpetual camouflaging of reality. Now, that is not and cannot be the case of the army — as the Russian army is and functions.

On the question of "power" and effective relations between the army — military society — and the Party, see the discussion below, in conjunction with the problem of the internal antinomies of Russian society and its dynamic.

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there existed for many years, a "balance" in the relations of forces, but rather a massive imbalance in favor of Russia;

2. That this situation is quite "naturally" exploited to its full potential by the Russians when the occasion presents itself or the events lend themselves to it;

3. That this situation, which is practically impossible for the Americans to redress, pushes the nuclear extremes to the fore;

4. That at the level of nuclear confrontation, and given the present and foreseeable means and technologies on each side, the notions of "balance" and "imbalance" make no sense;

5. That the process leading to war and the conducting of the war itself, infinitely surpasses the capacities of the ruling apparatuses, here and there, to "rationally control" it;

6. That the representation of the effects of nuclear war do not suffice to the slightest extent to suppress the real possibility of such a war.[8]

8. The relevant figures on the relation of forces between Russia and the United States are well known. Two remarks, however, are in order. The Russian war fleet, created practically *ex nihilo* in the last 25 years, only makes sense, as much as by its *size* as by its *composition*, in being destined for *offensive* operations. (I do not speak here of nuclear armed submarines, nor of nuclear anti-submarine forces.) I will abridge a highly complex and ultimately futile discussion on this point: obviously, the distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons (and weapons systems) makes no sense on many levels, and makes sense on others. In sum: as a function of its territory, of its geographic position, of its land army, Russia was and remains unconquerable by "classic" means. And, given the situation of the West, in all respects but ultimately politically, the initiative of a non-provoked nuclear attack was (and remains) unthinkable up until the moment that the Russians had attained "nuclear parity" sufficient to their needs-usage (that would have been in the second half of the 1950s). That was when the Russians started to build a considerable surface fleet (which changed nothing on the thermo-nuclear level) that only makes sense in the perspective of supporting and aiding local offensive operations or, evidently, in the event of total war.

As for nuclear weapons, it is well known that for many years Russia had possessed a significant superiority in numbers of missiles, which is complemented by the fact that the American missiles are mirved (have multiple atmospheric re-entry warheads). This was the situation that SALT II more or less aimed at freezing. But it is equally well known that the Russians now are able to "mirv" their missiles as well: which, without SALT II, would quickly given the Russians an incontestable strategic superiority in this domain. Now, the Pentagon estimates that at the beginning of the 1980s the Soviet attack missiles will be sufficiently numerous and sufficiently accurate to destroy a large percentage of U.S. Minuteman missiles in a surprise attack. The MX system (the continuous deployment of American missiles over a huge expanse of land on a network of tracks, so that the attackers will not know in which silo they will find a missile at a given moment) aims at restoring the strategic American-Soviet balance. The GAO has affirmed that without the limitations contained in SALT II the Russians could even threaten the MX system. In this case, the report affirms that the United States must either expand the MX system at still greater costs, or concede the strategic superiority that the MX system aims at preventing to the Russians. If the present program is maintained, the first of the MX missiles will be in place in 1986 and the ensemble of the 200 will be deployable by 1989." (*International Herald Tribune,* March 8-9, 1980). I pass over the fact that the initial cost estimates ($33 billion) are considered much too low by the United States' own General Accounting Office, and according to that agency it is necessary to replace that with a figure closer to $60 billion. The question for the United States is certainly not dollars. In that even the second figure is not reliable according to the GAO, "because the fundamental decisions have still not been made concerning the manner of deployment of the missiles." According to the same report, "The Department of Defense as well, has not established its priorities in the case of all the envisioned programs not receiving their full budget requests."

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The overwhelming superiority of the Russians on the infranuclear level is as much military as it is politico-military.

The situation is well known on the military plane: the figures and totals are spread over all the newspapers, and it is pointless to review them again. The Russian superiority does not only rest on a massive superiority of power, but is also strategic. The "encirclement" of Russia (that is to say, the fact that the Earth is round) has a completely inverse significance to that given it by the pro-Russian philanthropists: actually Russia holds a *central* position (analogous to that which gave the Germans a powerful advantage during the last two world wars) which allows them to operate "via internal lines."

Europe is a perpetual potential pawn in the hands of the Russians. In a "conventional" war, in view of the power of the Russian army, its size, the proximity of its bases and reservoirs of material and manpower, the Russian divisions could be at Biarritz in several days. Today, as thirty years ago, the mosaic of the NATO divisions stationed in Europe, with their veritable Bable of uncoordinated equipment and logistics, could at the best offer scattered resistance to the Russians. Even that supposes that these divisions would fight and be able to do so: is it possible to have an army in a country — as the case of Italy or France — where perhaps 15-25% of the population prefers to fight on the other side, or at least not against them?

This situation is not modifiable either politically or militarily in the foreseeable future. The installation of new tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, which was decided on at the end of 1979, and will take several years to complete can only *partially* off-set the heavy advantage which the Russians possess in this area as well. It is imbecilic to hypothesise that the Russians will limit themselves to counting the Pershing missiles as they arrive, and restrain themselves for the good will of Giscard from maintaining the advantage that they already have.

In short: if the tactical nuclear weapons are not used, the SS-22s and the Russian Backfires give them several years advantage. And they will maintain this advantage by responding to the recent decisions of NATO by correspondingly increasing their means. Europe's only protection still rests in the ICBM silos and Polaris submarines of the U.S. That is why an *escalation* to the extremes is inscribed in the "logic" of the situation.

This is not only the situation of Europe. The Russians can intervene in many other locations, be it directly, or be it by the Cubans, Ethiopians, Yemenis or Vietnamese: by way of their "conventional" military power; by their central geo-strategic position; or through their "political" know-how by utilizing the local "communist" parties or "National Liberation Movements." It is by such methods that they have installed themselves in three African countries (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia) and perhaps tomorrow in a fourth (Rhodesia) — as in South Yemen, and perhaps tomorrow in North Yemen. The Americans are, and will probably remain, incapable of responding to this "salami tactic." (The few Russian reverses up to now are minor and are more failures to succeed than setbacks: Egypt or Somolia).

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At any rate, since the Russian invasion of Afghanistan it is pointless to debate this further. But from *this* perspective it is important to emphasize that the invasion of Afghanistan is hardly a "local" affair. There is an obvious truth here, which has always been obvious, and since December 1979 even the blind must be able to see it. If the Russians had invaded Iran or Pakistan in the wake of the Afghan expedition (of which there was never any question, despite the serious examination of Mr. Mitterand and the sudden discovery of "warm waters" by various sorts of western hack editorialists), the Americans *would not have been able to do a thing* to oppose them on the ground. Their only possible response would have been total war.

The problem was discussed in a recent Pentagon report, the Wolfowitz Report, a "secret" report which was recently published (*International Herald Tribune*, February 15, 1980) by the American journalist, W. Safire (ex-ghostwriter of Nixon speeches and a "hawk" who is renowned for his moderately low level of intelligence). According to the Wolfowitz report, the question is: "does the United States have the military *project power* in the Gulf (Persian) in the event of a Soviet push into Iran or on the Arab oil fields." But that is clearly not the question. The true question is: what could the United States do if the Islamic phantasmagoria collapses (the Teheran unemployed having had enough Sourates to eat) and the ensuing chaos in Iran leads to an open confrontation between the divisions of the two popes, as the late Joseph Stalin said, namely, the Tudeh (communist) Party on one side, the lieutenant-colonels of the Iranian Army on the other.

The conclusion of the "Wolfowitz Report" is, it seems, that the American forces could not oppose a Soviet military occupation of Iran if Moscow "decided to seize the historic occasion to change the world balance" (*ibid.*). One of the inferences of the conclusion of this report is that "to keep the upper hand in this Iranian scenario, we would be obliged to threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons, or to actually use them." One is once again flabbergasted by the I.Q.'s of the military experts. If the Russians wanted to provoke the Third World War on the battlefield, what need would they have to detour through Iran? And, if they did not want to provoke it, why would they directly and militarily occupy Iran? What use would there then be for the Tudeh Party? What use would there then be for the Cuban volunteers (and one can soon expect Yemenis for operations in an Arab or Islamic country)? But let us suppose that the Russians try to militarily occupy Iran or Pakistan. If the Pentagon decided to respond with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, can we suppose that the Russians would limit themselves to making the sign of the hammer and sickle? In a local war conducted with tactical nuclear arms, the Russians would still probably have the advantage (just taking into consideration the distance of the bases from which the one and the other would operate). But only a madman could believe that such operations would remain limited as to their place, or to their means.

In fact, what the "Wolfowitz Report" shows — and moreover, everything that is known about the American "strategy" — is that the Pentagon is

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incapable, and with reason, of understanding the lessons of Vietnam, the African countries and even (despite the admirable resistance of the Afghan people) of Afghanistan: namely, that the Russian "scenarios" are not military scenarios, but socio-politico-national-military ones. They remain incapable of seeing this because for them social conflict in general (exploited by communist totalitarianism) remains a fallacious Marxist invention. But only these scenarios make sense in the case of Iran, as perhaps tomorrow in Turkey as only they made sense, years ago, in the case of Portugal (and they do not make sense, for all one knows, in the case of Pakistan).

On the American side, the "conventional" military scenarios approach the grotesque. The official estimation of the Pentagon is that it will take one month to put a force of 20,000 men on a maneuverable footing in the Persian Gulf. (It took a week for the Russians to place 80,000 in Afghanistan).

Even if the force were doubled and the time reduced in half, the situation would remain preposterous, or "symbolic" ("semiotic" as one brave French general who will be encountered below said). The 1800 marines that Carter wants embarked on the American fleet in the Gulf are symbolic — as is the garrison in West Berlin. Symbolic of what? Of this, and only this: that an attack would unleash the holocaust. But it is not true to say, as Safire does in the cited article, that "The Russians know that the United States is bluffing. The U.S. is not on the verge of starting the Third World War to "save Iran" or to 'save Middle Eastern oil.'" The Russians may very well delude themselves that they "know" that. No one really knows what the U.S. will do (the President and Pentagon as little as anyone else) and the question is not knowing what they will do in *this* particular case. The question is to know what they will do before the Russian push, which is certainly not destined to finish with Afghanistan. The question is to know, when will the accumulation of "local" advantages by the Russians be considered as being on the verge of passing to the "global" level by the Americans — and what will happen then?

Given the reality of the nuclear "balance of terror," the skindeep calculations of the experts holds little interest in face of the massive body of known facts. From the moment when neither of the adversaries dispose of, nor can dispose of an incontestable wholesale advantage, be it quantitative or be it "technological," and this is perceived as such by the other (for example, the possibility of a preventative precision attack that would "surgically" annihilate the near-totality of the forces of retaliation of the other), the question of knowing that the Russians can atomise 12 billion people and the Americans only 11 is of little interest: alas, the population of the earth only adds up to 4 billion. Let us simply note in passing that the supposed parity, fragile and disputable aim of the SALT II accords, in fact consists in freezing the situation as it would be at the moment when the rapidly ascending curve of the Russian nuclear force intersects the very slowly ascending curve of the American nuclear force. One can leave aside the many other questions relative to SALT II, the means of verification, and above all its insertion into a general framework, not of balance but, as we have already shown, of

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imbalance. The fact is that Russia has shown in practice that Afghanistan interests them much more than SALT II. Evidently, this clearly shows their justified conviction that in the present circumstances the concept of "parity" or "nuclear balance" makes no sense, and that its only utility is to permit the Russians to pose as champions of peace, to allow Kissinger to have himself photographed, and for Nixon or Carter to be elected or reelected. Further, the implication is that the growth of the Russian nuclear force will continue, and as is well known (see *International Herald Tribune*, February 1 and 2, 1980), even supposing a massive effort on the part of the Americans, the supposed "balance" could not be achieved until after 1985, or rather towards 1990. (This situation is principally due to the fact that the Russians, already possessing a great superiority in numbers of missiles are now capable of mirving them — giving them "multiple warheads" MIRV — and they have already started to do so).

But this obscures the essential fact, that at the present level of technology and armaments, the notions of nuclear "parity," "balance" and "imbalance" are beside the point. The value placed on the relations of forces on the *nuclear* level makes no sense, outside of a situation (ended 25 years ago) of a flagrant and massive imbalance which could only consist of a quantitatively overwhelming monopoly by one party of one, or a combination of critically important weapons. (In passing, this is why the "nuclear independence of France," the gargle of the political milieu here, from the Gaullists to Rocard, is a humorless joke. If the Russians wished to invade France, and the Americans did not interfere, they would know that — "at best"! — Kharakov would be destroyed.)

Two factors render the notions of "parity" and "balance" senseless. The first, already mentioned above, is well-known, that the two superpowers are *beyond* balance. They each have an *overkill* capacity. *After* having suffered tremendous destruction, both sides would *still* be able to destroy the other several times over (if only due to the survival of a good number of missile-carrying submarines), that is to say: they'd just be adding rubble to the pile. The *mass* of the disproportionate available means of the two sides is so much beyond the "needs" (!) that it would be useless to figure out their relation on paper.

But there is also a second reason: in light of the possibilities of massive destruction, it is completely absurd to supposedly make exact estimations of the capabilities of each of the adversaries. After leaving the room in which they play war games and computer simulation, one once again realizes that real war has nothing to do with war on paper. For, henceforth, no past "experience," even from the distant past, can serve as a guide. The problems posed by the concrete circumstances of an eventual launching of war, its rhythms, the Western "political" environment, the respective rapidity of detection, the reaction and activation, the accuracy, the mistakes and miscalculations in reasoning or of techniques, by all evidence create a fantastic margin of uncertainty on both sides. (It has just recently come to light that for

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several years a significant portion of American missile-carrying nuclear submarines were not operable).

When the autopsy of the Third World War is made by the historians of the 21st century — that is, if that century can have the luxury of having historians — they will undoubtedly discover a greater collection of stupidities committed, in proportion to the event, by each side than in the First and Second World Wars, where they were legion (Stalin not wanting to believe information that displeased him, Canaris only transmitting part of the information he had, the German cipher code known by the English, Hitler delaying Operation Barbarossa by two months, the French General Staff conducting not the war of 1914, as wrongly stated — in 1914 the Germans had already applied the von Schlieffen plan, to attack through Belgium — but the war of 1870, etc., etc.).

These remarks are a reminder that a "calculated rational strategy" that continues to dominate all representations in this discussion is pure fantasy. This fantasy approaches pure and simple delirium when it is claimed — as it is in the general and official pronunciations of the General Staff, the politicians and the "strategists" — that the "Mutual Assurance of Destruction" (the well-named M.A.D.) guarantees the achievement of a "total rationality" of war — which would have the effect of hereby rendering war impossible.[9] The idea, if one dares to say it, is that, given the present technical levels, if each side possesses a sufficient quantity of missiles that will always survive the possibility of a surprise attack to inflict "unacceptable damages" on the other, no one will start a war, because both would know that the only result would be mutual destruction.

The absurdity of this idea lies, to begin with, in a total mistunderstanding of the actual manner in which decisions are formulated in the apparatuses — which are profoundly and necessarily irrational — in a misunderstanding of historical processes and real politics, and finally in a misunderstanding of the concrete situation that the two adversaries find themselves in. The supposed "balance of terror" is accompanied by, and will be accompanied for the foreseeable future, by an essential imbalance in the relations of forces short of a nuclear confrontation. This in fact effectively *transforms* the world situation — already considerably transformed over the last ten years — into a situation of "imbalance," and sooner or later this transformation will become intolerable for one or the other adversaries.

Things are tragic enough to permit a note of humor. Here are several utterances of General Poirier, from the cited article: "We have entered an era of obligatory politico-strategic rationality.... The adversaries constantly exchange information as to their capabilities of action and reciprocal reaction in regard to their nuclear umbrellas, which can never be used in real acts.

9. For a perfectly logical exhibition — that is to say, perfectly paranoic — of this conception, see the text of General Lucien Poirier in X. Sallantin, *Douze dialogues sur la Defense*, Les Cahiers de la Fondation pour les etudes de defense nationale, Cahiers 9 and 10 (Paris, 1978), pp. 27-43.

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This is a strategy of imagination in which the weapons systems only have a semiotic function [!!!]. Appended, for the information of the eventual aggressors, are the depicted strategic models. . .of the chain reactions that will be decided upon if the aggressor menaces the sanctuary. . .that is because the model describes what will happen. . .in a convincing enough way, so that nothing will happen."

According to the brave General Poirier, having so forseen that the Russians will not menace "the sanctuary," the U.S. will remain at ease. The Russians would be able to install themselves in Mexico or Canada: it suffices that they do not invade Nevada. Who knows what is next? If the Americans succeed in placing their bombs, the President, and the Pentagon in orbit, perpetual peace will be assured.

Nothing can prevent a General Staff (the "decision makers") from *Believing* that the other will attack: no one can prevent them from imagining that temporary circumstances confer on them a passing but decisive advantage; nor can a preventative attack of surgical precision against the other's means necessarily create a situation of sufficient imbalance to force the attacked to renounce continuing the struggle. But above all, no one can ever make actual history into a "semiotic" war game, or conceive of the context in which critical "decisions" will be taken as leaving ample room for an — in any case, non-existing — measured "rationale" of "decision making."

The idea of "unacceptable losses," on which this whole construction is based, is meaningless. Each side can hope to "almost completely" destroy the other, themselves only losing, say, a third of "its" population (which would still leave 150 million Americans or 180 million Russians). Those innocents who believe that just because this mode of calculation is unacceptable for them it is the same for the General Staff and Chiefs of State, should remember that the essential element of the strategy of the great Stalin consisted of carpeting the battlefield with the bodies of Russian soldiers, several waves of attack being freely and deliberately sacrificed for the cause, so that the nth wave could succeed. Moreover, he invented nothing, and this is not what exposes his barbarous traits the most clearly. From the battle of the Marne to the final offensive of the Summer of 1918, that was the essential element of the "strategy" of the graduated, braided and decorated Cartesian, Baconian, and Kantian butchers of the Western Front.

But what has been forgotten throughout is — despite an abundant historic past — that there are no longer any "unacceptable losses" when the adversaries fight with their backs to the wall, when the stakes are total. Nor are there any "objectives of war" which could limit the means. If one wanted to extract a tribute from a population, it is absurd to exterminate them; if one wants to exploit a territory and its inhabitants it makes no sense to completely devastate it. But in the present case the "objectives" are transformed into the pure and simple chance to survive, and that bars any limitation of means. One argues before the Third World War as if it were a matter of the wars of Frederick II or Napoleon — instead of thinking, if one

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must have a historical analogy at any price, in terms of the destruction of Carthage, or the wars of religious and other exterminations. The war we find ourselves before will not be a Clausewitzian war.[10]

10. This article was finished on February 27, 1980, except for the notes, and was sent to the French printer the same day. Since then, here is what I have read in an interview with Andre Sakharov recorded by Kevin Leose, bureau chief of the Washington Post in Moscow (published in *The Washington Post,* March 9, 1980): "*Question:* Will the Soviet government exercise or try to exercise more control over the internal life of its citizens in the new decade? *Answer:* I fear it will. *Question:* Do you think the 1980s will bring fundamental changes in the Soviet economy? *Answer:* Our country faces serious economic difficulties. Among these are shortages of goods, especially foodstuffs, rural and urban manpower shortages, deteriorating workplace discipline, growing alcoholism, pay-scale inequalities, shortages of fuel and many other raw materials, slow growth of labor productivity and decline of capital investment funds, greater losses due to waste and bad planning, shortcomings in public service systems. All these problems encourage the continued militarization of the economy. . . . Any such reforms (as to decentralization) inevitably affecting the very bases of the totalitarian economy and social structure are very unlikely at the present time. In fact, the last few years have seen the heightening of the tendency to compensate for internal defects with external activism, the parasitic exploitation of world progress and resources under the flag of detente abroad while strengthening the militarization of the economy and military-industrial complex at home. The dangers of this development to the world are obvious. *Question:* Do you think the Soviet leadership will continue to be interested in arguments on the limitation of strategic weapons with the United States, and do you think a SALT III agreement will be signed in the next decade? *Answer:* In their imperialist designs for expansion the leadership of the Soviet Union is playing a complicated and dangerous game, but I do not think they are crazy, at least not at this stage of history."

What Sakharov calls "military-industrial complex" corresponds, in my eyes, to what I call the Russian military sub-society.

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FOR A CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SIGN

by Jean Baudrillard

According to Baudrillard, the mainspring of modern society must be located in consumption and in the cultural system in general. As with artistic, intellectual and scientific production, culture is immediately produced as sign and as exchange value. Hence, in modern society consumption defines the stages where the commodity is immediately produced as sign, and signs as commodities. This collection of essays attempts an analysis of the sign form in the same way that Marx's critique of political economy sought an analysis of the commodity form: as the commodity is at the same time both exchange value and use value, the sign is both signifier and signified. Thus, it necessitates an analysis on two levels, in order to provide the same radical critique that Marx developed of classical political economy.

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THE CRISIS OF THE STATE IN THE THIRTIES*

by Antonio Carlo

The 1929 crisis represents a break in the history of contemporary capitalism. The challenge to the State by economic events precipitates a profound transformation. Generally, interpretations of the Great Crisis fall into four types.

1. *The Marxist interpretation in terms of the tendential fall of the rate of profit*,[1] which, however, finds in the Great Crisis its clearest refutation. According to Marx, this law is a result of the increase of the proportion of constant capital (machinery, installations, raw materials) over variable capital (wages). Since it is human labor which creates wealth, the relative decrease of the latter in the organic composition of capital should lead to the fall of the rate of profit. In the United States in the 1920s, at the beginning of the crisis, the relation between wages, productivity, prices, and profits not only safeguarded but also increased the rate of profit.[2] Prices, which had artificially increased during World War I, did not go back to their normal level: their decrease during the second half of the twenties was very modest.[3] Thus, Heilbroner writes: "As production rose to the sky and employment fell, the hourly produce per man increased rapidly; in fact, between 1920 and 1929 it grew by more than 30 percent in the transportation industry, by more that 40 percent in the mines, and by more than 60 percent in manufacturing. This great flux of hourly production meant that wages *could have* significantly increased or prices fallen suddenly. But this did not happen. Only in the railroads did wages go up, by about 5 percent.... Thus the productivity increments did not result in higher wages for industrial workers. Did they perhaps result in lower prices? Yes, in a certain sense. The general cost of

*Translated by Maurice A. Finocchiaro.

1. This interpretation is based on theories elaborated on the eve of the crisis by H. Grossman, cf. *Il Grande Crollo* (Milan: Jaca Book, 1977); *Marx, l'Economia Classica e il Problema della Dinamica* (Bari: Laterza, 1971); *Saggi sulla Theoria della Crisi* (Bari: De Donato, 1975) and reworked by his follower Paul Mattick. Cf. P. Mattick *et al.*, *Capitalismo e Fascismo verso la Guerra* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1976). Even after the 30s, Mattick remained faithful to this account. See P. Mattick, *Critica dei Neomarxisti* (Bari: Dedalo, 1979). Yet, there was no lack of interpretations of the crisis in terms of the theory of overproduction and underconsumption. See N. Moszkowska, *Per la Critica delle Teorie Moderne delle Crisi* (Turin: Musolini, 1974). Mattick, of course, believed that overproduction was only an epiphenomenal aspect of the crisis.

2. See D. Gilman, *Il Saggio del Profitto* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1961;, pp. 86ff. L. Maitan in *La Grande Depressione e la Recessione degli Anni '70* (Rome: Savelli, 1976), pp. 14-15, writes: "During the decade, profits increased almost twice as much as productivity, i.e., 80%, while profits by financial institutions grew by 150%." Thus, while the GNP increased, wages stagnated. The problem was that of recycling the enormous quantity of profits that capital was "creating": not the absence but the over-abundance of profits.

3. See E. Varga, *I Due Sistemi: Economia Socialista ed Economia Capitalista* (Milan: Contemporanea edizioni, 1976), pp. 152ff.; J.K. Galbraith, *The Great Crash* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961); H. Morsel, in AA. VV., *Storia Economica e Sociale del Mondo*, V, 1 (Bari: Laterza, 1979), p. 174. There was also a widening of the gap between increases in production and increases in wages.

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living was reduced by 15 percent between 1920 and 1929. Part of this reduction was due...to lower prices for foodstuffs...but this decrease was not sufficient to redistribute fairly the profits derived from the use of technology in industry. We can say this because *the profits* of large industrial corporations rose to the sky between 1920 and 1929. From 1916 to 1925 the profits of these companies were on the average $730 million per year; from 1926 to 1929 the yearly average was $1400 million. In fact, in 1929 profits were three times those of 1920."[4]

Simultaneously, employment stagnated and, in the most technically progressive sectors, decreased. As a whole, then, the rate of profit did not fall: the light reduction in prices after 1920 was far from what it would have been in the old 19th century context. Thus, it was not by chance that the higher strata of the population where capitalists were concentrated could see an increase of their share of the social wealth. The rate of profit was not in crisis.[5]

2. *The monetarist theory according to which the crisis was due to errors of monetary policies.* Against this thesis, Gordon has written that "The downturn [cannot] be explained by monetary developments. The rise in interest rates was not great enough to discourage business borrowing."[6] Moreover, after 1925 a certain amount of monetary stability had been internationally established, in spite of the overvaluation or undervaluation of some currencies. The collapse of the stock market occurred when the problems of the American economy were evident so that, at worst, it was only an important contributing factor.

3. *The eclectic or coincidental theories.* According to these theories, the crisis is a result of the interweaving of several factors. Here one normally gives great weight to agricultural overproduction, but it hardly needs saying that in America at that time agriculture was a primary sector in name only and that the phenomenon of agricultural overproduction was constant since about 1925. The weakness of agriculture contributed to the accumulation and to the development of oligopolistic industry through unequal exchange in the same way that colonies contribute to the development of the imperialist metropolises. The same holds for international trade. In fact, despite post-1919 protectionistic tendencies, the situation was not catastrophic for the United States. Using 100 as an index for international trade in 1913, by 1928 it had risen to 167 and the ratio of American foreign trade to world trade grew in the same period from 8.3 percent for imports (and 12.4 percent for

4. See R.L. Heilbroner, *Nascita e Sviluppo della Società Capitalistica* (Naples: Liguori, 1978), pp. 193-94.

5. The rate of profit falls during the crisis (see N. Moszkowska, *op.cit.*, p. 40), or better as a consequence of the crisis, so that the connection between cause and effect is reversed: it is not the falling rate of profit that causes the crises, but the opposite.

6. This monetarist thesis is maintained by Friedman and his school. See M. Friedman and A. Jacobson Schwarts, *A Monetary History of the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). For a critique, see R.A. Gordon, *Economic Instability and Growth: The American Record* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 45.

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exports) to 12.4 percent for imports (and 15.4 percent for exports). Between 1925 and 1929 world trade grew by 20 percent, while the increment in industrial production is 23 to 27 percent. For the United States, the situation was even better than the average.[7]

4. *The theory of overproduction* seems the most adequate. There is overproduction and, correspondingly, underconsumption, when the system is unable to absorb all the wealth it produces. Overproduction can take the form of unsold goods as well as unused plants. These signify that more has been produced and invested than the market can absorb. The same can be said of unemployment, which indicates the system's inability to recycle the most important productive force, i.e., labor power. Overproduction is thus an excess, relative to the capacity of absorption and consumption. This state of affairs began in the United States in the 1920s. Employment and wages stagnated, profits grew disproportionately, while prices remained exceptionally high and productivity increased. The rate of disuse of plants also grew drastically, along with investment, further emphasizing the tendency to overproduction.[8]

In such a situation, in order to sell one had to expand consumer credit to the maximum, and in 1929 it was equal to about one-third (30.3 percent) of consumer income and allowed incredible levels of consumption.[9] Gordon, who is otherwise not a supporter of "overproductionist" theories, admits that: "It is clear that the rise in output of durable goods in 1928-29 was too rapid to be maintained."[10]

Signs of overproduction were everywhere. Yet, the decisive new fact was not overproduction, which is congenital to capitalism, but something else. Beginning with World War I, the tendency of capitalism to eliminate price competition and to control prices becomes crucial not only in the United States, but in the whole West.[11] During the Great Crisis in the U.S., prices in monopolistic sectors declined by 10 percent, while those in the competitive sectors fell by 60 percent.[12] Capital concentration is so high that even during periods of crisis, monopoly capital is able to contain price competition.[13] The

7. See H. Morsel, *op.cit.*, p. 195.

8. In 1923 plants operate at 94% of productive capacity, and this goes down to an annual average of 88% in the tirennium 1924-26 and to 82.7% in the triennium 1927-29. In the five year period between 1919 and 1923, $15.86 billion were invested on the average each year, and this became 19.34 in the 1924-28 period and 21.1 in 1929, despite the crash at year's end. See Gordon, *op.cit.*

9. Thus, for example, on the eve of the Great Crisis, in the U.S. there was one automobile for every five persons — a level reached in Italy more than forty years later in the 70s. According to A. Nevins and H.S. Commanger in *A Short History of the United States* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), global indebtedness was equal to $100 to $150 billion on the eve of the crisis. For comparison, the U.S. GNP was $67.8 billion in 1919 and $98 billion in 1929. Cf. Gordon, *op.cit.*, p. 24.

10. Gordon, *op.cit.*, pp. 43.

11. See "Causes de l'Inflation," in *Les Cahiers Francais,* n. 189 (1979), p. 53.

12. See H.J. Sherman, *Stagflation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 164.

13. In 1929 the 200 largest industrial corporations control 45.8% of industrial business. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

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problem in 1929 was monopoly domination, which had intensified capital's normal tendencies toward underconsumption. Thus, on the one hand, there were immense industrial empires with an enormous capacity which could not be translated into an adequate increase of employment. On the other hand, increases in productivity do not result in corresponding reductions in prices, thus opening a serious gap between production and consumption.

It is widely argued that in the 1930s there is a change from liberal to organized capitalism. Although the capitalist State has always intervened in the economy,[14] the transformation that occurred in the 1930s relates to the type and nature of the state intervention: from "directed capitalism" (before the 1930s) to organized capitalism (after the 1930s). In the phase of directed capitalism, the State intervened into the economy in order to regulate capital by channeling it in certain directions.[15] Here the State does not attempt to prevent crises by establishing a constant anti-crisis guide for the economic cycle. The novelty of the turn in the 1930s is in the nature and aim of organized State intervention.[16] The State intervenes in order to sustain, and not to supplant, profit and the market. These measures tend to control the cycle and to guarantee the stability of the system by preventing catastrophic economic crises which could lead to social explosions. In particular, this involves closing the gap between production and consumption. To do this

14. Already in 1880 Wagner had noted that the state budget tended to grow more than the national product of a country. See A. Pietre, *Les Grands Problemes de l'Economie Mondiale. Ou Va le Capitalisme?* vol. I (Paris: Cujas, 1976), pp. 19-20. The U.S. before Roosevelt confirms Wagner's intuition: in 1903 public expenditures were 7% of the GNP, in 1929 they were 9.8%. See P.A. Baran and P. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), p. 146.

15. Thus the ten-hours law in England implied a change of model, from an exploitation of the length of labor time (with work days of 15-16 hours) to a more efficient operation based on the intensity and productivity of labor, which required a greater use of technology. Similarly, the American choice of protectionism and anti-slavery paved the way for challenging English industrial hegemony (favored by the free-trade policies of the Southern agricultural exporters) and it shifted to the north and to manufacturing industry the center of the American economy.

16. In the 1930s, Pollock defined the new planned capitalism as follows: "The execution of planning is imposed by state power, in such a way that no essential element is left to the laws of the market or to other economic 'laws.' This may be interpreted as a supplementary rule to the principle that, in the last analysis, all economic problems are treated as political ones. The creation of an economic sphere, autonomous vis-a-vis the state is categorically excluded.... Another difference between private capitalism and state capitalism is that the profit motive is supplanted by the interest for power." See F. Pollock, *Teoria e Prassi dell' Economia di Piano* (Bari: De Donato, 1973), pp. 208-10. But Pollack thought that capitalism was evolving toward a new form which included Nazi Germany as well as Stalinist Russia, and in which property, profit, and market were replaced by political power. This new capitalism would have been free of economic crises but not free of political tensions and natural limits. This is an untenable position, similar in some ways to that of Bruno Rizzi, and not shared even by other exponents of the Frankfurt School like Neumann, who saw very well the difference between Nazi capitalism and Soviet bureaucratic collectivism. Unlike Stalin's Russia, in Hitler's Germany profit, competition, and property remained central. Pollock does not realize that, while in the Soviet Union the state has destroyed the bourgeoisie and the market and has built a new noncapitalist (but not socialist) economic system — the so-called bureaucratic collectivism, in the West the state, even when it takes authoritarian forms (like Nazism), intervenes to defend profit, property, and the market. See F. Neumann, *Behemoth* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 255ff. See also A. Carlo, "The Socio-Economic Nature of the USSR," in *Telos*, n. 21 (Fall 1974), pp. 2-86.

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what is needed is the necessary power to subjugate the various social subgroups and individual capitalist in the name of the needs for the system's equilibrium and development. A plan of this type cannot be reduced to a set of suggestions and predictions. Yet, the effectiveness of planning does not necessarily mean using coercive laws. The problem is not formal-legal but substantial: the State must have at its disposal direct (i.e., legislative) instruments and also merely indirect (or political) ones, in order to make its suggestions effective, and not merely advisory. Thus, organized capitalism is a system based on the market, profit, and private property, in which the State tries "effectively" to bring about a series of goals that the market is no longer capable of realizing spontaneously. This is precisely what the capitalist State tried unsuccessfully to do in the 1930s.

Attempts to organize capitalism in the 1930s are usually related to Nazism, Fascism, and the New Deal. Of the three, the Roosevelt experience is the most controversial. There is no doubt that Roosevelt was non-ideological and pragmatic, that his collaborators' views were heterogeneous,[17] and that his administration passed some "19th century" laws such as the Securities Act of 1933. Despite all this, the Roosevelt administration sought to create a type of organized capitalism apart from any "theoretical" consciousness of Roosevelt and his collaborators. Roosevelt's goal was to boost production by increasing employment, consumption, and wages.[18] What was in question was the overcoming of the causes of the Great Depression by closing or reducing to safe limits, the production-consumption gap. This objective could not be realized through the spontaneous action of the market, without a deliberate political intervention by the State. Thus a law was passed (the NRA) which sought to create a planned economy guaranteed by the State. In it, minimum wages, work hours, and prices were determined in such a way as to increase consumption and employment without depressing, but rather by boosting, investments. Despite some resistance, as many as 557 guidelines (plus 188 supplementary ones) were developed. They concerned 95 percent of American firms and the bulk of the economy. Industry was regulated in a very detailed manner.[19] Other laws, such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act for agriculture and the TVA for the economic recovery of Tennessee, also helped.

Consequently, wages grew by 8.6 percent and prices by 9.6 percent. The small contraction of per capita buying power, however, was compensated by the increase in employment so that the sum-total of wages grew by 38 percent. This growth was stimulated largely by the government action which through

17. See E.A. Hawley, *The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), where he denies that a definite current established itself within the New Deal.

18. This is well-known. See H.W. Arendt, *The Economic Lessons of the 1930s* (New York, 1965), pp. 57ff.; W.E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); A. Schlesinger Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt* (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1958), vol. II, pp. 102ff.

19. For example, on the basis of the NRA, they forbade in New York that any production could be featured with more than four strip-tease shows a day. See W.E. Leuchtenburg, *op.cit.*, p. 68.

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various laws created millions of government jobs and supported agricultural income through the AAA. From this complex activity it is clear that Roosevelt was moving towards organized capitalism. It was recognized that the market contains anarchical elements that had to be controlled, and the State therefore had to guarantee a stable regulation of the cycle.

Despite some defeats (especially concerning taxation in 1938), Roosevelt never gave up the principle that politics should control business. Even in his second administration, his goal was never to implement the old Sherman Act since he knew well that the old 19th-century competitive society was dead. Thus, it is no accident that during the 1928-39 period the 200 main manufacturing firms handle from 45.8 percent to 48.7 percent of the business conducted by industry. Yet, during his second administration, he used the Anti-trust Division of the Justice Department led by Thurman Arnold, who regarded the Sherman Act as the fig leaf of monopolies, but he thought it necessary to use anti-trust regulations in the interests of consumers, as "an attempt to test the vitality of the establishment by reference to its ability to aid or to hinder the flux of available goods." Clearly, the goal is not the destruction of trusts and the return to the 19th-century market, but rather the political control of their organized power for the sake of consumers so that buying power and consumption balance the system. Despite some oscillations and a great tactical flexibility, the broad outline of Rooseveltism remains unchanged: to establish organized capitalism.

In the 1930s, the United States did not succeed in moving out of the crisis by means of State political action. Roosevelt's recovery was partial and limited: in 1937, at the peak of the recovery, unemployed labor power was 14.3 percent and the economic situation began once again to worsen.[20] Thus, the later reappearance of a capitalistic crisis of 1929 dimensions[21] raises again the question of why Roosevelt failed. Here interpretations differ depending on whether they came from the system's supporters or opponents. In this second group belong Baran and Sweezy, who write: "Very few people nowadays are opposed to a modest public housing program and of course everyone is in favor of at least enough spending on health to control epidemic diseases. But beyond a certain point, opposition begins to build up in each case, at the first from real estate interests to housing and from the medical profession to public programs of medical care. But real estate interests

20. See Gordon, *op.cit.*, pp. 66ff. In absolute figures, unemployment in 1937 exceeded 8 million. In 1939 unemployment was still 17.2% (see Baran and Sweezy, *op.cit.*, p. 161).

21. Cf. F. Caffe, "Interview" to *Il Manifesto* (November 14, 1979), p. 3. He argues that the present crisis is already a new 1929, with its 18 million unemployed in industrialized countries. All economists focus on inflation as the main enemy, forgetting that no recovery is possible without eliminating unemployment. Furthermore they overlook the connection between inflation and unemployment: both are produced by the monopolies' use of technology to reduce labor power, and by price fixing. Thus, the present period presents the same problems (only worse) as the 20s and 30s. Employment is likely to fall, while inflation is nothing new. The enormous development of monopolies in the post-war period (see Pietre, *op.cit.*, pp. 63ff.) has reinforced their ability to control prices, so that the tendencies of the 20s and 30s have reappeared full blown.

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presumably have no special reasons to oppose medical care, and doctors no special reasons to oppose housing. Still, once they have each gone into opposition to further increases in their own spheres, they may soon find it in their joint interest to combine forces in opposing both more housing and more public health. The opposition to each individual item thus builds up faster when two items are under consideration, and fastest of all for across-the-board increases in the whole budget."[22] Thus, the New Deal fails because reformist policies based on public expenditures clash with a growing and unified opposition. This interpretation is surprising for its superficiality. That reforms face opposition is clear, but history shows that reforms can be made even against very strong opposition: the English law about the ten hours in 1848 was eventually approved against the resistance of most English capitalist. Why, then, did Roosevelt fail where the 19th-century English State succeeded?

The problem is all the more intriguing in that Roosevelt's reforms never questioned property and profit. The NRA itself drew support from at least part of the business community. To be sure, many businessmen were not inclined to give in even to Roosevelt's "conservative" reforms. But why was conservative resistance able to hinder the political program of a president who could challenge and defeat the Supreme Court and who could be elected four times to the White House?

The heart of the contradictions into which Roosevelt's program ran is the following: Capitalist opposition did not express a conjunctural but a structural resistance rooted in the sytem itself. This is not refuted by the fact that tax revenues grew progressively during the war. Roosevelt's victory was only in principle, and it was accompanied by an unusual phenomenon of tax evasion on the part of big capital: neither in the United States nor in Europe has there been an adequate implementation of the progressive taxation desired by Roosevelt and his Old World imitators. Capital has continued to pay much less of what it should. The reason for this failure is to be found in the organic tie between production and distribution of wealth. If property rights and profits exist in production, they cannot be denied in distribution. Progressive taxation implies that, for certain levels of income, the greater part of the wealth is taken by the State. This means that large capitalists would end up working more for the State than for themselves — which is absurd in a system based on private property and profit. Moreover, if during times of prosperity the State takes 70 to 80 percent of the income, large capitalists cannot accumulate the financial reserves necessary for the operation of immense oligopolistic firms whose vitality conditions whole sectors of the economy. So at the first sign of recession, they would be in extreme difficulty. In other words, when business is good, capitalists will take risks, while the profits will largely go to the State.

To be sure, capitalism can accept sacrificies because of rationalization

22. Baran and Sweezy, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

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which eventually would boost the rate of profit. Even in this case, however, it will be necessary to overcome the conjunctural resistance of at least some capitalists. Here, instead, prospects are only for a constant reduction of the rate of net profit without the possibility of future recuperation. The more profit grows, the greater the tax rate. For capitalists, this is the crisis *par excellence,* insofar as for them a crisis is not unemployment or inflation, but rather the fall of their rate of profit. Thus, it is absurd to ask capital to accept a reduction in the rate of profit to avoid a crisis; for capital a reduction of profits is the crisis. Therefore a policy aiming at drastically limiting by taxes the rate of profit during periods of growth acts as a strong disincentive for investments and, if pursued decisively, it can stop private investments.[23] This was the problem confronting Roosevelt and other fiscal reformers after him. In the 1930s Roosevelt did not succeed in making capitalists pay their taxes. Had he succeeded, he would have destroyed a system which cannot tolerate a democratic distribution of wealth. What he was left with was only an interventionist policy. Then the war came, and with it American capitalism overcame the crisis and accepted a system of highly progressive taxation. Yet, capital continued to evade taxes so that the post-war economic recovery overcame the crisis but not its causes, which eventually erupted in the troubles of the 1970s.

The most successful attempt at organized capitalism in the 1930s was the Nazi one. When Hitler came to power there were 6 million unemployed, while when Germany entered the war in 1939 there were only 38,379. The recovery was all the more exceptional since the disappearance of unemployment was accompanied by an increase of 15 percent in working hours and of 20 to 25 percent in the rate of work.[24] The masses' buying power grew by about 20 percent in five or six years, compared to Paris, where real weekly wages had grown only by 3 or 4 points from 1933 to 1938.[25] Yet although wages grew, they grew much less than profits, so that they decreased as a percentage of the growing national wealth.[26] In spite of the strong controls on wages, prices increased, but less than in other countries during the same period: 16 percent in Germany, 34 percent in the United States, 43 percent in France, and 30 percent in Great Britain. The working class' support for Hitler is also undeniable and represents another achievement of the regime.

23. The problem cannot be solved by a policy which taxes in different ways profits that are distributed and reinvested, by partially or wholly exempting the latter. Such a solution only encourages the tendency of capital to finance itself by reinvesting profits, whereas the problem is that of establishing a more balanced relation between production and consumption. Given that capital tends to produce many goods and few jobs, without adequately increasing wages, it is necessary to take wealth away from it to support consumption and to create, through the state, new jobs so as to rebalance the production-consumption relation.

24. See A. Sohn-Rethel, *Oekonomie und Klassenstruktur des Deutschen Faschismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971).

25. See G. Merlin, *Com 'Erano Pagati i Lavoratori Durante il Fascismo* (Rome: Ed. Cinque Lune, 1970), pp. 146-47.

26. See W.L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 263-264.

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These results were obtained with an economic model based on State military expenditures which allowed the elimination of unemployment, the expansion of global income, and thus the creation of some demand for consumer goods which grew, though less than in heavy and military industry. Already in 1935, before the definitive militarist turn of 1936, there had been a qualitative jump in the German economic model in relation to the situation of the 1930s and military expenditures had already become central.

This growth in military expenditures was accompanied by an enormous increase of state intervention in the whole economy: labor relations, banks, capital market, wages, consumption, foreign trade, etc. But how were the Nazis able to finance their re-armament? According to Guérin: "German re-armament was financed primarily by means of drafts called 'for the creation of job opportunities' which expired every six months and were subject to renewal. The State remits the drafts to industrialists, who have banks pay them. Their amount cannot be easily estimated, but probably in 1938 it reached a figure between 20 and 30 *billion marks*. The system is comfortable because the public cannot easily understand it, but there are some serious drawbacks. In fact, there is the risk that banks, once they are saturated with drafts, can no longer honor their obligations to their depositors and must cash their drafts with the *Reichsbank,* thus doubling or tripling monetary circulation. This is not an abstract possibility since it is mentioned in a memorandum sent to Hitler in 1937 by the Ruhr industrialists.... The fascist State tries to consolidate its fluctuating debt, that is to say, to transform it from short to long term.... To force private citizens to buy these long-term treasury bills, the State establishes strict controls on financial institutions that drain off savings: savings and loan associations, various semi-governmental institutions, and banks."[27]

Through these ingenious systems public works program and 38 percent of the re-armament expenses were subsidized. This was a noticeable accomplishment, but not a definitive solution. The contradiction between opposite requirements of political economy, which Guérin notes, is the expression of the fact that in capitalism the antagonistic mode of production must be accompanied by an antagonistic distribution of wealth. Hitler ran into the same problem as Roosevelt did in financing his public works program: the problem of taking away from capital a constant portion of wealth so as to create jobs. But this requires heavy taxes, which conflicts with the stimulation of private enterprise and production. The Nazis were able to mediate this by means of ingenious technical-financial schemes, but they were not able to overcome it. This created a cluster of problems, which is at the root of the Nazi disaster. The military boom allowed the recycling of millions of workers, and thus generated support for the system as well as a demand for consumer goods. But as the number of unemployed was reduced, it generated a new problem. Already in 1936, due to the scarcity of manpower in some sectors, there was a return to competition among capitalist to attract the few

27. Guérin, *Fascismo e Gran Capitale*, pp. 229-30.

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available workers by means of higher wages. The phenomenon was brought under control, but from then on there was a greater increase in real wages.

The laws of the capitalist market began to reemerge. In a situation of shortages of manpower in which workers cannot be dismissed, if wages are not increased there is a loss of mass support vital for Nazism to sustain the enormous economic effort. The same happens if wages grow only nominally through inflation. Wage movements in Germany after 1936 indicate that there is a change in the labor market to the advantage of the working class. In 1938-39, the Nazis were at the height of their success, and their power seemed unchallengeable. Structural problems, however, reappeared with the disappearance of the army of unemployed and posed the problem of regaining the support of the workers at a different level. Unable to let the market and the class struggle operate "freely," a substitute for a normal wage movement had to be found. There was only one way of solving the problem: to unload outside the system, by means of an imperialist war, the contradiction of the Nazi model.

German aggressiveness and expansionism in the 1930s are generally explained in a very traditional manner. By and large, all explanations may be reduced to three: the first is primarily political, while the other two apply to Germany, originating from Luxemburg's and Lenin's interpretation of imperialism. An example of the first is Kalecki's thesis: "The fact that armaments are the backbone of the policy of fascist full employment has a profound influence upon its economic character. . . . The fascist system starts from the overcoming of unemployment, develops into an armament economy of scarcity, and ends up in war."[28] This type of explanation assumes the autonomy of power in relation to the economic structure. At first, the goal of public expenditures is full employment, but then the growth of military power from a means becomes an end, everything becomes an instrument of armament and of the expansionist logic, while other countries, in response, arm themselves until the final collision.

Against this it is relevant to ask the following: if in the modern era wars and conquests are made for economic ends (to secure raw materials for the war industry), what is the end of the war industry itself and, above all, of the economic mechanisms as a whole? It is at that level that one must identify the motive for war: if the end of the armament policy is the achievement of full employment, as Kalecki maintains, one does not understand why that end eventually becomes war. Things proceeded in a very unilateral fashion: that is, it was only Germany that threatened other countries, all of which were very far from responding in a decisive and coordinated manner. So this Nazi aggressiveness remains unexplained: what ends were being pursued by the Third Reich, whose aggressiveness grew parallel to their economic successes and to the achievement of full employment?

28. See M. Kalecki, *Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy 1933-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 141-142.

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Attempts at structural explanation relating economic structure and military expansionism within the framework of theories of imperialism are more adequate but mistaken in their conclusions. Bettelheim, reformulating Lenin's (and Hobson's) classic theory of imperialism as a phenomenon of exportation of capital, runs into a major obstacle. The exporting of capital has a negligible weight in Hitler's Germany. In fact, at a certain point, it was forbidden and punishable by capital punishment: all wealth must be used within the country. Bettelheim argues that military expenditures were a temporary substitute for the exporting of capital and prepared the way, through conquest, for future exportation of capital.[29] Now, apart from the inadequacy of the Leninist theory of imperialism,[30] Bettelheim forces the meaning of Lenin's essay. The latter argues that capitalists need to export because, in the putrefying economies of advanced countries, they no longer find adequately profitable outlets for their investments. But in Germany, there was a profitable outlet in military expenditures, which, though it absorbed a growing portion of the social wealth, was far from saturated.

Also off the mark are the explanations based on Luxemburg's theory of imperialism, according to which the fundamental feature of the phenomenon is the necessity of exporting goods, rather than capital. Thus, Sohn-Retel argues: "To the extent to which this program has been substantially completed, they now need exports, i.e., they need foreign wars and allies without war industry, on which they could unload their enormous productive capacity, now hindered by Göring's autarchic politics. An economy based on armaments and capable of great war potential has in peacetime an absolute necessity to export."[31] Sohn-Rethel's reasoning is not clear: the real problem for the Nazi economy was not exports, but imports of raw materials — though it had hitherto been solved. Moreover, what could Nazi Germany export? Arms perhaps? But the main customer of the war industry was the State, whose military program of rearmament, even in 1939, was far from complete. As regards consumer goods industries, there was no significant unused capacity. After 1935, the bulk of investments had gone to the heavy military sector and the Nazi economy appeared like a gigantic apparatus supporting itself: all wealth (capital and labor power) is mobilized for industrial development based on military expenditures; the exporting of capital is discouraged; foreign commerce is used to obtain the raw material needed for the development of military production; and the market of capital is ingeniously pillaged by the State in order to supply heavy industry.

Yet, this economy has a vital need for external expansion. The thesis of *Lebensraum* is not a Nazi invention but the expression of an organic

29. See C. Bettelheim, *L'Economie Allemande sous le Nazisme* (Paris: Maspero, 1971), vol. II, p. 62.

30. Cf. A. Carlo, "A Redefinition of Imperialism," in *Telos,* n. 20 (Summer 1974), pp. 108-118.

31. See Sohn-Retel, *op.cit.*, p. 222. On p. 168 he refers to wage barriers, which supposedly lead to the search for external markets Neumann also (*op.cit.*, p. 305) refers to the need to gain new markets.

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requirement of this model of development. As the industrial reserve army was used up, Nazism could no longer impose on workers wage levels much lower than normal for a situation of full employment and for that kind of technological and productive development. Nor could the problem be solved by an increase of the work schedule since this had already been done at the beginning of the Nazi period. Since it was unthinkable for Nazism to restore democracy and the freedom of organized labor, the only solution was outside expansion to allow the appropriation of the wealth of the occupied countries and the transferal of a portion of it to the German working class. Germany did in fact do this. As regards financial resources, dinstinct from raw materials and labor power, the looting amounted to 125 billion marks: almost six times public investments in the 1938 German budget.[32] Looting of labor power was no less significant: 10 million persons were forced to work in Germany, often in conditions similar to slavery. The difference from the first World War is clear: then Germany forced into work only 75,000 Poles and 12,000 Belgians.[33]

This impressive and monstrous looting was imposed by war needs but this would only be partly correct. What is involved here is a structural feature of Nazi imperialism, which makes it an anomalous phenomenon even in the history of imperialism. Looting without compensation was planned by Nazi theoreticians for the future: Poles and Russians were to be reduced to the level of subhuman slaves for the Germans. To use only means of exploitation based on the market, i.e., on unequal exchange, was inadequate since it implies the recognition of some autonomy and of formal equality in the other contracting party. In a design in which the economy was permanently militarized and guided from above, this was a disturbing element. It was logical, then, to anticipate the presence of vast provinces and populations reduced to a subhuman level, without any political or commercial autonomy, or any power of dealing contractually with the center of the empire, and from whom one could obtain without complications the resources needed for the equilibrium of the German economic model.

Here it is possible to compare the two main attempts to solve the 1930s crisis: Nazism and the New Deal. The problem that Hitler and Roosevelt faced was analogous; to match the productive system's productive with consumptive capacities. Roosevelt tried to solve the problem by increasing mass consumption, employment and wages. His labor legislation (Wagner Act and Fair Labor Standards Act) is a clear indication of this tendency. The liberal character of American society prevented the rigid militarization of the German economy. When in 1941 the American economy discovered the stabilizing effect of military expenditures, it envisioned the possibility of co-existence between liberal democracy and high military expenditures.

Hitler, instead, approached the problem differently: German real wages

32. B. Michel, *Storia Economica e Sociale del Mondo* (Bari: Laterea, 1979), vol. V, part 2, p. 589.

33. H. Morsel, in *Storia Economica e Sociale del Mondo, op.cit.*, vol. V, part 1, p. 37.

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increased, but their percentage of GNP went down considerably. Thus, the gap between investment and consumption capacity widened. Paradoxically, Hitler tried to overcome the contradiction at the root of the Great Crisis by sharpening it. The squaring of the circle was carried out by allotting increasing portions of the GNP into a type of reproduction not meant for consumption. In this manner, he re-absorbed unemployment, boosted investments, created a modest increase in wages and consumption, and obtained the support needed for the system's survival. Both Roosevelt and Hitler sought to overcome the causes of the Great Depression to guarantee a balanced development of the system. By itself the market could not bring about such a development, so that State intervention was needed. In the United States, this was done through the NRA and the subsequent laws which replaced it, and in Germany through the militarization of the economy, the drainage of credit toward military spending, and the rigorous control of wages and of the balance of payments. Roosevelt did not overcome the crisis and did not therefore achieve the dream of organized capitalism. Hitler did so, but failed to implement the guiding ideas of planned capitalism. With the disappearance of unemployment in Germany in 1939, there reemerged very serious problems: real wages had to increase much more than in the past in order to maintain mass support. But the system could not deal with this and had to choose a policy of foolish expansion.

The preceding considerations allow us to deal with the question concerning the relationship between economics and politics. For the New Deal, the primacy of economics over politics is all too clear: in the 1930s Roosevelt was not able either to plan or to overcome the crisis, and so it is no accident that the theorists of the autonomy of politics, in order to maintain their thesis, have to invent a non-existent overcoming of the crisis by Roosevelt. From Thalheimer on, many have spoken of primacy of politics. What is surprising about this view is that it overlooks how economic policy is not a matter of whims but of power relations. If Hitler accepted capitalism and eliminated the more radical parts of his original program, this must have been due to reasons more serious than that the Nazis found any economic system acceptable.[34] This becomes clear if one considers the genesis of Nazism: if it is now possible to claim that the party developed independently of big capital[35] it is also possible to argue that it was Nazism that "became" capitalist and that the choice was rather painful. The June 1934 purge that led to the destruction of the populist "left" within Nazism was forced upon Hitler by the representatives of the old order (Krupp and Papen).[36]

The Nazis tended to transform *power* into *possessions*, understood as existing capitalist property.[37] Like the American gangster, the plebeian Nazi

34. M. Salvadori, *Storia dell'Età Contemporanea* (Turin: Loescher, 1976).

35. R. Kühl, *Due Forme di Dominio Borghese: Liberalismo e Fascismo*, second edition (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976), pp. 125ff.

36. A. Bullock, *Hitler* (London: Odham, 1964), pp. 146ff.

37. Neumann, *op.cit.*, p. 302, has described this process as follows: "A comparison with gangster organizations will illustrate the problem. National Socialist officialdom has not been

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agitator, once come to power (which he must share with the old apparatus that has not been completely conquered), tends to become a rich and respectable bourgeois and to make himself accepted in terms of the criteria of success typical of the society in which he lives.

Kühnl's account, although assuming the primacy of politics, recognized that Nazism always remained firmly anchored in the capitalist framework. Yet he claims that never before had the State attained such an autonomy from the economic structure. According to him: "Fascist executive power made itself independent not only from the mass of its followers, but also to a certain extent from economic power groups (in Germany much more than in Italy). This obviously does not deny that the freedom of decision by this executive power is limited by the principles of capitalist social structure.... Nevertheless even members of the upper classes fell victim of Fascist terror: the political exponents of the bourgeoisie who opposed the Fascist government were put in prison or in concentration camps the same as social democrats and communists.... The administrative apparatus, the judicial system, and the armed forces were incorporated into the Fascist regime more or less the way they were before, and here the most important positions were occupied by representatives of the old upper classes. Thus it is not correct to say that the upper classes gave up all political power to the Fascist party, but they retained bases and points of support in the executive apparatus. It is no accident that the tendencies toward opposition by the upper classes began precisely there. The Fascist rulers were perfectly aware of the presence of this uncertain factor which could endanger their power."[38]

Kühnl's argument contains contradictory claims: the executive was independent from the economy, but dependent on the principles of capitalism. The bourgeoisie, deprived of political power, retained great power in the civilian-military apparatus. The only concrete evidence is the reference to some bourgeois persecuted by the regime. But this is nothing new: the ten hours law was endured as an abuse by most English capitalists and caused tensions that lasted years between State and businessmen. Even before Hitler there is no lack of cases involving physical violence between the State and capitalist groups. At the root of positions such as Kühnl's lays liberal ideology whereby before 1929 the State was the night watchman for the economy and society. Of course, during the 1930s the relation between politics and economics did change, but this did not result in the primacy of politics. Politics was and remained autonomous from the economy, in a

able to pierce the fortifications held by the ministerial and industrial bureaucracies in the nationalized sector. The overwhelming influence of these two groups is still as secure as it was under the Weimar Republic. Nor has the party been able to penetrate into private industry, which, on the whole, is run by the very same set of people. The party has not succeeded in supplanting the power of the bureaucracies in the army and the navy, in the judiciary and in the administration. The party controls only the police, youth, and propaganda. But this is not enough. A gangster can survive only if he becomes honorable. Terrorism alone may not give him sufficient security. Only an economic basis, providing him with a steady income and giving him social status, will open the way for him into society."

38. Kühl, *op.cit.*, pp. 212-214.

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subordinate and limited way.

To put it another way, the State is autonomous, but its autonomy is limited by the economy. After 1929 there is no change in the subordinate nature of this autonomy. What changes is the type of economic policy the State pursued. Before 1929 it was a matter of directing the system. Afterward one had to plan it (organized capitalism). This need for planning, however, is a function of capitalist development and can be implemented only in the framework of the system. This is why both Roosevelt's and Nazi planning failed when they clashed with the system's structural features. This economic structure generates the new problems of planning the development. In trying its best to solve the problem, the State runs against capitalism's intangible structural features. Thus, the old Marxian distinction between structure and superstructure has not been overcome.[39]

At this point it is possible to compare the two main models of attempted organized capitalism (New Deal and Nazism) with Italian fascism, which is a sort of submodel of the two main schemes. During its first phase, in the 1920s, Italian fascism was not very interventionist.[40] The fascist years before 1929 are a period of directed capitalism. During the second half of the 1920s there is no real shift: the Ministry of Corporations had the same function as the Ministry of Industry and the *Carta del Lavoro* (1927) gave the State the right to intervene in the economy in exceptional situations. The real turn came with the crisis in the 1930s. The IRI is born as a "hospital" for firms having problems, and it then became an industrial empire by controlling shares in companies amounting to 44 percent of Italian capital stock. In 1936-38 there was the passage of extremely important banking reforms. This was a crucial event since banks were vital for accumulation and this law allowed the government to program investments and thus orchestrate the dynamics of production. The civil code of 1942 completed this institutional reconstitution by ratifying the permanent preeminence of the State in guiding the economy.

39. This distinction is presently being questioned. Cf. K. Klare, "Lawmaking as Praxis," in *Telos,* n. 40, pp. 123ff. J. Habermas too, in his *La Crisi della Razionatita nel Capitalismo Maturo* (Bari: Laterza, 1979), pp. 62ff., notes that nowadays politics and economics are integrated because: (a) the state creates a series of jobs and activities that are political but necessary to capital and to its reproduction, the latter being determined also politically and not only by strictly productive labor; (b) the price of labor power is bargained by coalitions of entrepreneurs and of workers at an "almost political" level; (c) administrative planning by the state intervenes into weak areas of the market, thus breaking the old dichotomy between economics and politics. Here Habermas analyzes the state in mature capialism by focusing on the state and neglecting capital. By analyzing the latter and the labor process, it seems clear that labor productivity in the classical Marxian sense is central to the system, and that the activities of public administration are useful but not productive: they represent a necessary nonproductive cost. Moreover, the concept of an "almost political" price for labor power is extremely vague. Of course, power relations among classes are important to determine this price. But this was true even during Marx's lifetime when labor power could be sold between a minimum represented by workers' vital needs and a maximum represented by the needs of reproducing profit. Habermas has not shown that things are any different today.

40. This does not mean, however, that Fascism sought to restore *Laissez-faire* capialism. See G. Salvemini, *Under the Axe of Fascism* (ew York: The Viking Press, 1936), p. 50.

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Like Hitler's Germany and Roosevelt's America, Italian fascism in the 1930s also moves in the direction of organized capitalism. But what could not succeed for much stronger and dynamic systems could not succeed for Italian fascist capitalism either. Fascism's audacity for reforms was meant to increase employment and consumption, but it did not work very well. Industrial employment increased primarily in industry's dynamic sectors, which were benefitting from fascist policies, while less dynamic sectors experienced a drop or stagnation. Moreover, in the more forward-moving sectors of the economy, monopolies were emerging which could manipulate prices in such a way as to unload onto consumers the cost of fascist "social" policy. In 1937 wages were lower than the 1920-21 level, and they went up to a little above that only in 1940-41. But in the second half of the 1930s nominal wages grew by 40 percent and prices by 56 percent, thus causing a contraction in popular consumption which was not too high to begin with.[41]

Fascism's failure both when it imitates New Deal policies of support for employment and consumption, and the Nazi military model, are not an expression of provincialism but rather of its weakness: the limited and contradictory character of its industrial base. Italy entered the era of organized capitalism with a very limited industrial base. Thus, employment grew only as a result of increased accumulation and production. While for Roosevelt the problem consisted of how to use the enormous resources after 1929, for Italian fascism it had to do with how to enlarge the very small productive base by helping the development of monopolistic enterprises. Then why not adopt a German model? The answer once again is that Italian capitalism was too weak to support an effort like the German one.

The intense State activity in the 1930s has generated a wide-ranging debate on whether it is possible to bring about a rational capitalism organized by the State to achieve full employment, absorb the system's traditional tensions, and guarantee a stable development. Kalecki at first believed that it was not possible within a liberal democratic framework. Full employment, in fact, contains a series of elements that cannot easily be accepted by capital: (1) the limitation of the capitalists' social power who lose the ability to hire and fire; (2) the growth of State activity in competition with or instead of private activity; (3) public assistance by the State, which intervenes by means of public consumption to support employment, conflicts with the Calvinist morality characteristic of capitalism.[42] Consequently, full employment could be accepted by capital only within a dictatorial framework, which would give adequate compensation to the bourgeoisie. Kalecki himself, however, later admitted that the U.S. post-war boom had led to a drastic reduction of unemployment within a liberal-democratic framework.[43]

41. P. Grifone, *Il Capitale Finanziario in Italia* (Turin:Einaudi, 1971). Using as a base of 100 the real wages of 1929, they were 123 in 1921 and 106 in 1939. Moreover, in 1942 real wages resume their decline. The wage level of 1940-41 was thus exceptional. During the whole Fascist era, real wages remained below the 1921 level.

42. Kalecki, *op.cit.*, pp. 138ff.

43. M. Kalecki, *Sul Capitalismo Contemporaneo* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1975), pp. 43ff.

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Recently, however, there has been an attempt to revive Kalecki's old formulation. According to Boddy and Crotty: "Keynesians have significantly undervalued the importance of the compression of profits in a condition of full employment.... Wages generally tend to increase in the final phase of expansion. There is in effect a compression of profits. Capitalists have something more than their class instinct to understand that prolonged full employment is not beneficial.... Full employment not only has an effect on wages but also gives free reign to strikes. It has been observed for a long time that when conditions favorable to work are created, the level of actual work decreases."[44] But things do not proceed "automatically" in the labor market. When the working class is weakly organized it is not able to take full advantage of the law of supply and demand. Beginning in the 1950s, prices no longer fall, even during crises. This strengthening of capitalist control on prices allows big capital to take back most gains by organized labor through inflation.

Even if real wages grew as much as productivity, price increases would be good business for capitalists. The reason is that they sell not only to workers, who are now a minority of the population, but also to large strata who are not workers. Consequently, as Sherman claims, monopoly prices bring about an unprecedented stability in the rate of profit.[45] Of course, full employment represents an advantage for the working class. But now large capital has adequate means for defending profits, even during the phases of the business cycle when it comes close to full employment.[46] Thus, if the capitalist system had had to diminish employment, this is the consequence of uncontrollable internal contradictions and not the result of an aversion by modern capitalists toward high employment rates.

Not only the U.S. but the post-war Swedish and Japanese miracles refuted Kalecki's excessive pessimism in 1943. Thus, within a very conservative (Japan) and very reform-minded (Sweden) liberal-democratic framework it was even possible for a time to reach full employment without the volcano of military spending. On the whole, in the 50s and 60s things go well from the point of view of employment: unemployment is at such a low level as to be a dream in comparison with the 30s. But, since almost-full employment was realized only in the high points of the system, there was always the possibility of utilizing emigration from the many poor areas of the capitalist world in order to keep wages under control.

44. R. Boddy and J. Crotty, "Conflitti di Classe, Politiche Keynesiane e Ciclo Economico," in *Monthly Review,* Italian edition, n. 11-12 (1974), pp. 1 and 2.

45. H.J. Sherman, *Stagflation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 170ff.

46. The precariousness of Boddy and Crotty's theses becomes evident if one compares the recessions in the American economy between 1952 and 1970 with the employment levels reached during the preceding phases of expansion. Thus, in 1952, before the recession of 1952-53, the rate of unemployment is 3%; in 1956, before the recession of 1957-58, it is 4.1%; in 1959, before the recession of 1960-61, it is 5.5%; and in 1969, before the recession of 1970-71, it is 3.5%. Clearly, in the U.S. recessions flare up when employment levels are enormously higher than in the 30s but lower than those of other rich Western countries characterized by high production until 1969, when unemployment was 0.7% in Germany, 1.1% in Japan, 1.2% in Holland, and 1% in France. Thus it is difficult to claim that the richest country in the West could not sustain considerably more unemployment. On the contrary, today full employment seems to present more advantages than disadvantages for the equilibrium of a system which has at its disposal adequate for defending profits.

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After his pessimistic article of 1943 on the possibility of full employment, Kalecki seemed to change his views after he participated in a debate with Oxford economists on the topic of full employment and the stabilization of capitalism. In that debate, Burchardt argued that unemployment is a result of low demand, which the State must remedy by increasing public spending. The account, however, remains at the level of mere distribution of wealth, without questioning the manner in which it is produced. In reality, it is not clear that the increased demand for consumer goods determines an adequate and proportional increase in either employment or demand for investment goods. Most importantly, in getting out of a crisis in a developed economy, there are enormous reserves of unused productive capacity which can be set in motion without requiring much new investment or much supplementary employment: the New Deal is an instructive example. The problem cannot always be solved by manipulating demand.

Furthermore, there is then the problem of how to finance the spending. According to Kalecki, this can be done by taxing gross income, before deductions for depreciation.[47] But this involves a rather mild but highly progressive fiscal pressure, needed both to balance demand in relation to investment and so to provide the State with the enormous means it needs. Somehow, it will be necessary to requisition an increasing portion of the wealth that goes to capitalists and this will be higher than the bigger income of the capitalist. Kalecki himself has no illusions about this and he admits that "full employment through taxation" encounters greater opposition than a policy of budget deficits, precisely because it tends to equalize incomes. Thus, when it is no longer practically possible to use taxation, it is necessary to find recourse to deficits. But deficit spending can degenerate into irresponsible finance (and inflation). Moreover, since debts must be paid, either one must indefinitely increase the public debt, thus risking bankruptcy, or one must increase fiscal pressure to pay for it. The problem is only postponed, not solved.

It is no longer possible to have illusions about a policy of mild fiscal pressure, which has been refuted by the events of the last fifty years: capitalism tends to invest by employing little labor power. The State, then, must finance the creation of a significant number of jobs, but in such a way as not to excessively tax the working class: to balance the relation between investment and consumption it is necessary that capital bear a consistent portion of fiscal burden; it is also necessary that this burden is not transferred, like other costs, onto prices, for then it would be born in a camouflaged way by consumers, and thus risk of moving in a vicious circle. Thus, there must be a blocking of the mechanism whereby monopoly prices defend and regenerate profit, by means of Draconian controls on real business costs and on prices, to prevent the transference of the fiscal burden. The result would be a drastic fall in the rate of profit, which from the viewpoint of capital is the crisis *par excellence*, and cannot act as an incentive

47. M. Kalecki, in *L'Economia della Piena Occupazione, op.cit.*, pp. 74-76.

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for private investment. Burchardt, Kalecki, and the Oxford group all deal with the real problem without confronting or solving it: the necessarily antagonistic nature of capitalist production and, as a consequence, of distribution.

Just before he died, Kalecki said that now the system seemed to have won over its contradictions by means other than planning. That was in 1970. One year later, there was the first crisis of the dollar; in 1973 the second one; eight or nine months after that the oil crisis, and then galloping inflation, re-emerging unemployment, and more or less hidden trade wars among States. Today, taking another look at the 1950s and 1960s, one can see that behind the boom terrible tensions were hiding, preparing the events of the 1970s. These tensions are nothing but the unresolved inheritance of problems that began with the Great Depression. In anticipating the future of capitalism, Kalecki has always been wrong, first for excessive pessimism and then for excessive optimism. Capitalism can achieve almost full employment, but it can never permanently overcome its contradictions.

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THE KANSAS *TELOS* CONFERENCE (December 4-6, 1980): "The Crisis of the Left"

by The Kansas *Telos* Group

"What? Four cats talking about the crisis of the Left in the middle of Kansas? The Left must be hurting." It is. Not only is the old liberal coalition practically disintegrated and traditionally Left programs discredited, but New Left values as well as Left theory in general have not held up very well under critical blows coming from all directions. While there is no direct relation between the kind of esoteric discourse carried out in journals such as *Telos* and national or international politics, unless it is possible to outline a coherent set of values and a series of measures to bring about that projected, desirable state of affairs, Left politics becomes meaningless. The purpose of the conference was to rethink fundamental tenets while at the same time to continue the discussion opened the previous spring concerning narcissism and the changing character of American politics.[1]

Paul Breines opened the conference by portraying the New Left as a response to post-World War II modes of domination and to failures of existing radical thought and politics (especially Marxism-Leninism). This "novel political, social and theoretical experiment" sought to generate new and emancipatory forms of social relations while avoiding the Leninist tendency to reproduce relations of domination in deceptive radical dress. In doing so, the New Left drew heat from various segments of the American political spectrum. This response resulted in the Nixon presidency, united "middle America" behind "law and order," and culminated in the consolidation of the "new right." Breines reserved most of his criticism for the traditional Left which not only failed to absorb New Left cultural radicalism but actively opposed it by reasserting "counterrevolutionary" Leninist reproduction of capitalist organization and discipline. Their asceticism undermined the emancipatory thrust of the New Left by trivializing and even proscribing its most progressive dimensions. And now this call for discipline and asceticism is coming from many of New Leftists who have unwittingly embraced rightist themes. He concluded with the claim that the "society sought cannot be brought into being by means that conflict with the desired ends." Thus, in order to revive itself, the Left must once again address the issues raised by New Left cultural politics.

Following Breines, Robert Antonio argued that Leninist influences in the early 1970s may have been exaggerated: Leninism was discussed, but seldom practiced in organization or in lifestyles. In short, it was ineffective. On the other hand, some aspects of the New Left's cultural radicalism were a reflection of dubious commodified American values. Though there were glimpses of emancipatory cultural innovations, there was also consumerism, self-indulgence and unreflective individualism. This strain (which still thrives in the narcissism of today's college students) contributed as much to the Left's decline as the Leninists' puritan drivel. Furthermore, the New Left failed to address structural problems involving the functioning of the state and private

1. Cf. "Symposium on Narcissism," in *Telos*, n. 44 (Summer 1980), pp. 49-125.

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bureaucracies, the consequences of oligopolization and of the economic crisis. The intensification of the structural crises in the mid-1970s (e.g., rising inflation, energy costs and unemployment), combined with partial integration of the New Left's cultural program (e.g., day care, co-ops) made the critique less vital. Thus, the connection between traditional Marxism and cultural conservatism must be developed further. Perhaps a new Gramsci is needed who would combine the commitment to cultural radicalism with appropriate concern for organization. This is crucial because the society that the Left wishes to transform is characterized by a massive bureaucracy that controls the mass media and has at its disposal efficient means of repression.

During the ensuing discussion, it was questioned whether a cultural revolution was a revolution at all, or whether revolution necessarily includes a structural component which makes a vanguard necessary. Breines responded by pointing out that all revolutions (French, Bolshevik, and Cuban) have reproduced structures of domination, exploitation, and emmiseration. The New Left sought to generate organizations whose structure did not contradict its values. The Left's problem today is the creation of a political movement which will generate values enhancing individual and collective growth. These responses generated a discussion of the positive developments of the seventies, and how *Telos* played a major role in criticizing the predominant scientistic rationality. Emancipatory change may no longer occur through politics but instead at a deeper social level made possible by the New Left's critique. Only if this critique continues will it be possible to expose the repressive foundations of political rationality and generate a truly emancipatory movement.

The next series of questions focused on what direction the remnants of the New Left should pursue. Breines argued that immediate cultural issues must be the focus of local political activity. Some participants indicated the need to go beyond the individual or small group level and introduce an economic critique, since this is the only universal issue that cuts across class, racial and ethnic boundaries. Breines did not oppose an economic critique, but cautioned not to become overly absorbed in it. He expressed dissatisfaction with various national political groups (Citizens Party, Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, and the New American Movement) and argued for the enlistment of local participation. It is at this point that what was to become one of the main issues throughout the conference was first formulated. On the one hand, some argued for the necessity of a national political organization, to unify various potentially emancipatory groups. On the other, these groups were seen as fundamentally incompatible, thus requiring a critical reexamination of theories that demand a unified world-view. Furthermore, this type of theoretical totalizing, rather than the inadequacy of politics, was seen as the main problem by some of the participants.

Breines' account, and most of the subsequent discussion, failed to address the more fundamental question, i.e., why did the New Left disappear so readily without leaving any significant imprint even on the traditional Left? In fact, today there does not seem to be any focus around which the New Left could be reconstituted, and its fundamental values are either derided or ignored. Breines' chastisement of people such as Lasch, Elshtain and Piccone for allegedly capitulating to the predominant national rightward shift missed the main point of the criticism of the New Left. Far from infusing new hope and revitalizing what everyone agrees is a society in crisis, the New Left simply accelerated the nihilistic slide. In a situation characterized by intensified alienation, the New Left anti-authoritarian program translated into a license for irresponsibility and narcissism. Its emancipatory values require an

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individuality not presently available. Consequently, it is necessary to create this individuality before any further discussion of emancipation takes place. Lasch's and Elshtain's criticisms are not concessions to the Right, but necessary medicine for a moribund political movement. The call to self-discipline and the critique of much scatterbrained self-serving forms of radicalism must be confronted rather than shunned aside as rightist bombast. From the fact that there are a plethora of feminisms, it does not follow that *any one* variety of them *must* be right, and to point to the confusion cannot postpone indefinitely the reckoning of what many are beginning to suspect: feminism as such *may* not make any sense. Until the New Left sees its theoretical way through many of its slogans, its death will not even be eulogized by its nostalgic ex-militants unable to function effectively within disintegrating institutions for which there seems to be no immediate replacement.

The next paper, by Piccone, sought to explain why the Left had collapsed. Strangely enough, no mention was made in it of the New Left as a distinct and historically identifiable movement. This was because Piccone's earlier analyses had already redefined the New Left as largely an artificially mass-media generated phenomenon: the American version of the Red guards -- idealistic shock troops allegedly slaughtering political dragons while in fact being manipulated by a faction of the ruling class to defeat an opposing faction. In Piccone's account, the New Left had been encouraged and instrumentalized by the monopoly sector of American capitalism to defeat the still-significant competitive sector. In this sense, it does not make sense to talk about the New Left, but rather to focus on the Left in general.

In approaching the collapse of the Left, Piccone argued that it has been entirely absorbed by the welfare state. Thus its fortunes during the last twenty years rose and fell with the New Deal model. What is needed is a new agenda whose guiding values are to be found in the critiques of the early Lukacs, Gramsci and Bloch, before they themselves were absorbed and de-radicalized by Marxism-Leninism. To the extent that the basic problems of capitalism — de-humanization, fragmentation, domination of nature, self-destructive growth, etc., -- remains the same, those critiques are still valid to provide a vision of society beyond the bankrupt welfare state and its totalitarian variations.

Before any discussion, Tim Luke read his paper which, building on the earlier one, sought a redefinition of the crisis in ecological rather than political economy terms. In this respect, too, he argued, the Left has missed the boat and become part of the problem rather than its possible solution. According to Luke, a theoretical house cleaning must go hand-in-hand with the development of ecologically sound life-styles which will provide qualitative alternatives to the present collective insanity threatening to destroy the delicate ecosystem.

Rob John was the discussant for Piccone's paper. He began by pointing out that Piccone's position on whether the Left was dead or alive was that the Left was comatose. John took issue with this by arguing that there is compelling evidence to the contrary, and that the Left is now in the process of regrouping. John used such examples as the formation of a Black political party, the fact that the Soviets have not yet invaded Poland, the failure of Thatcher's implementation of Friedman's economics and Reagan's turning away from the radical right wing of his party as important signs that the Left has not yet been beaten into total submission. While the Citizens Party had mounted an ineffective campaign, its platform did represent a meaningful Leftist program.

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A second problem that John raised was Piccone's classification, under the heading of artificial negativity, of all radical movements from the communist organization of labor unions in the thirties right up to the present. This is not a defensible position because it denies the emancipatory accomplishments or potential of these efforts and plunges the Left into a bad infinity: all Leftist efforts are doomed to fail in the face of the overwhelming integrative capacity of advanced capitalism. John further questioned Piccone's claim that the corporatization of politics was necessary for political stability since the neo-right are equally concerned with the corporatization of politics but argues exactly the opposite. Thus, in the Trilateral Commission Report on the *Governability of Democracy*, Huntington has warned against democratization and voting blocs. This indicates that the right believes that the corporatization of politics causes political instability by "overloading" the system with demands.

John also responded to Piccone's claims that Left politics deteriorates into the three main functions of calling for a more "just" society, greater democratization, and a defense of the "common good," and is most successful when capitalism is not in crisis. Contrary to Piccone's position, the Left is successful in performing these functions only when it is organized and capitalism is threatened. Thus, Carter lacked a vision or, at least, the ability to implement that vision. His 1976 campaign platform was basically a populist one which he had failed to implement. John concluded by defending the viability of the New Deal coalition since Blacks, Jews, labor, Hispanics, women and intellectuals will not be better served by rightist politics and will have to turn once again to the Left for guidance.

Piccone responded to John's portrayal of the Citizens Party as a genuine possibility by describing it as "warmed-over Roosevelt," with "a little Red Dye Number Two" thrown in. The call for more democratization by the Citizens Party and many other contemporary Left organizations, is inadequate and ignores the advanced capitalist crisis of homogenization and corporatization. These movements point only towards a "proletarian welfare state," which not only has nothing saintly about it, but is less efficient than a capitalist welfare state. Contemporary leftist politics fails to go beyond a "recycled, camouflaged program of 1930's proletarian, frontist politics." In response to John's cautious praise of the new Black political party, Piccone labeled it "a sad joke." The contemporary Black leadership "is part and parcel of the welfare state," because it was created by the state to provide a mediating agency between it and the Black underclass, something that had disappeared as a changing economy had destroyed the traditional Black leadership composed mostly of preachers and morticians. Piccone concluded by addressing Carter's failure and Reagan's politics. Carter failed, not by betraying his populist vision, but because he could not implement his program. Carter failed in the typical role of the executive branch of government to represent the interests of the totality (i.e., monopoly capital) against the particular capitalist interests that Congress traditionally upholds. Reagan will aim at this same program, but may be more successful. As part of the program, there will be an integration into the state of "the best ideas of the Left of the last ten years."

The nature of John's response was further evidence for Piccone's argument that the Left had become a relatively irrelevant appendage to the reformist wing of the Democratic Party. And even if politically independent, its vision would not constitute a qualitatively different alternative. John's approach to emancipatory politics, like that of most of the present Left, falls squarely into that program that Piccone had characterized as already fully integrated into the welfare state. Of course, one could still argue, as John did, for the possibility of resuscitating such politics; but that has

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long since lost whatever emancipatory or revolutionary possibilities it may have had once, during the golden age of competitive capitalism, in the 19th century.

The next discussant was Mike Lacy, who responded to Luke's paper, the main thesis of which was that the crisis of the Left derives in part from its sharing with the right the erroneous belief in the infinite productive capacity of the system. Reagan and the right have won, Lacy argued, by recapturing what was the traditional Left vision: the possibility "of an abundant life for all." The Left might reinvigorate this vision by offering a more sophisticated version that would take account of the importance of long-run ecological preservation. Lacy, however, disagreed with Luke's suggestion that more state intervention could not solve the environment and energy crisis, since it was in fact the cause of the problem. Lacy then attacked as "utterly abstract" certain "back to nature" tendencies in arguments similar to Luke's. Relying heavily on the work of André Gorz, Lacy noted that the coming "increasing emiseration" might lead people to be more open to leftist ideas and maybe even traditional Marxist theses. But this was tantamount to recycling all of the proletarian nonsense long since discarded and presently holding no promise for any viable politics.

In the ensuing discussion, Bob Antonio found two areas of indeterminacy in Piccone's argument. First, Piccone dismissed movements with "progressive possibilities" too readily. Secondly, he failed to adequately define "organic negativity." Piccone responded that he had tried to explain "artificial negativity" to Antonio for over four years without success, so he doubted that he would succeed now. Anyway, he gave it another try. Piccone argued that "organic negativity" presupposes individuality, a "genuine opposition," and a "new vision" — none of which currently exists. Programs which assume the presence of these factors are doomed to failure. Their "emancipatory possibilities" cannot be realized until "Marxism, environmentalism, and pseudo-Leftist authorities" are replaced with a coherent Leftist vision and alternative lifestyles. Antonio further questioned at what point theoretical reconstruction must begin. Piccone replied that the most basic questions involve definitions of emancipation and of a "good society," and that the Left must address the problems which lead to gulags when Marxism becomes official ideology in "actually existing socialist" countries.

From the very beginning, Marxist theory had been confronted with a perplexing dilemma. On the one hand, it postulated an increasing cretinization of the proletariat because of the nature of the capitalist division of labor. On the other, however, it designated these cretinized subjects as the revolutionary agency. What kept the two sides from rendering revolution impossible was a deterministic theory of economic crisis and an Hegelian theory of history. One postulated unavoidable economic ruin, and the other necessary reunification of the historical subject-object through collective objectification. But today no one buys that anymore. Marxist economic crisis theory is dead, while the Hegelian theory of history within Marxism has turned out to be a secularized theological nightmare concealing, under its theoretical rhetoric, the reality of the Gulag or of its more acceptable otherness: the totally administered society. Gorz has somehow realized this in his last book, *Adieu au Proletariat*. A more appropriate title would have been: *Adieu au Marxisme*. This book, however, will not be translated into English for a while yet — so Marxism will presumably still thrive, in Kansas at least, for a couple of years, until the 1979-vintage Gorz finally reaches the Great Plains.

Piccone agreed with Breines that his argument was tied to a reconstruction of Leftist history, but disagreed with Breines's claim that he advocated a linear theory of history,

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with emancipation as the inevitable climax. Rather, he stressed, he used linear history as a "hypothetical reconstruction" necessary for the construction and legitimation of a truly emancipatory vision.

Piccone also agreed with another member of the audience to the effect that people within bureaucracies may attempt to systematically undermine the bureaucratic system. But he noted that the organizational structure of bureaucracies results in the defusing of emancipatory efforts. Tim Luke added that Reaganism represents an effort by some people within the corporate sector to expel others within the system who are critical of the nature and effects of bureaucracy. And Rob John observed that the ecological crisis, as presented by Luke, represents a movement which cannot be "defused." The discussion ended with the audience's arguing for possible positive effects of current emancipatory movements.

The next paper by D'Amico confronted the crisis of the Left on a theoretical level. In a nutshell, Marxism and its two main historical opponents, utilitariansim and political economy, had lost their conflictual character and become practically indistinguishable. Consequently, drawing from Foucault's work, he argued against any attempt to develop a critical as distinct from traditional theory, since the distinction no longer makes any sense.

David Sciulli commented on D'Amico's paper. He interpreted Arendt's and Piccone's works as leading to the basic question of organizational forms. The most important task confronting the Left is thus the discovery of organizational forms which allow for open debate and the emergence of a consensus. Two problems must be confronted within this task: 1) how to restrain rationalization; and 2) how to restrain the arbitrary use of collective power. Habermas' work on communication theory may present a solution to the first problem. Solutions to the second problem have, thus far, been simplistic. The Left will not become very meaningful until it confronts these two problems. Capitalism, on the other hand, continues to be legitimated because it at least provides minimally for both an open forum and limits on the arbitrary use of state power.

D'Amico responded by criticizing consensus theory as developed by Habermas. Every theory has built into it the method by which it is to be applied; and agreement (or consensus) is necessary for the acceptance and application of any theory. Thus, "consensus theory" is of little use in explaining the nature of theoretical formulation and application, since by definition it suffers from the problems inherent in all theories. The important question is how any theory, including consensus theory, is "machined into the process of socialization."

Alan Sica asked D'Amico to clarify why it is impossible to distinguish between emancipatory and repressive theories without resorting to "Foucault and all the structuralist nonsense." D'Amico answered that theories represent connections between programs and their implementation, and that any theory may become more or less emancipatory when it is implemented. So, to analyze theories in terms of whether they are themselves "emancipatory" or "repressive" is useless. Sica noted that D'Amico's view would lead to the conclusion that the theories of Piccone and Foucault are similar, since both constitute artificial negativity. D'Amico agreed that Piccone's and Foucault's theories are similar at least in their rejection of Marxist and liberal-utilitarian explanations of recent events. But he rejected the term "artificial negativity" as another label which may take on a life of its own, and thus lose its usefulness. Here, Antonio noted that D'Amico seemed to be implying a necessary contradiction between the organization of groups and any theoretical re-

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flection on the nature of organization. D'Amico replied that although people do and will organize, organization is neither the key crisis of the Left nor a solution to that crisis. The real crisis instead is the blurring of distinctions between Marxism, political economy and utilitarianism. This results in Leftist theory's being united with the very problems it arose to combat. And neither current nor new forms of organization can, in and of themselves, solve this crisis.

The next paper, by Jacoby, was both a restatement of the current non-existence of the Left in the U.S., and a discussion of reasons for its collapse. A primary culprit was, of course, Marxism itself. Like earlier speakers, Jacoby argued that the collapse of the New Left "coincided with the incorporation of Marxism." Here he meant not only rigid political orthodoxy, but also the continued reliance upon various "crisis" theories that had historically weakened the Left and led to automatic responses — a shift from "The Politics of Subjectivity" to the "Politics of Objectivity" to nothing. This was not to deny the persistence of poverty and suffering, nor of the many *external* obstacles to the formation of a viable Left in the U.S. (McCarthyism, state repression, etc.). But in this society, traditional Marxian antagonisms have been "suspended and shifted to the margins." Thus, Marxism has become another academic fad. This "academic Marxism" is sterile, detached, and growing increasingly isolated with the absence of a politically active student Left and the contraction of universities. We are now in the era of "partial struggles" (health care, ecology, rent control, etc.), which, though dealing with real problems, remain fragmented. The *whole* remains elusive. He concluded by noting that nothing is certain other than the fact that the current condition of advanced industrial society is not ordained to last forever, and resignation must be resisted.

Following Jacoby's presentation, Pat Akard inquired about a *positive* political program in addition to negative criticisms of existing historical conditions. Jacoby, he claimed, had described the contemporary situation of the Left, but had given no clue as to how to bridge the gap between "waiting for the revolution" and "one-dimensional pessimism."

In the discussion of Jacoby's paper the issue of the relation of the New Left to the Old Left was raised. It was suggested that the lack of continuity between the New Left and Old Left in the U.S. may have been a blessing in disguise insofar as without the break during the McCarthy era, the New Left would have become poisoned by orthodox Marxism much sooner and to a greater degree. Still, despite the disastrous ideological fallout of Old Left orthodoxy, it was noted that part of the heritage of the Old Left in the U.S. was not Stalinism but a supportive social infrastructure. One of the failures of the New Left was in not having developed similar counter-cultural institutions. After all, many who came to the New Left after being brought up by Old Left parents, remembered not Stalinism but schools, discussion groups, summer camps, etc. This failure may also explain why the New Left embraced the Old Left so readily.

Someone raised the possibility of transcending "partial struggles" by focusing on the Third World. With the internationalization of production, international emancipatory struggles may be developing in underdeveloped countries. Jacoby pointed out that he never intended to deny the relevance of Third World developments, but while the Left in the U.S. should support emancipatory efforts in the Third World, emancipation cannot be expected to come as a result of this support. No revolution has even been won by *support*! In fact, much could be lost by focusing on Third World developments rather than developing a critique of late capitalism.

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Jacoby continually stressed the need to revitalize a Left critique, rendered all the more necessary in light of the problems that Marxism failed to articulate and answer for the New Left. It was also pointed out that there had not been many emancipatory political victories in the Third World.

On the question of potential Left political movements, the long standing opposition of the Kansas *Telos* group to the Piccone position of "forgetting workers" was discussed. Several Kansasonians argued that the proletarian theme in Marx's thought might be revitalized in the current dismal economic situation. It was argued that with inflation spelling wage reduction and lower standards of living, increasing numbers of workers are open to a Marxist interpretation of the situation — one which makes the proletarian theme very useful for explaining present conditions. Naturally, this position was attacked as crude economistic reductionism. On this issue Jacoby showed his diplomatic skills -- which explains why he usually ends up being applauded for claiming the same things that earn Piccone considerable flak -- by not ruling out the (remote) plausability of the Left organizing in the workplace, although he clearly felt that if things deteriorate further, politics is likely to shift to the right rather than to the left. The Kansas group agreed with this, but only if the Left fails to provide a meaningful interpretation of the present economic crisis. If the Left brackets off discussion of economic conditions for fear of an automatic Marxism, this will only leave open the possibility for the development of an automatic conservatism.

Thus, the conference closed with a strange juxtaposition — a kind of generational gap -- between the older *Telos* editors, veterans of many a battle within the ranks of the New Left, and the younger Kansasonians eager to recycle Marxism and to run through all of the mistakes made during the last half-century. While for the speakers the crisis was a deep one effecting the very idea of the Left, most of the natives still held fond feelings for the proletariat and preferred to see the crisis as essentially an organizational one. This contraposition of weary pessimists and eager beavers insisting on their rights to make their own mistakes was emblematic. In many respects, it accurately reflects the present predicament of the U.S. Left.

THE LEFT'S RIGHT:
REMARKS ON THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE BASE

by Paul Breines

This will be short and sour; a belch brought on by a politically acid stomach. The immediate cause is a number of passages in some of the papers presented at the recent Narcissism Symposium at Cortland and published in *Telos* 44. Seemingly signs of a new and astonishing sensibility, the passages in question are really signs of an older and tedious sensibility newly conceived and confident. The immediate culprits are Christopher Lasch and Jean Bethke Elshtain (with a small and remediable contribution by our own beloved helmsman, Paul Piccone). What we have here are theoretically sophisticated expressions of a phenomenon that reaches back at least to the late 1960s. The phenomenon itself is the cultural counterrevolution that emerged from within and from the margins of the cultural revolutionary gropings of the (old)

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New Left. In Lasch's recent writings, Elshtain's, and in some of Eugene Genovese's polemical essays, we are dealing with the base theoretical superstructure of the Left's Right, or if you like, the Right's Left. Building variously on Hegel, Marx, Freud, Critical Theory, Gramsci, and others, these theorists denounce the New Left's anti-authoritarian, anarchist tinged, cultural politics, against which they affirm traditional notions of order, discipline, hierarchy, social roles, and sex roles. This is not easily digestible food for thought.

A summary case in point is a remark from an earlier essay of Lasch's cited by Elshtain: "a 'conservative' respect for order and authority has now become an essential ingredient of any radical movement that seeks to transcend the progressive and socialist pieties of an earlier time.... Meanwhile the Left has turned its back on its proper constituency — the people who cling to family life, religion, the work ethic, and other ostensibly outmoded values as the only source of stability in an otherwise precarious existence. The Left has chosen the wrong side in the cultural warfare between 'middle America' and the educated or half-educated classes.... Lewis Mumford once regretted that 'patriotism should be monopolized by reactionaries.' The same thing applies to other 'bourgeois' virtues. But the American Left, in its unexamined committment to positions it believes to be 'anti-authoritarian,' has repeatedly forced the legitimate need for authority, stability and continuity to find reactionary political outlets."

If only the American Left *were* guilty of an unexamined committment to anti-authoritarian positions, we might all be better off. As Lasch surely knows, the American Left and its European counterparts have often, and often for long periods, been committed to authoritarian norms and forms. And as Reich, Horkheimer, Emma Goldmann, Murray Bookchin, and others have stressed, the Left in both America and Europe has not been entirely lax in upholding various bourgeois virtues. Evidently Lasch and Elshtain as well are talking about the New Left of the sixties and its now bedraggled remains. And they are talking with an animus that is as self-defeating as it is grating. Their shared *idée fixe* that the New Left long ago simply blew it in an outburst of mindless subjectivism and narcissism parading as liberation has the single merit of putting on display the narrowness of spirit accompanying many of their apparently deft theoretical moves.

One example appears in the long footnote in Lasch's commentary on the papers from the Narcissism Symposium. Here he goes after the film, *Coming Home*, and what he thinks was the self-indulgent individualism underlying much student anti-war activity in the 1960s. More than a protest against America's ravaging of Vietnam, Lasch argues, the character played by Jon Voigt in *Coming Home* embodies "opposition to any form of sacrifice at all, an attitude based not on moral or political principle but on a survival mentality that clings to life at all costs. It is as if the makers of *Coming Home* were unable to imagine any form of loyalty that might justify the sacrifice of life. The character played by Voigt has come home from Vietnam with wounds deeper than those imagined by his creators, a paralysis of the moral will...."

Now *Coming Home* has its problems but they cannot match those in Lasch's own remarks. As everyone who has seen the film knows, the wheel-chair bound anti-war veteran played by Voigt shows himself quite capable of great sacrifice, twice risking his life both for friends and for principles of solidarity and decency: once when he chains himself to the gate of an armed forces base in outraged protest over the suicide of a fellow veteran; and again when he confronts the armed and miserably berserk husband (Bruce Dern) of his lover (Jane Fonda). I don't want to make a mountain out

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of a molehill, but did Lasch actually see this movie? Or did he himself come home from exposure to the New Left, the anti-war movement, and the counter-culture with wounds that now prevent him from seeing those movements (or *Coming Home*) in the round; that now compel him to see only what he wants to see?

Elshtain's impulses are similar. Witness her swipe at Sartre, whose existentialism she calls a "parody of the self-made man" — a claim I would happily label courageously novel had it not been put forward three and four decades ago by hack Marxists. Whereas Lasch's search and destroy mission through the narcissist jungle overlooked Sartre's thought ("perhaps because exponents of this notion of the self have long been identified as radical critics of contemporary society"), Elshtain, an emergent expert on what is not radical, is not about to be fooled. In a cacophany of dogmatism and superficiality she thinks she detects a clear link between the allegedly abstract individualism of *Being and Nothingness* and the possessive individualism of the capitalist market. As proof she cites the example of Sartre's downhill skier who visually appropriates and conquers the passing spaces and scenes. That Sartre's terminology and its meanings here are essentially Hegelian; that even his early concept of self is bound to a concept of inter-subjectivity and communication; that his itinerary since *Being and Nothingness* seems pertinent here...all this vanishes. Jean Elshtain's denunciations of feminism are likewise distinguished by their rancor rather than their differentiated analysis. Feminism gets reduced to radical feminism, which gets reduced to Firestone and Ti-Grace Atkinson. How do you spell relief from this? You call a spade a spade and say that such an approach, with its strident simplifications, one-sidedness, and pontifical tone amounts to some wierd blend of Jerry Falwell and Stalin.

Then there is Paul Piccone's more forgivable contribution. Criticizing some of Marcuse's ideas of an emancipation of erotic drives, Piccone writes that, "if anything, Gramsci's opposite claim to the effect that a counter-hegemonic struggle entailing an enormous amount of hard work and discipline — and consequently much of that currently discredited, but unavoidable traditional sublimation — is a condition for qualititative social transformation, is immensely closer to the mark." To this he appends a quotation from Gramsci in 1917 distinguishing between "mechanical and authoritative" bourgeois discipline and "autonomous and spontaneous" socialist discipline. Wonders never cease. Here is our Paul Piccone who, for years now, has been slicing away, often brilliantly, at one after another Marxist and Leftist shibboleth, disclosing their obsolescence, their strait jackets, and their shipwrecks, and what does he drag out for resurrection in 1980 but the notion of socialist discipline!

And he is not the only one, nor is Lasch or Elshtain. To greater and lesser degrees, they share in a larger current or reaction against the New Left's practical and theoretical assault on domination and hierarchy. Gelatinous, incoherent, awkward, and finally self-destructive, the New Left of the 1960s, especially in its development in this country, was the beginning of the most radical social movement industrial capitalist society has seen since the struggles against the imposition of industrial capitalism in the early and mid-19th century. One index of the force of this presently quiescent movement is the scope and depth of the reactions to it, which far exceeded the New Left's numbers, always relatively small, and the social institutions it constructed, at best few and weak. It is well-known, for example, that the New Left along with counter-cultural groups threw wide segments of the American public into fits of defensive anger, pleasure anxiety, apocalyptic fears and similar understandable

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reflexes, which in turn figured centrally in the formation of Nixon's law and order presidency and more recently the New Right. Equally common knowledge is the fact that the New Left elicited comparable outbursts from a range of liberal intellectuals and social scientists, some of whom, Podhoretz and the *Commentary* circle, have emerged as part of Reagan's brain trust, giving their all in the struggle to preserve the family, heterosexuality, manliness, femininity, the rights of white people, capitalism, and so forth.

Less discussed is the extent to which a dimension of this cultural counter-revolution emerged from within the Left, including the New Left itself. From the start in the early and mid-1960s, the Old Left — the Communists, Trotskyists, and Socialists — was by and large hostile and at best ambivalent toward what it saw as some sort of bizarre infantile excresence of capitalism's decay, although the older organizations did what they could to recruit from among the new movement's ranks. More important in this context is the Progressive Labor Party, which was launched in the early sixties by Eugene Genovese and others who had broken with the CPUSA, having taken the Chinese side in the emergent Sino-Soviet dispute. Often militant on this issue and that, Progressive Labor was a culturally conservative phenomenon, its utopia being that of a factory where, with the aid of well-disciplined party cadre, workers discipline themselves. But Progressive Labor was only the most forceful among other groups and individuals who, by the close of the 1960s, unable or unwilling to pursue the culturally revolutionary visions of the New Left, were pushing or turning to reborn Marxism-Leninisms — a situation expertly dissected in Murray Bookchin's *Listen, Marxist!*

With the implosion of SDS, the focal point of the New Left, its members, friends, and fringes had several options. Some went into Progressive Labor or the Weathermen, which represented New Leftism gone haywire. Some sought to keep the initial faith, while others dropped away from the Left altogether, moving into private lives, religious sects, therapy movements, and so forth. Still others gravitated toward the "new Communist" groups, October League, Revolutionary Union, and their present-day heirs. They are of interest here because they began to emerge roughly at the same time as the New Right and at least *in part* for the same reasons — frustration, disgust, or fury at the New Left and counter-culture. As the 1970s progressed, some of the new communist groups matched the New Right step for step in their denunciations of communal experimentation, homosexuality, long hair, sloppy dress, personal autonomy, and dope, and in their insistence on the virtues of marriage, nuclear families, short hair, and the like. For good and for bad, these groups are part of the Left. But they are also part of the Right, a wing of the cultural counterrevolution. The same goes, to repeat and close, for a good deal of what Christopher Lasch and Jean Elshtain are saying.

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WHY DID THE LEFT COLLAPSE?

by Paul Piccone

In the 1980s, any analysis of the Leftist perspective can only begin by pondering the question of whether, as a philosophical outlook, a social theory as well as a political force, it is already dead or is still languishing in intensive care. The Reagan victory, the collapse of Eurocommunism, the burying of the Great Helmsman and his policies in China, the threat of disintegration in Eastern Europe and scores of other less sensational but equally indicative events signal not only the defeat of certain particular projects, but also the failure of a vision. Thus, a careful reexamination of the very meaning of the Left is overdue. Any such reexamination will reveal the paradoxical predicament that generally the Left has long since ceased to be *radical*, does not have even the faintest idea of a meaningful alternative to the existing order, and in the frantic effort to come up with immediately applicable tactics, it has overlooked that its strategy has long since become conformist and uncritical.

The two major Left traditions, the Marxist and the anarchist, have for quite a while had very little to say which has not already been integrated in predominant political discourse: one feeds into the logic of the welfare state and the other into the right-wing rhetoric of nostalgia for a transcended entrepreneurial phase of capitalism or an idyllic precapitalist community. Whether Western, orthodox, or otherwise, Marxism cannot avoid the swamps of the class analysis, of the collective subjectivity whose historical otherness has turned out to be statism, bureaucratism, and the Gulag, and of a philosophy of history whose end point is no longer either clearly understood or even vaguely desired. Whatever in Marxism has survived the century of criticisms and reconstructions following its inception, e.g., some version of the dialectic and the theory of alienation, have pre-Marxist roots and, at any rate, no longer seem to have even a minimal political or theoretical impact on the Left. For all practical purposes, Marxism died with the "Bernstein Debate" at the turn of the century under the critical blows not only of Bernstein, but also Sorel and primarily Croce. The Leninist, Luxemburgist or generally the Western revivals essentially *conceded* the main criticisms and sought to vindicate the revolutionary kernel of Marxism through a minority's will, faith in a vague proletarian vision recycling Christianity, or a slight democratic rationalization of factory management. By the middle 1920s, it was all over, and, with the final collapse in 1929 of the very system whose internal dynamics and logic it sought to inherit, Marxism lost any relevance or promise.

The anarchists' fate is more complex, since their radicalism is more rooted in the French Revolution and Enlightenment tradition, and in reaction to the dehumanizing excesses of capitalism. Instead of postulating a radical break with the fundamental presuppositions of this tradition by contraposing a qualitatively different subjectivity to the monadic individuality of the bourgeois order, anarchism simply seeks to vindicate the radical features of the bourgeois project and develop its occluded communitarian dimensions. But the whole project presupposes precisely that kind of full-fledged individuality whose realization constituted emancipation. Thus, in the age of the culture industry and its most important product, reified consciousness, anarchism can only appeal to a privileged minority that has already managed to escape collective McDonaldization. The lingering attractiveness of its vision feeds on those very values that even late capitalism cherishes but has long since rendered unrealizable in practice: autonomy, citizenship, self-determination, community, etc.

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Its critique of authority, however, has floundered on its inability to articulate socially possible and politically legitimate forms of authority in advanced industrial societies without at the same time requiring the effective dismantling of the whole existing technological and productive apparatus. Historically discredited through a forced identification with terrorism before World War I, it survived the 1920s in the form of small communities whose most distinguishing characteristic was instability and disorganization.

Both Marxism and anarchism are, on the whole, the radical otherness of two past stages of capitalist development: the entrepreneurial phase and, in the United States, its New Deal reconstruction. They were the social conscience of two periods whose supercession owes also to a successful integration of their critiques. In the age of multinationals' domination, any attempt to recycle them are, in Korsch's words, reactionary utopias.

The problem is compounded by the fact that over the last half-century the very character of politics has changed by displacing the traditional arena as well as potential constituencies -- which explains why the Left has remained crucified with two equally obsolete models and unable to develop a new outlook adequate to drastically altered social realities. Thus the public sphere, whose demise has been so aptly bemoaned by Habermas and Sennett, was an institution — never fully realized -- of entrepreneurial capitalism which performed in politics roughly the same regulatory functions of the market in economic life. The same fate that befell the market with the inauguration of massive state intervention was shared by the public sphere through the development of the culture industry. In such a context of manipulated consciousness, traditional politics understood as the negotiation of a governing consensus within a plurality of conflicting interests organized into parties is obsolete or, at best, part of an increasingly unnecessary legitimating ideology.

With the development of the state-regulated productive and distributive apparatus, to service the new emerging homogenized populace, politics evaporated from the limited and class-restricted public sphere to a corporativist arena within which both major political parties opt for state power by proposing only quantitatively different models of mediation among formally organized corporative structures vying for optimal allocations of goods and services. Here the Left disappears as an organized political force and its fragmented remnants, in continuing on playing the game with the old rules, unwittingly turn into the shock troops of capitalist rationalization. The communists' organization of labor unions in the 1930s successfully corporatized the working class, as much as the civil rights organizers in the late 1950s and early 1960s did the same for disenfranchised Southern blacks. Far from paving the way to a qualitative alternative to the existing system of domination, these developments facilitated its reconstitution in a context where the old competitive capitalism could not function without successfully adapting to the new historical conditions that it itself had helped bring about.

The instrumentalization of old contradictions, however, brings about new ones. The homogenization of consciousness and the corporatization of politics tend to be ultimately incompatible. Yet, while the first is a condition for the smooth functioning of the system of mass production and distribution of monopoly capital, the second is necessary to guarantee its internal political stability. The rise of new phenomena such as the narcissistic personality and the unmanageable bureaucracy as a result of the strategy of social homogenization signal the erosion of those autonomous areas of civil society that could previously be successfully instrumentalized as corporativist

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structures and thus effectively regulate the system. It is in this context that it becomes necessary to bureaucratically sponsor those Left politics which had also fallen victim to the general New Deal project of social reconstruction.

After all, in the welfare state Left politics degenerates to three main functions. Having effectively operationalized the vision of a qualitatively new humanity in terms of economic development and political democratization, Left politics deteriorate to these three functions: (1) the mere renegotiation along more "just" lines of the redistribution plan managed by the central bureaucracy in favor of disadvantaged sectors of the population; (2) the enfranchisement of previously excluded groups within the political process; and (3) the defense of "the common good" against the greedy one-sidedness of powerful special interests. But these "radical" politics also coincide with the welfare state's internal requirements for smooth functioning. Thus, it is not surprising that the crisis of the Left is also the crisis of the system. Contrary to Leftist conventional wisdom that identifies the success of Left politics with the intensification of capitalist crises, the situation is exactly the opposite and explains, among other things, why at least during the last couple of decades, Left politics in the United States seem to have fluctuated pretty much in step with the Dow Jones averages.

The successful negotiation of more equitable forms of distribution of the social product buffers major crises of overproduction and under-consumption such as the Great Depression by raising the aggregate demand for consumer goods in allowing more discretionary income to flow to relatively marginal social groups: old people, workers, welfare recipients, the handicapped, etc. If "fine tuning economics" meant anything, it referred to the realization of an optimal balance between investments and consumption which is at the same time socially legitimate and economically feasible. Abnormally high unemployment and-or inflation rates generally result when investments and consumption fall out of step or, as in more recent times, when the international order attempts to shift its base from military-political to sheer economic domination, and exceptional events such as the Vietnam war or the Middle East crisis generate unforeseen imbalances by means of exceptionally high military expenditures and skyrocketing energy costs. But the Left has not only failed to confront the ecological long-run viability of such a system of cybernated waste; it has not yet successfully come to grips with the meaning of the Vietnam war as a crisis of over-administration and planning resulting from the weakening of the system's internal regulatory mechanisms. Thus, it insists on simplistically reducing it to merely another expression of reckless imperialism. This analytical failure and other similar capitulations to the ahistorical linear logic of the Enlightenment have contributed to the Left's decline and the eventual weakening of the Kennedy wing of the Democratic Party. This state of affairs resulted when liberal democrats and their DSOC cohorts disastrously sought to recycle unaltered an orthodox New Deal program in a situation desperately calling for a rationalization of the administrative apparatus by further centralizing *legislative* functions and drastically decentralizing *executive* tasks, thus eliminating much of the uncontrollable and problematic middle levels of the federal bureaucracy. Ironically enough, Carter's fiasco was partly due to his opportunistic last-minute attempt to appropriate the defeated Kennedy program and focus on those same traditional corporative coalition politics rendered progressively unworkable and obsolete by the overwhelmingly successful post-New Deal homogenization of consciousness.

The strategy of administrative enfranchisement of previously excluded social groups

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has also failed. In creating the "affirmative action" wing of the black leadership, not only has bureaucratic penetration in the black community meant the effective disintegration of organic social bonds, but also the development of a deadly relation of dependence on the welfare state which condemns the black community to the permanent status of de-facto second-rate citizenry. As Cruse, Reed and others have argued, bureaucratic penetration in the black community, through civil rights and other legislation, has resulted in the annihilation of the old black elite and, while it has created significant opportunities for some middle-class blacks who cannot subsequently leave the black community fast enough, it has also rendered the perpetual dependence and marginality (as well as its potential explosiveness) of the black community the very *raison d'etre* for the "affirmative action" wing of the new leadership, thus effectively bringing about the management rather than the emancipation of ghetto blacks. This explains, among other things (such as Reagan's astonishing recollection that there were no racial problems in his youth), why blacks were the only group to unwaveringly support Carter's recycled New Deal policies.

The situation with the women's movement is even worse. Born almost as an afterthought at the tail end of the last major wave of civil rights legislation, women's liberation in the late 1960s meant initially the extension of the homogenization of consciousness to a sector of society whose entrenchment in pre-capitalist institutions such as the family had hitherto allowed it to resist most attempts at bureaucratic penetration. By vindicating women's formal equality, the women's liberation movement immediately rendered problematic any relation not based on the exchange principle and indicted any lingering family function presupposing an organic division of labor. As part of a successful attack on and industrialization of even those last minimal productive tasks still carried out within the family, such as cooking and house cleaning, the women's liberation movement successfully homogenized female consciousness at precisely the time when that social strategy of which it was the last expression had upset the corporative political balance and precipitated the crisis of over-administration and planning. The radicalization of the movement into a feminism vaguely contraposing "feminine" values (nurturing, cooperation, compassion, etc.) as the essence of a new and improved socialist consciousness to their masculine counterpart (competitiveness, aggressiveness, individualism, etc.) characterized as intrinsically capitalist, proved to be irresistable to a Left as politically exhausted and theoretically worn out as the New Deal model of which it had become an inextricable part. But the corporatist logic soon took its toll. Unable to translate its vision of a feminist society into socially operational projects, in politics feminists quickly reverted into the vociferous shock troops of that same women's liberation movement it had earlier derided as conformist and bourgeois, and ideologically feminism degenerated into a convenient and fashionable stance for upwardly mobile career women.

With issues involving the defense of the "common good" against particular interests, the Left has fared much better than in the first two cases. But it is here that its role is most immediately *regulatory* and, rather than challenging the system as a whole, it simply helps eliminate the most obviously problematic features. It ultimately provides advanced capitalism with the kind of political consensus concerning future development without which its legitimacy may be threatened — especially in times of crises. Thus, in the case of environmental energy policy, solar as an alternative to nuclear energy poses no major threat to the monopolies in the energy industry that can reap as much profit off small, decentralized solar cells as with nuclear generators. As for

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utilities who have fought and still fight opposition to nuclear energy, they are also monopolies whose profit rates are carefully monitored and guaranteed by public service commissions. Thus, the issues are political in the broadest possible sense that they pit the question of collective quality of life against narrow short-run efficiency criteria and they involve the recreation of a critical public sphere as an area of debate and discussion. Only in this last instance do emancipatory interests seem to emerge alongside purely corporative ones. But then, again, this too falls in line with the new strategy to artificially reconstitute urgently needed negativity to regulate and thus strengthen the status quo rather than qualitatively alter it.

The deadly dual logic of homogenization and corporatization has effectively absorbed the Left as an unwitting accomplice which solidifies the new system of computerized domination under the guise of its implacable opposition. In the present stage of capitalist rationalization characterized by further multinational centralization and bureaucratic decentralization so successfully marketed by Reagan, the Left as the social conscience of the Welfare State finds itself checkmated by anti-bureaucratic resistance from below and super-bureaucratic power from above. Thus, in its defense of "jobs" at home against successful foreign competition, it sides on the same corner with the most reactionary forces of protectionist capitalist interests — those internationally competitive sectors such as automobile and steel. In civil rights it is forced to defend rapidly fading programs such as affirmative action and busing, which merely defuse resentment by dealing with symptoms without penetrating into real causes. In supporting women's control over their own bodies and reproduction functions without at the same time providing a clear ethical vision, the Left appears as an advocate of irresponsibility and immorality, and thus as one of the prime causes of the general social deterioration. In all of these issues and more, the Left takes a stand with the Welfare State or remains silent. As an agency of homogenization or corporatization, it thus ends up sliding into the conformist logic of different modes of capitalist rationalization.

In order to tackle the causes of this crisis, it is necessary to return preliminarily to the vision of the Lukacs of *The Soul and The Forms,* the Gramsci of *La Città Futura,* or the Bloch of *The Spirit of Utopia* — well before the Bolshevik Revolution camouflaged as the living embodiment of collective emancipation either absorbed and systematically destroyed all these energies by identifying emancipation with statist rationalization, or politically marginalized them as idealistic claptrap. In a situation where socialism or the Welfare State has turned out to be a further extension rather than the answer to the capitalist crisis, the same general principled critique developed at the beginning of this century remains not only valid but also equally powerless. Its success is entirely a function of conditions beyond its control. As a broad existentialist critique of the Enlightenment and of bourgeois civilization, Lukacs, Gramsci, Bloch and Co.'s vision translates into a vindication of that subjectivist quasi-religious precategorical dimension which has not yet and can never fully capitulate to the logic of the institution but which all too easily and often falls prey to it. Thus, in a situation where the right has successfully integrated and defused Left models and strategies, the Left must reappropriate and radicalize the Right's critique and most successful organizational forms. Only by meaningfully elaborating and operationalizing that subjectivist critique into a project of reconstitution of that same autonomous civil society that earlier forms of capitalist rationalization had destroyed, will the Left become once again an effective emancipatory political force. Ironically enough, at this particular point a long-term Left strategy coincides with the

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requirements of short-term capitalist stabilization.

In attempting to reverse some of the most devastating unintended consequences of social homogenization such as narcissism, normlessness, statism, nihilism, etc., by bureaucratically reconstituting a minimum of pluralism and heterogeneity through corporate structures such as Community Development Corporations or other more indirect means, the state integrates the latest New Left projects of organizing neighborhoods, forming cooperatives, etc. Thus, the Left must have no illusions about the short-term revolutionary potentials of its projects, but in consciously participating in the most advanced forms of capitalist rationalization, it must see to it that the system does its job too well for its own good. The successful reconstitution of civil society will then become the precondition for the reconstitution of individuality and the resurgence of emancipatory possibilities.

RADICAL ECOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

by Tim Luke

Left programs today are in crisis because capitalism, on whose productive capacity leftists have anchored their hopes since the late 19th century, has itself entered into a series of structural crises that seem to have no obvious solutions. Indeed, the Left is presently in crisis since, like the system it opposes, it refuses to acknowledge the ecological constraints limiting further developments of advanced industrial societies. Instead, as stagflation, structural unemployment and escalating energy costs intensify the crisis, the Left continues to debate how this creaking social and economic edifice might be propped up with yet more of the organizational buttresses that have accelerated its collapse, namely, *more* state intervention, bureaucratic planning, and public control of the technical means of production in order to exploit diminishing natural resources. Leftist political organizations such as Gardner's "Common Cause," Commoner's Citizens' Party or Hayden's Campaign for Economic Democracy, generally propose *statist* solutions — especially if the state would come under their allegedly more enlightened direction. Having never been the primary building contractors of America's industrial order, and, at best, having only served as consulting engineers, most American Leftists can only call for more populist state intervention to salvage advanced industrial society from the excesses of technocratic state intervention.

But the current crises are far deeper than conventional Left programs suggest. For nearly three generations the "emerging post-industrial order" has been winning illusory victories against nature in the war against material scarcity. Its triumph arrived in a fit of moral blindness which refused to acknowledge that unprecedented material affluence for 6% of the world's population has required consumption of 35% to 40% of the planet's annual production of material goods. As the oil shocks of 1973

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and 1979 have indicated, however, the endless age of abundance and the attainment of the affluent society globally are gross mystifications of the severe imbalances between advanced industrial metropolitan nations and poor peripheral countries, technological efficiency and ecological irrationality, present consumption and future production, organizational effectiveness and structural inequity. Rather than conquering scarcity, advanced industrial society has been creating new scarcities, both in advanced industrial states and dependent third world countries, which, in turn, are fueling new conflicts between the OECD states and the Group of Seventy-Seven, between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the EEC, Japan and the U.S. In the final analysis, advanced industrial society, like the Holy Roman Empire, is turning out to be neither advanced, nor industrial, nor very sociable as both the EEC and the U.S. rearm themselves to militarily seize vital stocks of raw materials in the third and fourth worlds, as whole sectors of American industrial production are either moving abroad or collapsing under foreign corporate pressures and as the intrinsic dynamic of a consumption-based economy continues to generate false needs and narcissistic character traits. In the U.S. these trends are finding their most telling expression in the multi-million dollar "survivalism" industry whose magnates vend all of the products needed by the average consumer to prepare for the Hobbesian war of all-against-all looming beyond the materials shortages of the 1980s — home gasoline storage tanks, freeze-dried foods and automatic assault rifles.

On the whole, only the radical social ecologists' work seems to fully understand the current crises. Some conventional Leftist groups occasionally pay lip service to the concerns of radical ecology. Yet they continue to believe that modern science and technology will find acceptable solutions to economic problems and material scarcities. Consequently, the Left either discounts or ignores the heedless destruction of nature and non-renewable natural resources. Just as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, or East Germany are more than willing to employ almost any technique that promises to improve their overall economic performance, the Western Left is largely blind to the real costs of retaining the present industrial system. Instead of developing *real* alternatives that do not presume the input of multiple megawatts of electrical power, environmentally-minded Leftist groups such as the Citizens Party openly advocate digging up half of the Rocky Mountains and using all of their available water resources to extract the oil, gas, coal and shale petroleum needed to "keep industry working" in the Atlantic and Pacific coastal states. Such environmentalist thinking may provide a needed dose of artificial negativity for the extremely unprofitable nuclear power state-corporate combine, but it is not radical ecology.

The Left refuses to recognize what radical ecologists have for many years, i.e., that an unanticipated development, "the entropy state," has unexpectedly risen from the rational designs of advanced corporate capitalism. More concretely, "the entropy state is a society at the stage when complexity and interdependence have reached the point where the transaction costs that are generated equal or exceed the society's productive capabilities." [1] Advanced industrial capitalism has now reached this point.

The apparently unavoidable costs of maintaining the necessary "throughput" of goods, services and information at least matches if not surpasses the input capacity of the environment. This excessive demand, in turn, endangers not only monopoly capitalism's satisfaction of its clients' expectations of eternal plenty; it also threatens to wreck entire natural biomes for centuries. For example, Brazil, in its rush towards

1. Hazel Henderson, "The Entropy State," *Creating Alternative Futures,* p. 83.

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industrial development, is looting the resources of the entire Amazon basin using forestry, agricultural and mining techniques that are largely ill-suited to the fragile tropical ecology of the Brazilian rain forests and savannahs. Thus, in emulating the high-energy, high-technology, high-consumption industrial regime of North America, the Brazilian "economic miracle" is eradicating the world's largest body of natural vegetation, and thus its largest exchanger of carbon dioxide and oxygen, as it creates vast eroded mud flats, dust bowls and oversilted watercourses.[2] In turn, this "development trade-off" is significantly contributing to the buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that is leading to the warmest temperatures in over ten centuries over many parts of the globe.

The widespread assumption is that continuing advances of scientific research and technological innovation will inevitably solve these worrisome problems. Yet, it is precisely this faith in a science and technology that presume an instrumental approach to nature, which must be challenged. While some critical theorists have been struggling with this problem for decades,[3] nothing has changed. Indeed, this problem goes to the very essence of modern domination inasmuch as practically no one can conceive of moving beyond or outside of the present technological regime. The critique of social democrats, Marxist-Leninists or even anarcho-socialists remains fairly simple and direct, namely, that the problem is not in *how* the technological regime functions but rather in *who* controls, manages and benefits from its operations. Thus, if the bourgeoisie, or the corporate sector, or the new class or the enlightenment schema, or the party, or professional-technocratic intelligentsia were removed, then the intrinsic virtues of technological production would come into full play. These positions are nonsensical.

Advanced technology has built into its operational parameters a number of irrational, destructive and inefficient assumptions that any group who uses these methods will have to confront. Yet, in genuinely confronting them the alleged efficiency of advanced technology self-destructs. By intensifying the inputs of non-renewable energy, management, advanced technological expertise and capital, there has been an improvement in the material culture of a small minority of humanity. But the true costs of these processes are never calculated or even taken into consideration. The invisible, intangible and external *costs* of advanced technologies' visible, tangible and internal *benefits* are continually charged off because they can not be conceptually, financially or fiscally accounted for under non-ecological modes of thinking. Consequently, many today would argue that the battle against scarcity in agricultural production has been won forever. The development of corporate agriculture in the U.S. promises to deliver increasingly larger amounts of food to increasingly larger groups of consumers with increasingly smaller contributions of human labor. Yet, this agriculture is doomed to collapse precisely because it has substituted energy and organization for labor. Today, as the farm belts around American cities are covered over by surburbia with its service industry centers, and as the food production of the nation is concentrated in a few scattered areas bound together by interstate trucking, it takes six calories of non-renewable fossil fuel energy to produce one calorie of renewable food energy and one bushel of good topsoil is lost for every two bushels of corn produced under these energy-intensive means of production. Thus, in less than a century, nearly one-half of the topsoil in the

2. Richard J. Barnet, *The Lean Years: Politics in the Age of Scarcity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), pp. 75, 149.

3. See William Leiss, *The Domination of Nature* (Boston: Beacon, 1971).

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American plains states has been lost to erosion, nearly one-sixth of all known reserves of fossil fuels have been dissipated and these losses are accounted for as "gains" by advanced technological society because the external and invisible costs of accumulating petroleum energy and topsoil over the millennia enter into modern industrial social thinking as "free" goods ready to be exploited at a profit.

The vaunted rational efficiency of advanced technology actually hides gross irrationalities such as Love Canal, the Torrey Canyon, New England's acid rain, Three Mile Island and the Hanford nuclear site, that are an integral and not an accidental part of modern life. Presumably, these ecological disasters would be worthwhile trade-offs, if the material utopia that advanced society promised was indeed a reality. But, it is not. Instead, there are a few select centers of privatized commodity consumption in Europe, Japan and North America, which have bullied their way into existence over the past century by despoiling the material resources of eons. Basically, present-day technology *does not* have the technical answers for using the planet's finite fund of material, intellectual and cultural resources at levels enjoyed by the more affluent classes of the OECD countries for everyone in the world. At best, it aims in the future to provide the same level of goods and services given a small growth in population with a diminishing input of resources. Thus, the goal of IBM, Exxon or General Foods has become the provision of the same material standard of living to a population that is perhaps 7% of the world's populace and uses only 30% of its resources rather than being 6% and getting 40% of its material resources.

The Left today is not facing these problems, much less dealing with them. On the whole, they are attributed to a crisis of political leadership, of managerial command or of economic control that all ties back to their criticism of the advanced capitalist system on the grounds of *who* controls it and for *whom*. Having failed to consolidate its inchoate cultural revolution in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the New Left and its contemporary heirs have mainly set traditional Old Left goals for themselves — organize the workers, mobilize the people, inform the masses, raise funds for the cause, work within the system to keep it partially rational, regulate social institutions to aid the dispossessed and seize command over the society in order to slowly fulfill the Leftist program of economic equalization, personal liberation and social emancipation. In addition to the real scarcities that existed prior to worldwide industrialization beginning in the 1880s, artificial scarcities have been created and aggravated by the new productive processes of advanced industrial society. Deforestation has caused massive desertification, irrigation has led to tremendous salination of agricultural land and fresh water supplies, fossil fuel consumption has altered weather patterns and activities, chemical fertilizers and pesticides have destroyed food chains, cheap energy has given way to expensive energy and corporate farm mechanization has depleted once immense stocks of arable soils. Until the Left confronts these issues, its program, like that of moderate centrists and liberals, will fail to address the real crises. While posing as social and political revolutionaries, then, the Left remains allied with ecological and technological tories.

Today, the only social forces engaged in truly radical activity are those radical or social ecologists seeking a viable, alternative social, economic and technical model that consciously stands both within and outside of the present technological and economic assumptions of advanced industrial society. Thus, radical ecology circles are presently developing on a small-scale, local and decentralized level the technological, ecological and social alternatives to advanced industry's totalitarian technical regime. Through the cooperative, communal and community action movement, a number of

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significantly effective alternative technologies are being developed that assume a relation of stewardship and cooperation with nature rather than one of exploitation and domination. Moreover, the creation of these alternative housing, energy, agricultural, transportation, communication and organizational technologies is aimed at generating both material hardware and cultural software that presumes individual autonomy, skill, discipline, and activity. By moving from energy-intensive to energy-saving techniques, from capital-intensive to capital-saving investments, from hierarchical complexity to non-hierarchical simplicity and from inaccessible technology to accessible crafts, radical ecologists are stimulating the fabrication of appropriate technological and economic forms that are "...the hardware and the processes that allow for the efficient production to support materially comfortable lives for all, based on machinery that is understandable and maintainable at the local level, that draws on renewable resources of energy, uses recycled materials and builds self-confident personalities and local control, while it reduces the artificially-created need for 'more' goods regardless of quality or utility...."[4]

Ultimately, the radical ecologists are working from within the technological traditions of advanced industrial society, but are bending its techniques to new, more rational, more effective fulfillment of human needs by attacking directly the anomic dependency, consumeristic narcissism and cretinization that advanced industrial society purposely creates among its client populations. Similarly, the radical ecologists' advocacy of self-reliance, voluntary simplicity, personal discipline, collective democratic decision-making and individual reskilling, all pose a revolutionary challenge to contemporary social practices, which presume dependency upon experts, conformist consumption to sustain the economy's need for unwanted aggregate demand, concentrated ownership, hierarchical control, centralized technocratic decision-making and personal deskilling. Yet, because the radical ecologists have no explicit organization structures, no commitment to lobbying, public hearing or electoral politics and no institutional program, it is difficult to argue that they serve as real sources of artificial negativity within the present order. Instead, they seem to represent a new collection of genuine "outsiders" whose opposition to technocratic regimes is fundamental, total and inherently antagonistic. Nonetheless, these social, political, intellectual and cultural forces are operating outside of the current political economy of advanced industrial society in a fashion that challenges the conditions, costs and controls of advanced technology, which the conventional Left continues to regard as sacrosanct to its world historical mission.

4. Neil Seldman, "Reviving Common Sense in the USA," *Ekistics*, no. 43 (June, 1977), p. 376.

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LEFTISM: AN ADULT DISORDER

by Robert D'Amico

The depth of the crisis of the Left can be measured by the level of resistance to discussing it. Mere mention of the topic elicits groans of terminal *dejà vu*. All sides seem to agree that there is nothing "left" to discuss. Orthodox Marxism, which is still alive and well, points to the empirical evidence that all is going according to its most dire predictions. Who can deny that industrial society is now showing classical symptoms of disequilibrium and stress? It is merely a matter of time before the political forms of class struggle emerge with their reassuring familiarity. On the opposite side, those who have had enough with leftism and its traditional political functionaries want to hear no more historical and theoretical dissections. The Left is dead and gone so we are free to pursue some new politics of the body, the person, the environment, or the community and in the spontaneous availability of these new creeds there is, of course, another familiarity. The question is whether a debate about the Left can be raised above this level and not replicate these tired and worn out alternatives.

The crisis under discussion is also theoretical, i.e., if there is a crisis of the Left it is not just the result of failed opportunities, will to action or problems of organization. *There are* and *were* failed opportunities, weaknesses of action and problems of organization but they are for now insoluble and misunderstood by the Left because of specific theoretical assumptions which continue to claim hegemony. We can begin, however, with a political observation. The Left program, and here I assume that Marxism represents its most theoretically and historically complex form, is indistinguishable from both the successes and shortcomings of the state interventionist period of capitalist development. This holds for both situations where the Left has political representation as well as situations, as in the U.S., where it is not present as a political force. In fact, where it has no political representation the problems of the Left appear sharper. A lack of official status seems to push the Left toward a more desperate search for alternatives and criticisms which are short-circuited at every turn by the resources of a society more flexible and complex than the theory admits. The Left's attitude to such dilemmas is appropriately ambivalent. On the one hand, it must support the extension of state services and welfare to workers, blacks, women, unemployed while, at the same time, proclaiming all this a sham to divide and demobilize the masses. In many ways, this paradoxical response links together orthodox and unorthodox variants of Marxism — despite their obvious differences — because of the common assumption that the state defuses social conflict through its ability to manipulate state services for ideological ends. The radical criticism of the Left continues to see itself as potentially dangerous and that is confirmed in the sophistication of state suppression.

The single question then of Left self-criticism has been "How is this dangerous and devastating criticism defused, controlled and domesticated by the state?" But what if there is nothing to be defused? What if the so-called ideological control over the Left is not the strategy of the state but the simple result of the fact that the entire Left political program has been implemented? After all, the feeling that there has been a cooptation may be the subjective response to having a political program realized and then having to assess the distance between theory and practice. This is not to echo the conservative position that Roosevelt and the New Deal are "creeping socialism" nor to

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ignore the fact that to claim that "the entire Left political program was implemented" does not mean a change in the society's economic structure or privileges. What needs to be done, preliminarily, is to put aside the distinction between socialism and capitalism, both having their mythical forms, and pursue the question of how state intervention was able to conjoin with socialist politics. Within this context it becomes possible to see a common basis and program between mid-19th century strategies of modernization. Such a convergence has had the effect of crumbling Leftism as an opposition force, regardless of the subjective or moral superiority of individual Leftists.

The mid-19th century gave birth to a series of great social theories and political programs. There were three central ones — classical political economy, utilitarianism, and Marxism. Obviously the three interact in complex ways and are mutually related. These three "theory programs" share not only common roots but certain basic assumptions that allow them to coincide with, rather than stand in opposition to, contemporary state capitalism. This does not mean that they lose their historical aversion to each other — nor that they don't each continue to criticize aspects of contemporary society — rather each has been confronted with events that in the same way and in the same direction reduce their theories and programs to impotence and silence.

Hannah Arendt has called the "rise of society" the crucial event of modernity. She takes political economy as the science of the modern age because it was born and made possible only with the emergence of "the social." The "science of political economy" was, as Arendt liked to point out, an oxymoron. The terms "political" and "economic" were Greek terms meant to express two wholly separate and distinct spheres of activity. Therefore, for Ariostotle politics was the object of a practical science but economics was not the object of any science since, as the domain of the household, it was at best an expression of custom and opinion. Consequently, the arrival of this new science required that the distinction between the "household" and the political — or what Arendt preferred to call the distinction between the public and private — be abolished. The rise of society was precisely what replaced the distinction between public and private and the object of society was a kind of action which was neither the intercourse of politics nor the privacy of economics.

The rise of society is relatively recent and was accompanied by the rise of the state. The single most powerful symptom of the emergence of society was a liberation and expansion of economic activity. That means first the removal of boundaries such as the "household" from the domain of economic action and, second, placing politics in the service of economic interest. Marxism, political economy and utilitarianism each concentrated on the implications of this two-fold change. On the one side there was a "functionalization" of politics in which private interest was allowed to dominate over the public good and on the other side there was the "collectivization" of the private. The social as a category represented a publicization of formerly non-public and non-political actions. In both these aspects there was expansion. The economy could expand outside of what Marx called "organic" limits and the public could expand to include human activities which traditionally lay hidden from the collective eye. These two moments of functionalization and collectivization were precisely the point at which, for example, political economy and Marxism began to debate. But in looking at this debate from the vantage point of the triumph of society and its consolidation of control, the two theories are two sides of the same coin because either strategy — a more functional public sphere (utilitarianism) or a more collective private sphere

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(socialism) — led to the same end. Therefore, the triumph of the social and the destruction of the distinction between public and private brought two opposed 19th century programs into coordination; a new object emerged called the common good.

What the three theories of modernization in the 19th century agreed upon was that isolating and constraining the economic within organic or natural limitations was the major obstacle to increased social productivity and wealth. What they disagreed on was the nature of socialization and whether collectivization of the private sphere meant the elimination of capitalism itself. Capitalism and the rise of society were related events because capitalism was and is an economic deterritorialization of cultural boundaries. While this deterritorialization was in many ways "violent" — as both Marx and Hegel had argued — it was also a kind of benevolent concern since the liberation of productivity could be in the name of a public, common end (utilitarianism). But a massive restructuring of the economic toward a social end — one lying neither in the public nor the private — therefore demanded a new form of politics. Consequently, the domain of the political became a place where administration and the functional or utilitarian decisions necessary for increases in productivity took place. The major theories of capitalist development all noted this important shift toward administration in the state and assumed — including Marx — that it would be a beneficent and benign contribution to the common good.

The argument then is that the common assumption between our three great theories of modernization is the dual strategy of collectivizing the private and administering the public realms of a new object called "society." In considering this hypothesis we have to reconsider Marx's critique of political economy. Marx's attack on political economy was against its theoretical inconsistency as revealed in a "communistic" core hidden inside the theory itself. The disagreement between Marx and political economy was not over socialization as a means of increasing productivity but whether capitalism itself was not an obstacle to a truly collective "household." Marx showed, brilliantly and with a theoretical level of criticism, that socialization was the key to wealth in the modern age and that capitalism, as it then existed, was the effort to maintain a non-collective or non-social — that is, quasi-private — economic initiative. He correctly saw competitive market capitalism as a society which had not fully broken with a pre-capitalist private sphere and therefore would prove to be an historical obstacle to wiping away the last vestiges of organic limitations on productivity. The theory-program of political economy, as Marx further argued, expressed this same obstacle theoretically in its inconsistencies over the labor theory of value.

Marx's real significance among the 19th century alternatives was that he attacked political economy in terms of a theoretical self-reflection and not merely an empirical catalogue of facts. In doing so, Marx proposed the possibility of a new science. While Adam Smith still had to invoke the "invisible hand" to coordinate what could prove to be unpredictable human actions or initiatives, Marx simply extended the concept of socialization and was able to dispense with any external theoretical entities or assumptions of order. As "social beings" human behavior followed patterns and regularities with exceptions lying only in that which was "asocial" or "abnormal." In proceeding in this manner, Marx linked his theoretical foundations with the rise of the social sciences which would prove to be powerful forces in the consolidation of collectivization and increases in social productivity.

Economics as a new science — born with the rise of society — has been superseded by the human sciences (social or behavioral sciences). These new sciences found their object in the standardization and normalization of behavior as well as in the discovery

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of new categories or objects of abnormal, asocial or non-utilitarian activities. Allied with the techniques of statistics, these new sciences proved themselves invaluable tools for expanding productivity and preparing new areas for the expansion of society. The process of deterritorialization which gave rise to society produced both increased productivity as well as new instabilities. Strategies of state intervention have to be precisely and carefully managed. Unemployment insurance, for example, requires not only the social worker, criminologist and psychologist but the statistician and statistical-economist so that rates of payment can be precisely measured against effectiveness and social impact. Foucault's work has shown in detail how the discovery of "abnormality" or asocial behavior (the delinquent, for example) was both an epistemological and political event. As the discovery of a new object of knowledge and information (with dossier, statistics, case histories, sociological backgrounds) it opens up a new field and therefore a new arena of power. The object discovered in these new sciences is always a practice to be implemented. As Arendt puts it: "Statistical uniformity is by no means a harmless scientific ideal; it is the no longer secret political ideal of a society which, entirely submerged in the routine of everyday life, is at peace with the scientific outlook inherent in its very existence."

To return to the starting point, it is clear that Marxism, political economy and utilitarianism share a common world: the world of society. That is partly why these three apparently divergent theories seem to become more mixed and indistinguishable in the contemporary world. To suggest one example: as strategies of modernization, our three theory-programs first confronted the problem of poverty in the late 19th century. Poverty was approached then in two ways: (1) it was a problem of ethics, understood traditionally as a question of charity or altruism; (2) it was a problem of social wealth or productivity. In both cases the question of poverty also revealed a problem of power in which social labor and wealth had to be managed. Marx proposed that poverty would either lead to revolution and the final complete socialization of wealth, or the increase in poverty would demand levels of repression effectively blocking the increases in productivity necessary to sustain capitalist growth. But after 1848 this hard choice seemed bypassed — there was neither revolution nor the counterproductivity of repression. Rather the social struggle was bisected in much the way that Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, among others, have suggested.

The major event that has proved to be an anomaly for Marxism was the growth, extension and implementation of laws, measures and services aimed at the spheres of labor, unemployment, sickness, schooling and in general what came to be called social security. These social measures began at the end of the 19th century and accelerated by the mid-20th century. The reason these measures cut across the political struggles as well as the political discourse is precisely because they are what Arendt called a "socialization of the economic," that which each of our 19th century theories supported and encouraged. It is just at that point that we find the common assumption between Marxism, political economy and utilitarianism. It is this common aspect of their programs whose implementation makes differences between them superficial. Further, the effort by Marxism to grasp these new events (these new laws and services of the state) in the language of "exploitation versus humanization" found itself vacilating between condemnation and support (and such vacilation also marked the pro-capitalist theories of development). The moment in which the state took on social costs so as to increase social wealth and productivity, the state realized the common project of 19th century theories of development and simultaneously those theories were incapable of grasping this new strategy of socialization.

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Of course, the rise of society — and with it the rise of social wealth, production and security — did not occur without struggle and resistance from all sides. But this struggle was not in the form of a confrontation or defeat for either camp — nor was it the struggle the Left had predicted. Rather these new strategies made the Left alternative more obsolete and structurally impotent. The result was not a defeat for either capital or labor but the formation through strategies of social security and state intervention of the world common to both capital and labor and, in the act of securing this new realm of the social, the state formed between these forces a new cohesion or solidarity.

Foucault has used the term "political technology" to describe such strategies and measures. In the political technology of state intervention there was what Arendt called the "rule of large numbers," namely the use of statistics as allied to the social sciences. For example, the reparation of calculated social costs in the wage is what introduces into salaries a factor of secured social wealth. The worker does not confront capital but is employed by society, whether the worker is working or not. The shouldering of social costs requires the precision and yet "anonymity" of statistical patterns. The social sciences gather the information and keep a running check on the application of the techniques so that collective security can have both mathematical precision as well as moral justice.

Labor therefore is no longer defined by the organization of production but the organization of security. The state manages not only social wealth and productivity but social labor as well. This entire administrative and organization integration produces the phenomenon that Marxism has identified as an ideological effect — namely a new type of integration in which the struggle for survival of labor is replaced by a pursuit of well-being, promotion and sociability. As a case in point, the enormously important problem of unemployment, which was at the center of late 19th century debates (between Marxists and Malthusians, especially) was not solved finally in the terms of that debate but administered through a socialization of hiring. Here is an example of how the terrain of the "theory-programs" of the 19th century was altered in such a way that their implementation was their demise.

The new solidarity of modern society is not a seamless web or impregnable fortress — it only appears that way when one is looking for traditional 19th century struggles. The emergence of the social demands planning, efficiency and coordination, and therefore the expert or the technician rather than the speaker now is at the center of politics. Speech and persuasion are banished from the political sphere as part of the obliteration of the distinction between public and private which made way for the rise of society. The problems of struggle begin to revolve then around how the state can bring about effective adherence to purely technical solutions. But once again the traditional themes of popular democracy, as found in our 19th century theories of modernization, can only offer messianic promises of escape from need. Those promises are wholly discredited and effectively blocked by the new political technology. The promises of modernization are reduced to emotional rhetoric which may continue to fill a vacated space in the political realm but has lost the power to understand its own fate let alone that of this new political technology.

This discussion began with the suggestion that the problem with the Left is a theoretical one, and why the theory-programs available to the Left are no longer distinguishable from their historical opponents. Proposing a theoretical reconstruction is a complex task since it means both reworking the history of the Left, in terms of the previously sketched vague outlines, as well as applying the lessons we learn to a

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redefinition of what Leftism means both morally and politically. The suggestions that follow are therefore wholly negative comments about the direction of such a reconstruction.

In recent works Foucault has outlined a number of theses about the nature of power which are directed at both liberal-utilitarian and Marxist theories. Rather than repeat these by now well-known arguments, it is important to realize why Foucault turned to the theme of power after his studies of the rise of the human sciences. Specifically, there seems to be a correlation between his views about the relation between power and knowledge, and the relation between theory and practice in the human sciences.

In his early work Foucault seems to blend two themes. He tries to show that theoretical activity and institutional forms are related as types of control over discursive practices. Furthermore, once theory is seen as a kind of institutional practice, claims of truth, self-reflection and grounding all have to be reexamined and treated with suspicion. The notion of a transparent relation between theory and practice is analyzed throughout *Les Mots et les Choses* and Foucault concludes the study with an examination of historicism as precisely such an illusory effect (man is both subject and object of a new science). In Foucault's view, criteria of truth and self-reflexivity are "effects" produced internally to a theory; therefore theories always have a "positive unconscious" concerning their own limitations and "blind spots." Foucault links together this inherent limitation in systems of thought (at the epistemological level) with its institutional form (at the level of a practice).

In his recent explorations of sexuality and prisons, Foucault seems to have extended this epistemological point into a political dissection of the role of the human sciences in strategies of modernization. The demand for a scientific basis for practice is not innocent. There is a political "pay off" in the belief that a theory necessitates a form of practice. Once thought can claim such a "ground" it gains a certain strategic level of control. The point of this line of analysis by Foucault is not to discover power lurking everywhere but to look suspiciously at the "discourse of liberation." In his studies of the history of sexuality or prisons, Foucault shows how theories claiming the right of emancipation became powerful techniques for control, how the social sciences were able to take over the strategy of "collectivizing the private" and how this new level of power transcended the difference between radicals and reformers. The special theory-practice relation found throughout the new social sciences — in its most developed form in Marxism, psychoanalysis and utilitarianism — claims to justify its practice through the theoretical guarantee of emancipation and enlightenment. It is the dogma of the Left to believe in this "interest" of emancipation or liberation, as the guarantee of a theory's political program, and as a fact rather than a construction of the theory itself. As Foucault suggests, it is not that these new "sciences" struggle against the power of the state but are precisely the tools with which a complex political technology operates.

In considering the crisis of the Left as a theoretical crisis, we must dispense therefore with the self-satisfying belief in the distinction between critical or emancipatory theory versus traditional theory. Historicism has been the fundamental dogma of Left doctrines and, as such, it gives to so-called emancipatory theories a Manichean vision of the battle between good and evil as a certain guideline for the interpretation of all events. We must force ourselves to stop looking at "texts" as the keys to this Left Manichean vision of politics and theories. We must finally learn the lesson that every claim to emancipation and enlightenment is a strategy, a potential technique, and that history is not a simple story.

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CRISIS OF THE LEFT?

by Russell Jacoby

"Today in the United States there is no Left; practical political activities are monopolized by an irresponsible two-party system; cultural activities — although formally quite free — tend to become nationalist or commercial or merely private." This statement could have been made today or yesterday. In fact it was made in 1959 by C.Wright Mills in an essay titled "The Decline of the Left." Historical parallels are tempting. Mills' essay was posed before a renaissance of political activity that stretched out from the Cuban Revolution. The urge is great to view the future in the same terms; the 80s will witness a renewal of political activity.

Yet the Left has always drugged itself with the medicine of an imminent turn; the crisis of capitalism is always in the offing. After every setback the Comintern dusted-off the metaphor of the revolutionary wave; the revolution was always in the trough between upsurges. Today you do not need a weatherman to know the revolutionary storm is over. The 80s will be as close to the 60s as the Black Hundreds are to the Red Guards.

Violence not of liberation, but of destruction and self-destruction is in the air. The murder of John Lennon is a sign of the times; nor should we forget Allard Lowenstein, and the others. The lesson is clear: the 60s will not be ignored but annihilated. There were not two Oswalds but a million. Marcuse quoted Beckett: "Don't wait to be hunted to hide." Today we need an E.J. Gumbel. Long before Nazi violence triumphed, Gumbel, a left-wing statistician, documented its institutionalization. In the early years of the Weimar Republic he published a series of pamphlets, including *Two Years of Murder*, and *Four Years of Political Murder*.

If the absence of a Left in the near future is probable, it is also rationalization; it justifies the hysteria of everyday life and work as the only recourse for glum revolutionaries. Down-in-the-mouth Leftists could not be happier; they can manage their careers as if directed by the Central Committee. They pine for the heat of revolutionary fervor while dousing the flames. This seems certain: to affirm that nothing will change will guarantee it; and to simply repeat past practices and theories will repeat past setbacks.

To analyze future prospects requires sorting out the subjective and objective dimensions of the current impasse. Defeats of the Left may be due to faulty theories and practices; they may also be due to the overwhelming power of the establishment. Recent symposiums on the Left have tended to wring hands — "we have failed to overcome racism, sexism in our midst, etc. etc." — instead of pointing fingers to forces outside the Left. To lose does not necessarily signify flabbiness of theory or will, but absence of power.

Objective reasons for the weakness of the Left are familiar; the "classic" weakness of the U.S. Left was compounded by McCarthyism which severed its living history. For some of these reasons that emerged in the 1960s was strikingly novel; there were few guides, good or bad. For these same reasons the New Left lacked roots, history and consistency. When it ran into obstacles it embraced the past as if it were the future. The enthusiasm for Stalinism and orthodox Marxism was possible only because of the social amnesia. Comintern resolutions on the Black Nation, bankrupt already in the 1930s, were pondered as the latest word. The Left ate its way through the past as if it were a plate of fortune cookies.

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The impact of the state did not end with McCarthyism; it is easy to gloss over the consequences of more recent state repression and persecution. It is not simply rhetorical to argue that especially the black movement suffered profound damage. The stock of leadership is never large. Martin Luther King, Malcom X and George Jackson were irreplaceable. That each was shot down exactly at that point in their lives when they were embracing a wider and more radical politics does not seem accidental. On the American Left the only consistency has been the blood-bath.

To be sure, the role -- real and potential -- of leadership in the Left is difficult to appraise. Yet the significance of a leadership with talent, integrity and vision is often understated. Here theory ratifies reality, for the U.S. left has never been blessed by capable leadership. Perhaps the most damning comment on the New Left is its failure to produce a stable leadership. Moreover, its theoretical vision came from aging Europeans such as Isaac Deutscher and Herbert Marcuse. No one has replaced them. Of course the vagaries of the movement itself exacted a toll. As the focus changed from students to revolutionary youth to lumpen youth to China to Third World to the prison movement to the working class a stable leadership proved impossible.

The fitfullness and flightiness of the Left responded to a real absence: the absence of a revolutionary subject. Marxists hunted for a revolutionary subject. Every strike presaged new developments, and confirmed old ones. The Left generally canvassed the socio-economic structure for revolutionary groups as if leafing through the Sears catalog of power tools. Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man*, now over 15 years old, is hardly obsolete; it indicated the dilemma. The central contradictions of capitalism have been "suspended," and only surface on the margins.

The conventional responses are not satisfactory. One magically substitutes the universe of the self for the revolution. Whatever I am doing, thinking or feeling is identified as revolutionary. The other is no better, and perhaps worse; it requires total self-abnegation. The revolutionary movements are always somewhere else -- in Latin America (for whites) in the black community, and so on.

Narcissism and self-sacrifice are the approved flights from an intractable society. To be sure, today sacrifice has fallen on dog days, the province of new immigrants. Everywhere self-absorption absorbs the self. To note that the full time cultivation of the self has little to do with revolution is not to advertise revolutionary asceticism. The politics of guilt has sullied the Left for decades. Today, however, the imperatives of self-advancement and pre-occupation seem only to advance. A recent survey of incoming college freshman found that not only were their parents more affluent than previous students'; but there was a decided jump in the desire for money and power, and fall of interest in public affairs. The Left is not composed of incoming freshman, but the same forces are at work.

Within a dim scene, Marxism flourishes in universities and colleges. Nor does it suffer from the ills of born again Stalinism; it has its own ills. As Max Horkheimer noted in the 1930s, academic Marxism, deprived of the urgency of social change, decays into meaningless symbols. Today it has become a minor industry, a fast food outlet of freeze-dried concepts. That Marxists have been on the forefront of spreading structuralism, semiotics, Lacanism, grammatology, and so on, is worth considering. It is an expression of the crisis of the falling rate of intelligence, which may be the hope. Anything fills the void; and anything does.

Academic Marxism is caught by pincers. A significant student Left belongs to the past; consequently, there is very little pressure on universities to keep or hire Leftists. Those on the margins become academic "guest workers," a migrant labor force with

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few rights and little pay. This only increases the insecurity and guilt of those Leftists who have already managed to obtain secure jobs. They avert their eyes and redouble the efforts to achieve respectibility. For this price they receive their rewards as reliable servants of the bureaucracy. In a period when jobs are short and the prospects for the Left uncertain, the price is a bargain.

Nevertheless, academic Marxism harbors a specific hope: it will preserve the past for the future. When the conditions change, and the students are once again provoked, the links with past radicalism will not have been severed. For years Paul Baran was perhaps the single self-identified Marxist on a U.S. campus; and through his books he aided the renaissance of Marxism. This could be an inspiration and a model. The situation today is certainly different, and better. Yet it would be idealist to argue that Marxism will be preserved because many individual Marxists have obtained sinecures. Paul Baran was threatened with isolation not semiotics. The danger is a Marxism which has lost its mind and soul.

Academic Marxism is hardly the whole of the political Left. Recent symposiums on the Left have stressed that the goals of the past decades have not been met: racism, poverty, discrimination, remain current realities; the 80s will see groups trying to survive in the teeth of government retrenchment and recession. This is undeniable. The struggle to survive cannot be criticized; yet it has little to do with the fate of a political Left. Nor is this an insult. The Left has often confused oppression with revolution; the most oppressed were the most blessed. Yet it belongs to basic Marxism that there is no automatic link between suffering and revolutionary activity. Marx never argued that the working class suffered more than the peasantry. The specific conditions of the working class prompted the hope of revolution. That various socio-economic groups and minorities are in for a bad deal in the coming years, cannot be doubted. It can be doubted that they will cross the line separating the struggle to eat from the struggle for emancipation. Those who are sound in body and mind will not fight the revolution; those who are mutilated beyond repair cannot: this is the curse which has bewitched the revolutionary project.

The next years will be the era of *partial* struggles. Groups will enter the political arena to do battle for separate rights and interests: rent control, health care, environment, and so on. It would be arrogant to write any of this off. A wildcat strike to preserve a coffee break which is being eroded away is surely justified. Yet the struggles are fragmentary, local and transitory. The whole is elusive. If the strength of contemporary radicalism is its localism, this is also its weakness. As always the danger is in self-righteousness and self-mystification: the confusion of better garbage collection with revolution. Apart from any ends which are achieved, partial struggles keep alive an arena for political activity and commitment; for many individuals this will be critical — and more: a renaissance of political activity is unthinkable without the participation of individuals. When the conditions change, those who have remained in the daily fray may be able to show the way. To be sure, in the rat race of daily politics they may also forget the way.

Any predictions about the Left ring false; the situation is objectively ambiguous. To ransack the political reality searching for motion and radical groups testifies to impotence. Vulgar Marxism has not improved with age. The New Left and Western Marxism are distant memories and the private turf of academics. A crisis of Marxism had already been announced in 1899, when Labriola attacked it. He noted that before Marxism could enter into a crisis, it had to be established.

Yet no matter how bleak the present prospects, neither the U.S. economy nor the

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international political order are ordained for eternal existence. Resignation and cynicism must be resisted. It is clear, at least, that whatever the historical weaknesses of the Left, it never suffered from too much intelligence. C. Wright Mills can remain a guide. In the same essay on "The Decline of the Left," he stated, "Opposition to established culture and politics often consists of scattered little groups working in small circulation magazines, dealing in unsold cultural products."

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Notes and Commentary:

RECENT HEGEL LITERATURE: General Surveys and the Young Hegel

by James Schmidt

It is now evident that the so-called *Hegeljahre* of 1970 — the 200th anniversary of Hegel's birth — was only the start of a decade of Hegel. Over the last 10 years a flood of commentaries on various aspects of Hegel's thought have appeared, critical editions of his works have been published, and new translations of his works have been ventured. This review can make no claim to be comprehensive. In an attempt to provide some rough sense of the current status of research on Hegel, and most especially on the question of the role his social and political thought plays in his philosophy, a few of the many commentaries and some of the more important new editions and translations have been selected for examination.

It is impossible to work one's way through even this limited portion of the Hegel literature without some degree of agreement with a paradox noted by Charles Taylor at the conclusion of the more substantial of his two studies of Hegel.[1] While the level of interest in Hegel's work has perhaps never been greater, Hegel's ontology itself, in Taylor's words, "is quite dead." While we are more informed about the exact status of Hegel's project at the various points of its development thanks to a series of critical editions that have given us far more material than was available previously from the period of the Jena System, the Heidelberg and Berlin Encyclopedias and the Berlin lectures on the *Philosophy of Right*, we are still left with a situation where, in Taylor's words again, "no one actually believes his central ontological thesis, that the universe is posited by a Spirit whose essence is rational necessity" (538).

Stated this baldly, there is something clearly amiss in Taylor's characterization of the present attitude toward Hegel, although rectifying the judgment only makes matters worse. It is not so much that no one believes that "the universe is posited by a Spirit whose essence is rational necessity" as that it is not even clear if anyone can now believe that Hegel himself believed anything so straightforward (though perhaps outlandish). While Hegel's immediate heirs in the 1840s were left with a rough sense of what he was saying, and hence free to agree or disagree, and while the subsequent tradition of Marxian-influenced Hegel interpretation had its stock Hegel in whom rational kernel could be separated from mystical shell, we lack an equally clear and coherent — if misguided — sense of how to characterize Hegel. We have the ability to modify any simple statement of what Hegel was in fact doing into virtual incoherence; we have a sense of what is misguided as a characterization of Hegel's thought; but beyond accounts of Hegel's thought as a certain type of intention, historically situated within a certain peculiar context, there is little one can offer as a general characterization without an almost instantaneous sense of doing violence to his thought. The major critical achievement of the recent work on Hegel has been at last to free Hegel from the various traditions of Hegelianism (right, left, British, or Neo-Marxian) in which he had been placed. But what emerges from this critique of corrupting traditions is less a coherent body of thought than a network of tensions, a set of intentions that strike us as incommensurable, and a series of summaries that can only be looked upon with an immediate sense of their inadequacy.

*This is the first of three article-length reviews on recent Hegel literature. Subsequent reviews will deal with texts and commentaries concerned with the Jena period and with the *Rechtsphilosophie*.

1. Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge University Press, 1975).

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General Surveys: Plant, Rosen and Taylor

To make this dilemma more palpable, a preliminary look at three of the better attempts at characterizing Hegel's project which have appeared in the last decade is in order. Charles Taylor's *Hegel* initially appears to be the most conventional of the three, structured generally along the lines of John Findlay's earlier *Hegel: A Re-Examination* and sharing the same general sensibility. Both have as their goal an exposition of Hegel's mature system which is free of unnecessary jargon and which stresses that a commitment to a discursive exposition of the structures of empirical reality lies at the heart of Hegel's work. Hegel's discussion of nature, the state, history, art, religion and the history of philosophy are juxtaposed to an examination of the categorical structure developed in both the *Science of Logic* and the *Logic* of the *Encyclopedia*. Likewise, both Taylor and Findlay preface their discussion of the system with an account of the *Phenomenology*, arguing that despite the subsequent immersion of a discipline termed phenomenology within the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, the *Phenomenology* of 1806 continues to play an important role as prolegomenon to the system proper.

There are, of course, major differences in the two accounts -- differences that in part suggest the altered climate in which Hegel is now read. The discussion of the two logics looms slightly larger in Taylor's account, and the *Philosophy of Nature,* a sympathetic exposition of which played an important role in Findlay's influential rehabilitation of Hegel, is polished off rather quickly by Taylor as "a somewhat more derivative work" of a thinker who never shared the same concern with *Naturphilosophie* which could be found in his contemporary Schelling (351). Hegel's political and social thought, on the other hand, receives a good deal more emphasis in Taylor's account, which argues that it is this dimension of Hegel that is most significant today. Taylor's other book on Hegel, *Hegel and Modern Society,*[2] reinforces this evaluation: in editing and rearranging his longer work for a more general audience, Taylor deletes his discussion of Hegel's logic, the *Phenomenology* and Hegel's views on nature, art, religion, and philosophy in order to stress again the significance of Hegel's examination of politics and society.[3]

The altered climate that separates Taylor's book from Findlay's becomes even clearer when one contrasts the discussions with which each book opens. Findlay's introduction is devoted to an attempt to salvage Hegel's sense of the dialectic from the distortions that had been introduced by a previous generation of English Hegel interpretation. The point of this discussion is to indicate how unrigid, how open to the particularity of its specific subject matter Hegel's dialectical method in fact was. Taylor, in contrast, is concerned with situating Hegel's philosophy within its historical epoch, and by drawing on Isaiah Berlin's discussion of J.G. Herder and "expressivism"[4] he seeks to demonstrate that the point of Hegel's conception of "self-positing spirit" can only be appreciated if one realizes the moral and political dimensions it encompasses: the reconciliation of an "expressive" conception of human nature (Herder and the *Sturm und Drang*) with the commitment to a radical conception of freedom and moral autonomy that is the legacy of Kant and Fichte (13, 29, 33).

2. Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge University Press, 1979).

3. *Hegel and Modern Society* contains no new material, although at times the compression of the argument of the larger book makes matters clearer. Both books, it should be noted, erroneously refer to Hegel's essay on natural law as an unpublished theoretical work (*Hegel*, p. 574; *Hegel and Modern Society*, p. 173). The essay, in fact, was published in 1802. All future references to Taylor will be to the larger of the two books.

4. Isaiah Berlin, *Vico and Herder* (New York, 1976).

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Taylor's book thus surveys Hegel's system and concludes that Hegel is best read today as a *political* and *social* thinker rather than as a *systematic* philosopher. Conversely, Raymond Plant's *Hegel*[5] is a study of Hegel that initially appeared in an English series of books on important political theorists and whose major thrust is to demonstrate the extent to which Hegel's "political thought" cannot be restricted to those writings conventionally designated as being about politics: *The Philosophy of Right* and the various essays collected by George Lasson and partially translated in the édition of *Hegel's Political Writings* edited by Z.A. Pelczynski.[6] Beginning with an account of Hegel's general system, Taylor reaches the conclusion that what remains of relevance in Hegel today is a conception of politics and society, while Plant, beginning from an attempt to elucidate Hegel's political and social thought, denies Pelczynski's claim that these writings can be understood and appreciated "without having come to terms with Hegel's metaphysics"[7] and argues instead that "the whole of Hegel's work has a social and a political dimension" and that "his whole philosophy...was a response to certain problems in social and political experience" (9).

In examining the way in which Hegel responded to this experience, pride of place in Plant's account goes to Hegel's writings from the Berne, Frankfurt and Jena periods (1792-1807), with Hegel's writing after the *Phenomenology* occupying a little under a third of the book. Even within this concluding discussion, little attention is paid to the *Science of Logic* — although Plant does, for reasons which in light of recent research now seem questionable, devote considerable attention to the Jena logic[8] — and the discussion of the *Philosophy of Right* is considerably weaker than the earlier sections of the book. The point, however, of the closing chapters of Plant's study is intentionally not that of providing an account either of Hegel's mature system or of his later views about the specific institutions necessary for the creation of a rational political order. Rather, what ties Plant's book together into a coherent and extremely readable whole is an effort to understand the way in which Hegel came to see in philosophical reflection a means to a reconciliation with political and social disruption which he felt, in the wake of the French Revolution's self-consumption in the Terror, could not be attained on the level of political practice.

Plant's neglect of the *Science of Logic* and Taylor's conclusion that Hegel's ontology can serve no longer as the basis for a contemporary appreciation of Hegel's significance stand in sharp contrast to the role given to Hegel's logic in Stanley Rosen's *G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*,[9] a rather dense book that deserves close scrutiny. Almost uniquely in recent studies of Hegel, Rosen gives primacy to the *Science of Logic*, arguing that "Hegel is first and foremost a logician and not a philosopher of history, a political thinker, a theologian, or a *Lebens-*

5. Raymond Plant, *Hegel* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1973).

6. Hegel, *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie*, ed. G. Lasson (Leipzig, 1923), partially translated by T.M. Knox and Z.A. Pelczynski, eds., *Hegel's Political Writings* (Oxford, 1964). Knox has subsequently translated the natural law essay and the *System der Sittlichkeit*. Both will be discussed in the sequel to this article.

7. *Hegel's Political Writings*, p. 131; George Armstrong Kelly has also strongly objected to this claim. See his *Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis* (Princeton, 1978), p. 8.

8. Hoffmeister's 1932 edition (*Jenaer Realphilosophie* I) dated the manuscripts from 1802, i.e., at the start of the Jena period. H. Kimmerle's study of the manuscripts, "Zu Chronologie von Hegel's Jenaer Schriften," in *Hegel-Studien* 4 (1967), pp. 125-176, now dates them from no earlier than 1804. Hence, they represent a later stage in Hegel's thinking about logic than Plant assumed and are not the systematic key to the entire Jena period. On Hegel's Jena logics, see J.H. Trede, "Hegels frühe Logik (1801-1803-04)," *Hegel-Studien* 7 (1972).

9. Stanley Rosen, *G.W.F. Hegel. An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

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philosoph," and goes so far as to reverse the usual pecking order and employ the *Science of Logic* as an interpretive key to the *Phenomenology*. But one should not conclude that Rosen is completely indifferent to the political dimension in Hegel's thought on which Taylor and Plant have focused, since his claim about the primacy of logic in Hegel continues, "Of course, as a logician, he is all of these and more" (xiii). The main burden of Rosen's account is the redeeming of this "of course," and Rosen is at great pains to stress that Hegel must be seen as responding not simply to the immediate social and political problems made apparent by the fate of the French Revolution, but rather as taking the French Revolution as a starting point for a complex examination of the more fundamental problems of the relation between ancients and moderns (5). So far, there is little in Rosen's reading that is exceptional: Plant and Taylor, for instance, see Hegel's grappling with the French Revolution as part of the broader question of how the ideals of the ancient politics can be recaptured on the terrain of the modern social and economic order. Likewise, Joachim Ritter and Manfred Riedel have documented in even more detail the extent to which Hegel's political thought must be seen as an attempt to revitalize the traditional Aristotelian conception of politics in a world where the separations between household and *polis*, and private and public spheres, which rest at the heart of Aristotle's *Politics,* have been shattered with the emergence of a market in which private needs are pursued outside of the household in exchange with others.[10] What *is* unique in Rosen's reading is the insistence that it is a *conceptual resolution* of the battle between ancients and moderns that is at stake and that the reconciliation is achieved not within Hegel's practical philosophy but rather within his *Logic*.

At the center of Rosen's argument is an interpretation of nihilism as the fundamental crisis facing modern philosophy which resembles on the level of metaphysics an argument that his teacher Leo Strauss developed on the plane of practical philosophy.[11] As a consequence of the break with the ancient conception of nature and the substitution of a program for the domination of nature through a conception of reason modelled on calculation and best exemplified by Descartes, modern philosophy gains practical mastery at the price of a loss of an understanding of its own foundations. This loss, in turn, comes to a particularly clear consciousness in the work of Kant and Fichte (6-11, 2-60, 92-104). Paralleling this inability of theoretical reason to obtain clarity about its grounds is the moral nihilism whose cultural manifestations Hegel explores in the *Phenomenology's* discussion of the self-estrangement wrought by the Enlightenment (193-202). Rosen argues that the crisis

10. Joachim Ritter, "Hegel und die französische Revolution" (1956), now in Ritter, *Metaphysik und Politik* (Frankfurt, 1969) — a basic and important study. A translation of this is in progress. Manfred Riedel, *Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt, 1969) and *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft und Staat: Grundproblem und Struktur der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* (Neuwied, 1970).

11. There are also parallels to Husserl, who was also a major influence on Strauss. The discussion in Strauss' *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953) should be supplemented by Wilhelm Hennis' similar account, "Politik und praktische Philosophie," now in *Politik und praktische Philosophie: Schriften zur politischen Theorie* (Stuttgart, 1963), an essay of importance for Habermas' discussion in "The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social Philosophy," now in *Theory and Practice*, trans. J. Viertel (Boston, 1973). The weakness of this sort of account — which rests on the hypostatizing of a single "classical doctrine" and then proceeds to measure "modernity" in terms of deviations from this norm — cannot be discussed here. But see J.G.A. Pocock, "Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Ancients and Moderns," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 2:3 (1978), pp. 93-109, who discusses the failings of this sort of dichotomy of "ancients and moderns" for Florentine republican theory. Habermas' discussion also falters rather badly on Machiavelli.

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visible in Kant and Fichte and made more tangible in the disaster of the French Revolution provides the impetus for a productive renewal of the main themes of classical Greek philosophy which reach their culmination in Plato and Aristotle. Thus, Hegel's primary response to the crisis of his age is to be sought not on the domain of politics or practical philosophy, which Rosen argues Hegel continually subordinates to philosophy just as Aristotle subordinated practice to theory, but rather on the level of Hegel's theoretical philosophy proper, the *Logic*. The rough correspondence of the concerns of the first part of the *Logic* (the Doctrine of Being) to the traditional themes that occupy philosophy from the time of the Greeks to the advent of modern science and the concerns of the second part (the Doctrine of Essence) to the period from Spinoza to Schelling provides a key to the comprehension of the complexity of Hegel's own project as set forth in the Doctrine of the Concept at the conclusion of the *Logic*: "Hegel's completion of modern philosophy is at the same time a return to the debates within classical thought. . . . Hegel is able to correct Kant and Fichte by the process of correcting Plato and Aristotle" (25).

The achievement of the *Logic*, then, is to have overcome the dilemma that modern thought faces when the substantial ground on which it claims to stand is rendered unknowable by the restriction of its concept of reason to calculation. By reinterpreting this loss of "deeper meaning" as the positive experience of a liberation from the illusion that meaning is to be sought on some "deeper" level Hegel manages to overcome both classical and modern dilemmas (108-110). Similarly, the *Phenomenology's* overcoming of the dilemma of moral nihilism rests on the elucidation of a logic inherent in the process of nihilism itself, which leads us from the mad chatter of Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew* to Rousseau's withdrawal and turning inward of culture, a turning that reaches its culmination in Kant's moral philosophy and sets the stage for Hegel's own project (194-195, 198-199). The problem that Rosen finds still persisting in Hegel's solution is that despite his demonstration that the dichotomy of essence and appearance represents not a disjuncture bridgeable only through some inexplicable leap from one state to another but rather a dichotomy supported by a persisting presence that can be rendered self-conscious through reflection, no claims can be made that there is a necessary order in which this presence will be made manifest (pp. 113-114). To state this is to question whether there is any clear order of succession within the *Logic's* categories, and to raise this question is in turn to risk falling back into a bifurcation between an essential logical system that is always present as a basic structure and the various contingent ways in which this structure can be realized (113-114).

Hence, even in a study which is by far the most sympathetic to Hegel's ontological concerns, there is a perception that on a rather basic level something is amiss in Hegel's system. The problem is eventually reformulated at the conclusion of Rosen's work as the question of whether it is possible for Hegel to claim to have dispensed entirely with intellectual intuition (*noesis*) of determinate form. Against this doctrine of intuition, which Rosen sees present in a modified form in Kant and Fichte as well as in Plato and Aristotle, Hegel advances the argument that discursive thought (*dianoia*) alone is sufficient and that intuition is either "empty of all determinate content, or it expresses the immediate and therefore incomplete element of form as a separate, non-dialectical abstraction. In both cases it is associated with sensuous images rather than with intelligible structure" (270). In response, Rosen argues that Hegel's attempt to do without an intuition of form — the linchpin of his attempt to overcome the fragmentation of systematic philosophy into a series of discursive elaborations based on separate acts of intuition of the sort one encounters with Fichte's posing of the

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intuition of identity and non-identity as distinct acts — invariably produces a series of paradoxes, which culminate in the introduction of equally serious bifurcations into Hegel's discursive account. Hence, Hegel himself is left in a situation where the connections between particular cases of negative, discursive activity cannot be successfully combined with the complete account of the whole which Hegel claims to have achieved (271-280).

A similar dilemma is posed by Raymond Plant in his concluding discussion of the degree to which Hegel's project of finding, through philosophy, the reconciliation with reality that could overcome the sense of separation and alienation that marked such contemporaries as Schiller and Hölderlin and which was reflected in the works of those thinkers such as Ferguson, Smith and Steuart, who Plant takes to be the major influences on Hegel's political and social thought. Plant sees three basic contradictions in Hegel's account of this reconciliation, the first of which turns on an antagonism between his concept of necessity and the notion of reconciliation itself. Arguing that the notion of necessity here employed can be taken neither analytically nor synthetically, Rosen likens Hegel's notion to what Wittgenstein calls context-dependent relations of loose entailment.[12] But Plant goes on to argue that this interpretation is not adequate to cover all of Hegel's examples of necessary connections between states of affairs, since typically the most important transformations which Hegel must demonstrate as necessary cut across cultural or social contexts, and would thus breech the contexts on which they would be dependent given the Wittgensteinian reformulation. For example, Hegel's account of the necessity of the modern state must show that it is in some way the culmination of a whole series of political forms, beginning with Asiatic patriarchal despotism and stretching through the polis, the Roman empire, and the medieval order to the modern state. The only context Hegel can find to tie these disparate cases together, Plant argues, is the movement of the Idea itself as elaborated in the *Logic*. But a recourse of this sort would violate the essential principle that underlies Hegel's conception of reconciliation: the abolition of all transcendental otherness and the end of recourses to a level somehow "deeper" than history itself (187-190). The moment when Hegel must drag distinctions from the *Logic* into the *Philosophy of Right* in order to show the necessity of institutions such as a hereditary monarchy is the very moment when, in Marx's words, the *Philosophy of Right* becomes a parenthesis within the *Logic*.[13]

Likewise there is, in Plant's eyes, another sort of antagonism which frustrates Hegel's program for reconciliation: a tension between the general claim that Hegel makes to have "cancelled and preserved" an earlier mode of life or thought and the specific empirical detail that needs to be elaborated to make this cancelling and preserving convincing. In discussions of political institutions, for instance, Hegel insists against Fichte that it is not necessary to spell out such details as what attributes a passport must have.[14] However, if one is to be at all convinced that the modern state does indeed cancel and preserve the earlier political forms, then some indication of rather specific details — for instance, how the subjectivity first expressed in Christianity is to be incorporated into a political constitution — is needed. But it is precisely at points such as these that Hegel is forced into such apparently arbitrary

12. Plant, p. 187, which refers in turn to P. Nowell Smith, *Ethics* (London, 1962). John Searle's notion of "institutional facts" would also seem to be relevant here; see *Speech Acts* (Cambridge, 1969).

13. Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State," in *Early Writings,* ed. Q. Hoare (New York, 1975), pp. 73-74.

14. *Rechtsphilosophie*, Preface, Knox trans. p. 11.

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constructions as the notoriously unconvincing argument for a hereditary monarch, which, as already noted, can be sustained only with a further leap into the *Logic* (191-192).

Finally, there is a third problem Plant sees in Hegel's notion of reconciliation: if one indeed takes seriously Hegel's claim that the general characterization which his philosophy provides can be tested against reality to show that it is in fact embodied in some essential fashion, then it is quite likely that the result will be less a reconciliation with reality than an even greater sense of the discord between the ideals of reason and the actual state of affairs. While this tension is not as intrinsic to Hegel's argument as the first two, its empirical force cannot be denied. The young Marx sensed that the state indeed embodied freedom leads directly, as Plant argues, to the demand that reality itself must be transformed in a direction that will permit this philosophical claim to be abolished by being actually realized. The goal of reconciliation thus gives way to a demand for the very political practice that Hegel had, in Plant's account, earlier abandoned (192-196).

Finally, Charles Taylor's critique of Hegel's ontology draws on certain themes also developed by Rosen but pushes his conclusions in a direction that would seem, if coherent, to provide a warrant for both his and Plant's stress, against Rosen, that Hegel's significance today must be sought in his political and social thought rather than his ontology proper. The tendency noted by Rosen for Hegel's efforts at overcoming those ruptures which intuition introduces into ontology to fall prey to another variety of the disease he is fighting — in the form of a separation between particular discursive accounts and the completed discursive account — is posed by Taylor in terms of a failure to have two sorts of dialectics mesh properly. Taylor distinguishes between two general paths which Hegel's dialectics take: one descending, the other ascending. The burden of the ascending dialectic is that of showing that finite reality cannot be understood unless more and more comprehensive interrelations are posited. Hence the contradictions in and between finite entities are exploded until we reach the point where it is shown that if finite things are to exist, then they must be "dependent on and posited by *Geist*." An example of this general course of argument can be found in the Philosophies of Nature and Spirit in the *Encyclopedia*. The descending dialectic, in contrast, beings from the standpoint of *Geist* and argues that "if cosmic subjectivity is to be, then the furniture of the world must be of a certain sort." This type of argument may be found, Taylor argues, in both of the logics. Hence, within the *Encyclopedia* we do not simply have two merely circular or redundant dialectics, but rather a demonstration that not only do finite objects require *Geist, Geist* itself requires finite objects. Thus, "finite reality is shown to be not just contingently given, but to be there in fulfillment of a plan, whose articulations are determined by rational necessity" (99). To rephrase the relation in Rosen's terms, both types of dialectics are needed since (1) a descending dialectic alone will give us only a formal requirement that certain types of entities must exist, without showing us that determinate entities of the specific sort we have to deal with in the world must exist, and (2) an ascending dialectic alone will remain forever dependent on the contingent starting point from which we proceed, and thus will not have successfully overcome the contingency and nihilism that marks intuition.[15]

Taylor's critique parts company with Rosen in his discussion of a central ambiguity in Hegel's concept of contradiction.[16] Taylor argues that Hegel's dialectics are driven

15. In light of his rather hostile review of Taylor in *Hegel-Studien* 12 (1977), pp. 245-249, I assume Rosen would deny the correspondence.

16. Cf. also Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic* (New Haven, 1976), pp. 83-84.

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by two different sorts of contradictions: contradictions between an implicit purpose and a set of circumstances that are inadequate for the realization of the purpose — a type of contradiction found paradigmatically in Hegel's historical accounts — and contradictions between a standard which we know has been met and various conceptions of this standard which terminate in an argument that cannot account for the standard's being met — a type of contradiction found paradigmatically in the *Logic*. Both types of contradictions can be used to illuminate one another, just as the ascending and descending dialectics illuminate one another (131-132).

Both types of contradiction, however, suffer from problems that prevent them from successfully driving the ascending and descending dialectics on which the proof of the rational necessity of the world hangs. Both involve a juxtaposition of a general claim — be it an implicit purpose or a given standard — with some particular action or statement. Both may be started without a full comprehension of the *telos* towards which the dialectic will be driven: the purposes and institutions of the historical dialectics will be reformulated in the course of the argument and even within the conceptual dialectic one need only have some general features of the standard to start with, not a complete discursive elaboration of the standard. But one must have in Hegel's view some type of irrefutably established purpose or standard on hand at the start, and Hegel's failure in Taylor's reading can be seen as a failure to have secured adequate starting points in either of the two demonstrations of the system Taylor examines in detail: the mixture of historical and conceptual analysis which drives the ascending account of the *Phenomenology*, a work that Taylor argues is to be seen as a general introduction to the closed circle of the *Encyclopedia,* and the pure descending dialectic of the *Logic*.

Taylor finds the opening arguments of the *Phenomenology* the most successful of Hegel's efforts to locate an indubitable starting point.[17] Consciousness' claim to possess true knowledge represents an implicit purpose that consciousness pursues, but demonstrations of a failure to attain this knowledge — for instance, the failure of consciousness' claim that the "here" and the "now" of sense certainty represent the fullest and richest sort of knowledge — do not lead to an abandonment of the quest for knowledge, since the statement that *we know* that knowledge is impossible would be a flagrant contradiction. Hence, we have at the start of this ascending dialectic the sort of "realized standard" which is needed if we are to follow a series of contradictions that have something more than historical contingency at their basis (135-136). But this is not true of arguments of the latter part of the *Phenomenology*. Once one has moved from the dialectic of consciousness to the subsequent discussions of self-consciousness, reason, spirit, religion and absolute knowledge, "we can see that the first three chapters are much too weak and sketchy to support the rich superstructure of historical and anthropological interpretation that Hegel has erected" (220). These later discussions are convincing not because they rely on the indubitable standard that the claim of knowledge represents, but because, like good historical accounts, they "fit" the materials discussed and provide a coherent narrative (217). But this is to claim for them only the rank of persuasive hermeneutic or interpretive dialectics, which is not enough to establish the claim of rational necessity.

The burden of Hegel's argument thus falls on the *Logic*, which eschews any attempt at articulating an implicit purpose and instead makes use purely of the conceptual sort of dialectic. The problem here is the reverse of that of the *Phenomenology*: while Taylor feels that once the stage of "Infinity" is reached the argument of the *Logic* does

17. See also his more complete discussion "The Opening Arguments of the *Phenomenology*," in *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. A. MacIntyre (Garden City, N.Y., 1972).

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indeed take the form of a deepening of our understanding of what is implied by a conceptual standard to which we are irrevocably committed, the opening parts of the *Logic* are considerably less convincing.[18] The stage of Infinity is reached by demonstrating that determinate being (*Dasein*) is racked with the contradiction that if being is to exist, it must exist in the form of finite determinate being, while at the same time determinate being contains within itself a negation that forces its demise. The category of Infinity, "the immortal, self-subsistent system of mortal dependent finite beings," is thus required if we are to move beyond the level of passing finite beings. But it is unclear how convincing this step in fact is, or if the unfolding of an ontology which might be plausible on the level of fairly complex types of beings -- living beings -- who are preserved through some network of relations which spreads beyond the individuals can be convincingly demonstrated on the abstract level of such simple forms of being (346-349). We would seem to be left again with an interpretation that makes a certain amount of sense as an interpretation of human historical life, but this would be to transform Hegel's argument into a hermeneutic of social life rather than to remain loyal to its claim to be a strict ontological proof.

From this summary, it should be evident that while the analyses offered by Plant, Rosen and Taylor are at one in pointing to serious problems with Hegel's ontology, there are important distinctions among their arguments. While it would be of no little account to pursue these differences further with the end of either reconciling them or evaluating them more critically than has been attempted thus far, the concerns of this review point in a different direction. What is most immediately striking is the curious fact that despite the apparently serious charges each author brings against Hegel, all three are at one in proclaiming that Hegel's thought retains a great contemporary relevance.

Rosen's conclusions about what is now to be done with Hegel's project are in some ways the most astounding, simply because it is difficult to see why he should continue to argue for the persisting significance of Hegel's project. There is no mistaking the significance given to Hegel's project by Rosen: "Our way to the future," he writes, "if *there is a future for philosophy*, lies through the reassimilation of Hegel" (265). Hegel retains a claim on our attention because of the degree to which his project for a philosophical interpretation of formal logic remains a valid project. Hegel may perhaps have provided "the wrong interpretation," Rosen states, "But I know of no better ones now in currency" (263). After this evaluation, it is strange indeed to find that the only plausible suggestion for a path beyond Hegel's impasse would seem to side-step what Rosen has argued is the heart of the project. Rosen's suggestion that Hegel's rejection of intuition in favor of dialectic can perhaps be overcome "through the assimilation of intuition into conceptual thinking" (273), if read as a proposal for future lines of development rather than as a demonstration that there is no way out of Hegel's dilemma, would seem to make sense only as a move back to a pre-Hegelian position of the sort represented by Aristotle -- a move that Rosen seems to reject (275) -- or an adoption of a standpoint, such as that of Husserl in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, which has nothing to do with Hegel's project. If it is difficult to read Rosen's suggestion as anything other than an indication of the radical and irresolvable contradiction at the heart of Hegel's logic, it is even more difficult to understand how it can be read as such in light of the continued allegiance to Hegel's project which the study manifests.

18. Cf. Gadamer, p. 87, who has little problem with the transition from *Werden* to *Dasein*, but argues that the transition from *Sein* and *Nichts* to *Werden* cannot be adequately "dialectical" since *Sein* and *Nichts* are such impoverished categories in the first place.

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Similar problems emerge in making sense out of Raymond Plant's evaluation of Hegel's significance. After having demonstrated that a Wittgensteinian reading of Hegel only shows up more seriously the degree to which what is really central and original in Hegel's argument cannot be adequately glossed by a category like "loose entailment" since the types of connections Hegel wishes to draw are specifically context independent, we suddenly find an argument that perhaps an ordinary language reading of Hegel does make sense. "Hegel certainly failed to provide a unified grasp of experience, but his struggle and failure to do so are instructive.... A more sceptical approach, more concerned to elucidate types of experience from within, might well succeed where Hegel failed. Such an approach, transposed into our own present day idioms of thought, has a great deal in common with the intimations in Wittgenstein's later work, intimations which have perhaps been followed furthest by Peter Winch" (202). The notion of elaborating the implicit presuppositions of various forms of social action which one finds at the heart of Winch's approach may or may not be appealing as an alternative, but it is hardly clear what is gained by claiming that it approximates an intention unique to Hegel or even especially well developed in his philosophy of history. Plant goes on to argue, "Hegel went beyond Wittgenstein, and was surely correct in doing so, in connecting up the realization of specific human powers and capacities with living in and participating in particular modes of experience. In the idiom of contemporary philosophy this demand would come to an attempt to show how different language games presuppose and develop different kinds of human powers" (205). Again it is difficult to see in what way Hegel is a particularly unique thinker in proposing this type of approach if indeed such a proposal can be read out of his work at all. It is as if having questioned the validity of the claim of transcultural rationality that lies at the heart of Hegel's approach to history and politics, Plant was attempting to reinstate Hegel's claim to our attention not on anything he was unique or innovative in suggesting, but rather on points that could have been found in virtually any of Hegel's contemporaries. We hardly need to read Hegel to learn that powers and situations are related in curious ways, and if that is all Hegel has to tell us, it is not clear why time might not better be spent with Wilhelm von Humboldt, who develops the point more explicitly and tests it with considerably greater specificity.[19]

Indeed, Charles Taylor's study of Hegel closes with the suggestion that what is unique to Hegel — the claim that *Geist* could achieve complete self-clarity — may be the very point that closes him off from that legacy that is most provocative for us today — the "expressive" tradition of Herder, Hölderlin and von Humboldt (569-570). As has been seen, Taylor sees in Hegel's project an effort to reconcile "expressivist" and Kantian conceptions of the nature of man. This double allegiance produces a complex relation with the prevailing tendencies of his age. Hegel could thus share certain aspects of the Romantic critique of a society dominated by a utilitarian calculus while at the same time argue against the Romantics' tendency to locate the cause of this state of affairs in the inadequacy of reason itself and look instead for a means of transforming society in either art (Schiller, Schlegel) or religion (Schleiermacher, Novalis). Instead, Hegel argued that both Romanticism and the Enlightenment had reduced reason to *Verstand*, the one to disparage it, the other to promote it as the universal organizational structure of reasonable institutions. Hegel could hope for an implicit reconciliation of expressive yearning with modern utilitarian society because he felt that the disruptive experience of modern civil society would nevertheless

19. See, for instance, the elaboration of the linkage of powers in Herder's sense and language in Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development*, trans. G.C. Buck and F.A. Raven (Philadelphia, 1972).

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engender a more comprehensive and diversified milieu. Civil society represented for him the standpoint of "reflection" or "essence" — a division between individual activities that seem to proceed out of purely individual motives and that network of universal laws in which they are in fact immersed, a network that can be comprehended by Reason and whose comprehension forced the emergence of more and more inclusive structures (543). Yet both the lack of conviction carried by the ontological warrant for this faith and the empirical course of history have made this sanguine hope less believable. As a result, we have a society that has reconciled Romantic yearning and Enlightenment calculation in a far less rational form than Hegel would have desired: society is enlightened and utilitarian in its public facade, romantic and yearning in its private life (541). Hegel is thus robbed either of his difference from Romanticism, as in the left-Hegelian solution of converting Hegel into the basis for a radical anthropology, or is reconciled with the established public elements of modern society at the price of making a mockery of his pleas for a rational state.

Yet Taylor too argues that there is a continued relevance of Hegel for modern thought. The dilemma that faces the modern world is, according to him, "not unlike that of Hegel and the Romantic age. We need to combine the seemingly incombinable.... We need at once freedom and post-industrial *Sittlichkeit*." And in this attempt at synthesis, Hegel remains "a giant" (461). But from Taylor's own argument it would seem that Hegel's ability to believe that these two needs were merely 'seemingly incombinable" rested upon assumptions that seriously tilted the balance of his system against its expressivist elements and into an alliance with those very tendencies that have made a mockery of his hopes. Thus, just as he could not join the Romantic rejection of civil society because he perceived that it contained, in spite of the devastation it might wreak on the social fabric, a tendency towards a more diversified and conscious sort of social unity, so too he felt that the Romantic stress on the inadequacy of reason in the face of the ambiguities of expression could likewise be answered by an appeal to a reason that would no longer carry with it the deadening mechanical divisions of *Verstand*. But to hold out for total self-clarity against the expressivist tendency was to seal his fate. "As his solution fades, his far-reaching claims on behalf of conceptual thought separate him from Herder's heirs in our day [e.g., Polanyi, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger] for whom the unreflective experiences of our situation can never be fully explicated, and seem to align him with those for whom the problem should never have been posed" (569).[20]

What is disturbing about these three general accounts is that they have not gone far enough in either their attempt to describe the linkages between Hegel's social theory and his more general ontology or in the elaboration of their critique of the deficiencies of his thought. For Plant and Taylor, the failure to do the former explains the somewhat unconvincing results of their studies: despite grave problems in his ontology, Hegel is said to remain a vital and relevant social theorist. The critique of the ontology comes politely to a halt in the face of his social thought, which once detached from his ontology is allowed an afterlife despite the demise of the Hegelian system as a whole. The price for this afterlife, however, is the reduction of his social thought to a few rather general and conventional notions that could have been found in any of a half-dozen other thinkers of the same period.

Rosen's book is even more frustrating in that the claim that Hegel qua logician is "a philosopher of history, a political thinker, a theologian...a *Lebensphilosoph*" and more is never fully redeemed. The link between Hegel's ontology and his political and

20. See also Gadamer, pp. 92-95, for a similar argument.

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social thought is discussed only in passing. At the close of the book he argues that Hegel's pretension to have remedied the bifurcation between individual and world which marks both Greek and Christian views of the best life and hence to have found a way in which man may be "at home" in the world ends in failure. "In the Greek tradition," Rosen writes in an admitted oversimplification, "man achieves perfection by an extinction of practice in theory, whereas in the Christian tradition, perfection amounts to the assimilation of theory into practice." Hence Hegel's overcoming of alienation must have at its heart a reconciliation between the demands of theory and of practice. But this is precisely where Hegel fails: "Hegel requires us to find 'reason in history,' or to reconcile ourselves to the concrete historical present as the presence of eternity. This doctrine can be interpreted in one of two ways. Either Hegel means that 19th-century Prussia incarnates the divine *Logos*, or he means that the sage is now able to reconcile himself fully to political life, which is in general, and not in its contingent Prussian form alone, the one and only medium of complete satisfaction." The first point is, as Rosen admits, clearly absurd and, contrary to his claim, is hardly given "substantial support" by the relevant texts.[21] The second solution, in Rosen's view, only serves to preserve the disjuncture between theory and practice that Hegel had sought to resolve: "The sage's 'reconciliation' to actuality is equivalent to the Platonic realization that the just city is historically impossible." Nor can a solution be found, Rosen feels, in arguing that somehow the sage may find satisfaction in the recognition of this impossibility, since that would serve only to provide "the most radical evidence of the difference between the few and the many." We are left with the recognition that a certain alienation from political life is unavoidable, just as a difference between the sage-like few and the many cannot be bridged (280-283).

One could conceivably posit this position as an *alternative* to Hegel's argument and provide arguments for its merits, but to deduce it as the sole existing alternative to the ludicrous notion that Hegel is defending the rationality of the existent Prussian state is too much of a sleight of hand. The real task at hand should be one of asking *what* precisely is the relation between politics and ontology in Hegel such that he can pose those ambiguous equations between rationality and reality which so troubled the commentators of his day and ours. Once that is done more adequately than has been the case in any of these studies, we might be in a better position to come to terms with Hegel's social thought.

Theology, Politics and Philosophy in the Young Hegel

A first step in understanding the nature of Hegel's mature writing on politics and ontology involves understanding the character of the project which occupied him *before* he began his systematic writings on philosophy and politics in the Jena period. The writings from the period before 1801 have long been the subject of scrutiny and the more detailed studies to be discussed here go a long way towards remedying some of the defects of the general studies of Taylor, Plant and Rosen in dealing with this material.

Rosen's general stance towards the writings before 1801 consists in ignoring them. "It seems to be clearly inappropriate," he argues, "to base the study of a philosopher's ripe teaching on impressions garnered from the study of fragments composed by a boy scarcely out of his teens" (3). While he does not deny the value of intellectual biographies, his classification of Harris' study of Hegel's early development as one of that class of "extremely good books. . . written to defend what strikes me as erroneous

21. The most detailed discussion is that of Rolf K. Hocevar, *Hegel und die preussische Staat* (Munich, 1973).

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theses about the significance of Hegel's early writings" (4) hardly makes it seem likely that he would expect to revise his own interpretation in light of even "good" books on how Hegel first came to pose his project. We are left with a problem of evaluating Rosen's characterization of Hegel's intentions: while the argument that Hegel is by no means simply responding to a set of immediate political issues but rather is at the same time attempting to bring to resolution a set of theoretical problems inherited from Greek thought is certainly plausible, Rosen appears unwilling to specify the way in which the so-called "quarrel between ancients and moderns" was transmitted to the young Hegel.[22] Likewise, his use of Hegel's lectures on the *History of Philosophy* as a way of introducing the central theme of Hegel's encounter with Plato and Aristotle points to an interesting biographical problem: how and why does the history of philosophy become a significant area of study for Hegel within the relatively short period of time that separates the expressed disavowal of the historical dimension of philosophy in the essay on the *Difference between Fichte and Schelling's System of Philosophy* (1801) and the first lectures on the history of philosophy at Jena in 1805? But Rosen's discussion does not go beyond a suggestion of what would have to be done to establish this point.[23]

The suspicion that a reduction of Hegel's thought to a response to his times will blind us to the broader context in which his work must be inserted is certainly justified in light of the extremes to which disciples of approaches such as that represented by Quentin Skinner in the history of ideas have gone in disavowing the import of philosophical structures for the understanding of political theory. But the proper response would seem to be not a retreat to the argument that there is a "philosophical independence" to Hegel's thought that biography can only distort (4) but rather an embracing of the less dogmatic sort of *philosophische Entwicklungsgeschichte* that Dieter Henrich has embarked upon. Such an approach sees a philosopher's thought not only as a completed set of statements for analysis but also as an "answer to particular ways of posing a question." What such an approach gives us is a sense of the questions *Hegel* was asking and hence provides an insight into the ways in which a particular set of concerns was shaped and reshaped in response to differing sets of theoretical and historical contexts.

Such a study is helpful not merely as a check against Rosen's tendency to dismiss problems of intellectual biography as beside the point; it also provides a way of avoiding the equally problematic sort of history of ideas that Taylor provides at the start of his study. Taylor's discussion of the "Aims of a New Epoch" is reminiscent of the sort of "unit-ideas" approach to the history of ideas in which abstract proper nouns battle each other over a number of pages to a smashing finish that Skinner and others, whatever their own excesses, have managed at least to make considerably less plausible as a strategy of research.[24] The problem with a presentation like Taylor's which poses "Expressivism" and "radical freedom" as alternatives to "the main stream of radical Enlightenment" imported from England and France is that it substitutes a ready-made

22. Oddly, the sole reference he offers on the "quarrel" is R.F. Jones, *Ancients and Moderns* (St. Louis, 1961), a study of the quarrel in England originally published in 1936, which is neither very relevant to the matter at hand nor, even on its own terms, an entirely adequate account; see Hans Baron's discussion, "*Querelle* of Ancients and Moderns," *Journal of the History of Ideas* XX:1 (1959).

23. It is doubtful, however, that anyone will be able to do much better until a critical edition of the lectures on the *History of Philosophy* appears. At present, there is simply no way of determining what stems from the Berlin lecture cycles and what stems from the Jena period.

24. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8 (1969), pp. 3-53.

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set of classifications for the more difficult task of working out precisely how a thinker appropriates traditions that are rarely transmitted on the level of abstractions such as these, but rather come already mediated and compromised in various more concrete constellations of influences. The juxtaposition of Herder's expressivism and Kant's radical freedom tells us relatively little about the actual way in which *Hegel* came to formulate his project. In his early years he was far more influenced by the sort of moral psychology represented by Christian Garve, the Rousseau of *Emile*, and Adam Ferguson than by Kant's transcendental moral philosophy. When the second critique did come to be as important for his as *Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone*, it is clear that at least initially he saw it as a means of recapturing the sort of expressive unity the polis represented.[25] In other words, if one poses the dilemma the young Hegel faces — or, even more vaguely, the "aim of the epoch" — as that of unifying Greek expressivism and Kantian freedom, one misses the paradox that much of what is important in Hegel's early development is a process of finding out that indeed Kant and the Greeks cannot be reconciled. The decisive points that have to be developed with regard to the young Hegel then are: (1) the remarkable affinity he seemed to have for thinkers who cannot be mapped onto the dichotomy between expressivism and freedom which Taylor posits, (2) the complex path which led to a recognition on his part that the concepts which he has inherited from this tradition were hopelessly inadequate to the tasks he had set, and (3) the ambiguous fashion in which the lessons of his early struggles are assimilated into his later work. While Taylor's conclusions about the ambivalence Hegel had towards both the Enlightenment and towards Romanticism do suggest a number of important paradoxes in the subsequent career of Hegelianism, a reading back of this ambivalence into the earliest phase of Hegel's development buys Taylor's account symmetry and the expense of accuracy.

Raymond Plant's analysis of this period is, in contrast, by far the most adequate discussion of the young Hegel in these or any of the other general introductions now available. Plant sees Hegel's earliest writings — those written while he was still a Gymnasium student in Stuttgart — as a response to the disordered state of a Germany divided along religious, political, and social lines. In exploring this disorder Hegel made use of the two tropes which were more or less common coin among others of his generation: the image of Greece as a harmonious community — an image that took aesthetic expression in the writings of Winckelman, Lessing and Schiller — and the contrasting image of the social disintegration wrought by the diversion of labor in commercial society which was analyzed, among others, by Adam Ferguson. Seeking a solution for this disorder in his writing from his seminary days in Tübingen within the domain of what Plant terms "civil theology," Hegel explored "the characteristics of folk religion in order to derive some indication of the sort of religious reforms that it would be necessary to carry out in Germany in order to recapture anything resembling the wholeness of Greek life" (32). While it is questionable whether Hegel ever saw his project as that of suggesting "religious reforms" Plant does show very successfully how Hegel's project is directed towards social and political concerns rather than points of theological dogma (32), how its conception of moral action is far more interested in dimensions which would be characterized in Kant as heteronomy rather than with autonomous transcendental freedom (33), and how it is by and large indifferent to the theoretical side of philosophy (35).

25. The point is developed by H.S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 6, 19, 38, 107-108, 175, 187, and is also the main valid point in J.M. Ripalda's rather problematic study, *The Divided Nation* (Assen, 1977).

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This general approach to the writings from the Tübingen, Berne, and Frankfurt periods places Plant in explicit opposition to two earlier studies of the manuscripts by Georg Lukacs[26] and Walter Kaufmann. Both are emphatic that the term "theological" should not be attached to these writings. Lukacs argues that "the belief in Hegel's 'theological' period" is a "legend created and fostered by the reactionary apologists of imperialism" such as Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the targets of his later *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* — a book that undoubtedly marks the nadir of his career. Kaufmann likewise argues that they should more appropriately be called "anti-theological manuscripts."[27] The problem with both readings is that neither author seems to feel it worth the bother to look at what in fact were the themes being treated within German theology at the close of the 18th century. Judging from Dieter Henrich's and H.S. Harris' work on the atmosphere of the Tübingen seminary at the time Hegel, Schelling, and Hölderlin studied there, Plant's general attitude seems to be far more promising.[28] Rather than sniffing out every negative reference to Christianity, it seems more sensible to approach these writings with the recognition that while it was never Hegel's intention to prepare for a career in the ministry, he did seem to feel that study at the seminary would permit a confrontation with themes in classical literature and philosophy that had been of concern to him throughout his Gymnasium days.

Harris and Henrich have shown in their studies that Hegel, Schelling, and Hölderlin were exposed not merely to the dogmatic theology associated with G.C. Storr and J.F. Flatt, but were also acquainted with the rationalist approach of H.E.G. Paulus -- a former student at Tübingen who by 1793 had achieved a considerable reputation at Jena -- and Immanuel Dietz, the "Kantian enragé" tutor at the seminary whose private discussions with students consisted of a relentless criticism of all forms of theological dogmatism. Even though Dietz left the seminary to embark on a career in medicine shortly after Hegel entered (in any case, before Hegel became interested in the type of critical theology Dietz espoused) the legacy of Dietz, which grew considerably after his death while treating typhus patients in 1796, was preserved at the seminary by instructors such as his close friend F.G. Süsskind. What is decisive for Hegel's subsequent development is that both the tradition represented by Storr and that represented by Dietz made use of the critical tools Kant had provided, the former to show that reason alone was inadequate as an instrument for theology and hence a reliance on revelation was necessary, the latter to show that the moral dimension of religion can be constructed on the basis of autonomous reason alone. That Storr could cite the letter of Kant's epistemology against what was taken by Dietz and Süsskind — as well as Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling — to be the spirit of his moral philosophy prompted on Hegel's part an interpretation of Christianity that would focus on the weak point of Storr's approach — his use of history — and show either that Christ's message itself contained no dogmatic or "positivie" components and was rather simply a statement of the truths of practical reason, or that what is positive in Christianity must be tied up with the historical personality of Christ and the specific situation in which his message was promulgated. Here we have *in nuce* the project that was to occupy Hegel down to at least 1801.

26. Georg Lukacs, *The Young Hegel,* trans. R. Livingston (London, 1975).

27. Kaufmann, "The Young Hegel and Religion," now in *Hegel,* ed. MacIntyre, a collection that includes Kaufmann's appropriately nasty deflation of Karl Popper's outrageous discussion of Hegel in *The Open Society and its Enemies,* "The Hegel Myth and its Method."

28. Harris, *Hegel's Development,* pp. 57-153, and Henrich, *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 41-72; an earlier version may be found in English in *Hegel's Philosophy of Religion,* ed. D. Christensen (The Hague, 1970).

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While Plant's general discussion is commensurate with the more detailed studies of Harris and Henrich thus far, and hence integrates Hegel's writings from the Tübingen, Berne, and Frankfurt periods far more closely into the corpus of his later work than has been the case in earlier general studies, his account of the transformation of the project itself is open to criticism. Plant sees two tendencies at work in Hegel's writings during this period. On the one hand, there is a steady process of secularization that marks the writings as one advances from the *Life of Jesus* of 1795 through the fragments from 1795-1796 entitled by Nohl "The Positivity of Christian Religion," to the final series of fragments from 1798-1800 titled by Nohl "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate." By the time of the completion of the *Life of Jesus,* Plant argues, Hegel had already begun to move from a "totally religious analysis of the contemporary malaise to one which unites his religious preoccupations with an analysis in wholly secular terms of German social and political conditions." Plant concludes, "In a sense...*Das Leben Jesus* was outmoded almost as soon as it was written in that it seemed to presuppose that a folk religion could be seen as the total solution to the problem" (45). The essay on the "Positivity of Christian Religion" concentrates on the neglected historical and social dimension, relating the rise of Christianity to the "deep bifurcations produced in Roman social experience" and thus views Christianity not as the cause of human estrangement but rather as a symptom of a more fundamental social and political transformation (49-50). This new emphasis led, according to Plant, to an even deeper confrontation with the socio-economic dimension that underlay religious alienation, a confrontation which took the form of the detailed commentary on James Stewart's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy,* which Karl Rosenkranz claims Hegel wrote in 1799.[29] As a result of this confrontation with a thinker who stresses the mechanisms which lead from pastoral to agrarian to commercial societies, a new dimension enters Hegel's thought, "the notion of a rationally discernable *development* in history" (57). With this new dimension comes a "remarkable change" (56) in Hegel's attitude towards modernity. "The modern world was no longer seen in such a jaundiced light but was regarded by Hegel as embodying certain values and principles and actualizing certain human powers and capacities that could not find realization in the Ancient world. The present began to be looked upon as part of man's *fate*: there could be no sense in trying to go back to more ancient types of social, political and religious organization" (65).

Accompanying this process of secularization is a related second tendency that leads from active opposition to the present order to a reconciliation with the present. Plant argues that even before the turn toward political and social analysis represented by the "Positivity of Christianity," Hegel had been actively interested in contemporary politics, seeing the French Revolution during his student days in Tübingen as "an attempt to restore a closely knit community on the Greek model," an interpretation that he shared with his fellow students Hölderlin and Schelling (51). Indeed Plant claims that Hegel's ideal during this period was that of a "radically democratic" political order in which individuals directly administered all aspects of public life (53).[30] But by the end of the 1790s Hegel's enthusiasm for the French Revolution had dampened with the events after 9 Thermidor 1794, and like the Schiller of the

29. Karl Rosenkranz, *G.W.F. Hegels Leben* (Berlin, 1844). Reprinted Darmstadt, 1969, p. 85.

30. This is hardly the case. Hegel's political ideal was that of a representative republic; direct democracy was seen by him to be possible only within small sorts of communities, which marked early Christianity. For a discussion, see R.K. Hocevar, *Stände und Repräsentation beim jungen Hegel* (Munich, 1968).

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Aesthetic Letters, he had moved to a position where the world was to be "comprehended" rather than criticized. At the heart of the *Aesthetic Letters,* as in the work of Steuart, was the notion of a positive direction to history. Although the present might be an age of dismemberment, the period of fragmentation was necessary if the full powers of the human species were to be developed (72-75).[31] With this insight gained and with the troubling example of Hölderlin's madness at hand as a warning of the dangers of a resolute position to modernity,[32] Hegel turned after 1807 to an effort to reconcile himself to the rationality of the present (77-78).

However much one admires the forcefulness with which Plant elaborates this account, there is unfortunately a good deal questionable in it as can be seen by opposing it to H.S. Harris' far more extensive discussion of the writings on Christianity and to Otto Pöggeler's discussion of the relation between revolution and philosophy in the early work of Hegel. Harris strikes me as having provided a more convincing account of why Hegel could not complete the manuscripts, an account that throws into question Plant's discussion of the tendency towards secularization, while Pöggeler's somewhat more restricted account of Hegel's changing evaluation of the practical mission of his philosophy opens some lines of question with regard to the thesis about Hegel's growing disillusionment with political change and subsequent shift to a stance of philosophical "reconciliation."

The merit of *Towards the Sunlight,* the first volume of H.S. Harris' *Hegel's Development,* lies in its having brought coherence to the series of fragments and drafts that remain as a testimony to the theoretical struggles of Hegel's first 30 years. Harris' argument gives primacy to the so-called "Tübingen Essay" of 1793 ("Religion ist eine. . .") as the preliminary sketch that gives order to the diverse series of inquiries that follow over the next eight years. The essay, which Harris translates in an appendix to his book, sketches in concise form a program of research that is intended to study the relation between "folk religions" of the sort Hegel associated with ancient Greece, and the "positive," "objective" sort of religion that modern Christianity represents. Harris argues that the three canons that Hegel sets out toward the close of the essay as characterizing a folk religion — "I. Its doctrines must be grounded on universal Reason. II. Fancy, heart, and sensibility must not thereby go empty away. III. It must be so constituted that all the needs of life — the public affairs of the state are tied in with it" — serve as a rough outline of his subsequent work in Berne and Frankfurt.

By posing these three canons as the basis for a coherent project, Harris is able to avoid some of the problems of Plant's approach, which is unconvincing in its argument that Hegel's inquiries became more secular and historical after 1795. It is now apparent that Hegel's focus was historical and social from the start. In his very first weeks in Berne he was busy reading histories of the sort represented by Gibbon, Humean, Raynal, and Schiller (157-158), and indeed similar habits in his reading can

31. G.A. Kelly has also discussed Hegel's debts to Schiller, in a different fashion, in "Social Understanding and Social Therapy in Schiller and Hegel," now in *Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis.*

32. Plant, like other commentators, has a tendency to play down Hölderlin's significance as a philosopher and to simplify his poetic project into a diffuse species of German Grecomania. He was a good deal more significant as a *theoretical* influence on Hegel than Plant lets on — see Henrich's discussion in *Hegel im Kontext,* pp. 9-40, trans. by C. Hamlin in *Idealistic Studies* II:2 (1972), pp. 151-173 — and as a poet was not simply fleeing to Greece but, much like Hegel, was exploring the tensions between what Löwith has termed "bourgeois Christian society" and antiquity. For a discussion of his poetry that is sensitive to this dimension and devoid of a romantic treatment of the causes of his madness, see Michael Hamburger's essay in *Contraries: Studies in German Literature* (New York, 1970), pp. 3-42.

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be traced back to Stuttgart.[33] Nor was there ever, as Plant seems to suggest at times, a sense in Hegel that one could go back to ancient Greece. His historical sense of the uniqueness and ambiguity of the Greek experience was such that, in Harris' words, "Even when he penned his first eulogy to the Greek spirit, Hegel already realized that it was self-doomed" (134). In Harris' reading, by the time he set out to write the *Life of Jesus,* Hegel was already quite aware that all he was going to be able to do was to demonstrate that Christianity satisfied the first canon of a folk religion, a project far more restricted than the "religious solution" to political crises that Plant sees in the piece. Through a critical reading of Biblical texts elements of positivity could be removed and the rational core of the doctrine exposed, but because of a contrast between Socrates and Jesus which Hegel had completed before the writing of the *Life of Jesus* (185-186), it was already clear to Hegel that there would be considerably more difficulty in bringing Christianity into line with the next two canons. Hence the *Life of Jesus* was not so much "obsolete before it was written," as Plant claims, but rather only the first step of a project whose other stages would be marked by increasingly difficult problems.

Plant's suggestion that the essay now known as "The Positivity of Christian Religion" stems from a recognition that the "purely religious" solution of the *Life of Jesus* is not enough and that the "neglected" historical and social dimension must now be examined is also open to question on the basis of Harris' approach. As Harris argues, it seems more reasonable to assume that the essay forms a complement to the *Life of Jesus*, both of them having as their end an examination of how far Christianity is capable of advancing morality, the former focusing on Christ's teachings, the latter essay beginning with the conclusions of the former — that Jesus' doctrine lacked positive elements — and tracing out how Christianity was transformed into a positive religion with authoritative powers over believers. Just as the earlier essay seeks to remove positive elements from Christian doctrine, so the latter essay is concerned with the question of the appropriate relations between church and civil society and seeks to remove positive and authoritative elements from the present-day religious order. Both essays are fairly commensurable with an examination of the ability of Christianity to serve as a rational, non-positive religion, the requirement of the first canon (207-208).

Plant sees an even more severe break between the writings on the "Positivity of Christian Religion" and the Frankfurt fragments known as "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate."In an argument explicitly indebted to (but not identical with) Paul Chamley's work on Hegel's debts to the English political economist James Steuart, Plant argues that Hegel's reading of Steuart in 1799 introduced "something which has hitherto been lacking in Hegel's thought, namely the notion of a rationally discernable *development* in history, a development which, once comprehended, would change the attitude of people towards their social environment" (57). It is this encounter with Steuart, coupled with Hegel's reading of Schiller's *Aesthetic Letters*, which forever closes off the possibility of a return to the polis and leads to an acceptance of the modern, commercially based society as the fate of modern man. We have already questioned whether it is correct to claim that Hegel ever had any illusions about reviving the polis in anything like its original form. At the same time it is worth asking if the reading of Steuart indeed convinced Hegel that the general project of the Tübingen essay, the testing of Christianity against the canons of folk religion, needed to be radically recast. Such a step would involve the recognition that the polis could no longer serve even as a counter-image of contemporary society, as a means of outlining

33. See the appendix in Ripalda's study, which lists books Hegel read while in Stuttgart.

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tension and divisions.

The actual evidence of what resulted from Hegel's encounter with Steuart's *Inquiry* is scant. The commentary Hegel is said to have written has been lost and the most extensive description of its contents remains that of Rosenkranz: "All of Hegel's reflections about the nature of civil society and labor, about the division of labor and capital (*Vermögen*) among the classes (*Stände*), about poor relief and the police, taxes, etc., were concentrated finally in a running commentary on *Stewarts Staatswissenschaft* which he wrote between February 19 and May 16, 1799, and which is still intact. It contains many impressive views on politics and history and fine remarks. Stewart was an advocate of the mercantile system. With noble pathos, with a wealth of interesting examples, Hegel fought against what was dead in it as he strove to save the heart (*Gemüt*) of man admist the competition and mechanism of labor and commerce."[34] Harris' evaluation of the significance of the manuscript is the most modest. Seeing no radical break in the Frankfurt period (259) he argues that the turn to Steuart was a logical progression in Hegel's movement through the three canons of folk religion. The interest in political economy comes as a result of an effort to understand what remains once one is in a situation where the "living spirit of the State dies" (435). Steuart's analysis of the relation between man and economy thus provides him with "the problem of the sundering of human nature in its starkest form" (436), but this had been a problem that was before his eyes from the very start of his project.

Considerably more importance is given to the manuscript by Lukacs, who argues that the turn to the study of political economy is triggered not by any organic progression within Hegel's own research plan but rather by a disillusionment with Jacobin politics and a need to engage the basis of politics on an even more fundamental level (40). In Frankfurt Hegel undergoes, according to Lukacs, a profound personal crisis (101-104) and is forced to examine for the first time "the place of the individual, *of man in civil society*" (98).[35] While Lukacs' discussion of the economic dimension which underlies Hegel's early social theory is on a far higher level than his attacks on the "apologists for imperialism," some serious problems of omission and commission plague his account. His analysis of Hegel's use of Steuart is vitiated by his persistent lack of sympathy with any aspect of Hegel's civil theology. Hence Lukacs seems to find it a paradox that Hegel can turn from his study of Steuart to write "The Spirit of Christianity" (171-172) and his exegesis of that work is a rather breathless race throught the manuscript separating moments of "idealistic mysticism" from Hegel's true insights. It is not until the Jena period that Hegel makes, in Lukacs' eyes, a proper use of his economic lessons from the Frankfurt period, although there is little in Lukacs' account, aside from an undocumented presumption that Hegel must have read Adam Smith at this point and hence must have had the category of labor — which is so central to his later works — already developed, to indicate exactly what lessons Hegel was able to draw from his studies in this period.

Lukacs is not helped in these matters by an almost rabid disposition towards commentaries on Hegel ventured by anyone other than the strange trio "Marx, Lenin and Stalin." Rosenkranz' summary is flogged as "jejune" and "uncomprehending," and special venom is directed at the last line of the passage quoted above. "In the last sentence Rosenkranz claims that Hegel sought to save man's soul amidst the mechanism of capitalist society. This would suggest that Hegel's thoughts were running on similar lines to those of the reactionary [a favorite and much abused word

34. Rosenkranz, p. 86; for another translation see Harris, p. 435. Rosenkranz misspells James Steuart's name.

35. Harris questions whether such a crisis in fact took place, pp. 258-270.

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in Lukacs' book] Romantics. In view of Hegel's later development and the general character of what we have seen of his political and social attitudes, this sounds highly improbable" (171). There is little one can do here except express amazement at Lukacs' utter inability to read, even at a moment when what he could have read would have supported his own cause. Rosenkranz explicitly claims that Hegel opposed Steuart's embracing of mercantilism and seems to have argued that if man's heart and disposition are to be saved, it will have to be through the media of exchange and labor. Is this not a fair approximation of Hegel's subsequent stance in the Jena *System Entwürfe*, where he argues that cultivation (*Bildung*) of a general will is possible only through the means of a submission to the fate of abstract labor and exchange?[36] There is little of the Romantics here; if Rosenkranz is correct, and is not as is generally his tendency reading back Hegel's later position, we would seem to have evidence that indeed Lukacs may have been correct in claiming that Smith's views had already begun to win Hegel over.

Paul Chamley's treatment of these matters — a treatment that, as has been noted, influenced that of Plant — is much more tempered and restrained, but still problematic in that he seems reluctant to confront the letter of Rosenkranz' account. Rather than trying to fill out the contours of what Hegel would have likely *attacked* in Steuart — one must remember that Hegel's other great lost commentary of this period, on Kant's *Metaphysik der Sitten*, was likewise devoted to a work that Hegel admired but by this time had explicitly rejected — he is concerned with tracing what in Steuart might have influenced Hegel. As in all questions of tracing influences, the path is fraught with difficulties. His 1963 study *Economie politique et philosophie chez Steuart et Hegel*,[37] although welcome as the first serious study of that relationship, is ultimately frustrating in that the discussion remains for the most part on the level of rather vague comparisions of the general positions of Steuart and Hegel and a subsequent drawing up of "correspondences." Thus, we are told that Steuart's *"Die Vernunft kann nie mit gesunder Vernunft im Widerspruch sein..."* carries an anticipation of Hegel's famous "*Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig*" (109) — a rather unconvincing attempt to reduce Hegel's ontological claim to Steuart's imperative to act with prudence. At another point it is noted that Steuart's (*translator's*) "Aufhebung" parallels Hegel's (118). Likewise, other possible influences are not at times taken into consideration — the developmental theory which both Chamley and Plant see as the major impact Steuart must have had on Hegel was, as Ronald Meek has demonstrated,[38] a rather common trope of Enlightenment social theory and could have been found in a number of other individuals Hegel read in Stuttgart: e.g., Garve, Ferguson, Iselin, Meiners. At other times, Chamley's attributions of influence are simply erroneous: Steuart is conjectured

36. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke 6: Jenaer Systementwürfe I* (Hamburg, 1975), pp. 325-326. Marcuse distorts the argument in his discussion in *Reason and Revolution* (Boston, 1960), p. 79: "The tone and pathos of the descriptions point strikingly to Marx's *Capital*. It is not surprising to note that Hegel's manuscript breaks off with this picture, as if he was terrified by what his analysis of the commodity-producing society disclosed." This is unworthy of Marcuse; the tone and pathos are apparent only to a reader more interested in finding lines pointing to *Capital* than in understanding Hegel. The manuscript breaks off only after the category of legal personhood has been introduced as a result of the *Abstumpfen* of human faculties, which Hegel (following Adam Smith's account in the *Wealth of Nations*) had described.

37. Paris, 1963. Subsequent citations will be made in the text.

38. Ronald Meek, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (Cambridge, 1976); for the German context, see also Peter Hanns Reill, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism* (Berkeley, 1975).

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to have influenced Kant's notion of "unsociable sociability" since Kant, unlike Adam Smith, gives the notion a developmental aspect. Putting aside the adequacy of Chamley's interpretation of Smith, this overlooks the more obvious (and explicitly cited in other contexts) influence of Mandeville on Kant, and Mandeville, it should be recalled, explicitly outlined how unsociable sociability could lead to social development. Finally, Chamley proposes that the term *Gemüt*, which Rosenkranz uses in his summary, is in fact a term employed by Steuart's translators to designate man's instinctive intellectual faculties. But again, the correspondence of Steuart's term with Hegel's usages of the term point to no influence; Chamley seems unaware that Hegel was using the term *Gemüt* in this same general sense in the Tübingen essay — that is, before the Steuart commentary.

Chamley's article of two years later, "Les origines de la pensée economique de Hegel"[39] develops in more detail the one crucial chronological account of the 1963 book, the study of the specific impact of Steuart during Hegel's Frankfurt period. Chamley here argues that the major "economic" influence on Hegel before 1797 was John Locke, specifically the discussion of property in Chapter V of the *Second Treatise*. The treatment of property as an externalization of man's own activity which Locke develops in this section has as its counterpart in Chamley's view a critique of unfree forms in which labor is externalized, forms that carry with them a self-alienation (226-227). Chamley argues that this bifurcation is transposed into Hegel's early discussion of religion as the dichotomy of subjective and objective religion in the Tübingen Essay. While Chamley sees a later shift in the ideal Hegel posits from a Hellenistic lyricism to a less abstract ideal of republican virtue in the Berne writings, he argues that Hegel's economic views remain essentially the same. "The idea is always that man produces in self-externalization, and that he recovers only that which is freely produced" (228). In Berne the true labor is the political labor of the republic, and throughout the Berne period economic analyses are consistently subordinated to political discussions of the public good (229).

Chamley sees in the writings of the Frankfurt period "a profound contrast: it is not excessive to speak of a rupture" (235). Six changes in Hegel's thought are seen as particularly decisive: (1) an enlargement of his scope of inquiry to include material from the Old Testament (the so-called *Geist des Judentums"* fragment), (2) a study of historical processes in light of economic development, and a related rooting of the source of the state in the economy, (3) a shift in emphasis from political to economic labor as the most crucial category of activity, (4) a conception of nature which is less tinged by a Rousseauian conception of the earth as a gentle provider — nature now can take on hostile characteristics, (5) a change in the evaluation of Greek religion from its being a "folk religion" to a "Natur-religion," (6) a change in attitude towards religious alienation that no longer sees it as the predominant phenomenon but rather treats it as an "epiphenomenon of servitude" (232-234).

Unfortunately Chamley fails to discuss all of these points, developing in this article a case only for the first and fourth, and citing his earlier book as evidence for the other four arguments. This is rather unconvincing: points two and three seem to overstress how "economic" the post-1799 Hegel in fact is — *where* is the state ever said to be rooted in the economy? and *when* does Hegel ever abandon a stress on politics as the highest form of activity within that sphere which is eventually denoted "Objective Spirit"? There may be a shift of emphasis here, a shift perhaps related to the sixth point, but little contradicts Harris' thesis that in working out the consequences of the

39. *Hegel-Studien* 3 (1965), pp. 225-261.

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other two canons of folk religion Hegel was of course forced to look more closely now at economic and social phenomena. This can hardly be claimed a "rupture" in his thought.

Those points that Chamley does develop — the extension in the scope of Hegel's argument to include the Old Testament and the shift in the image of nature — are likewise not unequivocally evidence of Steuart's impact, although here the argument is interesting enough to develop. The evidence for the first claim appears to be very strong on first glance. In the fourth chapter of the first book of the *Inquiry*, Steuart makes use of the example of Jacob and his family as evidence for the general proposition that "The subordination of children to their parents, and of servants to their masters, seems to be the most rational origin of society and government." The case of Jacob demonstrates the role which a patriarchal organization of society plays in carrying out the transition from the state of savagery in which men live off the "spontaneous fruits of the earth" to life in society, which is said, later in the book, to preserve itself through the progressive multiplication of reciprocal bonds of dependence.[40] Hegel's discussion of the passage of the Jewish people from a pastoral to an agricultural society is viewed by Chamley as an appropriation of Steuart's basic argument with a substitution of Abraham for the role of "statesman" or "steward" here played by Jacob (241).

There is one fairly obvious problem here that Chamley explicitly acknowledges: however much Steuart's use of the Jews as an example of a primitive form of social organization making the shift to a pastoral form of subsistence serves as an example for Hegel, the degree to which Hegel's account *differs* from Steuart's cannot help but be striking. The crux of the matter is that Abraham is not Jacob. However much the latter may be a model for the Steuartian statesman, it is clear that Abraham is a much more complex figure who in effect *reverses* the course of history, taking his people out of a pastoral form of subsistence and back into the wilderness. Chamley's invocation of Hegel's later concept of *Heroenrecht* from the *Philosophy of Right* points in the direction that an explanation of Hegel's puzzling approach to Abraham might have to proceed (241-242), but it hardly deals with the problem adequately.

The invocation of the right of heroes to found states in the *Philosophy of Right* is only a distant echo of Hegel's more immediate concern throughout the period of the Frankfurt and Jena writings with the puzzling figures of mythical founders of cities, invoked at crucial points of both Rousseau's *Social Contract* and Machiavelli's *Prince* and given ample examination in the discussion of Lycurgus which Steuart inserts into the course of his argument in the *Inquiry*.[41] This segment of the *Inquiry* could not but have caught Hegel's attention since it replayed all of the themes he had been familiar with since his Stuttgart days. Lycurgus' Republic, dubbed by Steuart as the "most perfect plan of political economy...anywhere to be met with either in ancient or modern times" was made possible by a skillful use of the "voice of Divinity" in the founding of a state. This same notion, that religious symbolism is crucial for the establishment of a lasting political order, had been broached in Rousseau's discussions of the Great Legislator and the function of civic religion which Hegel had been acquainted with since Gymnasium and more implicitly in the list of figures — Moses, Cyrus and Theseus — summoned by Machiavelli in his "Exhortation to Restore Italy to Liberty and Free Her from the Barbarians" at the close of the *Prince*.

40. Steuart, *Inquiry*, Book I, iv, xviii.

41. *Ibid.*, II, xiv. The praise for Lycurgus drew a sharp attack from the reviewers of the *Inquiry* in *Monthly Review* and *Critical Review*; see Andrew Skinner's note in his edition of the *Inquiry* (Chicago, 1966), p. 218.

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Hegel seems to have had little admiration for Lycurgus — in that he shared the general tendency of German classicism as against the received tradition of holding Athens higher than the rival models of the Roman Republic and Sparta. As early as the Tübingen Essay, Theseus' name had been evoked and subsequently crossed out to be replaced by the phrase "the greatest men," as an example of someone who realized "that man does not know what religion is."[42] Presumably those who *understand* religion see beyond the positive features that threaten to turn men away from politics through the proliferation of privatistic sects and instead realize that the authentic function of religion is that of serving as a means of tying men together into a community that rests on a religious order that is public, rational and suitably satisfactory to the demands of heart, fancy and sense; in short, they see religion according to the dictates of Hegel's folk religion. Abraham represents a Theseus who fails to give his people a religion sufficiently public or appealing to heart, fancy or sense. To that extent, Chamley's notion that here we see a "perverse" sort of *Heroenrecht* at work may be valid. But what an account like Chamley's misses is the extent to which Hegel had by 1799 fleshed out in more detail the mythical founding accounts to include elements that run parallel to at least some of the material that is claimed to be derived from Steuart. My argument then is not, like Chamley's or Plant's, that Hegel lacked an account of social evolution before his reading of Steuart. Rather the point is, as Harris has suggested, that Hegel *did* have a fairly complex notion of what is involved in the founding of states and although the fundamentals of this theory have a strong classical cast to them, the general theory proved able to absorb at least some of the more concrete details Steuart was talking about.

Harris has given by far the most adequate reconstruction of the tacit theory of culture that Hegel was employing by 1798 (the date is crucial since it puts the theory before the explicit confrontation with Steuart), the date when Harris claims the crucial "conjunction of spirit and fate" first makes itself manifest in Hegel's writings (272). From the time of the Tübingen Essay onward the figure of Theseus had been used to mark the transition from natural communities such as tribes and clans to the artificial community of the city. Such a breach is essential in the preservation of the predominantly Aristotelian thrust of Hegel's conception of politics. The *polis* for both Hegel and Aristotle represented a step beyond the level of simple subsistence — a step which involved an entry into a realm of conscious human agency. The figure of Theseus is fundmental here mainly because of the role attributed him, in both the accounts in Thucydides and Plutarch, of combining the various clans into a *polis* by creating a civic religion which gives all the various lesser deities a function to play. How basic this vision of a civic religion which ties together the various gods of the household and the clan was to Hegel's thinking about politics can be appreciated by noting how persistent the themes are in his work. In the *Natural Law* essay, even after the project elaborated in the Tübingen Essay had been abandoned, we still see him employing the characteristic trope of a struggle for reconciliation between the civic religion and the household religion at the center of his account of the "tragedy in the realm of *Sittlichkeit*." Even later, one finds the juxtaposition at the heart of his interpretation of the *Antigone* in his *Phenomenology*.

What is new in the writings after 1798 is nothing which can be attributed simply to the addition of a "historical" dimension. Rather, what is involved is a productive coupling of the theme of the catastrophic beginning of human history shared by Plato, Polybius, Vico and others with metaphors derived from the various founding myths. When Hegel

42. Harris trans., p. 488.

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was engaged in his first studies of folk religion, Harris argues, "he could not yet say why the history of the Jews begins with Abraham rather than Noah, or the history of the Greeks with Theseus and Lycurgus rather than with Deucalion. We have, so far, found reason to speak of distinctive attitudes to fate, but not of distinct fates. We have identified, perhaps, the beginning of universal history in the breach of the 'State of nature' produced by some cataclysmic manifestation of the might of nature herself, but not the beginning of any particular history. . . . The genuine spiritual self-awareness of a 'people' (*Volk*) does not begin with their spontaneous reaction to this breach. It begins only when they deliberately adopt towards other *peoples* the attitude which they have reactively adopted towards the revealed might of universal fate. Thus the involuntary breach (which usually produces what Hegel calls a state of need [*Not*]) generates the possibility of a voluntary breach (which Hegel generally uses the word *Trennung* to refer to); and the character and manner of that voluntary breach, if it occurs, determines a 'fate' that is peculiar to the spirit that makes the breach" (273-274). Through a subtle modification of two of the basic topoi of classical approaches to history — the myths of founders and the myths of a cataclysm standing at the start of history — Hegel produces nothing less than a peculiar hermeneutic of political culture which seeks to comprehend the fashion in which polities react against one another in terms of an original stance struck against nature at the moment of a departure from a simple continuity of natural life processes. Now it is of course possible to find traces of Steuart here, just as it now becomes clear why Hegel would eventually have to come to terms with modern natural law theories of the departure from the state of nature. But all of these attempts to relate Hegel to more conventional ways of exploring the nexus between man, nature, and politics remain beside the point. They fail to grasp what is most bizarre about Hegel's own civil theology by assuming that is was not complex enough to be able to absorb accounts derived from political economy about the relation between man and nature into its own terms. To find breaks or ruptures here or to treat the program of the Tübingen Fragment as a hangover from seminary days which Hegel gradually got over is to underestimate both the audacity of Hegel's theologico-politico treatises — to revert to Walter Benjamin's title, which here becomes singularly appropriate — and the staying power of this remarkable vision of the nature of political life.

We are now in a position to examine more closely the second of the two transformations which Plant sees in Hegel's thought during this period, the movement from a position of resolute opposition to the established political order to a position of resigned acceptance of the fate which faces modern man in a fragmented world, a resignation which is expressed by the quest of philosophy to come to reconciliation with the world as it is, rather than to attempt to transform it. As evidence of the earlier attitude, Plant makes reference to the politically charged atmosphere of the Tübingen Seminary (51), where, as has been shown in the more detailed discussion of Harris, the considerable interest in the French Revolution held by those students in Hegel's circle found expression in reading of French political newspapers, the formation of various political clubs, and the propogation of any number of suitably revolutionary slogans and passwords. It was this politically engaged attitude which Plant feels subsequently influenced Hegel's study in Berne of the social and economic basis which permitted the Berne aristocracy to maintain power, a study which was eventually to produce Hegel's first publication, the anonymous translation of and commentary on J.J. Cart's letters criticizing the dominance of the German speaking canton of Berne over the French speaking Vaud. Likewise, the letter of April 16, 1795, which Hegel sent from Berne to Schelling, who remained in Tübingen completing his studies, in addition to making

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some preliminary observations on the Berne social structure, goes on to hail the role Kantian philosophy will play in the transformation of German politics. "Philosophy. . . will demonstrate the rights of man and the political order will not be able to withstand the onslaught of new ideas," Plant states, summarizing Hegel's argument and quoting directly from Hegel's letter Plant concludes, "He states quite categorically: 'I await a revolution in Germany'" (52). Plant feels that at this point Hegel's politics were equally unmistakable, "He is committed to a view of social and political life which is radically democratic, praising a constitution which allows men to: '. . . obey self-given laws, to follow self-chosen leader in peace time and self-chosen generals in war, to carry out plans in whose formulations one had had one's share'" (53).[43]

Plant sees a profound alteration in Hegel's attitude at the close of the Frankfurt period. As a result of his own work on folk religion which had convinced him that the Greek experience" is reinforced (72-73). Hegel's sense of the practical mission of the deterioration of the French Revolution into Terror and, more immediately, the impact of his own direct experience of the destruction which resulted from the French occupation of areas around Mainz, "the lesson which Hegel appears to have learned from Steuart, namely that there could be no returning to anything remotely resembling Greek experience" is reinforced (72-73). Hegel's sense of the practical mission of philosophy shifts, no longer is it intended to transform the world by pointing out what ought to be the case, rather it must grasp what concretely exists. In Plant's words, "The need was, as Hegel began to see it at this time, for a comprehensive grasp of experience which, by enabling a man to have a very firm insight into the nature of the world confronting him, would change his view on that world so that it would no longer appear as a source of estrangement" (75). Nothing perhaps documents this apparent transformation more forcefully than the introduction to the fragmentary political work known now as *The German Constitution* where it would seem, as Otto Pöggeler puts it, that the "Owl of Minerva" has already begun to speak. "The thoughts of this essay can have no other aim or effect, when published, save that of promoting the understanding of what is, and therefore a calmer outlook and a moderately tolerant attitude alike in words and in actual conduct. For it is not what is that makes us irascible and resentful, but the fact that it is not as it ought to be. But if we recognize that it is as it must be, i.e., that it is not arbitrariness and chance that make it what it is, then we also recognize that it is as it ought to be." Nothing could be further from the program for philosophy outlined in the letter to Schelling, where it is hoped that "With the broadening of the ideas which show how something should be, the indolence of those who confer eternity on everything just as it is will vanish."[44] From an attempt at critical confrontation we have seemingly come to a stance of resigned reconciliation before fate.

Plant's point here is a good deal stronger than his claim about a gradual secularizing of Hegel's approach, but because of his reliance on the secularization thesis as an explanation of why Hegel is driven towards this position of resigned reconciliation with fate, a rather complex and nuanced transformation is made considerably more cut and dried than is in fact the case. Here it seems best to develop a few lines of the argument posed in a series of lectures by Otto Pöggeler now published as "Philosophie und Revolution beim jungen Hegel."[45]

43. Plant is quoting Nohl, ed., *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften* (Tübingen, 1907), p. 223.

44. *Political Writings*, p. 145.

45. *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. J. Hoffmeister and R. Flechsig (Hamburg, 1952-1960), I:11 (letters will be cited by volume and *letter* number).

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Pöggeler's concern here is literally that stated in the title; he does not enter into the question of Hegel's changing attitudes towards the French Revolution but rather poses the more general problem of Hegel's attitude towards "revolution" *per se*, his use of the term in his own early writings, and the function which he saw performed by philosophy in an age of revolution. The starting point, once again, is Hegel's series of letters to Schelling, but it is the considerable service of Pöggeler to have restored more of the political context to Hegel's observations about France, Germany, and the problem of revolution than is the case in Plant's quoting one of the more inflammatory passages ("I await a revolution in Germany") out of context. If we look now more carefully at the series of letters Hegel and Schelling exchanged, aided by a few of Harris' observations on the personal tensions between the two young men which were also present throughout this exchange, a bit clearer sense of Hegel's political position emerges.

Hegel's first letter to Schelling, written on Christmas Eve 1794, begins by praising the essay by Schelling on mythology which had recently appeared in H.E.G. Paulus' important journal *Memorabilien*. Hegel complains about his own failure to bring any of his own work to completion — an obvious sore point in the face of the easy success which seems to have fallen to the younger Schelling. He goes on to note that he has met C.E. Oelsner, an important publicist who had written a series of articles in *Minerva*, a "historico-politico" journal published in Berlin and Hamburg from 1792 onwards which played an important role in disseminating information about the French Revolution in Germany. Like Hegel, Pöggeler explains, Oelsner was a Jacobin who remained faithful to the general ideals of the revolution even after the revolution itself seemed to have turned against them. His own diagnosis of the situation was remarkably similar to that eventually taken up by Hegel in the *Phenomenology* and repeated in various places afterwards: abstract reasoning has premeated all of the atoms of civil society, bringing about a situation where either a voluntary reform of society takes place to bring it in line with the dictates of reason, or revolutionary upheaval is suffered (27-28).[46] What would appear to have been lacking in the French Revolution was a parallel "Reformation," a "religio-philosophico concretization of the principle of freedom. . . ." (13) which could have served as a check on the disintegrative tendencies of political revolution. Hegel's letter concludes with his first expression of disenchantment over events in France, noting the guillotining of Carrier and stating that his trial "has revealed the total ignominity of the Robespierrists."[47]

Schelling's response of January 6, 1795, is oblivious to these political concerns, and expresses amazement that Hegel is still worrying about theology. The essay on mythology which Hegel had praised is belittled, and described as a type of work which he is no longer interested in. He proclaims that he now "lives and moves" only within Kantian philosophy, and in a remark which, as Harris points out could not but have cut Hegel deeply, asks, "Who can entomb himself in the dust of antiquity, when his *own* time is in motion every instant, sweeping him along with it?" He gives a brief outline of the argument of his own essay, "Uber die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie Ueberhaupt."[48]

Hegel's rejoinder of late January reinforced the one area of Schelling's letter where there could be agreement, noting that he was not surprised by Schelling's report that Kantian methods had now been adopted by the orthodox theologians at Tübingen as a way of shoring up theological dogma. "The orthodoxy will not be disturbed," he writes,

46. Oelsner, as Pöggeler points out, also seems to have influenced Hegel's reading of Rousseau's notion of general will. See p. 28.

47. *Briefe* I:6.

48. *Briefe* I:7; see Harris, pp. 186-188.

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"so long as its progression is combined with worldly advantages and woven through the whole state." A few digs at Fichte, who Schelling had praised, are slipped in, hitting at points which could not but have won Schelling's reluctant agreement; the extent to which Fichte's *Critique of Revelation* reopens the door to orthodoxy is stressed in particular. Hegel requests a copy of Schelling's article on the form of philosophy and closes with a rather out of place invocation of an old slogan from the seminary: "Let reason and freedom remain our watchword and the invisible church our rallying point."[49]

Schelling's response, dated February 4, picks up this theme and appears to try to make ammends, dredging up more metaphors from seminary days, agreeing with Hegel's evaluation of Fichte, and then going on to outline the major features of his own system, which he claims to be Spinozist in inspiration. This outline and the essay on the form of philosophy appear to have given Hegel any number of bad nights, resulting in a curious series of notes which Harris discusses in detail, and which convey the unusual picture of Hegel totally out of his depth. It is apparent that Hegel is baffled by the new philosophical terminology which is now the rage in Tübingen, that isolated in Berne he appears to have few resources in dealing with it, and that the most he can make of it is a translation of Schelling's system into the terms of his own moral psychology.[50]

It is in light of these notes that the rather outlandish claims Hegel makes for philosophy and revolution in his letter of April 16 to Schelling, a letter which plays such a major role in Plant's discussion of the young Hegel's attitude towards revolution, is best understood. The letter itself begins as previously noted with a discussion of class relations in Berne; in light of the rest of the letters we now can see more clearly that Hegel is maintaining the same stance of his earlier letters: Schelling, however avant-garde he may be in philosophy, is being given yet another lecture on politics by the elder Hegel. He then hails Schelling's work as "the most important revolution in the system of ideas in all of Germany" and goes on, "From the Kantian system and its highest completion I await a revolution in Germany which starts from principles that are already there and merely require to be worked over and to be applied to all our knowledge. An esoteric philosophy, to be sure, will always remain — the idea of God as the absolute ego will belong to that. . . ." Comments on the way in which religion and politics serve the cause of despotism follow, and Hegel then sketches the program for a critical role for philosophy which has been quoted above.[51]

Placed back in context, "I await a revolution in Germany" loses a good deal of its fire. "Revolution" has here been displaced from the political to the intellectual realm — Schelling's philosophy, it should be noted, is a "revolution" in the "system of ideas" in Germany. This philosophical revolution had, of course, a crucial political role in Hegel's reflections on practical philosophy at this point but the center of gravity remained the theologico-politico program of "Reformation" at which he labored. The critical elaboration and development of already present notions of what *ought to be* in a fashion which will shake lose individuals from an immersion in what simply *is* manages to marry Schelling's philosophical concerns with Hegel's more practical work on folk religion. Indeed, if one remembers that while these letters were being exchanged Hegel was writing his *Life of Jesus*, one can see how the program sketched here would match the intentions of that work rather nicely: critical philosophy reinterprets familiar Biblical texts in a way which will highlight the need for political and moral reform.

49. *Briefe* I:8.

50. *Briefe* I:10; see Harris, pp. 190-194. Hegel may also have drawn on Hölderlin's critique of the new philosophical fashions in his letter to Hegel of Jan. 26, 1795. *Briefe* I:9.

51. *Briefe* I:11.

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Thus, faced at the start of the series of letters with the justifiable sense of despair at the younger Schelling's abandonment of the very line of work that Hegel was (unsuccessfully) trying to bring to order, by the end of the exchange Hegel had managed to reground his own project in terms that would be more philosophically presentable than the rather conventional set of assumptions about the status of moral psychology that he had taken with him from his studies in the seminary.

I have gone into this set of letters at such length because it illustrates the difficulties which plague too simple an attribution of revolutionary intentions to Hegel in the years after his departure from the seminary. From his very first days in Berne he was immensely better informed about the political situation in France than most of his classmates (one letter asks if French newspapers are still banned in Tübingen, suggesting that even if they can be obtained there, it is clear that there is much easier access to news in Berne).[52] And, once we become clearer about what forms of government Hegel was in fact advocating in his early writings, it becomes evident that he was in no sense betraying an earlier and more radical position. It is important that we not use terms like "radical democrat" as carelessly as Plant appears to: in the very passage which Plant is citing as an example of his radical democratic leanings, Hegel specifically uses the term "*Republic*" as a way of designating that political order in which individuals live under self-made laws.[53] As early as the essays on "The Positivity of Christianity," it was clear that Hegel did not feel that the direct type of participation which one found in ancient Christian religious communities could be extended to the political realm: from the start *representation* played a major role in his political thought, from the start he did not ignore the aristocratic character of the Athenian *polis*, and from the start he seems to have been swayed by Plato's stress on the importance of integrating a number of distinct estates together as the basis for the polis.[54] To call any of this evidence of a commitment to radical democracy is to confuse terms mercilessly and to measure an older Hegel against a position he never held.

We must not, however, ignore the extent to which Hegel's early position does nevertheless differ from that which is adopted in the essay on the German Constitution. Two major shifts should be highlighted. First of all, as has already been mentioned, by the time of the *German Constitution,* it would appear that Hegel has revised his conception of the function of practical philosophy. No longer is the goal of philosophy that of developing the immanent ought which is already present in society, rather its function is to show us how that which is "is as it ought to be." Secondly, the discussion of the "essence of the state" with which the German Constitution opens differs markedly from the ideal of the polis that infused his earlier writings. Hegel's "essential state" would appear to be the classical liberal state, or at least the minimal sort of state which is deduced in social contract theories. It is defined simply as a union of individuals "for the common defense of the totality of their property. . . ." Running through a list of what aspects are irrelevant to this essence of the state we find such matters as: the specific form in which public authority is realized, the regularization of civil codes and the administration of justice, specific arrangements about how individual estates participate in the political process, the form of administration of the state in general and more specifically the existence of even distribution of taxation, the degree to which the citizens are united by ethos, culture and language (*Sitten, Bildung, Sprache*), and the

52. *Briefe* I:6.

53. See Nohl, *op.cit.*, p. 223. Translated into English by T.M. Knox, *Early Theological Writings* (Philadelphia, 1971), p. 156. Hegel refers to Montesquieu's analysis of republics in the *Spirit of the Laws* III:3.

54. Harris, pp. 425-426.

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degree of religious uniformity.[55] The integrated polis indeed seems far removed from this conception of the political order.

Any number of commentators have noted this problem, although few accounts have been impressive. Z.A. Pelczynski's effort to translate Hegel's concept of the state "into a language which contemporary political and social theorists will understand" simply ignores Hegel's earlier discussion of the nature of the political order and takes the *German Constitution* to be an overly simple model, akin to the Hobbesian state, which is subsequently abandoned once Hegel becomes aware of its limitations and rehabilitates the Greek conception of politics in his Jena period.[56] Pöggeler does a bit better here, noting that indeed one must look upon the *German Constitution* as an anomaly in Hegel's political thought, and not as his starting point, but this is not developed. He describes the *German Constitution* as an extreme swing of the pendulum of Hegel's thought: it marks the highwater mark of a "practical Machiavellianism" which Hegel would abandon in the Aristotle-tinged writings of his Jena period.[57] But this is to leave the *German Constitution* as simply an anomaly which, however, is not the case, since a parallel tension can be seen even earlier in Hegel's writings.

It is important to remember that at the very moment when Hegel seems to rely most on the model of Greek civic religion as the keystone in his ideal political order, one can find analyses of the relationship between church and state which resemble nothing so much as Mendelssohn and Lessing's writing on toleration. The heart of the essay "The Positivity of Christian Religion" is a distinction between ecclesiastical and political contracts (*Vertrag der Kirche; Vertrag mit dem Staate*) which would put Kant's discussion of the difference between church and state in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* to shame. While it is possible, Hegel argues, for an individual in civil society to "subject his will to the general will and regard the latter as his law," a contract about matters of *faith* is viewed by him as simply a contradiction in terms. The church can rest on nothing other than "a general uniformity in faith" and this uniformity cannot simply be the creation of a general contract.[58] This view, which seems so foreign from the Tübingen Essay's invocation of the intertwining of religion and politics that lay at the heart of the Greek *polis,* is in turn followed by a later fragment which appears to return once more to an embracing of the polis. In a fragment of his commentary on Kant's *Metaphysik der Sitten* from 1798 which Rosenkranz has preserved, Hegel writes, "... if the principle of the state is a complete whole, the church and state cannot possibly be distinct. What in the former is intellectualized and authoritative in the latter is the very same as living, presented in fantasy. The whole of the church is thus only a fragment if men are totally smashed into particular state-men and particular church-men.[59]

This set of apparently contradictory statements has likewise caused a good deal of consternation among Hegel commentators without particularly distinguished results. Lukacs simply rages once again against Rosenkranz, arguing that the discussion of church and state relations could not, or course, have been a central part of Hegel's discussion (we must remember that Lukacs' Hegel is forever trying to become Marx but failing; with this in mind it is fairly easy for Lukacs to determine what is and is not

55. *Political Writings*, pp. 153-161.

56. Z.A. Pelczynski, "The Hegelian Conception of the State," in *Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives*, ed. Pelczynski (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 1-5.

57. Pöggeler, p. 59; see also Pöggeler's important essay, "Hegel et Machiavel, Renaissance italienne et idealisme allemand," in *Archives de philosophe* 41:3 (1978), pp. 435-467.

58. *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 118-119.

59. *Werke* I (Frankfurt, 1971), p. 444.

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plausible for Hegel to be doing at any point without ever actually having to engage the texts on a serious level) and must have been afforded so much attention by Rosenkranz "because the problem was dear to his own heart. . ." (147). When Lukacs does deign to talk about what has actually been preserved rather than what must have been overlooked, he has little illuminating to contribute. With respect to the passage quoted above he simply states, "Even in later life Hegel never worked out a correct view of the relations between church and state, but he never went so far as to advocate this kind of reactionary [the word appears again, like clockwork!] theocracy" (149).

Although Avineri offers a number of helpful observations on the distinction between church and state,[60] it is Harris who has constructed the most generally satisfying account of these parallel tensions between what for lack of a better set of terms we shall call Hegel's "Hellenic" and "modern" conceptions of politics and religion. His argument, in brief, is as follows: in both sets of writings it is important to distinguish between cases when Hegel is arguing on the level of present-day "reflective" thought and when he is moving on a deeper level, eventually crystalized in the conception of *life* elaborated in the Frankfurt period. The distinction between the two levels emerges most clearly with the discussion of church and state in the *Positivity* essay. Because Christianity is a type of religion which is fundamentally *private*, it can come to play a public role only after it has completed its transformation into a positivie authoritative religion. Once this has been done, it can enter the public arena, but at the price of being one of the leading agencies of despotism and repression. Once one recognizes that what Hegel is dealing with at the close of the *Positivity* essay is Christianity as it *now exists*, one can understand the insistence on a separation between church and state of the Enlightenment variety. It is a remedial measure, designed to detach the positive dogmas of Christianity from the absolutist state. It is not, however, a stopping point for Hegel's own reflection, since he remains loyal to the critique of Enlightenment pretensions which form a major part of the Tübingen Essay's survey of trends within current theology. Enlightenment is incapable of pushing its argument far enough and does not move beyond this simple remedial position to a more profound understanding of the relation between religion and politics. Hegel's own efforts can thus be viewed as an exploration of that realm more fundamental than reflection. By the time of the critique of Kant's *Metaphysik der Sitten* he had come to see what this movement beyond reflection in fact entailed: it involved him in an ultimate rejection of the sort of categorical distinction which Kant drew between the ecclesiastical order and the political order in *Religion Within tl. Limits of Reason Alone*. Hegel's ultimate formulation, Harris argues, distinguishes on the level of reflection between the state, a system of negative freedoms and civil rights, and the church, a non-coercive union of the faithful. Any other set of arrangements leads to despotism.On the level of "life,", however, Hegel is claimed to distinguish between a more complex order of social groupings: 1) the state of necessity (*Not*), a situation where brute power and compulsive law reigns, 2) the level of moral freedom, where a self-willed authority rules in a non-compulsive fashion, 3) the level of love, a situation in which considerations of authority and compacts are totally irrelevant, and finally, 4) the level of religion proper, "where the felt union is itself the object of aesthetic awareness for the group, and the direct focus of the common activity" (414). Harris concludes, ". . . we can escape from this reflective level only if the original *Trennung* between Church and State can somehow be healed. For authority has no place in religion; but it cannot be banished form life. Life has to maintain itself against a background of natural necessity; the organism must exert force

60. Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 31-33.

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in a great many ways in order to live. . . . A free people must have a constitution as well as a religion; and only when the two together form a living whole will authority cease to be a problem at the religious level" (415-416).

Harris' discussion of *The German Constitution* draws heavily on this distinction between reflection and life as a means of explaining the apparently anomalous conception of the state with which the essay opens. He explicitly notes a parallel in the pattern of the argument of *The Positivity of Christian Religion* and *The German Constitution;* in each one he finds "a negative, critical analysis, followed by a positive, reconstructive one" (464). And further, just as the separation of state and church in the former essay was a separation on the level of reflection, which still left open the need for an integration of a less "positive" level of fantasy, so also in the latter essay the explicit distinction between the state and other parts of life must be seen against the background of Hegel's more general theory of culture. The "liberal" separation of church and state, a separation of the sort that could be seen in the policies of Joseph II of Austria, is only the "negative side" of Hegel's treatment of the function of religion, since Harris feels that Hegel "cherished the hope that the liberal policies of Joseph II would make it possible for some equally enlightened successor to establish a national Church within which both Protestants and Catholics could worship side by side, conscious of their community at the level of *Phantasie* and mutually respectful or even sympathetically appreciative of their differences at the level of *Verstand*" (473, cf. 454). Hence the "concept of the state" with which the essay opens is hardly indicative of Hegel's views on the essential structures of political life.

Indeed, it is important to note the particular sense which the term "*Begriff*" has for Hegel at this period of his development. A reader familiar only with Hegel's later usage would expect the discussion of the "*Begriff des Staats*" to provide the basic categorical structure on which the subsequent development of the essay should rest. But his usage of *Begriff*, in which the concept is taken to mean the concrete particularity itself, a particularity capable of unfolding and developing new distinctions and new content, is not present in Hegel's thinking before the end of the Jena period. *Begriff* during the Frankfurt period had a usage closer to that of Kant; it designated an external universal and stood opposite the spontaneous active unity brought about by love on the level of life itself. While *"Begreifen ist Beherrschen,"* "only in love does one achieve unity with the object; it does not dominate and is not dominated. . . ."[61] Life and love, and not the *Begriff,* occupy the center of gravity of Hegel's system at this point.

Hence, the opening argument of the *German Constitution* must be understood as a battle on the level of reflection. "Between events and the free interpretation of them," Hegel argues, men have inserted "a mass of concepts and aims and require what happens to correspond with them."[62] Because concepts are external to reality, it is possible to be faced with the sort of situation that now rules in Germany: an antiquated conception of Germany as a state is clung to, even in the face of the obvious fact that Germany is a state no longer.[63] Likewise, an ideal conception of what Germany should be is brought into opposition to the real situation in Germany, occluding an insight into the actual state of affairs. Against these inadequate concepts, Hegel attempts to frame a more accurate concept of what minimal criteria a state must satisfy. It is in the face of these minimal criteria that he attempts to demonstrate the obvious fact that has escaped reflection: Germany is a state no

61. *Werke* I:239-243; Harris, pp. 291-295, 318; cf. *Early Theoretical Writings*, p. 278.
62. *Political Writings*, p. 145.
63. Cf. Hans Maier's discussion, "Hegels Schrift über Reichsverfassung," now in *Politische Wissenschaft in Deutschland* (Munich, 1969), pp. 52-69.

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longer. But when Hegel speaks of reconciliation here, it is not a reconciliation to the *concept* — as would be the case after the completion of the *Phemonenology* — but more simply a reconciliation to the political *history* that now confronts Germany as its peculiar fate.

It is this history which is the concern of the bulk of the essay. The argument here may be sketched more quickly. From the birth of the Empire the German constitution had been essentially private rather than public law, a set of arrangements which protected the rights of individual *Bürgers*. Before the wars of religion and before the growth of Imperial cities and the "*bürgerliche* sensibility" that marked their residents, "princes, dukes, and lords could regard one another more easily as a whole and accordingly could act as a whole." But with the advance of "culture and industry," the two forces which elsewhere in Europe give rise to the modern state, Germany is shattered into a mass of particulars. "The debacle of the religious disruption was exceptionally serious in Germany because the political bond was not so loose in any other country. . . with the loss of the religious tie, it was not only the innermost link between men that was snapped, but almost the only link. . . ."[64] Hence the significance of the call for a Theseus to give Germany a new constitution with which the essay closes: what Germany needs is both a legal order (on the level of reflection) that will not simply be the "fictional state" (*Gedankenstaat*) which collapsed in the face of France, *and* some way of healing the diremption which lay on the level of the very mores of German life.

It is possible now to come to an understanding of the full complexity of transformation which occurs in Hegel's attitude towards the political order during the period of his time in Tübingen, Berne and Frankfurt. Plant's picture of a gradual secularizing of Hegel's thinking and a gradual resignation in the face of a fate which cannot be outwitted must be modified. On the level of Hegel's general attitude towards practical philosophy, what appears to take place is *not* an abandonment of the classical model, but rather a remarkable *Hellenizing* of his thought. Beginning from a standpoint which takes Kant's second Critique as a virtually unproblematic starting point, he comes — *negatively* through the impact of Fichte's writings, which demonstrate the way in which the absolute "ought" can duplicate in philosophy the Terror of the abstract state of the French Revolution, and *positively*, through the influence of Hölderlin's thinking — to a conception of practical philosophy which roots moral conduct no longer on pure freedom but rather on a recognition of fate. Against the abstract power of the categorical imperative, Hegel opts for a conception of "the causality of fate" as a *particular* punishment, meeted out by the Eumenides unleashed by the trespassers' act.[65]

Conversely, when we look at Hegel's attitude towards the actual *institutions* which are seen as embodying the *public* content of his practical philosophy, one would at first appear to find a *de-Hellenization*, a renunciation of the *polis* for the neutral state. But the closer investigation of this domain of Hegel's thought leads to a less univocal characterization. From the start Hegel had used the polis as a counter-image to present day reality, and not as a concrete blueprint. It is one of those perspectives which, in Adorno's words, "displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light."[66]

64. *Political Writings*, pp. 189-190; the locus of the discussion here is the problem of the relationship between civic virtue and particular interests, and *not*, as Avineri suggests, the question of whether Germany can be modernized (pp. 54ff). His concerns, in short, are not so foreign from those *topoi* of republican theory that J.G.A. Pocock has analyzed in *The Machiavellian Moment* (Princeton, 1975), as one might first assume.

65. *Early Theological Writings*, pp. 228-234.

66. *Minima Moralia*, No. 153.

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The fleshing out of *what* particular institutions were appropriate for a political order is a task which is by no means exhaustively treated in any of the writings of the early period. Certainly there are provisional notions which remain fairly constant — the idea that any modern political order will of necessity be representative, for instance — but what is lacking is an elucidation of a political order commensurate with the dictates of Hegel's practical philosophy in the same way that Kant's *Rechtslehre* provides us with a political order that mirrors certain of the structural features of his ethical theory or, more to the point, the way in which Aristotle's *Politics* takes up the themes elaborated in his *Ethics*. Hence we cannot in fact say very much about Hegel's ideal polity during this period beyond the recording of what general features he might be said to admire or detest in political societies of his time, indicating how he responded to certain important events, or at most lifting out of his more immediate publicist writings a few notions about how states should be organized. But none of this is the sort of systematically elaborated political philosophy that one begins to find in the Jena system. The foundation upon which he would erect his political edifice — the practical philosophy that would serve as a basis — was in too fluid a condition to enable him to venture the task of building upon it. And the provisional and transitory character of this foundation would not be overcome until the *Phenomenology*, even if he was convinced at times during the earlier years in Jena that in fact he was ready to elaborate his politics.

Before turning to writing of that period and commentaries dealing with Hegel's years in Jena, one last bit of business remains to be transacted: José Maria Ripalda's *The Divided Nation — The Roots of a Bourgeois Thinker: G.W.F. Hegel*. While his topic is a worthy one — Hegel's relation to various strains in the German Enlightenment, the book itself is a mess. At least one problem is not the author's fault: he has been served rather poorly by translators and publisher. The translation is remarkably ungrammatical and at times lapses from English to German (e.g., we run across *theorie* [78], *Bibliographie* [209] and *Mythologie* [137]). At other points it is literal to the point of ridiculousness: Hegel's *unglückliches Bewusstsein* becomes the "hapless consciousness" (105), and Kant is credited with writing a "metaphysic of Customs" (195), a rendering that makes a mockery of Kant's insistence at the start of the *Metaphysic der Sitten* that *Sitten* should not be taken in its literal etymological sense as custom but rather in its more general sense of morality.[67]

It is less clear who is to blame for the failure to give the book even the most cursory of proofreadings. Misspellings abound and commas seem to have been randomly distributed throughout the book — certainly they provide little guidance to the reader. Indeed, the typographical errors in the book at times reach the level of grand comedy. In the course of a discussion of the reaction of Hegel to the French Revolution while he was in the Tübingen Seminary, we are told, "No one contributed more than Kant to arouse this scatalogical enthusiasm" (121). That passage alone may be worth the price of the book.

Most of the other things which make this book such a misery to read, however, must be attributed to Ripalda. He has a taste for remarkable metaphors: "The force of modern subjectivity dishevels the affected hair style of 18th century and summons the contradictory content of the Enlightenment before its own tribunal," (68) surely takes the cake, although "In his mature years Marx renounced the humanistic bla-bla-bla of alienation..." (158) also has its charms. This is coupled with an eagerness to drag various "bourgeois" thinkers before the blow-dryer of history to receive their just

67. Kant, *Metaphysik der Sitten*, Introduction, *Akademie-Ausgabe*, p. 216.

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comeuppance. Hence, Adam Ferguson is claimed to be "typically bourgeois" (are we then to assume that it was common for Scottish bourgeoisie to have ties linking them to the clan organization of the highlands, ties that "typically" estranged them from the commercial society of Edinburgh?), to have a "naive and elitist" mentality and to have been prevented by his "ethical mentality" from having followed up his penetrating empirical insights with "a critique of capitalist society" (are we to assume that the Edinburgh in 1766 *had* a capitalist society to criticize?). Hence he remained "ignorant of the implacable mechanisms that he conjured up in the name of Spirit and Humanity" (31) (are we to assume that Ripalda has somehow stumbled onto a lost Ferguson text which includes terms like Humanity and Spirit?). A few pages later Max Weber's hands are slapped for his "belief" in capitalist rationality by recalling how it led to the extermination of seven million Jews and the destruction of Vietnam (37). One looks in vain for the slightest evidence that Weber's manifest ambivalence towards rationalization has reached Ripalda. Conversely, "revolutionaries" get off easier. Lenin's "Concerning the National Pride of the Great-Russians" is hailed as "a document of a new revolutionary nationalism" tied to Renaissance and Enlightenment traditions. ". . . the horror of the Leninist Machiavellianism," we are told in the completion of the analogy, "arises from a defamatory intention similar to that which persecuted Machiavelli himself" (185) — surely a subtle point, one would have assumed the "horror" that greets Lenin's Machiavellianism had more to do with its later consequences than with a repetition of the desire to get in a few more licks at Niccolo.

These surface annoyances aside — after a while one learns to cease relying on the habitual expectation that punctuation in a book has something to do with its meaning, chuckling over typos provides needed relief from the wilder metaphors, and with a strong enough stomach one can make it through the non-sensical politics which infest the diatribes — the problem with the book basically comes down to Ripalda's effort to turn a fairly responsible article on Hegel's indebtedness to the Enlightenment philosopher Christian Garve in the formation of his early views about politics and culture[68] into a book which proports to treat Hegel as "nothing but a small element in a process, of which the Enlightenment is only an episode: the process of Capitalism" (5). Somewhere between these two poles — Hegel and Garve and the March of Capitalism, the more genuinely interesting point — the fate of the concept of the "divided nation" — is lost. Hegel's almost total failure to consider in his later philosophy the function which nationality and nationalism (as opposed to the neutral state) could play in world history has been duly noted by a number of authors. Ripalda's tracing of the early discussion of Garve's views on literature in Hegel's Stuttgart writings suggests an interesting tack to take on the question. By focusing on the role "nation" and "nationality" played in the period before the fateful coupling of nation and state, and by trying to account for the indifference in which Hegel holds considerations such as common language or culture in *The German Constitution,* Ripalda would have had a theme worth developing.

What we find instead is an expansion of his earlier discussion of Garve and Hegel (15-70), which remains of interest in light of the enormous impact Garve — virtually ignored in most discussions of Hegel's early period — had not only on Hegel, but also on German Enlightenment thinking in general. Ripalda has also provided an extensive bibliography that lists those books and journals that Hegel is believed to have read during the Stuttgart period. But once the discussion of Garve's impact on Hegel during the Stuttgart period is terminated, the book rapidly loses its focus, rushing

68. It is perhaps a measure of the chaos that reigns in the book that the bibliography gives the wrong citation for even this article! It appeared in *Hegel-Studien* 8 (1973), pp. 91-118.

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through discussions of Hegel's Berne, Frankfurt, and Jena periods that contribute little to the existing literature.

The linking of Hegel to capital is remarkably heavy handed, partaking of what Raymond Williams has termed the "epochal" tendency in cruder strains of Marxian historiography. Economic periods and intellectual epochs are lined up side by side, with little more mediation between them than the paste required to splice together the pages of an overly abstract history of ideas with the pages of an economic history. Ripalda, for instance, moves within two paragraphs from a discussion of the limits imposed on philosophy by "the relatively modest stage of development which the new form of production possessed" — an explanation that ignores Marx's more complex account of the relation between intellectual and material production as crystalized in the *Grundrisse* fragment on Greek art — to the following parade of reflexive verbs and abstract nouns: "From Wolff to Garve, the Enlightenment is withdrawing itself more and more from Rationalism. But in reality Enlightenment maintained itself at the fringes of the atmosphere of Rationalism in order to breath" (38-39). This account, which imparts self-movement to the most abstract intellectual constructs while simultaneously striking materialist poses, will have most readers, before too many pages have passed, screaming "Air! Air!" themselves.

ADORNO'S "STRATEGY OF HIBERNATION"

by Tetsuo Kogawa

> "All culture after Auschwitz, including its urgent critique, is garbage. While restoring itself after the things that happened without resistance in its own countryside, culture has turned entirely into the ideology it had been potentially."[1]
>
> — *T. W. Adorno*

Despite its widespread reputation, Adorno's remark is unclear. What is "garbage"? Is it a metaphor for ideology? He would not use such a cheap metaphor. As Adorno and Horkheimer had argued earlier: "The development toward total integration" produced a culture industry as a mechanism of totalitarian administration.[2] In the era of fully developed capitalism, cultural institutions and mass media have become absorbed by multinational corporations and local or national governments that generously subsidize them. Today, cultural control and administration are much more important than economic operations. Indeed, economic operations cannot effectively function unless they are preceded by cultural efforts.

The destruction of culture as an autonomous sphere was not a sudden accident of National Socialism, but the result of basic tendencies in bourgeois society that had long been antagonistic even toward its own literature. "The claim that Hitler has destroyed German culture is no more than an advertising stunt of those who want to

1. Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York, 1973), p. 367.
2. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, "Preface to the New Edition" in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York, 1972), p. x.

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rebuild it.... Such art and thought as were exterminated by Hitler had long been leading a severed and apocryphal existence.... Anyone who did not play the game was forced into inner emigration years before the Third Reich broke out." Some of these "inner" emigrants sought to dismantle the integrative force of the culture industry, although they remained restricted to literature, arts and human sciences, and did not extend to politics. In literature, these attempts meant the eruption of the avant-garde at the beginning of the century with the concomitant rejection of the fundamental categories of 19th century aesthetics. According to Jens, this revolution radically changed the basic relation between author, character and language. "Finally in 1901, 'once' and 'now' were separated and the 'I' was lost; due to the attack of 'Is,' its power, the object is alienated; the thing determines the character, and takes the 'creation' function away from the author; reality seems not to be bound by the conventional language anymore; the unity is broken."[3]

The real meaning of this revolution was not understood until the late 1950s, when new interpretations of Freud's psychoanalysis, de Saussure's linguistics and Husserl's phenomenology revealed explicit and implicit relations between their own theoretical innovations and contemporary experimental art works (expressionism, surrealism, formalism, Russian avant-garde, the theater of Meyerhold and Brecht). One of the most paradigmatic problems deals with the reader. The relation between reader and literary work has radically changed in 20th century German literature. Contemporary theory recognized that every literary work is not completed until the reader reads it, in contrast to the traditional assumption that the reception should conform to the author's vision during the creative process. Far from emancipating the reader as subject, this earlier position subordinated the reader to the author. Kafka, on the other hand, destroyed the psychological and authoritarian situation by requiring the reader to adopt a completely different attitude toward his work. In the opening passage of Kafka's *Amerika* we read of a statue of liberty with a "sword" in hand. The attentive reader will notice this conscious substitution on Kafka's part of a sword for the actual torch. In operation here is not only Kafka's humor, but also the indication that the narrator, far from being naive, is at once cunning, mischievous and unreliable. The reader cannot entirely depend upon the narrator, as was the case in the conventional novel. Reading Kafka's work, the reader cannot remain passive, i.e., he must not seek to find what Kafka *really* means, but must actively participate in reconstructing the "incomplete" story.[4] This approach has rarely been applied to Kafka's work because it contradicts the still prevailing existentialist interpretation of Kafka.[5]

This shift in linguistic experience from the author to the reader presupposes that the reader can bracket the author's authoritarian attempt to transmit a "message" to the reader; conversely, the author must leave the final meaning of the work with the reader. This has profound consequences for the communication between author and reader and the truth of a literary work. Might not everything become the reader's fabrication? If language were an immediate representation of the author, these doubts would be relevant, but the language in question is mediated by technological means, namely *langue*, or more adequately, *écriture*, not *speech* or *voice* (as in Derrida).

3. Walter Jens. *Statt einer Literaturgeschichte* (Pflingen, 1957), p. 62.

4. Wolfgang Iser, *The Implied Reader* (Baltimore, 1974); his *The Act of Reading* (1978) convincingly develops a reader-oriented theory of literature.

5. Cf. my "Reading Kafka Vulgarly" and "From the Psychologic Gesture to the Social Gesture." There I have tried to overcome the existentialist interpretation of Kafka. Both articles are now in my *Changing the Subject* (in Japanese — Tokyo, 1978), pp. 7-52, 91-128.

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Today, work (not only the literary work of authors, but also labor in general) is totally mediated by the production-market mechanism, and the worker (not only the author as a creator of work but every laborer) is alienated from his work. The contemporary *work* has nothing to do with the worker's specific character: the worker does not decide the value of the work. Thus, it is the user, arranger, and mediator of the work who decides its value.[6] Consequently, to shift the subject of language to the reader constitutes resistance to the situation in which the whole value of work is decided by administrators just as the meaning of a literary work is determined by publishers, ad men and reviewers, not by each reader.

Saussure's treatment of language as a system of signs and linguistics as a science of the life of linguistic signs within society anticipated today's language situation. The relation between signifier and signified replaces concept and sound-image respectively since, according to Saussure, the bond between the signifier and signified is *arbitrary*. "Whether we take the *signifié* or the *signifiant*, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonetic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it; thus the value of a term may be modified without either its meaning or its sound being affected, solely because a neighboring term has been modified."[7] Consequently, all linguistic values are determined by the user of signs (the audience), who relates signs within a specific *intersubjective* context. This context can be referred to as the socio-cultural *code* or *system*. And law, custom, principle, mode, public sphere, order, regulation, and rationality can all be replaced by this *code* or *system*.

Hence semiotics casts light on the present situation of language: the same sign can manifest itself both as artistic work and as advertisement. The meaning of the sign depends entirely on the code that the sign refers to.

Broadly speaking, one may distinguish three types of codes: major (or popular) code, minor (or alternative) code, and mass code. The major code belongs to the majority, like custom, and is originally the spontaneous legacy of a people. The minor code is an alternative to the major code. The mass code, finally, is characteristic of modern cultural administration of mass communication and culture industry. Today, the major code and mass code are hardly distinguishable, while former minor codes become marginal, as in the case of vestigial folk traditions confronted with mass culture. For example, despite the expansion of the cinema in the 1920s, the Yiddish theater was still a major cultural institution for the New York Jewish population. Besides the mass culture, the entertainment-oriented Yiddish theater addressed the majority of the subculture while the artistic or political Yiddish theater (Yiddish Art Theater and the ARTEF) were relevant to the intellectual minority.[8] In the wake of a transition to a fully administered culture, the function of the entertainment-oriented Yiddish theater has been totally replaced by television, film and Broadway. The Yiddish theater in New York, despite a slight recent revival, is marginally isolated, and

6. This situation does not invalidate Marx's analysis of the commodity but does demand the *extraterritorialization* of Marxist economics. Among the attempts to develop the implication of Marx's analysis toward the cultural approach, see Jean Baudrillard, *Le Système des Objets: La Consommation des Signes* (Paris, 1968); and *Pour und Critique de l'économie Politique du Signe* (Paris, 1972). Also, see Dean MacCannell, *The Tourist — A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York, 1976).

7. Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. W. Baskin and edited by C. Bally, A. Sechehaye, and A. Riedlinger (New York, 1966), p. 120.

8. See David S. Lifson, *The Yiddish Theater in America* (New York and London, 1965).

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no longer is an alternative to mass culture. Thus, in contrast to semiotics' notion of an infinite diversity of codes, only two possibilities exist: *mass code* or *marginal code*. This is the limit of semiotics whose radical potential seems to have been over-estimated.

Benjamin attempted to describe the emancipatory possibility of switching the code, specifically in his elaboration of the method of quotation as a response to the dominant culture situation. For Benjamin, quotation shifts the dominant and conventional code to a new one. Thus, his favorite form of criticism was, as he admits in his letter, "the writing almost entirely of quotations. The craziest mosaic technique that people can imagine...."[9]

In its broadest sense, the technique of quotation is not limited to Benjamin but can be found in almost all radical artists and theoreticians of the first quarter of the 20th century. Kafka created his new literary form by "quoting" the form of Yiddish theater,[10] while Karl Kraus' caricatures are based on citations, to say nothing of James Joyce and Marcel Proust. Similarly in epic theater, quotation has a crucial function. Brecht wrote that "in the first production of *Die Mutter* the stage...was not supposed to represent any real locality: it, as it were, took up an attitude itself towards the incidents shown; it quoted, narrated, prepared and recalled."[11] Victor Shklovskij's critical technique of parody is a kind of quotation, and Sergei Eisenstein's film technique of montage depends, as he himself admits, on his synthetic understanding of quotation.[12]

These similarities did not grow out of personal collaborations. The method of quotation has, rather, been developed as a reaction against capitalist rationalization and its cultural consequences. In the age of mechanical reproduction, the language of literature is always obsolete unless it is constantly related to a new code, that is, unless it is quoted. Therefore, in a letter to Gershom Scholem, Benjamin likens his method to a "salvage" of "scraps": "the philosophical salvage of surrealism — and therefore its *Aufhebung* — also the attempt to hold the image of history in the most unattractive fixations of being, so to speak, the scraps of being."[13]

Benjamin's use of the term *Abfälle*, or scraps, reminds us of Adorno's *Müll* (garbage). Apparently, Benjamin's scraps and Adorno's garbage indicate a reified situation in which language (the essence of culture) becomes an arbitrary sign. However, Adorno's garbage implies the impossibility of salvage, while Benjamin's scraps seems to suggest a strategy. For Benjamin, scraps that are obsolete as signs referring to old aesthetic values can still provide new value if they are related to some new code, i.e., if they fall into a newly organized social group's hands. Thus, he compares John Heartfield's photomontage and Renger-Patsch's picture: the former transformed the advertising photography into a political instrument, while the latter "succeeded in turning into an object poverty itself, by handling it in a modish technically perfect way, into an object of enjoyment."[14] Benjamin contends that the

9. Walter Benjamin, *Briefe*, Bd. 1, G. Scholem and T. Adorno, eds. (Frankfurt, 1966), p. 366. Cf. Hannah Arendt, *Men in Dark Times* (New York, 1968), p. 202.

10. See the work of Evelyn Torton Beck, *Kafka and the Yiddish Theater* (Madison, 1971).

11. Bertolt Brecht, "In Direct Impact of the Epic Theater" in *Brecht on Theater*, John Willett, ed. and trans. (New York, 1964), p. 57. Also see Walter Benjamin, *Understanding Brecht*, trans. Anna Bostock (London, 1973).

12. As for how "montage" decides the meaning of film, Béla Balazs tells an ironic story that Eisenstein's "revolutionary" cinema, *Battleship Potemkin*, was converted to an anti-revolutionary cinema by a Scandinavian distributor who shifted just one scene — "not a shot omitted, not a title changed." See *Theory of the Film*, Edith Bone, trans. (London, 1952), pp. 119-120.

13. Walter Benjamin, *Briefe*, Bd. 2, *op.cit.*, p. 685.

14. Walter Benjamin, "The Author as Producer," in *Understanding Brecht*, p. 95.

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cultural situation can be radically changed only if an alternative social context, i.e., a new collectivity, appears. Only if the mass-oriented capitalist collectivity is switched to the collectivity of a class-conscious proletariat. Hence, he confronted "the fascist attempt to aestheticize politics" with the Communist politicization of art, uniting artistic activity with the workers' movement.[15] Adorno nowhere shares Benjamin's optimism. The new technological means hardly provide the possibility of new and active collective reception of culture. Rather, the capitalist culture industry destroys not only the traditional community but also the basis of almost all authentic collectivity: collective memory or unconscious collectivity. Spontaneous collectivity is increasingly impossible, and is replaced by the artificial organization of the entertainment business and bureaucratic administration: even religious ritual and traditional feasts are no exception.[16]

In an apparent reply to Benjamin's thesis, Adorno in his essay "On the Fetish Character in Music and Regression in Listening," in referring to the attitude of the music listening audience insisted that "the new phase of the musical consciousness of the masses is defined by displeasure in pleasure; it resembles the reaction to sport or advertising. Contemporary culture, despite its seeming diversity, has been fundamentally chained to the dominant code. When an audience receives a cultural work (which should be originally free from any code before the association with the recipient), it has little choice in deciding what code it should be related to in accordance with the interests of its own members.[17] In this sense, Adorno argues that "in spite of all the progress in reproduction techniques, in controls and the specialities, and in spite of all the restless industry, the bread that the culture industry offers man is the stone of the stereotype."[18] That is why "all culture after Auschwitz, including its urgent critique, is garbage." At the same time, Adorno is fully aware that no matter how reified culture becomes, it is not totally reified. It always refers back to living subjects. Even in the context of extreme reification, the subject who is conscious of alienation survives, and this critical activity is the subject's final barricade.

Thus Adorno's statement regarding culture as garbage is not an epistemological definition of culture but a strategic critical gesture within the context of the culture industry. His "pessimistic" and totally negative tone reflects this strategy. He is not pessimistic but performs this pessimistic gesture. The philosophical basis of this performance is put forth in *Negative Dialectics:* "In epistemology the inevitable result is the false conclusion that the object is the subject. Traditional philosophy believes that it knows the unlike by likening it to itself, while in so doing it really knows itself only. The idea of a changed philosophy would be to become aware of likeness by defining it as that which is unlike itself."[19] But this does not suggest that he acts *as if* he is negative. He tries to *be* totally negative to the extent that the critical subject *is* essentially negative. If reification constitutes the basic trend of culture, the only possible response is neither a search for an alternative, given the present limited situation, nor an objective description of the status quo, but a strategic exaggeration of the negative element of the trend.[20] Accordingly, Adorno finds in Kafka one of the

15. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations,* Hannah Arendt, ed. (New York, 1969), p. 244.

16. David Gross, "Culture and Negativity: Notes Toward a Theory of the Carnival," in *Telos.* n. 36 (Summer 1978). pp. 127-132.

17. As for the semiological approach to this point, compare the works of Jean Baudrillard mentioned in note 7.

18. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment, op.cit.,* p. 148.

19. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics, op.cit.,* p. 150.

20. This strategic gesture, exaggeration may be closely related to Brecht's "alienation effect"

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most successful examples of this strategy. Adorno writes in *Prisms:* "As was done thousands of years ago, Kafka seeks salvation in the incorporation of the power of the adversary. The subject seeks to break the spell of reification by reifying itself. It appears to complete the fate which befell it.... Immersion in the inner space of individuation, which culminates in such self-contemplation, stumbles upon the principle of individuation, the postulation of the self by the self, officially sanctioned by philosophy, the mythic defiance. The subject seeks to make amends by abandoning this defiance. Kafka does not glorify the world through subordination; he resists it through non-violence. Faced by the latter, power must acknowledge itself as that which it is, and it is on this fact alone that he counts. Myth is to succumb to its own reflected image."

A common line on Adorno is that Adorno's "critical theory does not address any social group, nor can it provide a socialization model translatable into practice." [21] But as we have already shown, his "strategy of hibernation" was engendered by a socio-cultural situation in a transitional period marked by the overthrow of traditional concepts: "theory," "practice," "individuality," "collectivity," "language," and even "concept," all of which need radically new interpretations — the method of interpretation itself must be fundamentally revised. Given that advanced mass communication and bureaucracy cripple bourgeois individuality and organic collectivity, Adorno's emancipatory strategy cannot count on any kind of conventional practice.[22] Although Habermas criticizes Adorno when he writes, "Adorno's thesis can be proven with examples from literature and music, only as long as they remain dependent on reproduction techniques that prescribe isolated reading and contemplative listening, i.e., a mode of reception that leads down the royal road to bourgeois individuation," [23] Adorno does not depend on bourgeois individualism but only utilizes it in order to overcome both conventional individualism and collectivism. In this sense, he upholds the appearance of both a new individuality and collectivity, which are in turn never separated. His preference for highbrow literature and music is not accidental, and is in fact preferable to the extent that *readership* here is both too *individualistic* for bourgeois individuation and too spontaneous for the existing collectivity. Indeed, an extremely conscious, "individualistic" readership may open up a new collectivity,

(*Verfremdungseffekt*), provided that this theater technique is not received dogmatically.

21. Axel Honneth, "Communication and Reconciliation," in *Telos* 39 (Spring 1979), p. 56.

22. However, can some existing practices implicitly anticipate Adorno's negative dialectics? Alan Wolfe proposes a strategy "to fulfill democratic dreams" — *hoarding*, which he borrows from James O'Connor. Neither Wolfe nor O'Connor intends to trace their theoretical roots directly to Adorno, but their strategy seems to have an affinity to Adorno's "strategy of hibernation." "Hoarding constitutes a first step in the direction of a non-alienated politics, a negative refusal to have alienated power exercised over oneself." "There are degrees of political hoarding. Simple apathy toward the organized political process is one." "Those who engage in cooperative enterprises — such as neighborhood grocery cooperatives, daycare centers, and other social activities — are in a sense hoarding a certain amount of their power from the state, even if their expressed motive is a non-political one. The same is true of those who withdraw into rural areas to produce their own means of subsistence as much as they can. Even though such activities of the 'counter-culture' by themselves do not pose any direct threat against the existing order, they are a form of hoarding insofar as they withdraw from the existing political system's definition of what constitutes the productive 'obligations' of citizenship. When workers go on strike, they hoard their labor power for themselves; an important strategy for political change would involve a 'citizens' strike,' in which people would refuse to participate in the organized rituals that go under the name of politics in late capitalist society." *The Limits of Legitimacy* (New York, 1977), pp. 343-344.

23. Jürgen Habermas, "Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism — The Contemporaneity of Walter Benjamin," in *New German Critique,* n. 17 (Spring 1979), pp. 43-44.

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while the individuals of the administered world are themselves so deeply integrated in the mass collectivity networks that their desultory reading patterns steadily affirm the established mass collectivity. In this sense, Habermas was too optimistic when he argued that "a noticeable development of arts with a collective mode of reception...such as architecture, theater and painting, as well as utilitarian popular literature and music with their dependence on the electronic media, points beyond mere culture industry and does not *a fortiori* refute Benjamin's hope for a universalized secular illumination."[24] Unfortunately, since 1972, when Habermas made this claim, such "a noticeable development of arts" has turned out not to point beyond culture industry, at least in the North American context, and the socio-cultural context of West Germany is not much different. Despite Habermas' prediction, Benjamin's hope cannot be realized unless it is preceded by Adorno's strategy.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

SPARKS, INSANITY, AND FIREWORKS*

by Heiner Höfener

> "Illusion [Wahn] is the deception of regarding the mere representation of a thing as equivalent to the thing itself.... Now the consciousness of possessing a means to some end or other (before one has availed oneself of this means) is the possession of the end in representation only; hence to content oneself with the former, just as though it could take the place of the latter, is a *practical illusion*...."[1]

The certified "psychograph" of Marx, Arnold Künzli,[2] believed to have found in Adorno's philosophy a fruitful object for his own trade and adroitly posed the pseudo-Socratic rhetorical question, whether Adorno does not simply provide "the self-justification of paranoia on a high philosophical level."[3] The analysis — insofar as it can be called an analysis — latches on to one particular quotation from Adorno that apparently proves Künzli's point: "Dialectics cannot stop...at the concepts of healthy and sick. Once it has recognized the prevailing universal...as sick — in the literal sense, as characterized by paranoia or pathological projection — it proceeds to take as indications of recovery only that which it itself treats as sick, misguided, paranoid, or even 'insane'; thus today, as in the Middle Ages, only fools tell their masters the truth."[4]

For Künzli, this quotation is conclusive evidence of the "self-justification of

*Translated by David J. Parent.

1. Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (Chicago and London, 1934), p. 156.

2. Arnold Künzli, *Karl Marx: Eine Psychographie* (Vienna, Frankfurt, Zurich, 1966).

3. Arnold Künzli, "Linker Irrationalismus. Zur Kritischen Theorie der 'Frankfurter Schule,'" in *Aufklärung und Dialektik. Politische Philosophie von Hobbes bis Adorno* (Freiburg, 1971), p. 147.

4. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, quoted in Künzli, *ibid.*, p. 147.

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paranoia on a high philosophical level." Nevertheless, Künzli himself casts doubt on the precision of his analysis: "The unreflected, dogmatic assumption that the spell is absolute occasionally gives the impression that the author is a paranoic or compulsive-neurotic. Perhaps there is more to the story, however...."[5]

The inadequacy of Künzli's interpretation becomes clear when he completely ignores the epistemological function of what Adorno attributes to insanity; and without even minimal sensitivity, he inadvertantly becomes malicious and reproaches Adorno for not having been one of the victims of Auschwitz, which — as Mr. Künzli says — must have stirred a "personal feeling of guilt"[6] leading to paranoia. Thus, from Basel, Switzerland, Künzli reaches for the rubric "Leftist Irrationalism." In fact, for Künzli everything must seem "irrational" that does not coincide with the modern Western concept of teleological and instrumental reason that hospitalizes all contradictory experiences.

Künzli not only decries the "irrationalism" of the Frankfurt School, but also qualifies it as "leftist irrationalism," thereby politicizing the perspective of his critique. This corresponds to the prevalent practice of calling one's political opponents insane in order to be rid of them without having to respond to their arguments. Thus we have an opportunity, if not to clarify fully the problematic of reason and insanity in Adorno's politics, at least to reflect on Künzli's lack of understanding of it.

Adorno's philosophy has been criticized from the right — if one indulges in the sweeping political distinction of "right" and "left" — for its potential political consequences or its past influence on the student movement, while the left has deplored precisely its ineffectiveness. Even the critical critics of "Critical Theory" can understand that someone either finds the existing system good and wants to defend it, or discovers defects and favors evolutionary processes, or rejects the existing order radically and wants to revolutionize it. Depending on the position one accepts, other conflicting positions are dismissed as ideology to be fought. Adorno's critics fail to see that there is also a perspective of melancholy that discerns elements of untruth in all three of these positions. Unlike in Mannheim,[7] it does not lead to a historicist post-Hegelian pan-ideologism reminiscent of Bacon's theory of idols as it was developed in Part I of the *Novum Organum Scientiarum* of 1620. Yet, it resembles Mannheim's hypostasis of the "universal delusionary context," and consequently accepts the plausibility of an emphatic concept of truth. This melancholy neither strives for effectiveness nor is it merely "art for art's sake." Against the background of Freud's distinction between "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917)[8] which corresponds to the modern Western conception of truth, although its categorization of melancholy is pathological, it tends to be subverted when Freud expresses his astonishment by asking "why a man must become ill before he can discover truth of this kind"[9] — Adorno's formulation of the prerequisite for the possibility of a *conditio humana* becomes legible and the escape from melancholy can be noted: "Only if what is can be changed, is what is, not everything."[10] In other words "the metaphysical interests of men" need "the undiminished perception of their material interests."[11] The conditional sentence proves and tries to prove nothing; nor can it ever prove that what

5. Künzli, "Linker Irrationalismus," *op.cit.*, p. 146.
6. *Ibid.* Cf. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, p. 353ff.
7. Cf. Karl Mannheim, *Ideologie und Utopie* (3rd ed.) (Frankfurt, 1969), p. 238.
8. Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," in *Collected Papers* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), vol. IV, pp. 152-170.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
10. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, p. 389.
11. *Ibid.*

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is, is not everything. This "melancholy" has become suspicious to the advocates of modern Western reason, and — since the end of the Middle Ages — they have associated it with the concept of insanity (*dementia*) and punished it, seeking to define themselves as rational and joyous.[12] Western reason considers rational whatever is efficient and ultimately useful, while it considers sick all thinking that tries to escape as resisting economic reason. Although reason may still count as an ethical category, all thinking that attempts to be free from the "servitude of being useful" is declared to be diseased.[13]

Melancholy has been criminalized since the late Middle Ages and counted among the mental diseases; in fact, melancholy was forbidden at court where only the King had the right to it.[14] He alone was permitted to escape from the economization of reason that had been spreading since the early Renaissance. Like the economy, reason also produces luxury (of moods), which it forbids, and which Werner Sombart once called the "legitimate child of an illegitimate love."[15]

When this process reached its temporary peak in the 17th century — economically as well as philosophically — a qualitatively different reason was conceded to the melancholy ruler that the economic society had to consider madness. Similarly, since the early Renaissance and the conversion of the theology of grace into a theology of work, idleness became a sin: indolence of soul (*acedia*) which was considered the fundamental sin by High Scholasticism finds a secular counterpart in the economic category of "idleness" which, as the familiar proverb claims, is the root of all evil and without which today *acedia* itself would lose plausibility.[16]

Adorno contrasts "healthy common sense," which as he once said "has taken ill because of its health," with insanity as perhaps the last area permitting an adequate experience of reality and which might provide a stimulus to resist what is generally

12. Thus Adorno's "Minima Moralia" can also be understood as a "sad science." *Minima Moralia,* trans. E. Jephcott (London: New Left Books, 1974), p. 15.

13. "The common category under which all inmates of houses of incarceration are classified is the inability to cooperate in production, in the circulation or in the accumulation of riches (whether through their own fault or by accident)." Michael Foucault, *Psychologie und Geisteskrankheit* (Frankfurt, 1970) (3rd edition), p. 115. Foucault emphasizes that mental illnesses are being criminalized by society. Criminality was still rational for a Mandeville; in the *Fable of the Bees* (1714) he says that the locksmiths of London would be unemployed if there were no thieves, and he thereby explains his verse "The Worst of all the Multitude Did something for the common Good." Cf. Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees, ed. Harth* [*Harmonsworth,* 1970), p. 118ff. The mental patient, however, cannot be made economically meaningful through any "strategem of reason."

14. Cf. Norbert Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft. Eine Untersuchung zur Soziologie des Königtums und des Adels* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1969); Wolf Lepenis, *Melancholie und Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt, 1969).

15. Sombart, *Liebe, Luxus und Kapitalismus* (Munich, 1967), p. 223.

16. Max Weber's argument in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* can be applied to the Italian Renaissance, especially its Florentine type. There the work-theological aspect, which produced the theologically secured *parvenu*-class, acquired a socially dominant form. While Calvinist economic ethics can be contrasted with the economic rules of Leon Battista Alberti — and Weber actually did this in opposition to Werner Sombart's *Der Bourgeois* (Munich and Leipzig, 1913) — the work-theological justification of the *parvenu*-class, as it is manifested for instance in Cardinal Cajetan in opposition to St. Thomas, seems to formulate theologically a socially dominant form and thus to anticipate on decisive points the protestant economic ethics analyzed by Weber. The habitual enthusiasm for the Greeks, expecially of the Florentine humanists, who thereby demonstrate their own *parvenu* status, may easily disguise this fact, especially since they never openly attack Thomas Aquinas. In fact, Friedrich Engel-Janosi seems to have fallen into this error for entire passages in his otherwise noteworthy study *Soziale Probleme der Renaissance* (Stuttgart, 1924), which treats precisely this work-theological aspect.

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considered to be reality. One could argue that Adorno is operating with a romantic *topos*, if this area were not closed to him as a form of existence by his own critique of metaphysics (although the critique of metaphysics itself should be understood as an ultimate metaphysics).[17]

The concept of reason would have to be reconstructed as an ethical category in opposition to that of "instrumental reason" (Horkheimer). Such an effort would seem deeply irrational and insane to instrumental reason just as instrumental reason seems insane to ethical reason. The problem becomes clear: first, Adorno allows us to interchange the terms valuatively: insane instrumental reason must be countered by reasonable insanity. Secondly, however, this reversal process becomes impermissible since salvation is not metaphysically deducible; the only hope lies in the possibility that if thinking itself penetrates, insanely and energetically, through the reality that is recognized as insane, it will reach another reality which can now only be described as not identical with the existing one.

Foucault draws an analogy between *hybris* and insanity: as the Greeks stood in relation to what they called *hybris*, so Western man "has a relation to something he vaguely calls insanity, dementia, irrationality. Perhaps Western reason owes some of its complexity precisely to this vague notion, just as the *sophrosyne* [soundness of mind, prudence, moderation] of the Socratic orators owed something to the threatening *hybris*."[18] Insanity has not always been judged negatively. The insane person was not just a marked man but simultaneously a distinguished one; he was not only accepted by society but could even acquire central importance for the self-understanding of a community. Forms of existence were opened to him as hero or king, herald or priest, seer of poet, in which he was recognized and revered as *theios aner*, the divine man.[19]

For Adorno and Horkheimer, insanity has a certain dignity, as is proper only to truth. In their philosophy the difference between truth and insanity is minimized. They become identical in terms of the principle according to which extremes coincide. Like truth, insanity must be respected: "Insanity is serious; whoever does not live insanely is a bag of wind."[20] Similarly the modern Western mind, which considers instrumental reason to be rational, attacks both extremes: "Rationalization means both: the end of insanity and of spirit."[21] Yet, only in insanity does that which escapes rationalized rationality become evident. Adorno expresses this with the metaphor of light: "But just as in a short-circuit sparks are scattered, in reality one delusion communicates like lightening with another."[22] Truth and insanity are then brought close together, almost to the point of indifference that marks the condition for the possibility of truth.

"Truth is inseparable from the illusory belief that from the figures of the unreal one day, in spite of all, real deliverance will come."[23] What may at first seem like a visionary utopia is not one, as Adorno made clear in the final aphorism of *Minima*

17. Cf. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, p. 335.
18. Michel Foucault, *Wahnsinn und Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt, 1969), p. 9. Cf. also Egidius Schmalz-Riedt, *Platon, Der Schriftsteller und die Wahrheit* (Munich, 1969), pp. 62-64.
19. Cf. the outstanding collection of materials on this topic: Ludwig Bieler, *Theios aner. Das Bild des "göttlichen Menschen in Spätantike und Frühchristentum* (2 vols.) (Vienna, 1935-36); reprinted in one volume (Darmstadt, 1967).
20. Horkheimer, *Notizen, 1950 bis 1969* (Frankfurt, 1974), p. 191.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 164 (section 103).
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122 (section 78).

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Moralia. Still, the very possibility of thinking the impossible — a postulate of all energetic thinking — must seem suspect to instrumental reason. ("Only what they do not need first to understand, they consider understandable.")[24] While this may sound like a visionary epiphany that recognizes its own impossibility and yet invokes its possibility in the emphatic concept of truth, it is evident that even concepts like "madness" and "appearance" are covered by that of *doxa* [expectation, opinion]. But *doxa* and *episteme* [knowledge] are hardly contradictory. The last quotation may be interpreted with the help of Greek.

That Adorno formulated a new myth, must seem like sheer madness to "enlightened' Enlighteners, but to the philosophy of the Frankfurt School (except Benjamin) myth — despite the critical insights of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* — is a meaning-constitutive component of truth: "The overcoming of the mythical is paid for by a fall back into chaos. In other words, truth itself turns out to be progressing as a mythical product."[25] The core of truth in religion, which according to Horkheimer consisted in "longing for the other [world], by which this world showed itself to be bad,"[26] lived on in social philosophy, which is concerned with the "just, the right order,"[27] but which seems almost impossible to this thinking. Human existence is too entangled in the prevailing disorder for the "other" which escapes its concept[28] to become real to it. Thus, what the earthquake of Lisbon was to the Enlightenment, fascism was for "Critical Theory," which consequently gave up its belief in progress. That the "other" does not coincide with empirical reality lets the thought of it appear as insanity, but, with Kant, a "practical insanity." Madness then becomes a corrective: "Folly is truth in the form with which men are struck as soon as in the midst of falsehood they do not desist from truth."[29] So thinks Adorno, who is relatively optimistic compared with Horkheimer who writes: "Schizophrenia, the logical continuation of the rejection of every claim to love or respect, the last annihilation of mythology, becomes ultimately the more human attitude than the readiness for fallacious adherence to the idea that replaces the capacity for solidarity. In periods of decline like the present one, insanity has the higher truth."[30] Similarly, he argues that "Truth has come to an end, and the proof for this is that it still claims to exist"[31] — a sentence that claims to be true.

If truth — in the emphatic sense — has come to an end, still knowledge remains, "and knowledge is, ultimately, tied to a purpose."[32] The connection of "knowledge and interest," which produced an entire sociological theory,[33] previously treated by Karl Jaspers,[34] hides the view of what as truth is not directly socially realizable. Adorno is of the opinion "that the doctrine of objective social laws can itself become an insane system."[35] Positively or negatively, as resistance or affirmation, as "folly" or "neurosis": to those who have "made themselves totally like the world," neurosis is, "as

24. *Ibid.*, p. 128 (section 64).
25. Horkheimer, *Notizen, op.cit.*, p. 148.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
29. Adorno, "Bemerkungen über Politik und Neurose," in *Kritik. Kleine Schriften zur Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt, 1971), p. 91.
30. Horkheimer, *Notizen*, p. 127.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
33. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); Hartmut Neuendorff, *Der Begriff des Interesses* (Frankfurt, 1973).
34. Karl Jaspers, *Von der Wahrheit* (Munich, 1947), p. 645.
35. Adorno, "Bemerkungen," p. 91.

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it were, predecided."[36]

As Schiller would have it, the only universal seems to be the "prevalent delusion,"[37] although Schiller, with his faith in history, believed that history "restores the true standard for happiness and merit."[38] Catastrophe-mongers ascribe to insanity that mode of reality which they deny to an allegedly bad, inauthentic reality. Thus madness becomes a technique of romantic ecstasy, and Werfel could describe insanity as "the flight from reality, this demon of gloomy, turgid temperaments, this narcissism of depth, for which the abyss is a lascivious titillation, this god of complications and obscurity, this ideal of dead sensuality, forbidden charms, hypocritical gestures, morbid rapes."[39] That is one side of it.

Adorno and Horkheimer underwent a development that — paradoxical as it may first sound — ends in classical philosophy. The field of tension between the concepts "truth" and "insanity" that they seek to minimize is the expression of their experience that *gnosis* [real knowledge] is impossible and of their attempt not to go crazy without *gnosis*. Knowledge is possible only as critical knowledge, truth as critical truth. Platonic knowledge does then win out in the late Horkheimer: "love of knowledge" cannot become "real knowledge,"[40] as Hegel still considered possible, but "the loving thought belongs to critical truth, the longing for what is different, indeed they are identical."[41] The other can exist only as a longing, and cannot be evoked by utopia. Thus for Critical Theory the revolutionary gnosis which Ernst Bloch praised as the "specification of the 'Spirit of Utopia'"[42] remained suspect. This was true even for Marcuse who declared that "The critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap between the present and its future; holding no promise and showing no success, it remains negative."[43] And so those "who remain faithful to theory...are relics like those faithful to the Talmud and to the Messianic confidence."[44] Foucault hits the mark when he says: "Religious insanity is brought about by the laicization of culture: religion can be the object of a delusory belief, since culture no longer allows a group to assimilate religious or mythical contents of belief into the actual contents of experience. Messianic delusions are part of this conflict and the claim to overcome it....they restore in the delusory world the unity that is broken in the real world."[45] This is recognized by Hegel as "a unity, which insanity generally is."[46]

36. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

37. Friedrich Schiller, "Antrittsvorlesung von 1789," in *Historische Schriften*, vol. III (section 85), p. 23.

38. *Ibid.*

39. F. Werfel, *Verdi* (Vienna, 1923), p. 39, and also 545.

40. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 3.

41. Horkheimer, *Notizen*, p. 184.

42. Ernst Bloch, *Geist der Utopie*, Zweite Fassung. Nach Bemerkung von 1963 (Frankfurt, 1964), p. 347.

43. Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964), p. 257.

44. Horkheimer, *Notizen*, p. 190.

45. M. Foucault, "Psychologie und Geisteskrankheit," *op.cit.*, p. 124.

46. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 225. The quote in context: "The derangement cannot be taken to mean that in general something devoid of essence is regarded as essential, something unreal as real, so that what for one person is essential or real would not be so for another, and that the consciousness of reality and unreality, or of essentiality and unessentiality, would thus fall apart. If something is in fact real and essential for consciousness in general, but is not so for me, then in the consciousness of its nothingness I have at the same time — since I am consciousness in general — the consciousness of its reality; and since they are both fixed [in my consciousness], this is a unity which is madness in general."
This was recently taken up by psychology as a theorem as "reconciliation and delimitation" in

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The broken unity of the real world, marked by the interrupted dialogue of insanity and *logos*,[47] divided into the monologic delusion and monologic reason that are both meaning-constitutive, becomes the object of monistic experience in the reduction of the monologue as fragment and thus provokes processes of allegorizing. This constellation inspires Benjamin's aesthetic theory as well as what Adorno perceived as a monad in the work of art, especially in modern art, and what Frei, following Jonas Cohn, called the "insularity"[48] of the work of art. To deal with what evades dialogue, the "revolution against reason," Derrida called it "agitation," — a concept from "the language of the ministry of the interior."[49]

Adorno's attempt to define the relation of insanity and truth is associated with metaphors of light;[50] a temporal index is inherent in these images of "spark" and "lightning-like," which does not simply define duration as a deficient mode of truth, but grasps truth itself as historical, in the overcome delusion of duration"[51] and thus refers precisely to the fleeting, the briefly touching, in short the ephemeral character of truth. That truth is presented only momentarily is similarly at the basis of the shock theory of Baudelaire[52] and in the surrealism of Breton.

Like Benjamin, Adorno too had a great affinity with surrealism. This is evident in the theory of the shock which is not accessible to logical experience. "Logical experience. . . twists about in a cage," Breton wrote,[53] and for Carl Einstein logic is a "tremendous exception."[54] Logic is also suspect for Adorno, however much he tries to retain a concept of it. Shock, however, which — in one of Breton's formulations — seeks to destroy "the ineradicable mania to trace the unknown back to the known, to the classifiable," a mania that "lulls the brain to sleep,"[55] which holds firmly to an irreducible concept of experience, is an artistic construction of the modern era, which

recourse to Hegel by H. Stierlin, *Das Tun des einen und das Tun des Andern* (Frankfurt, 1973).

47. Marx's dictum from the *German Ideology*, the phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises" (Marx and Engels, *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. Feuer [Garden City and New York, 1959], p. 247), is not so much of Feuerbachian origin as, rather, a paraphrase of the Epicurus-adage which Marx, while preparing his dissertation, excerpted from Gassendi's *Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii, qui est de vita, moribus, placitisque Epicuri* (Lugduni, 1649), vol. I, p. 27: "Even the fantasies of the insane and dream-ideas are true; for they are a driving force; but the non-existing is not a driving force" (in Marx's translation, MEW: Supplementary Volume, Part I, Berlin, 1968, p. 19).

48. Dagobert Frey, *Bausteine zu einer Philosophie der Kunst*, ed. Gerhard Frey (Darmstadt, 1976), pp. 20 and 62ff.

49. Jacques Derrida, *Die Schrift und die Differen* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 61. The speech published in this volume, "Cogito und Geschichte des Wahnsinns" (pp. 55-101) must be the most subtle critique to date of Foucault's *Wahnsinn und Gesellschaft*; it elaborates on the inevitable aporias of Foucault's point of departure in his "archeology of silence."

50. One of many examples: Adorno to Krenek on Sept. 30, 1932, in *Briefwechsel*, p. 38: "Composing is a kind of deciphering (or also of remembering): the 'text' is looked at until it brightens and the sudden light of brightening, the spark in which meaning lies is the productive moment." On light-metaphors in general, cf. Hans Blumenberg, "Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit. Im Vorfeld der philosophischen Begriffsbildung," in *Studium Generale*, vol. 10, 1957, n. 7, pp. 432-447.

51. Adorno, *Asthetische Theorie*, p. 50.

52. Charles Baudelaire, *Raketen* (1855-1863) LI, in *Ausgewählte Werke*, ed. Franz Blei (Munich, undated), p. 331.

53. André Breton, "Erstes Manifest des Surrealismus (1924)" in *Die Manifeste des Surrealismus*, trans. Ruth Henry (Reinbeck, 1968), p. 15. Elsewhere Breton speaks of the "grating-bars of logic." Breton, *Nadja* (Frankfurt, 1974), p. 109.

54. Carl Einstein, *Bebuquin oder Die Dilletanten des Wunders* (Frankfurt, 1963), p. 40.

55. A. Breton, "erstes Manifest," p. 14ff.

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particularly questions the concept of duration. Duration and truth have become polarized for Adorno. The work of art, truth's last asylum, testifies to this: "If art ever shook off the illusion of duration by seeing through it, if it recognized its own transitoriness out of sympathy with ephemeral living things, then that would correspond to a conception of truth that is not abstractly constant, but which has become aware of its temporal core."[56] Adorno's anticipatory formulations here represent a postulate both of the reality and the possibility of art as *methexis* [participation] of truth, since art can be constituted and received only as authentic. Art draws its meaning and justification from truth; it is the only realm that constitutes and depicts truth, since truth acquires actuality only in its depiction. So it is not surprising that philosophy must have a deep affinity with art,[57] as, conversely, for Friedrich Hebel, "Art [is] in reality, philosophy."

Duration is for Adorno a non-historical category. In archaic, mythical eras, it was present immediately without appearance. Later, this immediacy is overcome, and duration as a category is invoked: "The enduring passed away and tore duration in its wake.... The concept of duration smacks of the helpless mythical archaism of ancient Egypt; the idea of duration seems to have been remote from the minds of productive periods."[58]

Referring to Hegel, Adorno seeks to avoid the problematic of historicism by regarding history as immanent in the works and conceiving of truth as itself historical, as the deficient form of itself: the truth-content in the work which objectifies correct consciousness. However Adorno does not adopt Hegel's *kairos*-theorem of being-timely[59] which would "accept as correct the course of the world which is not the development of truth."[60] That both Enlightenment philosophy of history as well as historicism, which Hegelian historical speculation produced as a countermovement, concurred in their treatment of the category of duration as merely apparent and ideological, evokes in Adorno an almost Baroque sadness about the transitoriness of duration, accompanied by romanticism — which, fixated on the permanence of ruins, ascribes to art what philosophy can no longer accomplish. "In the concept of aesthetic duration, as elsewhere, an original philosophy survives which has fled into isolated and absolutized derivatives after it had to abdicate as totality." Duration, however, is both a temporal and an economic category: "The duration which works of arts desire is evidently also modeled on firmly transmitted possession; spiritual as well as material goods should become property: the mind's sacrilege against itself which it cannot escape."[61] Following Ernst Schoen, Adorno sees fireworks as a model for art:

56. Adorno, *Aesthetische Theorie*, p. 50.
57. Cf. Adorno, *Phil. Term.*, vol. I, p. 87f.
58. Adorno, *Asthetische Theorie*, p. 48.
59. Hegel's "being-time-for" must be understood in the sense of the *kairos*-theorem, typical of all parousistic speculations and universal among modern theories of revolution, where it has the *topos* of the "favorable point in time" as its content, found in the earliest Stoic-Christian traditions; Homer had no knowledge of the *kairos*-concept. It first appeared in Hesiod's much-quoted verse: "Keep moderation; right choice (*kairos*) is in all things the best" (*Erga* 694); *kairos* is thus used completely in the Greek sense of moderation and order, for it is preceded by the passage: "One should not load all one's property on ships, but only less than half, otherwise the risk of a shipwreck becomes too great" (689-93). Herman Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (Munich, 1962), p. 510, says of this: "That has nothing to do with the 'favorable point of time.'" "The meaning 'favorable point of time' is more recent, which is often not known" (*ibid.*, p. 509). "*Kairos,* i.e., the norm of the accurate choice and wise restraint, a sense of taste appropriate to the respective circumstances, tact, etc." (*ibid.*).
60. Adorno, *Asthetische Theorie*, p. 283.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

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"Prototypical for the work of art is the phenomenon of fireworks, which because of its fleetingness and as empty entertainment was considered hardly worthy of a theoretical glance; only Valéry followed lines of thinking which at least came close to it. It is apparition *par excellence*: empirically appearing, freed from the burden of the empirical character of duration, a sign in the heavens and simultaneously a manufactured product, *menetekel*, a flashing and fleeting handwriting, which does not let its meaning be read afterwards. The isolation of the aesthetic realm in the total purposelessness of the ephemeral does not remain its formal destiny. Works of art are not separated from fallible being by a higher perfection but, like the fireworks, by the fact that flashing up they are actualized into an expressive appearance. They are not only 'other' than empirical reality: everything in them becomes 'other.'"[62]

The fireworks, "prototype of the work of art," can also be described as the prototype of truth, in which "one delusion communicates like lightning with another"[63] form that constellation which is decipherable as other than instrumental reason, i.e., as truth. The contours between insanity and truth disappear; insanity and truth become interchangeable. For Adorno, reason, or what is considered to be reason, has itself become irrational, and therefore that which this reason labels as insanity can become the representative of truth. Reason and insanity are not to be treated as extremes, or better, they can be construed as extremes precisely because they converge. Friedländer, whom Benjamin esteemed and Adorno certainly knew, wrote: "Extremes meet because their meeting point is the origin from which they become extreme."[64]

Duration is describable as a deficient mode of truth and truth as a deficient mode of itself, quite in accord with — one is tempted to say, with the "mechanism" of — negative dialectics, according to which even "freedom...can be grasped only in definite negation according to the definite form of unfreedom. Positively, it becomes an as if."[65] If truth can appear only as the falsehood of something enduring, then for its own sake it must give up duration — and that constitutes its historicity. The truth of the falsehood of the existing order indicates the vacuum of the "other," which however, like truth, surviving within it, is subject to the proscription of images. Yet, this proscription, which Adorno upholds, is doubly problematic: Adorno attempts to undermine the proscription through the subjunctive, which did not exist in the Hebrew language,[66] while language and linguistic symbols themselves have a pictorial character as has been known at least since Democritus: "The words (names of the gods) are voiced images (of the gods)."[67]

Adorno confronts instrumental reason with "practical insanity": that truth is possible. The allegory for both is fireworks, just as in the Baroque era fireworks were both a heraldic display of power and an allegorical representation.[68]

62. *Ibid.*, p. 164 (section 103).
63. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, p. 215.
64. Samuel Friedländer, *Sehöpferische Indifferenz* (Munich, 1918), p. 254.
65. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, p. 228.
66. Cf. Manes Kartagener, "Zur Struktur der hebräischen Sprache," in *Studium Generale*, vol. 15 (1962), section 1, pp. 31-39; here p. 39.
67. Diels, Fr. 142. Hierokles, Pythagoreus ad c. aur. 25: "The name Zeus is a linguistic symbol and image of the word-creative substance: because men who first gave things their names, in the superabundance of their knowledge, precisely as excellent sculptors, have expressed the essence of this [substance] through names and through statues."
68. Cf. Eberhard Fähler, *Feuerwerke des Barock — Studien zum Oeffentlichen Fest and Seiner literarischen Deutung vom 16. bix zum 18. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1974), pp. 104ff., 125ff., 128ff., 169ff.

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BLACK POLITICS IN THE 80s: A CONFERENCE REPORT

by Dwyane Woods

A conference on "Black Politics in the 80s was held June 11-12 at Antioch College in Yellow Springs, Ohio. Given the fact that American political life is typified by manipulation, administration and collective mass management, the topic could only be approached by focusing particular attention to the changing character of the Black elite: the disintegration of the traditional elite and the rise of a new one out of the civil rights movement. In order to make sense out of these new social phenomena, it was also necessary to frame the whole discussion in terms of recent developments in social theory dealing with contemporary socio-political dynamics, e.g., Gouldner's and Konrad-Szelenyi's new class theory, or Piccone's artificial negativity thesis.

The conference kicked off with Adolph Reed Jr.'s discussion of why the civil rights movement *exploded* successfully in 1955, whereas unsuccessful Black protest had been part of the American scene for at least a century. Contrary to standard liberal accounts, Reed argued that decolonization abroad and a new liberal attitude in American politics were only part of the reason why the civil rights movement was eventually successful. The more important side of the picture was the social reorganization taking place elsewhere at the same time. With the monopoly sector having successfully penetrated every part of U.S. social and economic life but the South, it was necessary to expand there as well. Thus, Reed's main focus was on the corporate agenda for rationalization of the Southern social order, and how this dovetailed with Blacks' long-standing efforts to dismantle Southern segregation. This resulted in a civil rights coalition of Blacks, left liberals and corporate interests that, contrary to leftist conventional wisdom, eventually laid the foundation for a new era of domination of Blacks. Thus, according to Reed, the civil rights movement, like others throughout the 20th century, was an elite phenomena. Harold Cruse, another participant, had already articulated this radical interpretation of Black protest as an elite interest in the mid-1960s. As Reed noted, however, Cruse's argument was simply ignored by the new Black elite, whose objective interests were increasingly coinciding with those of welfare capitalism.

The 1960s Black elite benefitted greatly from the civil rights movement and Martin Luther King Jr.'s international reputation, and was eventually legitimated by the government's willingness to allow them to administer the new welfare programs. This legitimated Black elite then presented its particular interests and social agenda as those of the entire Black community, and successfully checkmated alternative interpretations. With the Black community firmly under the elite's integrationist wing's control, the possiblity for open and critical debate on the subject was severely limited. Thus, according to Reed, the near future is not bright for American Blacks. Within the last two decades the Black community has become fragmented and depoliticized, even though the socio-economic problems raised by the initial civil rights struggles are still prevalent today.

The next presentation by Alex Willingham opened with some preliminary comments concerning the recent Miami riots. Willingham noted how Black leaders could only suggest increased voter registration as a solution to the problem. This exemplified how the elite could only respond to the Black plight within the

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framework of the two-party system, without even considering the possibilities for a third electoral force. He agreed with Reed's assessment that the new Black elite developed out of the civil rights movement with its own particular interests in mind, and that the collusion with the welfare state apparatus is clearly reflected in their relation with the two party system. Willingham pointed out that Blacks were not the only element in American politics successfully integrated and thus politically disarmed within the two-party system. The system's cooptation of other groups' social programs to fuel its own revitalization has been a traditional pattern — especially within the post-New Deal Democratic Party. In fact, Blacks found themselves at the tail end of a major social reorganization that successfully homogenized all ethnic groups in order to create a mass consumer market and a new pool of labor power reduced to the lowest possible denominator to fit into the newly Taylorized productive processes. The final stages of this massive project precipitated the integration of Blacks and the social homogenization of Southern particularism. But, according to Willingham, the New Deal model is presently breaking down and this is manifested in the crisis of traditional party politics and the emergence of a conservative power bloc. Since the affirmative action, protest wing of the elite — that element of the elite for whom race is a form of capital — was dependent on the New Deal welfare model for its very survival, this explains the atrophy of this group and its inability to see beyond existing disintegrating social relations. Willingham concluded by suggesting that the only way out of this impasse may be a third party able to organize and represent various subaltern groups in American society. These kinds of developments, however, are presumably highly unlikely.

Reed's and Willingham's presentations reconstructed the series of social changes that occurred in the American social scene after WW II and indicated how Blacks found themselves ushering in the last stage of this social reorganization. Harold Cruse, the third speaker, put the two previous presentations into a still broader historical context. Whereas Reed and Willingham emphasized the instrumentalization of the new Black elite, Cruse argued that this was not a new phenomenon for the Black intelligentsia but, if anything, characteristic of it. For various reasons, the Black intelligentsia has been manipulated at different periods in U.S. history and has never been able to develop a social program outside the framework of American capitalism. For Cruse, there has been a fundamental dichotomy throughout Black history between nationalism and integrationism. Even though the nationalists attempted to constitute an autonomous Black community, they never seemed to have really understood the historical importance of, e.g., a Booker T. Washington. Long considered an Uncle Tom by most nationalists, his idea of self-help in the community was never seriously explored. Moreover, the integrationists were always willing to be relegated to the role of social managers within the Black community. Thus, the contemporary crisis in the Black leadership had occurred in part because of an ignorance of past Black history among Black leaders, who did not understand that many of the problems facing the Black community today went as far back as the Fredrick Douglas-Martin E. Delaney debates.

Like Reed, Cruse argued that government intervention in the Black community has been spearheaded by the new Black elite. The result has been an administered community within an infrastructure that has increasingly deteriorated over the last four decades. Given these facts, if the New Deal social model is in crisis then the Black population is at another historical juncture since its elite's inability to formulate new ideas leaves them in a limbo and vulnerable to further fragmentation. Cruse, in agreement with Reed and Willingham, concluded that Blacks are an inextricable part

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of the American social system, even though most of them do not share the system's fruits. They have been homogenized and integrated as a permanent marginal sector. According to all the speakers, this leaves the Black population in a state of social paralysis, with a leadership that cannot envision anything beyond the present social horizon. In fact, even when the Black community has been politicized, it has actually been instrumentalized as the last shock troups in a process of broad social reorganization.

Paul Piccone kicked off the subsequent round table discussion by summarizing his artificial negativity thesis and indicating how the changing character of the Black elite can be understood within this framework. The New Deal model ran into problems after serving its function of creating the conditions necessary to relaunch monopoly capitalism. In fact, he argued that this had been accomplished too successfully, by homogenizing all particularity and otherness in American society. This successful annihilation of all opposition, however, has generated a new set of previously unknown crisis tendencies. These same measures that saved capitalism in the 1930s now tends to get in the way of further rationalization, and necessitates some form of social reorganization. Since the crisis of monopoly capitalism takes the forms broadly described by Habermas (motivation, rationality and economic — but not legitimation crises) the task for the state becomes one of minimally reconstituting communities and individuality so as to provide control mechanisms for the administrative apparatus, and dismantling most of the costly and counter productive middle-range bureaucracy which is presently managing the welfare system. Thus, the new Black elite described by Reed becomes one of the main targets of the forthcoming social reconstruction and cast the administered Black community in opposition to forthcoming social changes — hence, in an objectively conservative position where chances for success are, at best, slim. Similarly, this project of social reconstruction provides very little room for what Gouldner called the "new class," whose existence today is tied to the welfare state model. Since the major conflicts in organized capitalism are those between the competitive wing, which is committed both to the bureaucratic apparatus to administer the production and distribution system as well as traditional imperialism to guarantee its international survival, and the monopoly multinational wing presently is pushing for decentralization and a dismantling of most of the New Deal bureaucracy which merely gets in the way of further rationalization, the new Black elite finds itself on the losing side of this confrontation.

Reed further elaborated these points in terms of the possible role that the new Black elite, as part of the new class, could have in the Black community. A professional and technocratic stratum, whose power is not based on the successful management of Black ghettoes, appears to be constituting an internal opposition to the dominant affirmative action wing of the Black elite. According to Reed, this group found its clearest ideological expression in the works of William Julius Wilson, Thomas Sowell and others of the Black "neo conservatives." Even though this group differed from the affirmative action wing in the sense that they perceive their elite position as derived not through the direct capitalization of race but of skills, they are at the moment still aligned to the affirmative action wing brokerage politics, which operates within the welfare state model. Reed emphasized that two possible areas are likely to undergo interacting developments. First of all, since a stratum of the Black new class did not derive their elite position from the capitalization of race, their interests are likely to become increasingly polarized against the affirmative action wing's social agenda that is more directly tied to the management of race relations within the welfare state. Secondly, the Black community itself, where the overall situation has not

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appreciably improved under this new elite's direction, might once again explode as it did in the mid-60s when the mediational role of the old elite was undercut and the new elite had not yet established itself.

Reed's account did not explain why the technocratic and professional wing of the Black elite does not completely abandon affirmative action for the monopoly sector and its new model of social organization. In this regard, Willingham pointed out that this technocratic and professional Black elite (part of the new class) was slowly breaking away from the Black community and that it increasingly tended to live outside of Black communities. Furthermore, with the coming right-wing inspired dismantling of the bureaucracy, the Black community will be faced with the problem of developing a new organic infrastructure independent of government administrative intervention. But if the current political elite is delegitimated, who will undertake such a project?

Cruse pointed out that, if this reconstitution was to occur, then it was up to the present generation of college students to develop a new social agenda for the Black community. All discussants agreed that the reconstitution of Black communities was essential and that Gouldner's new class members within the Black elite did not seem to be the likely agency for the task since their interests remained tied either with the old bankrupt New Deal model, or with broader narcissistic social forces fostering depolitization and privatism. The prospects of this reconstitution of communities depend on a variety of factors, according to Piccone, but the most important of all was whether there would be enough open space within the administered society to carry out this task. In this regard, the general conclusion was that, given the weakness of critical opposition and the grip that the integrationist wing has on the Black community, the most that could be hoped for is that a new social order could develop a democratically grounded popular agenda within the new social spaces that the de-bureaucratization project of the surging Republican right-wing may unwittingly open up.

MARVIN FARBER (1901-1980)

by Robert D'Amico
Sang-ki Kim
Paul Piccone

November 24, 1980, Marvin Farber passed away at the age of 79 after along and distinguished career at The State University of New York at Buffalo where he founded and directed *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* — a high-powered internationl journal that put Buffalo on the philosophical map. His loss, however, will hardly be felt by official American philosophy because corpses have no feelings, and American philosophy has now been intellectually dead for decades. Within that professional context, in fact, Farber had for years been an illustrious outsider: a kind of oddball who steadfastly refused to flow with the tide and insisted on dealing with fundamental issues long after that had become unfashionable and the sophistry of

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linguistic analysis had come to dominate the scene. But, in this sense, Farber was probably one of the last genuine American philosophers: part of a rich and complex --even if now forgotten -- tradition within which he was intellectually formed at Harvard immediately after WWI.

In the late 19th century that tradition had experienced an enormous development with the twin movements of pragmatism and semiotics. Afterwards, it remained in contact with neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian trends in Europe while engaged in developing philosophy as an integrative and foundational discipline. Largely repressed and diminished by the massive importation of British analytic and ordinary language philosophy after WW II, that tradition deteriorated as a result of a misguided definition of the ultimate philosophical conflict as one contraposing science and religion (the American variant of the Diamat hypostatization of the materialism vs. idealism, or rationalism vs. irrationalism syndrome). Forced into such a sterile struggle by the need to fully de-provincialize American philosophy and leave behind traditional religious residues, naturalism and pragmatism emerged triumphant, but with profound intellectual compromises. Contemporary technocratic tendencies exemplified by those sad parodies of scientists called symbolic logicians who, as Farber derisively used to describe them in private, waste their time chasing chicken-tracks across blackboards, were unwittingly encouraged by American pragmatism's and naturalism's over-emphasis on the autonomy of science and on a rigorous discourse free of all speculative underpinnings. Within such a pseudo-scientific atmosphere reinforced by a general social climate where the administration of people is carried out through the sanctification of things, this total secularization of philosophical discourse advocated by most naturalists and pragmatists fitted all too well with the managerial outlook of both the progressives and the New Deal bureaucrats. Thus, it readily fell victim to that broader "dialectic of enlightenment" resulting in self-destruction and nihilism, where religious de-mystification gives way to scientistic re-mystification.

Such a massive process of collective philosophical cretinization was significantly accelerated by the unfortunate fact that members of the Vienna Circle dominated the philosophical emigration from Germany to American universities, thus paving the way for the introduction of the latest version of traditional British empiricism. An even more influential factor, however, was the extensive student exchanges with Cambridge and Oxford, and attractive visiting professorships and lectureships offered by American universities to British faculty members. The result was that a moribund and dispirited movement, producing a highly artificial and restricted approach to philosophy, gained hegemony throughout the American university system. The so-called "getting the fly out of the fly-bottle" degenerated in America to a bizarre imitation of British intellectual insularity and a mocking affirmation of philosophy's irrelevance.

Students who came to philosophy for intellectual meat during the 1960s and 1970s did so *in spite* of the dominance of the analytic approach to teaching and scholarship. From older members of departments still tolerated until they retired, or even from other departments such as classics or history, students managed to learn about both the classical traditions and the history of American philosophy by circulating and discussing old texts as if they were the native equivalent of *Samizdat* publications. In this context, Marvin Farber was an intellectual oasis in a desert of vacuous sophistry and mediocrity. He had the rare ability to bring together the American tradition with an intimate yet critical knowledge of contemporary European thought — particularly phenomenology. His *Foundations of Phenomenology* is still one of the best treatments

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of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, building bridges to Peirce's semiotics and exploring a line of criticism that he pursued in *Naturalism and Subjectivism*. To read him and to listen to him was to rediscover an excitement about philosophical thought and a sense of its value.

Farber was born to a Jewish family of Austrian origins. His father was a socialist who used to take his young sons to political meetings in Buffalo. These early experiences left Marvin Farber with very deep impressions which he often shared with his students a couple of generations removed. Farber's life-long sympathy for socialism, in fact, is rooted in those childhood experiences. In the early 1920s Farber was once again surrounded by socialists at Freiburg and Heidelberg Universities, and through them, he met Zinoviev — in Berlin at the time to evaluate first-hand the German situation and the possibilities for direct Russian military intervention. Farber often lamented that Lenin decided not to send troops: had the USSR intervened, it may have prevented World War II. And Farber was personally affected by those subsequent disastrous events. None of his socialist classmates survived the Nazi terror and the war. This explains why Farber's attitude toward Germany was a mixture of deep admiration and contempt. He liked Germany because of his culture and philosophical traditions: the land of Marx, Wagner, and Husserl. But he hated it because of its Nazi record. He was never subtle about his anger and contempt toward Heidegger whom he considered a muddle-headed obscurantist: a fascist sycophant and a coward without any redeeming quality. He had a hard time understanding his Jewish colleagues and friends such as Hannah Arendt who were strong admirers of Heidegger. Farber was always vehemently critical of any kind of obfuscation and other-worldly escape. He was also critical of intellectual asceticism that pursues clarity at the cost of content. When asked about Wittgenstein and other leading analytic philosophers, he disparagingly dismissed them as *"kindische Philosophen."* Although he was well versed in all of the technical aspects of the methodology of contemporary philosophy, he never took them very seriously. Farber was a cosmopolitan in the best sense of the term. He was unusually sensitive and sympathetic to the sufferings of all oppressed peoples. As a Jewish socialist he suffered the usual prejudices and bigotry. At the beginning of his career Harvard offered him a position to edit Peirce's manuscript. Later on, Harvard considered him for professorship twice more. But he rejected all three offers. Ostensibly, he claimed that he did not wish to give up his freedom. The real reason, we all suspected, was that antisemitism was still rampant in the Ivy League schools in the 20s and the 30s.

Farber combined this background with an enormously generous and charming character. He was endlessly patient, and provided an umbrella for many unorthodox graduate students who would have been easy pickings for a department drunken with the dogmas of language analysis. Farber had a marvelous ear for inflated and pretentious philosophical nonsense and he felt passionately about issues. His unrelenting criticism of Heidegger probably did much for his students' critical independence. Similarly, when, around 1968 or 1969, Althusser was becoming fashionable in the U.S. and was soon to become the object of considerable debate, Farber readily pointed out specific passages in *Pour Marx* where Althusser speaks of the "eternality" of ideology and how it will always be necessary. One of his fitting comments was: "I smell the absolute!" It did not take much, in pursuing this line of thought, to find Stalin and a badly recycled version of positivism concealed behind the scientific and theoretical mask. This may have had something to do with how, from the very beginning, those of us working on *Telos* saw through Althusser's fraudulent

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re-Stalinization of Marxism and never relented in exposing it for the totalitarian nonsense that it was.

Farber was an old-fashioned materialist (he preferred to call himself a naturalist) in the tradition of Roy Wood Sellers and V.J. McGill — both close friends and collaborators. And he was a consistent one at that: thus he was always very suspicious of the dialectic and, surprisingly enough, defended Lenin's *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* as a philosophical classic. His sympathies for Lenin, socialism, and every movement against injustice and exploitation were never tainted by any trace of dogmatism or authoritarianism. In and out of his classes, he never forced his views other than through persuasion and reasoned arguments. This explained why his classes were always overflowing with defrocked seminarians, flabergasted solipsists, red-book waving Maoists and every shade of New Leftists sitting side by side with intimidated would-be-bureaucrats collecting seniority towards academic certification and utterly dismayed by the circus atmosphere of the late 60s. Farber was a true pluralist. Even when the most violently anti-positivists among his students ripped into Lenin's *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* as mere political bombast having absolutely no philosophical value, Farber would politely disagree and patiently listen to what more often then not came out in blasts of over-inflammatory rhetoric.

It may be that teachers are no more chosen by their students than parents by their children, since in both cases chance is usually the agent. But there is a note of marvelous coincidence in this meeting between Farber and his last generation of students. This man who had studied with Husserl and Whitehead also knew Marxism and had attempted to integrate the best from that tradition into his philosophical position. It was a particularly happy combination for those of us who decided to break with the pedantry and irrelevance of the American philosophical establishment and create *Telos* — originally appropriately subtitled: "a philosophical journal *definitely outside* the mainstream of American philosophical thought." Who can ever forget the amused smile on his face when we excitedly showed him old yellow copies of obscure pre-Nazi German journals such as Hilferding's *Die Gesellschaft* or Becker's *Philosophische Hefte*, or early copies of *La Pensée* or *Argument* which we had just discovered in the most remote crevices of the library? It did not immediately dawn on us at that time that the reason we were able to dig out those philosophical fossils — some of which had not been checked out in over 30 years and still had some of their pages uncut — was because Farber had seen to it a quarter of a century earlier that they be there. When, in 1968, after having learned about Lukacs from *Alternatives* and *Studies on the Left*, we finally located a copy of Kostas Axelos' translation, *Histoire et Conscience de Classe*, Farber surprised us once again by showing up in class one day with his own beat-up copy of the original *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* which had been buried for years in a trunk in his attic. Of course, he had read the book almost half a century earlier — in fact, he had also introduced Lukacs in the U.S. in the late 1940s when he, Sellers and McGill edited a volume appropriately titled *Philosophy for the Future*, with a peppery article by no less than Lukacs himself. The same thing happened with Marcuse when, after reading *One Dimensional Man* and *Reason and Revolution*, we began to dig out some of Marcuse's early articles from the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* — only to discover that one of Marcuse's earliest and most successful articles in English (his criticism of the early Sartre) had originally appeared in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

Clearly, without Farber, *Telos* could not have readily explored the continental philosophical tradition necessary to reestablish for a whole generation of students a

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political and theoretical continuity which had brutally been broken by McCarthyism and its aftermath. And, after that was done, even if for different reasons, we began to grudgingly agree with many of Farber's negative judgments about the continuing vitality of that tradition. In that sense, Farber's heritage lives on with us — especially now that he is gone and even his most prized accomplishment, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* has been forced to emigrate to Brown University, thus leaving Buffalo philosophically what it already is for Pete Rozelle: the functional equivalent of Siberia for recalcitrant football players.

TRIBUTE TO A SOCIALIST: HENRY M. PACHTER (1907-1980)

by Stephen Eric Bronner

> The weight of this sad time we must obey;
> Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say.
> The oldest hath borne most: we that are young
> Shall never see so much nor live so long.
>
> —*King Lear*

Tragedy has stalked the recent past. It is neither the tragedy of the aesthete nor the politician. It is a tragedy that cannot be redeemed either through catharsis or reason, some *deus ex machina* or even a new order. The tragedy is nothing other than death itself; death in all its meanness, greyness, and senselessness.

Beyond the intoxicating Heideggerian and neo-romantic drivel wherein death appears as the "authentic" moment of human existence, as the decisive resolution in the confrontation with one's "Being," there is actually only the loss — the end to be avoided, the end that cannot be avoided. Death, it has recently chosen to ravage our little intellectual universe of the left: Barthes, Dobb, Dutschke, Fromm, Gouldner, Haupt, Ludz, Marcuse, Poulantzas, Sartre, and now Henry Pachter.

Surely, he was not as well-known as many of his friends. Nothing will ever detract from their achievements. Yet, in Henry Pachter, I never met anyone so oblivious to the prerequisites for "success" while at the same time so attentive to whoever sought his intellectual guidance or support. But, what did he have to offer? In the face of a pseudo-radical "deconstruction," the sophistic charms of the *episteme,* reified notions of the "discourse," socialism without Marx, cultural elitism on the one hand and neo-populist anti-intellectualism on the other, Henry Pachter's values seemed almost

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embarrassingly old-fashioned.

Whatever the specific political and philosophic disagreements that existed between us, a basic set of values drew me to him and forged a bond from which I — along with a host of other students — could only profit. Despite his own brand of cultural conservatism, his sometimes dogmatic anti-communism, and his public stance as a liberal social democrat, the values in which he believed are the lifeblood of any socialist vision of emancipation. In fact, that cultural conservatism stemmed in part from his years of activism, in part from the cooptation of the avant-garde and the faddism of the left; his anti-communism was rooted in the Soviet Union's betrayal of socialism; and even as a social democrat, both in public and private, he understood its limitations and always called for hard work in elaborating alternative goals.

The values themselves are an affront to the cynicism and snobbery which are still too much in evidence on the intellectual left. Cosmopolitanism and internationalism were as dear to him as reason itself. What he most despised was chauvinism and irrationalism, for Pachter believed that they only produced provincialism, mysticism, and arbitrariness. In his eyes, such values were always a threat to free inquiry and tolerance — which were givens. But, by the same token, in his view the inquiry itself needed to be based on a political position, and tolerance was essential insofar as it allowed for the engagement of an adversary who would test the validity of one's stance.

Though he taught in political science departments, Pachter always considered himself an historian. The bulk of his work bears this out. Ultimately, however, disciplinary definitions are useless when talking about someone like Henry Pachter. Anyone who ever heard him talk about early Franch drama with the same ease as foreign policy, about impressionist painting as comfortably as phenomenology, will attest to that. But, his own perception of himself as a historian is relevant to the values which he held. For Pachter always demanded what Korsch called "dialectical specificity" in order to elucidate the possibilities for change and also a sense of the *Zeitgeist* in which ideas arose in order to avoid hypostatization or an intellectual cult of the personality. For Pachter history meant coming to terms with the content as well as the concept of progress — not simply discarding it. For, without the category, any notion of emancipation would fade into the mist. Along with "The Idea of Progress in Marxism," one of Henry's favorite essays, "The Right To Be Lazy," provides a basic insight into his notion of progress; so too, it always sounded odd to hear a recognized social democrat decry the Weberian concept of efficiency.

Progress and goals. For Pachter, they were to be found in the socialist tradition, the tradition which he lived in theory and practice. Where to begin? It is never possible to condense a man's life into a few pages, especially when he was a teacher and a friend, especially when he was relatively unknown, especially when he lived the events that continue to shape our thoughts. It always sounds mundane.

Henry Pachter was born in 1907 in Berlin; his father was a Social Democrat who owned a publishing company that would print *Die Rote Fahne* when it was banned in the twenties; his uncle was Hermann Struck, an artist who was an illustrator for Hermann Hesse. Henry liked to describe this burgher's world with its thick rugs, oak chairs, and huge library where Thomas Mann — let alone his brother, Heinrich — was still considered *risque*. It was surely in response that he briefly joined *Der Schwarze Haufen*, one of the many groups that composed the German youth movement. There he got his taste of neo-romanticism, irrationalism, and elitism first hand. It repulsed him and — for right or wrong — whenever he criticized the New Left he would point to an example of his own early experience.

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As is reasonably well-known, part of the youth movement split and joined the Communist Youth. In 1926, at the urging of Wittfogel, Pachter followed suit. While studying at Freiburg, the transition was made easier by one of Pachter's teachers, albeit unintentionally. The professor in question was Georg von Below who taught medieval history and law. Von Below was a realist, who saw a linkage between romanticism and Marxism in their attempts to use "science" as the basis for speculative extrapolations. Opposed to both, von Below made Marxism even more attractive to Pachter who was given to speculation and rebellion. It was also von Below who advised Pachter in the friendliest terms to shift his focus from medieval history and concentrate on another area; medieval history was tacitly closed to Jews.

In Freiburg, Pachter also met Hannah Arendt — who was to become a lifelong friend — and studied with Husserl. Phenomenology, of course, was the intellectual rage at Freiburg. Yet, in contrast to Arendt whom Pachter would always respect despite their disagreements, Husserl left him cold. In fact, it was always with great merriment that Pachter recounted how his final paper for Husserl was an eidetic reduction of "*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles.*" Of course, he wrote it as a prank. But Husserl didn't get the humor; Pachter did well in the course and always liked to remark that Husserl's method could depoliticize anything — he had the proof.

When Pachter returned to Berlin at the end of 1926, he met Karl Korsch who was to become the major intellectual influence on his life. At the time, Korsch could not hold classes on campus, so Pachter attended Korsch's lectures at the *Marxistische Arbeiterschule* where he met the remarkable circle that included Hans Langerhans, Alfred Löwenstein, Arthur Rosenberg, Fritz Sternberg, and then later Brecht, Döblin, and others.

Joining the Party in the midst of its *Bolshevisierung*, targeted as a "Korsch man" almost from the beginning, Pachter came under attack. Before he died, Pachter told me that he was planning an essay on life in the Communist Youth. He spoke of the pride that he felt in believing that he was on the side of history, that he was on the side of the working class, that he had comrades who would stand with him, that he was part of a culture that saw itself as the culmination of the revolutionary tradition. The sense of political purpose, the dual attempt to write as a witness and a polemicist, would inform all Pachter's work; he said himself that this originated with his experiences in the party.

He never wrote that essay, but Pachter said that it wasn't the discipline *per se* that got to him; it wasn't the reification of theory either, or even the hours of meetings and the endless distribution of leaflets. What drove him to despair was the intra-party paranoia, which shackled debate, and the lies. That was what proved intolerable and, of course, with each new shift in the line there was the need for a new public recantation. As Henry put the matter, it was not just a question of the party making each new set of "deviationists" kneel, the party had to see them crawl as well. That was what rankled. And then there was the helplessness at the ongoing smear campaigns: Korsch, a "petty bourgeois gone wild," friend after friend "exposed."

He wanted to quit when Korsch was expelled, but the teacher told the student to stay as long as he could; it was and remained the policy of the Korsch circle for its members to try to work as intimately with mass organizations — whether party or trade union — as possible. But, by 1928, Pachter could no longer swallow the slop; in the same year that he met his wife Hedwig — a Ph.D in Germanistik who would remain with him the rest of his life as a companion and collaborator — the party line of "socialism in one country" proved victorious. Pachter spoke up, and was promptly

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expelled.

It was in 1930, without illusions, that Pachter joined the SPD. But, the years in between were important to his development. During this time, Pachter frequented the bohemian cafes in Berlin and came into contact with splinter groups; in the Communist Action Party (KAPD) he came to know Katz and Scholem; in the Socialist Workers' Party (SAP) — a group for which he felt great sympathy — Paul Fröhlich and August Thalheimer. Often Henry used to speak of these years with enthusiasm, more often with a nostalgia tinged with regret. The life of the Weimar intellectual with all its glitter combined with a growing dislike for political sectarianism and an aversion for the avant-garde scene.

Despite what Pachter himself termed his youthful "ultra-leftism," he came to believe that groups like the KAPD and the SAP were cut off from the working class, that they could not challenge the prevailing socialist and communist movements, and that they were themselves beset by intra-party squabbles over points of doctrine. As the Nazis began their ascent, Pachter began to see that the need for socialist unity outweighed doctrinal or philosophical considerations. Along with his friend, Willi Münzenberg, the great Communist organizer, Pachter became an early proponent of the popular front. In this regard, as well as in his perception of the Nazi threat, Pachter found himself at odds with Korsch and their paths began to diverge; as Korsch moved ever close to anarcho-syndicalism, Pachter began his philosophical shift to social democracy.

Indeed, the popular front became a basic position for Pachter to which he would essentially adhere for the rest of his life; he always said that one of the great moments of his life took place in 1935 at the *Mutualité* in Paris with the Internaitonal Writers Conference for the Defense of Culture and its array of anti-fascist luminaries: Benda, Bloch, Brecht, Döblin, Feuchtwanger, Gide, Seghers, and others. Yet, he always maintained a certain distance from the artistic circles in Berlin. Despite their aesthetic achievements, the ideological confusion, the irrationalism, and plain irresponsibility of so many artists and avant-garde cliques left Pachter angry and desolate; in fact, whenever anyone would ask about the spirit of these groups, Pachter would invariably refer them to Thomas Mann's ironic and devastating depiction of them in *Doctor Faustus*.

By the same token, following Korsch, Pachter recognized the primacy of the political and believed that without at least a coherent project of praxis radical philosphical inquiry would degenerate. Obviously, in this regard he differed markedly from the Frankfurt School theorists to whom he was introduced by Erich Fromm, with whom he was very close at this time. Their cultural bohemianism irked him, their refined intellectualism and elitism as well. But, most of all, he could not comprehend their lack of historical specificity and their political indifference. Always, Pachter would point to remnants of the monopoly capital thesis in Horkheimer's analysis of fascism and to the prevalent belief that the advent of Hitler meant just another dictatorial form of capitalism which placed these radicals on the same plane as the conservatives. Probably Pachter never really appreciated Horkheimer — let alone Benjamin whom he met later in Paris. But, he respected Adorno and held Franz Neumann along with Otto Kirchheimer, the great theorists of law and the state, in the highest esteem.

During these years, Pachter worked tangentially with various groups; he went to political rallies such as the famous illegal May Day demonstration of 1929, where many were beaten including Pachter himself, and taught economic history at one of

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the many night schools in Berlin. He also finished his dissertation at the University of Berlin under Oncken and Meinecke, "*Das Proletariat des Vormärz*," which was never translated and which superbly dealt with the socio-political formation of the German working class prior to 1848.

Around the time of his entry into the SPD, Pachter met Kurt Schumacher — who would lead the party after World War II — and Rudolf Hilferding in the latter's capacity as editor of *Die Gesellschaft*. Along with other members of the Korsch circle, such as Langerhans, he wrote for that journal and others as well. Continuously, he inveighed against the KPD's theoretical dogmatism, its catastrophic "social fascist" thesis, and warned of the international fascist threat. Indeed, in 1932, he wrote his *Wirtschaft unterm Rutenbündel* which was an incisive critique of the economic policies of Italian fascism.

After Hitler's rise to power, in collaboration with Richard Löwenthal whom he had first met in the communist movement and who was to become one of his closest friends, Pachter put out the first resistance journal — a little paper intitled *Proletarische Aktion*. Pachter never made much of this, or any other resistance work in which he was engaged; he always sought to shatter the illusion, burst the aura, and emphasize the routine and the drudgery that was involved in such work. Nevertheless, by the end of 1933, his friends advised him to emigrate and Pachter made his way to Paris; it was not until three years later that Hedwig was able to join him.

Paris was a lonely place for him. Pachter learned the language and performed odd jobs of various sorts; one of them involved work for Frederick Antal on his *Neo-Florentine Painting* which has justifiably become a classic Marxist analysis of the visual arts. Also, Pachter served as a lecturer at the *Université Populaire*. There he spoke against the prevalent notion that Germany could be transformed through domestic changes as well as the idea that Hitler could only last five years; after all, the communist slogan was still "After Hitler, Us!"

Still a Marxist, Pachter found himself caught within the same web of dogma and preconceptions in France as in Germany. The *Action Francaise* was on the rise, and Pachter welcomed the Popular Front when it finally came. He always spoke of 1936 as a year of solidarity, unity, and vitality; the anti-fascist enthusiasm, for just a moment, submerged the differences amongst the left.

"At least one thing came out of the German debacle," Pachter once said to me ruefully, "Stalin was finally forced to learn something." But, even this took some effort. The Popular Front idea came up from the bottom, and it was a torturous process to change the thinking of the Comintern. Articles, novels, plays, demonstrations, and activities of the most manifold sorts were necessary and Pachter played his part. As the first year of exile turned into the second and the second into the third, more émigrés made their way to Paris and a little German community was formed that included Willi Brandt among others. They were poor; Pachter said that he never made as many friends as during this time when he was one of the few to have a bathtub in his apartment. But, they clung together, hid each other, formed contacts for jobs, procured papers, and gave each other a fragile hope.

And then, for the briefest of periods, this hope seemed to explode into the world itself: Spain. Perhaps more than any other, this was the struggle that touched Pachter's heart. His book on the Spanish Civil War, *Espagne — Creuset Politique,* which was published in 1939, always remained his favorite. Published under the pseudonym Henri Rabasseire — which, like *Pächter,* translates as "dirt farmer" — in order to avoid possible deportation or expatriation, this book achieved the merger of

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witness and polemicist. This beautifully written work was avowedly opposed to the Communist line and supported the anarchists and the POUM for which Pachter also worked as a publicist. Interestingly enough, Pachter would later say that pragmatically, in retrospect, he might have been too critical of the Communist strategy and too uncritical of the anarchists — but that he was right nonetheless. Indeed, Pachter never believed that truth only emerges once the owl of minerva finally takes the time to spread its wings. There is a truth in struggle that always gets buried, and Pachter liked to say that the greatest danger in writing history was to ignore the fact that history generally becomes the province of the victor.

This danger became most horrifically manifest in the Moscow show trials. The terror, the chauvinism, the paranoia, the justification by "success," the Stalinist rewrite of history, all came to fruition in the kangaroo courts. It was the time to speak and when his pro-communist friends — such as Brecht — remained silent, Pachter never forgave them. In his view, the communist praxis of Marxism had become a charade which soon culminated in tragedy and insult: the fall of republican Spain and the Hitler-Stalin Pact. When World War II began, Pachter was interned. He was then given the choice of joining the French Army, which he did. By the time Paris fell, Pachter's unit had already been disbanded and he worked for a short time with the resistance. But, the round-ups began and, once again, he was forced to flee; he, Hedwig, and a group of friends, made their way south over the Pyrannees to Spain and then to Portugal.

When Pachter first told me the story of this journey, it reminded me of Anna Seghers' novel *The Seventh Cross*. As Pachter recounted it, there were no heroes; the everyday people themselves become the common hero. It goes against the grain of revisionist French history of the period, but he maintained this view of the *Zeitgeist* nonetheless. To be sure, the group encountered collaborateurs and there was the constant fear of being handed over to the authorities. Yet, they received help from people who came from every walk of life: political and apolitical, peasants, workers, shopkeepers, and policemen.

Looking back at his experience with fascism from the safety of New York, Pachter always tried to emphasize the difficulties, the moral dilemmas, the nuances of the lives which people led under the Weimar Republic and then under fascism. This sense informs his best historical articles and his last work, *Modern Germany: A Social, Cultural and Political History*. These historical pieces are as rich as they are insightful. But, in addition, story after story fell from his lips to make his point. There was the one about his friend, an anti-fascist social democrat, who was a musician; he was allowed on tour, his wife and child were left at home; should he speak out against the camps or remain silent? There was the story of his friend Karl Otto Paetel, an early national Bolshevik, who -- from feelings of early friendship -- helped Pachter out of many scrapes. There was the ambiguity of those who joined the Nazis out of simple ignorance of their ultimate goals and those who remained in Germany and who lived within their own "inner emigration." Pachter never made excuses, he was anything but a sloppy moralist when it came to politics. But, he always maintained a sense of tolerance and fairness.

This sense of tolerance grew in America. Initially, there were the same problems that he encountered in Paris. Through the good offices of Kirchheimer, however, Pachter became a consultant for the Office of War Information and then a research associate for the Office of European Economic Research that was a branch of the OSS as well as for the Institute of World Affairs; at the latter, he wrote his analysis of

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the fascist perversion of language for propaganda purposes which he entitled *Nazi-Deutsch*.

In America, Pachter found a democracy the like of which he had never experienced before. Still, despite the group of European intellectuals that clustered in New York and the making of new friends such as Ernst Cassirer, Pachter was clearly alienated in the new culture. He could never get over the scant attendence at May Day demonstrations, and he could never acclimatize himself to commercial television or fads; then there was also the lack of *Bildung* and the easy-going disregard of class and status differences in everyday life. But, unlike so many of the emigre intellectuals, Pachter did not bask in his alienation. In fact, he continually tried to attack European snobbery which, for example, often led him to over-emphasize the progressive nature of American mass culture. Naturally, he saw the lack of a socialist tradition and he remained a European in his intellectual concerns. Yet, he never believed that the "great tradition" could be imposed; at once, he despised those who nostalgically looked back to the elite culture of Germany and became a fervent believer in political and cultural pluralism.

It was a peculiar situation and, in a certain sense, it becomes manifest in Pachter's lovely book *Paracelsus: Magic into Science*; the irrational becomes transformed into the rational, the popular into the elite, the legend of the great intellectual — who was part charlatan — into the image of Faust in his majestic quest. Indeed, Pachter sought to overcome polarities in his historical works — though some continued to exist which were carried over into his worldview. For Pachter considered himself a socialist, sought to employ the Marxist method in a reflexive and critical way, but continually emphasized what Lukacs would have termed the "empirical" consciousness of the working class in what was often a static manner. The result was a brand of democratic socialism which, like the theory of the old social democrats, often vacillated between the dream of social transformation and the reality of democratic reform.

Nevertheless, Pachter often alluded to the contradiction himself and in practical terms made his allegiance with his new homeland — at least relative to the fundamental choice that he believed needed to be made following the war: the choice between West and East. To many, Henry Pachter was known simply as a cold warrior. The image grew through his foreign policy articles in *Dissent* and *World Politics* as well as through his *Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Co-Existence* and his extraordinary, though controversial, *Weltmacht, Russland*.

In Pachter's case, however, the cold war stance is not quite so simple to assess. For Pachter was neither an ambitious mandarin nor an aspiring bureaucratic hack who sought to rise in the hierarchy. Even less was he a McCarthyite demagogue or a reactionary moralist *à la* Solzhenitsyn. By the same token, for right or wrong, he found the ultra-left stance of "A plague on both your houses" along with Merleu-Ponty's notion of "a-communism" an abdication of real politics and an evasion. Indeed, he liked to say that he would always prefer the most inefficient democracy over the most efficient dictatorship. Thus, he believed that the Soviet Union should be opposed. Yet, the matter of how this was to be done was always a tactical consideration which changed historically. Consequently, despite his sometimes extreme criticisms of the New Left — for its moralism, its streaks of anti-intellectualism, and its lack of coherence both organizationally and programmatically — he was an early opponent of the Vietnam War. Indeed, peace in the atomic age became Pachter's primary consideration; he vociferously opposed the nuclear arms race and even spoke about the need for unilateral disarmament by the United States.

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In regard to the Soviet Union, Pachter simply took Soviet nationalism seriously. In his view, the "proletarian internationalism" preached by Soviet ideologues was a bad joke. The Soviet Union was one nation-state amongst others which made alliances in terms of a specific balance of power for its own interests. From this perspective, as a nation-state that pursued its own national interest, the Soviet Union lost its privileged position as the "homeland of the revolution" and the custodian of socialism.

To the same extent that he sought to strip the ideological veneer from Soviet expansionism, he assumed a critical stance to the blind support for third-world liberation movements. Until the end of his life, Pachter was an opponent of nationalism and the type of cultural relativism which served as a cover for oppression. In the last analysis, he turned his gaze back to Europe as the hope for an order that would be international, social democratic, and guided by the rationalist values of the European enlightenment. This was the vision that he presented in what is perhaps Pachter's finest work, *The Fall and Rise of Europe: A Political, Social, and Cultural History of the Twentieth Century*. In this work, Pachter elaborates the concept of a united Europe. Yet, he does so not simply in terms of the pragmatic survival of Europe, but as the culmination of a heritage. For Pachter, the "European idea" awaits its realization in the values that emerge from its greatest representatives: freedom as a universal, the sanctity of the individual, material progress, democracy, equality, socialism, and perhaps the greatest of all, Kant's dream of a perpetual peace. These are the values that stand as an indictment against oppression, no matter what form it may take.

Truly, this is a work that ranks with anything of its kind. All of Pachter's knowledge, reason, and vision, appear in that book. Characteristically, Pachter told me that he was dissatisfied with it: "there should have been more," or so he said. Recalling that conversation, Sartre's famous line also occurs to me — the line with which he ended *Being and Nothingness*, that "man is a useless passion." Perhaps, but when I remember Henry Pachter, somehow I don't think so. Those values with which he identified himself aren't worthless, nor was the life that he led, the works that he produced. Probably a bit of that life, a sentence or two from those works, will live in everyone who ever tries to take part in building a more human world. More than that, no one can ask.

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Book Reviews:

André Gorz, *Ecology as Politics*. Boston: South End Press, 1980.

The ecological imbalances of our time raise a number of questions that challenge every conventional social theory. The split between humanity and nature; the notion that man can dominate nature (a notion that derives from the domination of human by human); the role of the market economy in developing technologies that can undo the work of natural evolution in only a few generations; the absurdity of dealing with ecosystems and food webs in hierarchical terms — all of these issues raise immense possibilities for developing a radical social ecology that transcends orthodox left ideologies as well as the crudities of sociology. A serious theorist would explore these issues and use them reconstructively to foster the reharmonization of nature with humanity and of human with human

The attempt to achieve a new harmony between humanity and nature would involve an exploration of the uses of eco-technologies as means for recovering humanity's metabolism with nature in a non-Promethean way, e.g., the use of new methods of food cultivation, ecological sources of energy (solar, wind, methane, and the like), the integration of craft with "high" technologies, fulfilling forms of work or of work as play. It would involve an exploration of the decentralized, confederal, eco-communities and forms of direct democracy that a new society would seek to create. The attempt to achieve a new harmony between humanity and nature would involve an exploration of a philosophy of nature as the basis for a new ethics, of feminism as the basis for a new sensibility, and of the commune as the new form of human interaction and the arena for self-development.

The ecological project conceived as a project of a radical social ecology would thereby provide the bases for a rich critique of prevailing ideologies — bourgeois and socialist alike — that would transcend the traditional "radical" critiques of political economy. It would open the way for a discussion of new forms of organization (for example, the affinity group), new forms of struggle (direct action, conceived as self-management, not merely the occupation of nuclear power plant sites), new forms of citizenship (self-activity, viewed as forms of self-realization). The ecological project, so conceived, would provide the social gymnasium for shedding the sense of powerlessness that threatens to reduce the public sphere to a bureaucratized substitute for all forms of human consociation.

Critique and practice would thus merge to form a coherent revolutionary perspective opening a thoroughly radical critique of such crucial problems as patriarchialism, urban decay, corporate power, hierarchy, domination, pollution, technocratic manipulation — indeed, a multitude of issues that acquire meaning in light of a libertarian — yes, anarchist — interpretation of social ecology. Most precious of all to such a theorist would be the coherence and revolutionary consistency one would be expected to attain as a result of the possibilities opened by a radical social ecology, particularly one that has a revolutionary anarchist focus.

Given all this, Gorz's *Ecology as Politics* is a very disappointing book. Apart from the ideas Gorz pilfers quite freely from the works of anarchist theorists of the past and of the American new left, the book contains very little that is new or interesting. It was to be hoped that French readers, at least, would have acquired a fuller knowledge of these ideas in their original form, with emendations and possibly newer interpretations by Gorz. But Gorz is content not only to repeat them (with minimal or no acknowledgement) in a cursory, often tattered fashion. He does worse: he debases them and

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divests them of their roots, of their coherence, of their internal logic and their revolutionary thrust. *Ecology as Politics* is not only an intellectual *pastiche* of ideas whose theoretical pedigree is utterly alien to that of Gorz's: the book is an example of bad ecology as well as bad politics, often written in bad faith with respect to the real traditions Gorz leans on.

What makes Gorz's book particularly distasteful is its attempt to refurbish an orthodox economistic Marxism with a new ecological anarchism. Almost every page sounds a false note. To critically review a volume of some 200 pages with the detail that it requires would yield a work two or three times the size of the original. To illustrate the magnitude of this problem, let us closely examine Gorz's "Introduction," which presumably presents the theoretical framework. Although this section is scarcely more than seven printed pages, it acquires particular interest because of its pretense and scope. What lies under the carpet of Gorz's theoretical pomposity is an appalling amount of intellectual confusion — and an interesting glimpse of Gorz's methodology, notably the sectarian Marxian orthodoxy that always subverts the author's sense of "vision" and "discovery."

From the outset, the Introduction crumbles into semantic confusion. Its purpose is to distinguish two kinds of ecology (this is the actual subtitle of the introduction). But as it turns out, Gorz is really concerned with two kinds of politics. To ecologists who can use a viable politics, this might be a laudable endeavor if Gorz were intent on discussing *politics* as ecology — that is, to determine how politics can be developed in ecological terms. But this is not Gorz's claim. He is trying to tell us something about ecology itself as it relates to social questions — to explore its special qualities and how they interact with society. And it is here that the book falls apart, for it is apparent that Gorz knows very little about ecology or, as he puts it, "ecological thinking." There *are* in fact two different kinds of ecology — notably, ecology and environmentalism — but Gorz is oblivious to the difference. When he speaks of two kinds of ecology, he means two kinds of politics — bourgeois politics and his own. That ecology has very little to do with the distinction he seeks to develop becomes evident when, scarcely a few lines into the introduction, we are soberly advised that "Ecological thinking still has many opponents in the [corporate] board rooms, but it already has enough converts in the ruling elite to ensure its eventual acceptance by major institutions of modern capitalism."

While loose formulations of this kind might have been tolerable years ago, they are totally obfuscatory today. To describe the kind of environmentalistic thinking that goes on in corporate board rooms as "ecological" is to set back the clock of ecological thinking and the ecological movement. The attempt to rescue the term ecology from board rooms and from writers such as Gorz has been long in the making. Ecology, particularly ecology conceived as *social* ecology, contains very radical philosophical and cultural implications. These center around the non-hierarchical nature of ecosystems and the importance of diversity as a function of biotic stability. Extended to society, they suggest the need for non-hierarchical social relations and a non-hierarchical sensibility to achieve a truly harmonious balance with nature and between people. What Gorz means by "ecological thinking" in the board rooms is in fact what should properly be called environmentalism, the largely technocratic strategems for manipulating nature. Taken as an academic discipline, "environmentalism' is essentially an instrumental body of techniques that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology once taught as "sanitary engineering." Like Barry Commoner, who consciously eschews the word ecology in favor of environmentalism, Gorz is mindful

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that he is advancing a politics that is environmentally oriented, not an ecological sensibility that is meant to yield a political orientation. To distinguish ecology from environmentalism and to explore the social thrust of ecological thinking as distinguished from the merely technical strategies of environmental thinking would actually compel Gorz to confront the serious challenges a radical social ecology raises to his own mode of thinking — notably, socialist "thinking." For the real conflict that faces the left so far as society and the natural world are concerned *is not between a specious form of bourgeois "ecology" and socialist politics, but between a libertarian form of social ecology and an economistic, technologically oriented form of socialism — in short, Marxism.* This is not what Gorz intends to do. Ecology is effectively reduced to environmentalism all the more to spuriously fuse Marxist thinking with the ecological issues of our time.

Accordingly, Gorz proceeds to underpin his own environmentalist "thinking" by asserting that capitalism, far from being faced with an ecological impasse that can tear down the entire biosphere, can actually "assimilate ecological necessities as technical constraints and adapt the conditions of exploitation to them." Ironically, this formulation is not only "sanitary engineering" with a vengeance; it is even bad Marxism. If any serious ecological conclusion is to be drawn from *Capital* Vol. I, it is from Marx's compelling demonstration that the very law of life of capitalist competition, of the fully developed market economy, is based on the maxim, "grow or die." Translated into ecological terms, this clearly means that a fully developed market economy must unrelentingly exploit nature to a point (which even Marx could not foresee) that is geologically and biologically regressive. Capitalism is not only polluting the world on a historically unprecedented scale: it is simplifying all the planet's ecosystems, turning soil into sand, the oceans into lifeless sewers, indeed, threatening the very integrity of our sources of atmospheric oxygen. If one were to follow the logic of this tendency to its very end, capitalist — and hierarchical — society would be found to be utterly incompatible with a viable biosphere. What limits the ecological validity of Marx's view is obviously not his revelation of capitalism's "law of life" but rather the "progressive" role he imparts to capitalism's supposed success in achieving the technical domination of nature. This Janus-faced aspect of Marx's writings is what throws them into conflict with an authentic ecological sensibility. Gorz, by contrast, sidesteps *exactly* what we must learn in the contradictory position of Marx — namely, that the very technical achievements of capitalism, far from assimilating "ecological necessities as technical restraints," are governed by a "law of life" that technologically lacks any form of restraint.

Having twisted himself into a pretzel, Gorz proceeds to raise a hammering demand: "Reform or revolution?" Shall we have one kind of ecology, a reformist one that resolves our disequilibrium with nature by means of technology? Or shall we have another kind of ecology, one that resolves our disequilibrium with nature by means of revolution? As it turns out, these fiery demands are mere pablum. If Gorz is correct and capitalism can adapt to ecological necessities merely by developing pollution-control devices (this is what Gorz means by technical restraints), why not have a series of nice, orderly, genteel reforms instead of a messy, possibly bloody, revolution?

It is at this point that the seemingly "semantic" distinction between ecology and environmentalism acquires considerable significance. If Barry Commoner is really a closet Eurocommunist who at heart is committed to centralized economic planning, he rightly prefers to designate himself as an environmentalist rather than an ecologist. The concepts of social ecology stand at odds with his basically orthodox Marxian

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views. By not naming his social theories ecological, Commoner quite consistently can retain his refurbished Marxian views under the socially neutral term of environmentalism.

Whether Gorz is aware of it or not, he does precisely the same thing as Commoner. And it is not what is most viable in Marx's writing that Gorz chooses for the theoretical underpinnings of his views, but what is largely moribund or, at least, most questionable. In Gorz's view, capitalism threatens to produce a profound social crisis not as a form of ecological disequilibrium and breakdown, but rather as a form of economic disequilibrium and breakdown. If one is to take Gorz's introduction seriously, ecology can be regarded simply as an exacerbating factor in a much larger economic crisis that faces capitalism. If one peers behind the rich verdure of Gorzian "ecology," one finds the most dismal cobwebs of orthodox Marxism. For, when all is said and done, what Gorz really argues in his introduction is that capitalism, by introducing such "technical constraints" as pollution-control devices, increases the organic composition of capital, that is to say, the ratio of constant capital (machinery and raw materials) to variable capital (labor). Inasmuch as labor, in Marxian economic theory, is the source of all value and hence of all profit, this changing ratio yields the horrendous result that "either the rate of profit declines or the price of products increases." Hence "price will tend to rise faster than real wages, purchasing power will be reduced, and it will be as if the cost of pollution control had been deducted from the income available to individuals for the purchase of consumer goods."[1] Clearly, Gorz is concerned not with ecology or even with environmentalism, but with economics, and highly dubious economics to boot! Its crudity is matched only by its simplicity. To Gorz, price rises are the result not primarily of oligopolistic or monopolistic manipulations of the market, but of diminishing profits due to increasing capital costs. As it turns out, *this is precisely the argument that the bourgeoisie itself uses against environmental controls.* For Gorz to ignore the profound structural changes in modern capitalism such as price-fixing in order to rehabilitate Marx's most dubious theories in the so-called "free market" era of the last century reflects poorly not only on Gorz the environmentalist but on Gorz the economist. The essays that follow the introduction in no way redeem these crudities. On the contrary, they echo the most preposterous shibboleths of bourgeois media propaganda.

In any case, to talk about "ecology" when one actually means environmentalism is no mere word play. It means that one reduces ecology to environmentalism so that social ecology can be replaced by something else — in Commoner's case, by a closet form of Eurocommunism; in Gorz's case, by a very naive form of Marxian socialism that rests on economic reductionism. Gorz's economization of ecology is not a mere episode in his book; it is really its underlying theoretical basis and leitmotif. Scratch

1. It is interesting to note that, as far back as the 19th century, Marx's labor theory of value has been justly criticized for its schizoid nature. In *Capital.* vol. I, the labor theory of value functions brilliantly as a *qualitative* analysis of the emergence and form of bourgeois social relations. In *Capital,* vol. III, however, the theory functions *quantitatively* as a very dubious description of price formation, the distribution of profits between different enterprises, and the so-called "tendency of the rate of profit to decline." This tendency has never been clearly established in terms of Marx's labor theory because it is largely unprovable. It becomes meaningless and mechanistic, in fact, when value is viewed merely in quantitative terms and it can be justly regarded as equivocal in view of the countervailing factors Marx himself invokes — factors that shake the credibility of the tendency as an economic reality. Accordingly, this so-called tendency has not only divided Marxian economists from non-Marxian ones, but has also led to endless quarrels among the most devout acolytes of the master for generations. For Gorz, this highly disputable tendency is merely adduced as given — and that is that!

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Gorz the ecologist and you find Gorz the environmentalist. Scratch Gorz the environmentalist and you find Gorz the vulgar Marxist. Scratch Gorz the vulgar Marxist and you find Gorz the reformist. To a great extent, this summarizes the content of the book.

Until Gorz concludes his introduction with a survey of his "utopia," the remaining portions of the piece are largely declamations that have been stated with greater clarity and coherence in other, more original works. That limited growth under capitalism would produce unemployment and misery, as Gorz solemly avers, is painfully obvious. Even the bourgeoisie, in its denunciations of the environmentalist movement, have said as much. That certain goods (say, ocean liners, castles, ski slopes, and space ships — Gorz, in fact, focuses on such trivial and delectable items as Mercedes Benzes and swimming pools) must either remain scarce or be shared by everyone due to nature's cruel material limits, hardly requires emphasis. Gorz's grandiose ethic — "The only things worthy of each are those which are good for all" — is so trite that it has the earmarks of a Benthamite philistine. Yet, Bentham was right: the good is the greatest happiness for the greatest number — which did not prevent Marx from viewing Bentham as a moral cretin.

Gorz's capacity to debase a subject to the level of sheer absurdity, however, finds its most telling expression in the concluding part of the introduction: his account of utopia. And what, pray, is Gorzutopia? With breathless ardor we learn that his utopia focuses on the "production of apparently indestructible material" (an "indestructible" Mercedes, perhaps, if not a solidly built swimming pool), "collective dwellings" and collectively used transport, lots of bicycles, "major industries, centrally planned," that are meant to meet basic requirements of people without regard to styles, local "public workshops" that will be well-equipped with tools and machines for every individual to use, and a salad of other proposals that are promiscuously drawn from the gardens of Peter Kropotkin, Paul Goodman, and other anarchist theorists without the slightest reference to their intellectual pedigree. None of these people is even noted in terms of the broader body of ideas for which each one speaks, the tradition that each one represents, the continuity of these ideas into recent anarchist theories and reconstructive proposals. That we are saturated with Marx goes without saying, even if the brew has begun to turn sour — and, of course, with a generous amount of Gorzian eclecticism.

Is all of this possible in a market economy, Gorz asks. "No," he replies, "for such a 'utopia' corresponds to the most *advanced,* not the most *primitive*, form of socialism" — one is prone to ask what Gorz means by this delicious contrast: hippie tribalism or the "primitive" anarchist rebels from whom Gorz pilfers most of his ideas for a utopia — "to a society without bureaucracy, where the market withers away, where there is enough" — enough Mercedes, maybe? — "for everyone, where people are collectively and individually free to shape their lives, where people produce according to their fantasies, not only according to their needs." We will leave this explosion of primitive Fourieresque rhetoric aside and merely note for the moment that Gorzutopia acquires its appropriate seal of approval by closing with the following quotation: "in short, a society where 'the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all' (Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, 1848)." Thus, the halo of the Master is placed over an effluvium of intellectual goulash that would make even so scrupulous a theorist as the author of *The Critique of the Gotha Program*, a brilliantly unrelenting piece of criticism, disclaim his acolyte.

Now all of this may be spicy fare for certain Parisian *gauchistes* and the more naive

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adherences of Commoner's Citizens Party, but it is utterly tasteless to anyone who is even minimally familiar with radical social ecology. Quality production, libertarian collectivism and other Gorzutopian appropriations from "primitive" socialists and anarchists aside, one is stunned by the paradoxes that coexist in Gorz's vision. How in the name of intellectual coherence can he dream of a society without bureaucracy whose major industries are "centrally planned"? Note well that Gorz does not speak simply of planning or even coordination or even of regionalism — but of centralization. Will these major industries be centralized by mindless robots, by good vibes, by stoned hippies or will they be centralized by agencies staffed by bureaucrats? How will this planning and centralization be executed — by mutual love, by the high moral probity so nobly exhibited by the Russian Bolsheviks, or perhaps by a harsh system of obedience and command that Engels invoked in his insidious essay "On Authority"? Gorz is at pains to tell us that we must learn to live without Mercedes Benzes and swimming pools for each family, but he tells us virtually nothing about the administrative structures around which his utopia will be organized.

If Gorz's evocation of a society without bureaucracy whose major industries are nonetheless centrally planned seems indigestible, his image of a market that withers away produces outright heartburn. One senses that the withering away of the market is not far removed from such ominous formulations as "the withering away of the state" — and sure enough, Gorz does not let us down: the formulation *does* appear in the book. If it should come to pass that in Gorzutopia the market withers away, it is fair to assume that Gorzutopia will after all contain a market from its very inception. This may be satisfactory for a superficial thinker such as Proudhon, but one can reasonably invoke Marx's searching analysis of the emergence of the market, its immanent capacity to undermine all forms of reciprocity and mutualism, finally its triumph over every aspect of economic life. One does not have to be a Marxist to accept the enormous catalytic role Marx imputes to the value and market relation any more than one has to reject anarchism to mock Proudhon's "People's Bank," patriarchal family relations, and contractual theory of social relations.

It was to be hoped that if Gorz planned to outline the most advanced form of socialism he would not do so with the most primitive theoretical equipment. Surely, he would know that markets in a technologically "advanced" society, burdened by a savage historical legacy of ruthless profit-seeking, parasitic exchange, and cruel egoism, would make the withering away of the market as preposterous as the withering away of the state. All of which raises the really fundamental issues of Gorz's introduction: is he actually posing an authentic choice between reform and revolution? Or must one always look beneath Gorz's rhetoric and ask the embarrassing questions that follow from the internal logic of *Ecology as Politics*: environmentalism *or* ecology? Centralization *or* decentralization? A market economy *or* reciprocity and mutualism? State *or* society? An inextricable variant of Marxian orthodoxy *or* a consistently libertarian theory? Centralized power *or* decentralized coordination? Neither Gorz's intentions nor rhetoric, however well intended, can remove the intellectual confusion they are likely to foster in a reading public that is already plagued by more sinister publicists than Gorz.

Having taken up the first seven pages of *Ecology as Politics* with a modest degree of care, it is obvious that it would be impossible to bring the same degree of detail to a critical analysis of the other essays. I shall thus confine myself to the more outstanding idiosyncracies that mar so much of the book. Yet, for all my selectivity, I cannot help but note that the very first paragraph of the first chapter immediately ensnares us in

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sheer nonsense. Thus, the chapter opens with the resounding remark: "Growth-oriented capitalism is dead"; so, too, for all practical purposes, is "growth-oriented socialism." "Marxism, although irreplaceable as an instrument of analysis, has lost its prophetic value."

Now all of this is really a mouthful — and apparently it takes very little effort for Gorz to utter it. Unfortunately, "growth-oriented capitalism" (has there ever been any other kind?) is not dead at all, not even metaphorically. To the contrary, it is alive and kicking. It is not even "dead" in the Marxian sense that it has ceased to exercise a "great civilizing influence" (to use Marx's formulation in the *Grundrisse*), a view that Karl Polanyi brilliantly challenged decades ago. Furthermore, since Marxism "as an instrument of analysis" has never advanced any theory of socialism but one that is also growth-oriented (see *Capital*, Vol. III, *The Grundrisse*, and many smaller works by Marx), we encounter another Gorzian paradox: either Marxism is very unsatisfactory "as an instrument of analysis" or one of its most important conclusions — the historical, indeed progressive, role of growth and the expansion of needs — is basically unsound. Finally, in all fairness to Marx, the Master never assigned a "prophetic value" to his theories. In fact, he explicitly rejected as utopian any project for describing the contours of a future communist society. So Gorz's remarks begin with nonsense and they conclude with nonsense. The false note that rings in virtually every page of Gorz's book is sounded at its outset. What Gorz really seems to believe, when all the rhetoric is discarded, is that Marx's "instrument of analysis" is "irreplaceable."

It may be well to pause and examine this argument since it rears itself in ghostly fashion with every defense of Marxism against its most fallacious theoretical conclusions. The Marxian corpus lies in an uncovered grave, distended by gases and festering with molds and worms. Its once rich sweep — the project of a scientific socialism, historical materialism as a base-superstructure theory of social development, the call to proletarian insurrection, the ideal of a centralized planned economy, the strategy of developing revolutionary workers' parties in industrially advanced countries of the world — all have turned into a sickly, fetid jelly. But lest we face up to the decay of the Marxian project and draw serious lessons from its tragic destiny we are inevitably reminded by Marxist pundits that the "instrument of analysis" survives, indeed, is "irreplaceable." Marxism, in effect, is a success as a method however much it is a failure as a theory.

Why such an irreplaceable method should yield such impoverished results remains inexplicably unclear. Indeed, the crucial relation between methodology and reality raises far-reaching philosophical questions that can hardly be discussed at any length here. It is difficult not to note that the decline of philosophy itself from an interpretation of the world into a mere "method" of analysis has been the subject of brilliant critique by the Frankfurt School. One may justifiably turn this critique against Marxism itself, which has increasingly been turned by its acolytes into an analytical instrumentalist methodology rather than a theory of actual social change. That Hegel's dialectic, too, was reduced by Marx to a "method" may very well tell us a great deal about the instrumental dimension that vitiates much of Marx's own work, but at least he clothed it in a *reality* that followed intrinsically from his use of that method. If Marxism, too, must now be reduced to a method — that is, a mere technique of analysis deprived of its social substance or ontological content — we can fairly ask what this trend means for the corpus of its social theory.

In any case, this instrumentalist strategy for exorcising Marxism's theoretical results hangs like a shadow over the entire corpus — a shadow that even the most skeptical

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neo-Marxists have not dispelled. The orthodox Marxian sects, of course, have no problem at all. The corpus is not seen as an irreparable failure but merely as the victim of a conspiratorial betrayal by "petty bourgeois" intellectuals or, to borrow from Lenin's rich political vocabulary, by "social patriots," "traitors," and "renegades" to undo the method, the theory, or both. Nevertheless, the fetishization of a living Marxism as a method persists — reinforced by intense peer pressure among radicals in the academy, a peer pressure that morally degrades its victims as well as its high priests. Indeed, utterly alien theories like syndicalism, anarchocommunism, and utopian socialism, not to mention Freudianism and structuralism, are grafted onto Marxism in a persistent race to catch up with rather than "lead" in such exotic issues of our time as ecology, feminism, and neighborhood self-management.

Which still raises the question: what is this remarkable "method" that has survived a century of failure, "treachery," and misadventure? Stated quite bluntly, it is Marx's method of class analysis — a social and historical strategy for determining the conflicting material interests that have increasingly asserted humanity's domination of nature by means of technological growth, expanding needs, and the domination of man by man. To Marx, what makes this method so powerful is that it removes the "ideological" cloak, the "general process of social, political and intellectual life" (to use Marx's own formulations), that conceals the production relations that men enter into "independent of their will," the totality of which form the "real foundation on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness" (from "Preface" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*).

What is decisive in any discussion of Marx's "method" — as distinguished from the Marxian corpus — is Marx's more fundamental theory of a base-superstructure interpretation of society. Without this base-superstructure theory, Marx's "method" — his class analysis — is simply meaningless. In short, the "method" is meaningful only if it reveals the material interests that underline social consciousness, that is, only if social consciousness is seen as the derivative, however broadly and indirectly, of production relations. Culture, social institutions, family relations, ideologies and the like can only be clearly analyzed if their ultimate economic foundations and, more specifically, the material and class interests they serve, are revealed. Herein lies the power and practicality of Marx's method. As it turns out, the much-maligned Marxist sectarians, however shrill and repellent their denunciations, are very sound Marxists indeed. More so than the "neo-Marxist" critics (and presumably Gorz may be included among the latter), they insist on revealing the "underlying" material or class interests that ecology, feminism and other such ideologies conceal — the real base that Marx's method discloses. One cannot accept the method without accepting the base-superstructure theory that underpins it.

Gorz's real dilemma here is that he wants to have his cake and eat it, too. Marx's theory has been the target of such powerful critical analyses, be it at the hands of Max Weber in the early part of the century or the Frankfurt School in more recent decades, that its validity is completely in question. More currently, even such "superstructural" phenomena as the state have been designated as technologies so that the concepts of superstructure and base have become too interchangeable to be distinguishable. Aside from the fact that modern society is clearly capitalist — and we can reasonably add the "socialist" world to this category — the class analysis developed by Marx for the modern world hangs by a thread. Doubtless, Gorz would scarcely want to remove

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himself from the charmed circle of such superb social critics Weber and the Institute for Social Research, but neither can he retain his prestige as an authentic Parisian *gauchiste* without the appropriate genuflections to Marx. That neither the "neo-Marxists" nor Gorz has carried the analyses of Marx's method down to its reductionist roots as a base-superstructure theory has done nothing to remove the peer pressure that surrounds the entire issue of Marxism as a whole. That a method that hangs in the air without any ontological content, social reality or intellectual validity is little more than rank instrumentalism will hardly persuade the neo-Marxists to apply their own critique of bourgeois instrumentalism to Marx's.

Gorz's *Ecology as Politics* thus incorporates problems that are not evident even to its author. Not only is ecology confused with environmentalism, revolution with reformism, centralization with decentralization, a "withering away of the market" with a hortatory denunciation of market society (I leave aside Gorz's ability to accept a "withering away of the state"), but a resolute rejection of Marxism is completely tainted by a tacit acceptance of its theoretical core — the base-superstructure theory of society. Had Gorz confined his book to a mere journalistic account of the ecological crisis, it might be regarded as naive but well-meaning. But since *Ecology as Politics* engages in theoretical "summitry" as well as newsy chit-chat, it becomes laughable at best and grossly obfuscatory at worst.

The remainder of the book is largely journalistic. Unfortunately, as one might expect, it is no less contradictory in its treatment of facts as it is in its treatment of theory. Gorz fudges everywhere he can and rarely does he advance his views in a forthright and unequivocal manner. To be sure, one might excuse his contradictions by regarding each essay, or chapter, as a step in his development from Marxian orthodoxy toward a hybridized version of libertarian ecology. But as Hegel caustically observed of Schelling: why must he conduct his education in public? For what we witness is not how Gorz arrives at a clear libertarian outlook (one he has yet to achieve even in his latest book, *Adieu au Proletariat*) but how painful such an ordeal must be — not only to the author but to his utterly confused readers as well.

That Gorz seems to dislike capitalism is the only certainty with which we can function. For the rest, almost everything that follows the Introduction is misty or simply muddled. A few examples should illustrate what I mean:

Item: "It is impossible to derive an ethic from ecology" (p. 16). *Fact*: Perhaps no field these days holds more promise of an ethics than ecology, as Hans Jonas and other searching thinkers have suggested. Gorz here simply doesn't know what he is talking about if only because the problem of a philosophy of nature is beyond his competence.

Item: We must beware of "centralized institutions and hard technologies (this is the technofascist option, the path along which we are already halfway engaged)" (p. 17). *Fact*: Only a few pages earlier (p. 9), Gorz has told us that our "major industries" must be centrally planned. What are our major industries if not hard technologies, and how can they be centrally planned without centralized institutions?

Item: "The total domination of nature inevitably entails a domination of people by the techniques of domination" (p. 20). *Fact*: That Gorz has simply pilfered this sentence with curious modifications from recent American anarchist writings hardly

2. Albrecht Wellmer's *Critical Theory of Society* does, in fact, point to the "instrumental dimension" of Marx's writings and subjects it to valuable criticism. But Wellmer's criticism, unfortunately, stops short of an outright rejection of Marxism as a social theory and essentially falls within the orbit of Habermas' critique rather than a consistently libertarian one.

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requires discussion. What is interesting is that, even when he uses it, he does so erroneously. Humanity can never achieve the "total domination of nature" if only because it is itself part of nature — not physically above it or beyond it. For humanity to achieve the total domination of nature would be equivalent to lifting oneself up by the bootstraps — a nice metaphor, perhaps, but a gravitational impossibility. What Gorz apparently means to say (as I said some 15 years ago) is that the notion of dominating nature derives from the domination of human by human — a formulation that reverses the Marxian one that the domination of man by man stems from the need to dominate nature. This is a crucial reformulation that requires considerable discussion. Gorz confuses the *notion* with an illusory reality. What the *notion* has in fact produced is the increasing simplification of nature, the increasing reduction of the organic to the inorganic — a crisis that may well render the planet unable to support a complex species such as humans.

Item: "All production is also destruction" (p. 20). *Fact*: "All destruction is also creation" (Mikhail Bakunin). Or for that matter, Hegel.

Item: "Marx demonstrated that, sooner or later, the average rate of profit must decline" (p. 22). *Fact*: Marx leaves this question completely open — and, if anything, he speaks of a "tendency," not a certainty. Gorz should at least have consulted Maurice Dobbs' essays on the subject and the disputes that surround it before plunging into areas of which he patently has a limited knowledge.

One can go on indefinitely comparing and contrasting Gorz's remarks in one part of the book with contrary ones in another part. The fact is that Gorz simply does not know how to deal with the meaning of the word "scarcity." That "scarcity" is a social problem, not merely a "natural" one, is something he has learned from Marx. but how "natural" it is and how "social" it is confuses him completely — as it has the ecology movement generally. To explore clearly these distinctions would have been the most important service Gorz could have performed. Instead, Gorz the Marxist dissolves almost completely at times into Gorz the crude environmentalist. Accordingly, the Club of Rome's notorious report (I refer to the Meadows version), *The Limits to Growth,* earns Gorz's admiration as a document that "brought grist to the mill of all who reject capitalism because of its logic, premises, and consequences" (p. 78). Later, Gorz reiterates his concurrence with the report by adding: "Even if the figures in the Meadows report are unreliable, the fundamental truth of its thesis remains unchanged" (p. 84). Having spent years in the radical ecology movement, I am not at all certain what "mill" Gorz is talking about or how anti-capitalist the "consequences" of the report may be.

Actually, Gorz would not be Gorz if he did not try to qualify such utterly absurd remarks. So we learn later that the report is also designed to rescue capitalism. "When the Meadows report looks forward to tripling worldwide industrial production while recommending zero growth in industrial countries, doesn't it imply this neo-imperialist vision of the future?" (p. (85) — notably, a maximum exploitation of Third World resources. "Americans will become a nation of bankers, busy recirculating their profits levied on the work of others" (p. 85). That the United States is in fact undergoing a massive, indeed, historic, industrial revolution of its own in concert with Western Europe and Japan is an immensely important reality that hardly crosses Gorz's intellectual horizon. The man is still on the level of Lenin's *Imperialism*, a work long outdated by far-reaching structural changes in the industrially advanced countries of the world.

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His Marx, in turn, is a source primarily of the most shallow theories of over-accumulation and classical bourgeois theories of economic crises. Thus the maxim, "Grow or die," finally surfaces well on in the book (p. 22), but not to explore its ecological implications. Rather, Gorz uses it to shore up his emphasis on the "decline in the rate of profit," which he deals with not as a tendency but as a fact. In short, a social theory of scarcity is so crudely interlocked with a geological one that it is hard to determine if Gorz has abandoned social theory for economics, economics for biology, or biology for geology. Accordingly, the very man who has told us on the opening page of his Introduction that "ecological thinking. . . has enough converts in the ruling elite to ensure its eventual acceptance by the major institutions of modern capitalism" (p. 3) has no difficulty in emphasizing (15 pages later) that "the ecological perspective is incompatible with the rationality of capitalism" (p. 18). Gorz literally drops these contradictions all over the place — within his essays, between them, or quite promiscuously among them.

Gorzutopias abound in one form or another. In "one of several possible utopias," Gorz presents a scenario of how Gorzutopia (version No. 2) might come about after "the elections, but during the period of transition to the new administration." Exactly who has been elected and by what form of organizational process remain unclear. What we learn is that "a number of factories and enterprises had been taken over by the workers." Is this Paris in 1871? Barcelona in 1936? Budapest in 1956? Paris again in 1968? These are not idle questions if one wants to deal, even in a light-handed way, with a "period of transition." All we know is that there is turmoil. Everyone begins to occupy everything — the "young unemployed — who had the previous two years been occupying abandoned plants"; "empty buildings. . . transformed into communes"; schools, by students and their teachers — and everywhere "hydroponic gardens" (Gorz, incidentally, couldn't have made a worse choice than this for ecological gardening), "facilities for raising fish," installations for "wood-working, metal-working, and other crafts." We must assume on our own that the CRS has decided to occupy its barracks, the Parisian "flicks" their police headquarters, and the French army its long-lost forts in Algeria, much to the delight of the ORA.

Suddenly the veil is lifted: the "President of the Republic and Prime Minister" appear on evening television. Mass media score another triumph! Together the two men give the French people a heavy dose of Gorzutopia that happily mixes the fancies of Fritz Schumacher and Ivan Ilich together with those of André Gorz and Karl Marx. The "government," we are told, has "developed a program for an alternative pattern of growth, based on an alternative economy and alternative institutions." Frenchmen and Frenchwomen alike will "work less," "more effectively," and in "new ways." Everyone will, as a matter of right, "be entitled to the satisfaction of his or her needs." "We must consume better," the president warns, and the "dominant firms in each sector" will become "the property of society." "We must re-integrate culture into the everyday life of all." The presidential address to the nation runs through such delightfully diverse notions as individual and local autonomy, environmental controls, and a degree of decentralization that will avoid the dictatorship (not the abolition, however) of the state.

To jazz up the scenario, Gorz focuses on the prime minister, who rapidly lists "29 enterprises and corporations" that will be "socialized by the National Assembly." Workers will be free to hold general assemblies that will essentially take over production, and work itself will be confined to the afternoon so that the proletariat can be free to make its decisions in the morning — alternating hours, redesigning the

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goods that befit Gorzutpia, and setting suitable salaries. Somehow "Money itself will no longer confer any rights," declares the prime minister, but apparently it will continue to exist, together with prices, markets, and luxuries, which, presumably by governmental edict, will begin to wither away with the state. But before the state disappears altogether, Gorz cannot deny himself one delicious act of coercion: "After completing compulsory education, the prime minister went on, each individual would be required to put in twenty hours of work each week (for which he or she would earn a full salary), in addition to continuing whatever studies he or she desired."

This is no scenario; it is a childish "libertarian" Disneyland in which Gorz permits his readers to indulge in social spectacles on a cartoon level. The book itself could already be dismissed as an overdone comic strip were it not for the pits Gorz reaches when he reconnoiters the infamous "population problem." Here Gorz passes from Marx to Disney to Malthus and Garrett Hardin. "Twelve Billion People?" cries Gorz in alarm — and the reader is enjoined to tremble over the certitude of famine, epidemics, population pressure, resource exhaustion, and a classic game-theory scenario — "the tragedy of the commons." Whether Gorz knows that Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" is one of the opening shots in the emergence of ecofascism and the "lifeboat ethic" I do not know. But Hardin's views, like those of Malthus, are trotted out with the same aplomb as those of Marx. Accordingly, if the population growth rate is not slowed, "there will be 9 billion people in 1995, 40 billion in 2025, and 100 billion in 2075." By this time, Gorz says, "Catastrophe will be inevitable." Happily, he adds, "the Indian government knows something about this" — and one seriously wonders if Gorz has Indira Gandhi's forced sterilization program in mind when he celebrates "sterilization campaigns" as well as the Gorzian "achievement of a living standard that encourages a spontaneous birth rate," "agrarian reform" and the "emancipation of women." It is noteworthy that feminism, so vital to any libertarian "population" discussion, rates three words in the entire book.

What Gorz does here is simply embarrassing. His population projections, like those of the Population Foundation, deal with human beings as though they were fruit flies. His methodology implies an acceptance of neo-Malthusian demography. Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" mentality gains greater credibility and attention than does Josué de Castro's views in *The Geopolitics of Hunger*, which seem more like an afterthought than a serious program for analysis and action. The social roots of population growth, not to speak of feminism and Marx's critique of Malthus, are subordinated to hypothetical ratios of proliferation. The "Green Revolution" gets its obligatory wrist slap, but Gorz offers only a minimal explanation of the relation between famine and imperialism of, for that matter, hunger and geopolitics. Here the neo-Malthusian restatement of "original sin" (i.e., the population problem begins in the bedroom, not in the world's brokerage houses) acquires an extraordinary degree of eminence. The crisis appears more as a crisis of numbers than of social relations in which technical constraints like condoms are equally as significant as social factors. What ecology has done for Gorz is to confuse him. Far from enriching his outlook with the need for a nature philosophy, an ethics, the problems of society's interaction with the biotic world, and a radical practice, it has actually cultivated his most philistine intellectual qualities and his inner proclivity for ideological sensationalism. Despite its radical rhetoric, *Ecology as Politics* contains some of the worst, albeit fashionable, prejudices of the environmentalist movement, tastelessly decorated with Marxian terminology.

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I will not follow Gorz through his ritualized discussion of nuclear power and public health. If the readers have scanned Anna Gyorgy's *No Nukes!!* and Ivan Ilich's *Medical Nemisis*, they require no additional comment. The book concludes with a series of personal, largely "countercultural" vignettes of a Gorzean journey through California, titled: "The American Revolution Continues." To be frank, in California Gorz might just as well have looked for the world revolution — everything "continues" in one way or another in that part of the world. Needless to say, the vignettes include the prescribed "Jim," who is still active in campus politics; the indispensable "Susie," who hates California smog; "George," who practices socialism in one neighborhood; "Heinz," who has moved to California from Germany. It also contains my personal friends Lee Swenson and Karl Hess (the latter lives in West Virginia) and there is hardly anything Gorz can say about them that is not complimentary.

Perhaps the most interesting remarks in these vignettes center around Ralph Nader and Jerry Brown. Nader, Gorz tells his French readers, "believes that people have to organize and take power over their own lives" (p. 203). Having recently engaged in a brief verbal duel with Nader, I can attest to the fact that this consumer advocate is more oriented toward Establishment politics than popular action. Jerry Brown, in Gorz's sketch, is virtually characterized as a "neo-anarchist" (the term is Gorz's, not mine). Like all "neo-anarchists," no doubt, Jerry's "models are Ho Chi Minh, Gandhi, and Mao. His bedside reading is *Small Is Beautiful*. . . and he spends a lot of time at the Zen center." The French reader is further told that "Brown has become immensely popular. He refuses to live in the governor's mansion, he sleeps on a mattress on the floor of a rented apartment, and he makes his staff go on work retreats that can last from 7 a.m. to 2 p.m. Somewhat like Fidel Castro, he shows up where he is least expected. . ." etc., etc., etc. Linda Ronstadt receives no mention in this idyllic picture of the "neo-anarchist" governor of California, so it hardly pays to say more.

That a Marxist or a publicist trained in some kind of Marxism can believe that any governor of California is a credible figure does warrant some comment. It matters little what Brown says he is or what he claims he reads. What matters is that a supposedly leading French radical believes it and describes Brown's manufactured persona with an even modest degree of credulity. It now becomes painfully evident that Gorz's absurdities have a rationality of their own. Gorz's reality principle is hopelessly one-dimensional, indeed, surprisingly askew. The book itself is not simply a bizarre mixture of utterly contradictory theories and facts; it is a compelling symptom of the crisis of modern radicalism. The double meanings that Gorz gives to ecological thinking, decentralization, autonomy, the state, and his utopian scenarios for a new society become problems not of theoretical analyses but of social diagnoses. What appear as conflicting ideas in the book are not ideological contradictions; they are really cultural traits of an emerging era of intellectual confusion and incoherence as a normal condition of the international Left. If Herb Gintis can praise this book to the skies, if the reviews it receives in the radical press are in any way favorable, it will be because the Left itself has descended to unprecedentedly low depths — together with the culture in which it is rooted.

The most disquieting aspect of this theoretical and cultural regression is the inability of the radical social critics to distinguish between the differences in the premises and logic of profoundly disparate theories or even bear solemn witness to the internal contradictions that must inevitably cause them to clash with each other. Like those ponderous banks at the turn of the century that combined Greek columns with

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roccoco bas reliefs, leaving the viewer in an architectural limbo, radical theorists dip freely into disparate and profoundly contradictory traditions to fashion their blurred ideologies. To be out of focus is not merely fashionable today but absolutely necessary if one wishes to resonate with the prevailing culture. Gorz is merely one of the more vulnerable examples of this ideological eclecticism. Perhaps more clearly than most, he is the tombstone of an era when revolutionaries took their ideas seriously; when they criticized their opponents with ruthless logic; when they demanded clarity, coherence, and insight. One may agree or disagree with the Marx who wrote *The Critique of the Gotha Program*; but one cannot help but admire his stunning and unrelenting powers of critique, his willful demand for consistency, and his meticulous demand for coherence. With Gorz we enter an entirely different era — one where the state legislates anarchy into existence, where Marx must endure the company of Malthus, where centralized production exists together with decentralized communes, where workers' control is exercised under a planned economy, and where not only the state but the market "withers away." Neither Marx nor Bakunin, Engels nor Kropotkin, Lenin nor Malatesta is permitted to speak in his own voice. Gorz tunes them all in, out, or up as his journalistic needs require, like a television technician toying with his monitoring panel. Accordingly, fashion becomes a substitute for theory and the latest gimmick a substitute for serious practice.

Books such as *Ecology and Politics* are not merely a problem but a challenge. Will ideas become matters of serious concern or mere topics for radical chit-chat? Will revolution be the lived experience that literally provides the substance of life, or entertaining and expendable episodes? Will movements be guided by coherent ideas or dissolve into tasteless spectacles? To claim that these questions can be answered today would be mere pretension. But if truth should always be its own end, then the answer too should be clear enough. In any case, it will not be found in radical comic books that have been prepared by ideological cartoonists.

Murray Bookchin

Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*. Volume I: *The Founders*. Volume II: *The Golden Age*. Volume III: *The Breakdown*. Oxford University Press, 1978. $19.95 per volume.

In the career of any thinker, a time may come when old convictions no longer seem credible, when a familiar perspective seems unreliable, when previously shared beliefs seem exhausted, and yet when the outline of a faded confidence remains intact — a trace of faith legible enough to show and explain to others, at a juncture when such explanations seem necessary. A writer may then describe with special clarity the beliefs he is leaving behind, for having lived a way of thinking with passion, he can grasp both its limits and appeal. Perhaps he is not completely embittered by a sense of

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betrayal. Then he may have the patience and perspicacity to make his own crisis emblematic. It is the moment when insight and disillusion intersect. When I think of this moment among socialists, I think of books like Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon,* Franz Borkenau's *World Communism,* George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia,* Merleau-Ponty's *Adventures of the Dialectic* — and now Leszek Kolakowski's *Main Currents of Marxism.*

Such exiles can be irritating, particularly when they imply that those left behind are victims of bad faith. Partisans of the old ways may detect a great impoverishment in the thought of the exile, who, in turn, will often grope uncertainly for new criteria of judgment, or perhaps simply embrace a different kind of prejudice.

The exasperation of those reviewing Kolakowski's new book is certainly understandable. Harrington asks whether the author has "imprisoned" himself in a new ideology, "the scientistic version of social theory." Jay faults "a thoroughgoing positivism," apparently because Kolakowski accepts Popper's criteria for defining a science. And Lukes describes *Main Currents in Marxism* as the latest work "in the tradition of *The God That Failed.*"[1]

This is not the first time that Kolakowski has stirred controversy. When he became a prominent critic of Stalinist orthodoxy in Poland after 1956, his courage provided a model for young leftists in the West. Yet in the late Sixties, after he had been forced out of Poland, he became one of the most implacable foes of the New Left, angered by what he regarded as its infantile extremism. In the early Seventies, he published a series of essays questioning Marx's doctrine, in part by attacking the Stalinist state. Finally, in 1973 he summarized his position in one of the most celebrated polemics of the decade, an exchange of letters with E.P. Thompson in *The Socialist Register.*

Heresy is one thing, apostasy another. The editors of *The Socialist Register* felt compelled to disown Kolakowski's reply to Thompson, calling it a "tragic document"; his skepticism, praiseworthy when expressed as a revision of Marxism, was scolded for going beyond it.

But his current views can scarcely be dismissed out of hand, "tragic document" or no. In the case of his new book, Kolakowski has indeed written a work of blunt opinion, very much in the tradition of *The God That Failed.* But, as his reviewers have generally conceded, he has also produced the most comprehensive survey of Marxist doctrine in English, a study of uncommon intelligence and great erudition.

Kolakowski calls his survey "a handbook," and that it usefully is. But it is much more besides. The pointed prose and sharp judgments amount to a sustained effort to root out his own former faith — specifically, the kind of Marxism defended by Lukacs. As Kolakowski describes it, this Marxism hinges on the ability of the proletariat to usher in a *novus ordo seculorum.* Every worker potentially embodies "the self-awareness of humanity recovering its lost nature (a nature that really exists, not a normative ideal)." The task of the communist movement is to further, through the practical struggles of the working class, the "self-affirmation of humanity," the return of men "to their own essence," an act that inaugurates an entirely new era in human history (vol. II, p. 41).

Several things gall Kolakowski about this beatific vision. One is the way in which a

1. Michael Harrington, "Main Currents of Marxism," in *The New Republic* (February 3, 1979), pp. 28-32; Martin Jay, "Main Currents of Marxism," in *The American Historical Review,* vol. 85, n. 1 (February, 1980), pp. 83-84; Steven Lukes, "Low Marx," in *The New York Review of Books,* vol. XXVII, n. 9 (May 29, 1980), pp. 40-42.

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hope for redemption is pawned off as a scientific theory. Another is the pridefulness of the promise to surmount suffering in human affairs — a promise contradicted by the many terroristic regimes decorated in Marxist terms. Having experienced communist despotism firsthand, Kolakowski has more than an academic interest in the links between Marx's hope and man's fate in the existing Marxist states.

His conclusion is straightforward. Russian "Communism is not a mere 'degeneration' of Marxism, but a possible interpretation of it, and even a well-founded one, though primitive and partial in some respects." Efforts to revitalize Marxist theory now strike him as pointless. "As an explanatory 'system' it is dead, nor does it offer any 'method' that can be effectively used to interpret modern life, to foresee the future, or to cultivate utopian projections" (vol. III, p. 526 and p. 529).

As comments like this suggest, Kolakowski's overriding concern with Stalinism gives his book a polemical edge. This is no bland encyclopedia culling the conventional wisdom, but rather an intensely personal settling of accounts, written in a style that telegraphs its disenchantment on virtually every page.

In assessing Kolakowski's book, it may nonetheless help to approach it successively from three different angles, considering it first as an historical reference work, then as an argument about the totalitarian legacy of Marxism, and finally as a case for the sterility of Marxism as a theory.

As a handbook, *Main Currents in Marxism* stands alone. The most obvious competition is Lichtheim's *Marxism*, which pays more attention to the historical context. Yet Lichtheim lacks the philosophical learning of Kolakowski; he also omits many figures treated at length in *Main Currents*. G.D.H. Cole's *History of Socialist Thought* covers more ground, but Cole, without knowing German, was left blind in many areas (Lukacs, for one, has little place in his story). Z.A. Jordan's *Evolution of Historical Materialism*, which also stands comparison with the present work, focuses more narrowly on the emergence of Soviet Marxism; about Korsh, Gramsci and the Austro-Marxists, Jordan has nothing to say.[2] In sum, it seems fair to say that nothing in English quite rivals *Main Currents in Marxism*.

Kolakowski is a superb chronicler of ideas, with a gift for lucid exposition and an eye for the telling detail. He is also a savage and unyielding critic taking an almost perverse delight in the variety of human folly. The result is an entertaining survey, characterized by succinct summaries and acid commentary.

Of special significance is the book's first sentence, "Karl Marx was a German philosopher." This is emphatically a work of *philosophy*, written by a philosopher about what he takes to be a distinctive philosophy, indeed a metaphysic with its own theory of salvation. Who else treating the topic would include ten pages on Plotinus and only four on Adam Smith?

In general, the author admires geniuses, heretics, and flexible minds. He is generous to Karl Marx, Jean Jaures, Georges Sorel, Stanislaw Brzozowski, Antonio Gramsci, and, as a tactician, even Lenin. He despises dogmatists, dilettantes, and anyone he perceives as hostile to the canons of rational thought. He is especially contemptuous of Plekhanov, Trotsky, and Rosa Luxemburg. A special case is Lukacs, whom Kolakowski reveres as an exegete, but reviles as a doctrinaire: "His dogmatism was absolute, and almost sublime in its perfection" (vol. III, p. 307).

As with any survey, the reader may find omissions and differences in judgment.

2. I have omitted David McLellan's new book on Western Marxism because I have not yet read it.

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Lafargue gets a short chapter to himself, but William Morris is never mentioned. The Austro-Marxists (Adler, Bauer, Hilferding) are treated with respect, and Goldmann is described with some affection. But Kolakowski fails to make sense of Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, and he loses his temper with Marcuse. As for the New Left, some of us will be startled to learn that we aimed at "destroying. . .civilization from within, for the sake of an apocalypse of the New World of Happiness of which, in the nature of things, no description can be given" (vol. III, p. 415).

Such intemperate remarks help explain the reservations expressed by reviewers sympathetic to Marxism. What makes Kolakowski's work so troubling, though, is not any one gloss or slur, but instead a larger argument about the destiny of Marx's original doctrine.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess this argument, since the author tends to conflate two different accounts of the link between Marx and Stalin. The more plausible but weaker version of his argument runs as follows: Marx conjectured that humanity might achieve a new harmony by abolishing class conflict. Though Marx himself never advocated despotism as a means to this end, later revolutionaries, inspired by the doctrine, found despotic means indispensable. While "it would be absurd to say that the despotic forms of socialism were a direct outcome of the ideology itself," Marxist doctrine cannot be considered wholly innocent. "The Leninist-Stalinist version of Marxism was no more than a version, i.e., one attempt to put into practice the ideas that Marx expressed in a philosophical form without any clear principles of political interpretation" (vol. I, p. 419). In this form, Kolakowski's thesis will probably strike many *Telos* readers as unexceptionable, and also unoriginal.

But Kolakowski also offers a stronger argument, along the following lines: Marx was not simply a revolutionary and a social scientist, but above all a charismatic visionary. His conviction that the proletariat could realize the human essence "was not a scientific opinion but an ungrounded prophecy." This eschatology promised, as the outcome of communism, a society where contingency had been abolished. "What has hitherto been contingent, though miscalled freedom, derives from the power of objectified forces over man. To remove these forces and subject man's existence to his own freedom, abolishing the difference between empirical Being and species-essence, is to destroy the contingency of existence" (vol. I, pp. 373 and 403). This would liberate all the powers latent in every individual, enabled at last to win a new freedom of self-expression under socialism.

The essential precondition for this millenial flowering of individuality Marx believed to be the abolition of class conflict and alienation. But according to Kolakowski, this "presupposes that there can be a perfect identity between collective and individual interests, and that private, 'egoistic' motives can be eliminated in favor of a sense of absolute community with the 'whole.'" Once such perfect unity has been realized, society will have no need for such flawed institutions as representative government. The Bolsheviks grasped the logic of Marx's position perfectly. They tried implementing his doctrine in "the belief that social unity can be produced by institutional means." Indeed, Stalin attempted to institute Marxism in the most consistent way imaginable. "Marx took over the romantic ideal of social unity and Communism realized it in the only way feasible in an industrial society, namely, by a despotic system of government" (vol. I, p. 131; vol. III, pp. 160-161, and p. 527; cf. also vol. I, p. 307).

As has been pointed out by several reviewers, this line of argument is not convincing. For one thing, Marx himself never stressed *unity* in the fashion Kolakowski

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suggests. Nor did he urge liquidating private, egoistic motives. Instead, Marx and Engels once boasted of bringing "practical egoism to perfection." Communists, they wrote, by no means wished "to do away with the 'private individual' for the sake of the 'general,' self-sacrificing man." (It may also be noted that Marx's beliefs about the proletariat were not nearly so metaphysical and "prophetic" as Kolakowski supposes: even in 1843, the firsthand observation of poverty played a crucial role in his thinking.)[3]

In the second place, Kolakowski's strong thesis assumes that abolishing alienation in practice entails destroying institutions that mediate between the individual and the community, thus removing any safegurads for "negative freedom." Yet, the experience of the Soviet Union is not sufficient evidence to support this assumption, which the author nowhere clearly defends, apart from an elliptical assertion at the end of volume one that "the concept of negative freedom presupposes a society of conflict" (vol. I, p. 420). Kolakowski may be right about the premises of freedom, but such points need development.

Finally, and this is a third reason for skepticism about Kolakowski's argument, there is scant evidence that Lenin or Stalin were ever much interested in pursuing the eschatological element in Marxism, if indeed they were aware of it at all. This is not surprising. The various manuscripts where Marx was most explicit about wishing to abolish alienation were not published until the second quarter of the twentieth century. The orthodox Marxists of the Second International — the first teachers of Lenin and Stalin — cared little about creating societies of perfect unity. Taking Marx's philosophy of alienation seriously would in any case have risked discrediting the actually existing communist regimes.

The truth of the matter is that Kolakowski's strong thesis about the link between Marx and Stalin depends on ignoring his own evidence for Lenin's *novelty*. In his view, Lenin introduced into Marxism two important new propositions: first, that the working class spontaneously develops a bourgeois rather than a socialist consciousness; and second, that the true working class party is defined, not by the fact that workers belong to it, but rather by the socialist consciousness and communist ideology expressed by its leaders. On the basis of these innovations, Lenin was able to construct a consistent theory of one-party rule — the ideological foundation of Soviet despotism (vol. II, pp. 389-391). This does not mean that Leninism constitutes an unrecognizable distortion of Marx's original theory. But it is hard to see how an eschatological dream of abolishing alienation can be implicated in these innovations, or explain the Bolshevik recourse to one-party rule after 1917.

Kolakowski's argument about the totalitarian tendency of Marxism is therefore inconclusive at best. The same may be said of his dismissal of Marxism at the close of his survey. Once again, the nuances in his own commentary belie any sweeping rejection. In this respect, it is interesting to compare his position today with his views after 1956, when he defended a revisionist Marxism.

In the Fifties and Sixties, one of Kolakowski's most influential essays was "Permanent vs. Transitory Aspects of Marxism." Although there he rejects Marxism as a closed system, he also praises certain of its features: "a relentlessly rationalist orientation, a sense of radical criticism, a distaste for sentimentality in social research,

3. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Collected Works* (New York, 1975), vol. 5, pp. 247, 252. For what is quite unmetaphysical in Marx's approach to the proletariat, see Heinz Lubasz, "Marx's Initial Problematic: The Problem of Poverty," in *Political Studies*, n. 24 (March, 1976), pp. 24-42.

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a deterministic method." About the scientific validity of Marx's theory, however, he leaves no doubt. "His predictions as to the future course of history, especially, were as fallible as most predictions are. Such ideas retain only the significance of utopias, that of moral stimulus rather than scientific theory."[4]

He closes with this much-quoted passage: "'Marxism in this sense does not denote a doctrine that must be accepted or rejected as a whole. It does not mean a universal system, but a vital philosohical inspiration affecting our whole outlook on the world, a constant stimulus to the social intelligence and social memory of mankind. It owes its permanent validity to the new and invaluable points of view it opened before our eyes, enabling us to look at human affairs through the prism of universal history. . . ."[5]

This carefully-worded paragraph has been widely taken in recent months as proof of Kolakowski's change of heart — the implication being that his revisionist Marxism was far more sensible than his present apostasy. But the difference is by no means obvious. In *Main Currents of Marxism,* Kolakowski also concedes that Marx made "a tremendous contribution" to the understanding of history and society. While he still considers Marxism discredited as a scientific theory, he continues to find in Marx's original doctrine "a valuable heuristic principle" (vol. I, pp. 369-371).

Certainly, the author's tone has changed, as has his situation as a writer. He no longer needs to express himself in Delphic terms. Refusing to give Marxism the benefit of the doubt, he no longer places much emphasis on what he values in the original doctrine. Instead, by speaking of "trite aspirations," he tends to denigrate whatever moral stimulus he still finds in Marx's work. He writes as if all right-thinking souls were in agreement that a democratic and socialist society of free individuals would be a fine thing. (In his cynical flippancy, he seems to me quite mistaken.)

But though the emphasis and tone have radically changed, the logical substance of Kolakowski's position has not. As a revisionist and as an apostate, he has consistently held that Marx's doctrine is only one of the many interesting and important theories of man and society. "What is permanent in Marx's work will be assimilated in the natural course of scientific development." In the process, "the concept of Marxism as a separate school of thought will in time become blurred and ultimately disappear altogether" — an eventuality the author twenty years ago called "the greatest triumph of an eminent scholar."[6] As an all-embracing worldview, by contrast, Marxism is of use principally to the entrenched communist regimes. The chief difference between Kolakowski then and now in fact seems to be simply this: twenty years ago, he called himself a Marxist. Today he does not.

The difference is not merely semantic, since to continue identifying with Marxism is to support a principle of hope and an attitude of optimism, however guarded, toward a theory and a practice. This attitude is, I think, at the heart of E.P. Thompson's feeling of "injury and betrayal" when he confronted Kolakowski's later work. Perhaps the disquiet expressed by reviewers like Lukes, Harrington and Jay also comes down, not to quarrels over method and interpretations, but rather to the fact that Kolakowski adamantly refuses to identify with Marxism in any way — and this at a time when many still believe that Marxism, despite its problems, remains a uniquely

4. Kolakowski, "Permanent vs. Transitory Aspects of Marxism," in *Toward a Marxist Humanism,* trans. Peel (New York, 1968), pp. 178, 186. As this citation suggests, Kolakowski has for some time honored Popper's criteria for defining a science. Whether this makes him a "positivist," however, seems doubtful — especially since he has consistently criticized "scientism" and "positivism."

5. *Ibid.,* p. 187.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 186. Thus stated, these views seem to me eminently sensible.

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fruitful alternative to the pieties of orthodox liberalism and mainstream social science.

At one point in his "Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski," Thompson complains that "with you one feels that despair has. . . broken into reason's gates." Although I do not find the irrationality of despair so obvious, particularly for a Pole of Kolakowski's generation, Thompson seems to me perceptive: the unrelieved tone of futility running through *Main Currents of Marxism* is the truly aggravating issue. "And thus Prometheus awakens from his dream of power," Kolakowski writes at the close of volume one, "as ignominiously as Gregor Samsa in Kafka's *Metamorphosis*."[7] The author's case against Marxism is not, finally, so devastating as his relentless prose would have us believe. But after reading him, it is even more difficult to find inspiration in the lofty platitudes and exacting pedantry too frequently taken to warrant Marx's enduring significance for our times.

James Miller

7. Kolakowski, *Main Currents*, vol. I, p. 420. E.P. Thompson, "An Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski," in Miliband and Saville, eds., *The Socialist Register 1973* (London, 1974), p. 39.

Zdenek Mlynar, *Nightfrost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism*. Paul Wilson, trans. New York: Karz Publishers, 1980.*

Nightfrost in Prague is an immortal monument to the unbelievable naivété of the professional politicians of the Prague Spring, to their amazing ineptness in handling elementary social events, to their complete misunderstanding of history, of the Soviet Union and of their own chances. The same disarming good-natured simplicity of our Sacha, the ruthlessness of Cernik, the same lack of vision of a professional bureaucrat Bilak, the same sloppy Schlamperei in thinking of a Cisar, the same vulgar honesty of a Kolder (honest, according to his own value scale, p. 164 of the Czeck edition), the same shortsighted ambitiousness of a Smrkovsky — these qualities of reformist communist leadership are sparkling on every page of Mlynar's books because he shared all their qualities, all their ideas and sincerely and honestly believed in them — according to his own value scale, of course. The book is important, because with the same qualities of naivété and honesty, Mlynar provides the ultimate proof that amateurish leadership and criminal stupidity caused the defeat; no anti-communist right or left could provide a better argument against the reformers than the ex-communist reformer himself. Of course, he needed ten years to embrace ideas that his former opponents propagated during the national crisis, only to be labeled by the same Mlynar as irresponsible demagogues in *Rudé Pravo* (September 15, 1968). However, the dialectical contradictions worked in him: Mlynar saw the light and wrote an *apologia pro vita mea*, which proves that in all stages of his life he was right and honest, because by one's own standards everybody is in all circumstances, when he collaborates with Novotny, with Brezhnev or with Husak. If you yourself are the ultimate judge of moral values and history, is it not easy to prove your impeccable

*An earlier review of this book, by Robert J. Antonio, appeared in *Telos* 44 (Summer 1980), pp. 233-239. A section of Mlynar's book titled "From Prague to Moscow: August 1968" has appeared in *Telos* 42 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 21-55.

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democratic record by serving Stalin and little Stalins and isn't history itself seriously erring if it rejects your own leadership? Of course it does, read the book.

The unique and strange value of this book lies in the unintended but convincing proof that reform communism — read Stalinism — is a theoretical and practical dual paradox, because the Stalinist model is structurally incompatible with the reforms; but the leaders who try to mix fire and water do not know it, and so, they are trying to maintain the Stalinist structure and to reform it at the same time. What a classical exercise in Camusian absurdity by believers in historical inevitability. The ultimate black humor, however, lies in the astonishment of the same reformers — Dubcek's in the critical night, Smrkovsky's in 1974, and Mlynar's in 1978 — when, after the defeat, they see the cruel logic of the Soviets, but still justify their own ineptness by their own good intentions! Suddenly, the defeated ones are advocating moral standards, as if they have flunked all classes in Marxist dialectics or even the message of a Machiavelli. They — the Marxist leaders — have not learned that good intentions do not justify the bad outcome and that history is a malicious godess favoring the victors. To read Mlynar's book brings a bitter satisfaction to all those participants of Prague Spring 1968 who had absolutely no confidence in all these national heroes in the reformed communist party and who had the bad luck to be ten years ahead of the Politburo members. When their farcical performance in Cierna and Moscow is presented as a tragedy, then we must correct their self-delusions, because they cease to be funny. If one reads the events in the August 1968 Moscow discussions, when the kidnapped Czech government was signing its death warrant, my goose pimples are not the result of what Brezhnev said but of the surprise that such political ABC's created in reformers like Mlynar, who were astonished by the absolutely obvious power games they learned in Moscow a few years earlier! I hold the Russians primarily responsible for the invasion, but not for the defeat for which the national reform communist heroes bear full responsibility when they decided not to defend themselves and the nation. Unforgivable — this time not by their own moral standard of honesty. The Czech leaders, not the Russians, were conducting the political business as typical sons of their nation, because they were totally unaware what they were doing and played the old game of Czech history: let us show the West and East how to shape history, let us play again messiahs of Europe. Now, who were the irresponsible demagogues and the romantic dreamers, when they needed a Brezhnev to tell them that the frontier of the Soviet empire lies at the Elbe and that the Bohemian Forest is their own Soviet border? The only man who knew that all along was Gustav Husak, and without any sympathy for him I must confess that the last thing I would wish is his replacement by Dubcek.

In our national crisis, it is always the Czech leadership that gives up first and then passes the responsibility to others; it is us who failed to defend our state in 1938, the democracy in 1948, and the sovereignty in 1968, only to blame the corrupt West and the cynical Soviets after both occupations. Is it not strange that the gap between what we think we are and we can be, becomes visible exactly in these existential "limiting situations," that is, when the crucial choice becomes unavoidable? And then — we choose the wrong option— On the other hand, the national self-delusion that we can save the world and show the way to Europe is a logical compensation of the bitter fact — hardly remembered today — that since the Habsburgs came to the Bohemian throne, the Czechs lived under foreign domination most of the time, the Czech state was not independent either *de jure* or *de facto*, and that we simply do not have the

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national capacity to produce at least a reasonable leadership which could save us from ourselves. Well, *c'est la vie de la Bohème*. We cherish the non-existing independence and sovereignty so much that we think we are independent because we believe it; the unrequited love turns to hatred when we act with the cherished emotion and see the disastrous results. Then, we cease to cooperate with history and we capitulate without a fight. How familiar the scenario that took place in Moscow, how new for Mlynar! It is hardly understandable that a man who participated in the 1968 events as a professional politician, as a member of a Politburo of a communist party, and as an individual who belonged to the innermost circles of power, does not even raise the decisive questions. We cannot accuse him that "Mlynar obchazi Kreml," that he avoids the issues, because he — honestly, by his own standards — does not see them at all. How could he, if he was, since his youth, happy among the appartchiks at the secretariats where the stench of duplicating machines provided the lyrical flavors of his first love, where his intellectual fiber was blossoming among secret memoranda, and where not Marx's ideas but Party directives provided the intellectual cradle for a future politician who received the finishing touches at Moscow University? When human existence itself is reduced to the exemplary being of a bureaucratic organizer and when the author proudly announces that he really lived at the secretariat, how can we expect any sensitivity for that strange, amorphous, undisciplined and dangerously spontaneous chaos that rages outside the party headquarters and is just called life or uncensured history? What happens when the appartchiks recognize that there is life outside and that they were wrong? They give up, stop fighting — what else do you expect from the realists of power? Resign, and return to entomology.

What is strange is that a man who has had both his hands in the making of the history of 1968 does not see himself as co-responsible for the outcome and obviously believes that good intentions are enough as an apology for the bitter end. Mlynar is willing to talk in the majestic plural, for the generation, for reformsit communist, etc., but he does not understand that individuals and especially leaders are responsible for themselves in history, not for history itself. Individuals are responsible for what they do, not for what they think that they do, and no motivation can whitewash the crimes of the leadership of the Communist Party. Mlynar can absolve himself by writing the book about his own belief, that he was not responsible for the loss of the most treasured possession of a nation — its independence and sovereignty. History does not forgive, and does not blame either — it simply remains with the Soviet army. He does not accept the responsibility of a leader and he does not grasp that certain Czechs — guess who — are primarily responsible for the outcome. What is even more startling is a complete absence of criteria with which to judge history, social structures, and his own political behavior. Instead of accepting either the logic of class struggle, the Christian love of one's neighbor or the rules of democratic socialism as a set of firm standards for judgment about the past, the author is constantly dealing with his own opinions about Stalinist reality, as if his true believer's standpoint would explain the reality itself and as if the motivation with which police pressures or totalitarian violence is applied would exculpate the violence itself. And so, we learn that the Soviet Union was a bastion of progress, that Stalinism was, for the author, identical with socialism and in all dubious actions of the Novotny government, Mlynar disarmingly states that he sincerely believed that was the correct thing to do. He uses his particular life experience of an appartchik as the ultimate criterion of history, without dealing with the harsh reality of bureaucratic or totalitarian regimes, which was well known to the Trotskyite left or the conservative right soon after Stalin took power. The results are

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his constant attempts to refuse Stalinism by Stalinism, an ideological confusion in which he just erred with the "seduced generation" — there was no such generation — for which the reality was the approved party line. Mlynar's thinking is typcial for the reformers and its components — later called socialism with a human face — were the only "theory" — which was decisive for the reform communists. They never grasped — until the bitter end of expulsion and the final goodbye to comrades in the men's room — why for one quarter of a century the Soviet bosses were pleased with them and now they are not, and why the storm has thrown them from the firm chair in the warm womb of the secretariat into the cold reality of the hostile world.

Traumatic experience, for a bureaucrat, sure. Mlynar presents himself as a typical spokesman for a generation — what an insult to Pavel Kohout — but his career is just a classical development of an opportunist apparatchik, a typical career of a politician in any country and in any party. *Junge Revolutionäre — alte Hofräte*. Nothing new, but we should not judge any politician by the consistency of his moral profile. What is new is a surprising fact that the logic of opportunism has led a hard-core bureaucrat — and many other reform communists — to break with the party machine. When has that happened? Exactly at the time when the non-opportunistic hard-liners wanted to stick to the Soviet Party line, to the principles of strengthening the class struggle and all the precious formulas which Mlynar believed when studying Stalinism in Moscow. The crisis was triggered by the sudden incompatibility between theory and practice, his chair and his heart, between the leaden bottom and a clear head. Mlynar did everything to prevent such a break with the party — the beacon of truth and directions for all apparatchiki — and he held the chair he was sitting on by all the powers he had until the Soviets had written him off. The ultimate wisdom of the bureaucrat is: hold to your chair, where would you place your leaden bottom if you had no chair? Would you start working? No, fight for the chair, and defend the position from the worst competitors. Mlynar describes his career in the autobiographical passages himself. We can only add that he did not belong to the centrist group in the 1960s, but to the conservative faction of Novotny, Hendrych and Koucky, which has massacred writers and *Literarny noviny* in Fall 1967, but disassociated itself from Novotny in Spring 1968. The same Zdenek Mlynar has seen new opportunity, became the party spokesman for the intellectuals as a Politburo member and became the reformer, writing a new constitution! Unbelievable, but true; a clear-cut case of opportunism. The bosses change: what an opportunity for an ambitious Soviet trustee! In the next critical three months betwen April and June he opposes the reformers as much as he can, successfully prevents independent groups from emerging from the underground and even today he believes that Dubcek moved too fast, although other prominent reformers — Josef Smrkovsky, Jiri Pelikan and Ota Sik — have expressed just the opposite opinion, namely that Dubcek's main mistake was that he moved too slowly in these critical months. In August 1968, Mlynar plays again the "centrist" card with Svoboda, arriving to Moscow not as a hostage but as a mediator. And soon after the return, it is Zdenek Mlynar, not yet Gustav Husak, who becomes the first "realist" and presents on television a shameless credo of all collaborators in his September 13, 1968, address. An obligatory reading for those who do not take autobiographies at face value.

Soon after, the Soviets wrote him off, embarrassed him a little with his wife's trip to Germany and Mlynar grasped that he had lost the game. The same man who a few years ago could write classical Stalinist articles for the Soviet prominent propaganda journal *For a Lasting Peace* — more obligatory reading — realized how bad the

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coming times would be — and instead of being pushed out, he resigned as some others did, before being thrown out of the party. The same fate was in store for Dubcek's prime minister Oldrich Cernik, whose gentlemanly remark about his own fate is quite telling without hundreds of pages: "Prosral jsem pozici i cest." "My position and my honor have been flushed down the toilet." The loss of the ultimate certainty — of the party chair — had a beneficial effect on Mlynar, because without the benefits attached to it, he could for the first time think independently of the party line — and he did. The result is the most confused Marxist book I have ever read — the third obligatory reading — namely, his attempt to defend the lost Prague Spring at the international forum of Communist Parties, a horrifying example that indeed represented the level of thinking among reformers during and after Prague Spring. If that was reform communism, we do not have to regret its defeat, because with the exception of the confusion about democratic ideas there is no progress beyond the clarity of Stalinist cruel but correct formulas of a bureaucratic dictatorship. Then Mlynar starts cooperating with non-communist groups and as a chartist leaves the country in 1977, closing the cycle from orthodox Stalinism to social democratic convictions on the Western televisions, competing again with Pavel Kohout, whose Stalinist dedication in poetry ended in a similar vicious circle. Many Czechs and Westerners, many Stalinists and Trotskyites, many theoreticians right and left knew all along that reform communism was just pure junk, but it is nice to hear that as a belated confession from the reformists themselves, as a TV entertainment for the masses. And what an immortal gem, what a burial monument to reform communism is erected in the words of a Politburo member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who — with the usual disarming honesty — says about himself and his colleagues, the architects of the debacle of 1968: "Jsme vlastne blloci, ale nase blbost ma podobu reformniho komunismu" (p. 297, too much for the English translator, who used subtler words and the past tense instead of Mlynar's present tense: "We were really fools, but our folly was the ideology of reform communism.") Truth comes late, but better late than never. Some Stalinist self-criticism was not wasted in Zdenek Mlynar's Moscow education, but most of it certainly did not bear the expected fruit.

Ivan Svitak

Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979. 307 pp. $17.50.
Carl E. Schorske, *Fin de Siècle Vienna, Politics and Culture.* New York: Knopf, 1979. 378 pp. $15.95.
Frederic V. Grunfeld, *Prophets Without Honour.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979. 347 pp. $15.

Three more books, all beautifully produced and well-written, have been added to the recent crop of works circling around the concept of "modernity." Perhaps one should include in this review some side glances at earlier publications such as Peter Gay's *Freud, Jews and Other Germans* (Oxford University Press, 1978), Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin's *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (Simon & Schuster, 1973), William McGrath's *Dionysian Art and Populist Politics* (Yale University Press, 1974), and also two previews: the speech Jürgen Habermas gave on the occasion of his acceptance of the

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Theodor Adorno Prize (partially published in *Die Zeit*, September 1980) and Marshall Berman's *All That's Solid Melts into Thin Air* (Simon & Schuster, forthcoming), as well as the anthology, *Modernism*, by Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarland (Penguin, 1976).

What do these works, so different in scope, purpose, and execution, have in common? I think they indicate a significant shift of emphasis and interest: from the fiery and heroic "Weimar intellectuals" of the 1920s toward the more problematic period that preceded them; away from Berlin and Frankfurt (for these were "Weimar") to Vienna and other places that had been the cradle of modernity, like Paris and St. Petersburg.

Following Walter Benjamin, Berman begins "modernity" with Baudelaire and defines it as acceptance of the city culture with all its inner contradictions and ambiguities. In a brilliantly written chapter, which violates every accepted canon of Marxist studies, he then treats *The Communist Manifesto* to a symbolist interpretation, like a piece of modern poetry. Next, he uses the Russian novel to explore the significance of St. Petersburg, in particular the Nevsky Prospect. If I read this correctly, he is trying to tie modernism and nihilism more solidly to the social movement of the nineteenth century and thereby to widen the notion of modernism, which Bradbury and McFarlane describe rather vaguely as "a highly conscious artifice taking us behind familiar reality," or as "the scenario of our chaos."

For it is indeed bewildering that "modernity" includes "modernization" on the one hand, a term that invokes rationalization, urbanization, technology and commerce, and on the other hand the self-consciousness and dubiety of a mannered "modernism" in literature and the arts of the last century — a movement that has more affinities with romanticism than with technocracy. Habermas also reminds us that the word is much older and is related to *la mode* (fashion), but that every movement in history that overthrows a classical model in the name of modernity must strive to become classical in its turn, and must also evade the danger of becoming the fashion of degenerating into virtuosity. Habermas sees modernity as a succession of distinct revolutions, each of which seems to have a significance of its own. Berman sees it rather as a continuous process of fulfillment and self-destruction, as his title indicates.[1]

But perhaps the conflict between modernization and modernism is not as accidental or as mistaken as Berman will have it. Max Weber has indicated that the most characteristic trait of modernity is the loss of cultural unity, of the autonomous pursuit of truth, beauty, and morality in many disparate fields, each without regard for the other or for the common cultural mould from which they originally sprang, each following its own law not only to an ideal of perfection but toward the creation of a realm of its own, ending in a preoccupation with its means independent of any content. Art thus becomes not only *"l'art pour l'art"* but art *about* art; science no longer discusses results but methodology; philosophy is no longer the pursuit of wisdom and ultimate knowledge but the formalistic analysis of games; ethics has abandoned the claim to be a normative science and has been revealed, since Nietzsche, as the justification of various life instincts.

Each of these fragmented endeavors, moreover, may strive to recoup the lost totality by imposing its own outlook as the total view. But modernity in its most specific sense is the glorification of this state of suspended existence, the permanent explosion, the illusion of emancipation in the fulfillment of destruction. "In the destructive element

1. As though to emphasize the shifting focus of modernity, Cassell's German-English Dictionary (1936) defines "*Die Moderne*" as "the realistic school of writers after 1884." By this reckoning, we are now in the post-modern age.

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immerse; that is the way," wrote Joseph Conrad. I.A. Richards cited this line in a review of T.S. Eliot's *The Waste Land*, and Stephen Spender in turn used it as title for his collected literary essays on Henry James, Kafka, T.S. Eliot, D.H. Lawrence, James Joyce, and Yeats.

When the obsession with destruction and newness ceases to be a literary-psychological exercise and extends it totalitarian claim to the fields of politics and society, we obtain the generational movement — the subject of Robert Wohl's important work. Of course, there have been many movements in history that claimed to represent a new generation, or that directed their appeal to youth in particular. It is even natural for a revolutionary movement to do so. Indeed, the *Sturm und Drang*, the Russian anarchists, Mazzini's democratic "Young Europe" of the 1840s, the Social-Democrats in the nineteenth century (and among them again their radical wing, "the Young Ones"), and even "the Young Turks" — to name only a few — have claimed youth as their specific asset. But it is quite a different thing to make youth itself, newness for its own sake, the *cause* for which the movement stands and, moreover, to underpin the revolt of one generation with a theory that varies Marx's famous formula to read: All history hitherto has been the history of generational struggle.

No doubt, from Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons* to Jakob Wassermann's *The Maurizius Case,* European literature has been studded with father-son tragedies. Everywhere movements sprouted, magazines flourished, theories spread under the name of Youth, *Jugend, Giovinezza, Jeunesse, Juventud.* The famous Munich weekly *Jugend* promoted *Art Nouveau* (Nouveau!), which in German was called *Jugendstil*; the youth movement propagated a radically new lifestyle and sang, "With us the New Age strides" (again, its virtue seems to be newness). And, after all, this was the generation that produced the theory of the Oedipus complex. Those born between 1880 and 1900 were the first generation conscious of something that "even the most intelligent, aware, and unconventional parents could not share" (Carl Zuckmayer, author of irreverent comedies and of *The Devil's General*).

As the rebellion of youth offered itself as an alternative to the social revolution, it also challenged the prevailing trust in the rationality of human development and replaced it by a new myth: faith in the instincts. This transvaluation of values entailed a different view of the elites that were to open the future, and in particular a new look at the intellectuals's place in society and at the role of the Jews as pioneers of modernity. These two contenders for leadership had been closely identified with liberalism; they were now on the defensive. As they abandoned the hope of power, their concerns shifted from mastery of the outer world to the exploration of "the interior," from politics to psychology, from truth and beauty to aestheticism and sensibility, from the bourgeois values of work and achievement to an artistic orientation toward enjoyment and contemplation.

Wohl is interested in all three aspects of this movement: its specific claim of representing a new generation, its set of radically new values, and the general theory of generational change. The latter was developed well before World War I, especially by the Frenchmen Henri Massis, François Mentré, Ernest Psichari; the italians Giovanni Papini and Giuseppe Prezzolini; the Spaniard Gabriel Maura; and was even then tied up with nationalist and elitist ideas by Maurice Barrès and the older Julius Langbehn (author of a book, *Rembrandt als Erzieher*, that was to become the bible of the German youth movement). However, it was only after World War I that the mixture of generational theory, Nietzschean values, and virulent nationalism became explosive, expecially in Germany and Italy.

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The first problem every such theory has to face is, of course, the fact that people are born every year, making it difficult to assign a date to a "generation"; for that term now no longer comprises all people of all ages living between two specified dates but only those under thirty, fated to be of one mind by some biological mystery. But let us concede (with Karl Mannheim's famous essay of 1929, *Das Problem der Generationen*, which Wohl analyses at length) that people who are young at a specific historical juncture, who suffer similar educational influences and who live through identical experiences, may turn to a particular set of ideals. We further concede that from 1789 on European historians discern a series of rather neatly separated periods of about thirty to forty years — revolution and war to 1815, reaction and romanticism to 1848, liberalism and realism into the 1880s, imperialism and modernism to 1914, crisis and fascism to 1945 — and find it easy to assign a *"Zeitgeist"* to each of them. But earlier on Progress, Youth, radicalism, contempt of the philistines had passed for signatures of the left, e.g., in Georg Herwegh's *21 Bogen aus der Schweiz* (1841) and in the Russian students' "Manifesto" of 1861.

Moreover, does not the generational theory require that the revolt of the young is directed *against* the *Zeitgeist*? In particular, the movement we identify with "modernity" proclaimed itself the owner of values or attitudes transcending the current notions of what the *Zeitgeist* was. It rejected materialism, rationalism, and scientism, which to its mind expressed the conformity of the bourgeois who capitulated before economic and political necessity; it rejected the Enlightenment, which had introduced the reign of Reason; it abhorred all rationality and gave itself over to "Sensibility." Romantic populism and nativism then turned these attitudes into an ideology of reaction, forgetting or denying the emancipatory impulses that linked Nietzsche to the Enlightenment. Adorno called Nietzsche "the reckless climax of the Enlightenment," but this dialectic of modernism remains unexplained and unexplored in Mr. Wohl's otherwise stimulating book.

Should we accept the nationalist legend that the young worshippers of irrationalist nationalism alone represented "the generation of 1914"? Were there no others? Think of the Vienna circle of neo-positivists, the neo-Kantians, the literature of social significance, the great European labor movement, which in some countries had become "the strongest of all parties" as its anthem proclaimed; the urban renewal movement, "life reform," and a host of other endeavors, none of which was working in tandem with the mood Barres and Montherlant stood for. Wohl himself admits that it is "hard to understand that the author of *Les Jeunes Filles* and *Port-Royal* could have been considered typical of any social group, least of all his generation." Why then allow them to monopolize the title of spokesmen for that generation? Their style does not betray a "modern" sensibility, and some of them fought actively against modernism in the arts.

It is true that a few nationalist writers dealt with the experiences of WWI in the modernist idiom -- among them were Filippo Marinetti, Louis Ferdinand Céline, Ernst Jünger — but more modernist writers were on the Left: Ernst Toller, Fritz von Unruh, Siegfried Sassoon, Henri Barbusse. On the other hand, most nationalist writers, as well as most opponents of war wrote in traditional style. It is therefore not possible to associate "modernism" with either the Right or the Left. Yet, most historians use the term "front generation" for modernist nationalist literature.

Finally, Wohl finds it difficult to make his "generation" truly European. For France, Germany, and Italy, to be sure, he can cite enough proto-fascists, abject collaborationists, and precursors (thought, strangely, Céline is missing; so are Walther Rathenau and his murderer, Ernst von Salomon, who acquired Herostratic fame). But

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for England he has to make do with secondary figures like Rupert Brooke and T.E. Lawrence (surprisingly, not D.H. Lawrence), and his use of Sassoon only reminds us of the absence of other anti-war poetry. For Spain, he does not cite José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of the Falange, but his teacher José Ortega y Gasset, who indeed had a theory of generational change and did support a vitalist philosophy, but whose lifework as a liberal sets him apart from the type that dominates the rest of the book. In the end, indeed, Mr. Wohl admits that "by 1920 the word 'youth' had only a tenuous connection with chronological age," and that "the idea of a generational coalition remained a chimera, pursued by intellectuals of weak political instincts."

Yet, he rightly insists that an illusion may also make history happen and therefore must be studied seriously. Rarely have people of one generation had as harrowing an experience of historical hiatus as the "front generation" of 1914. But the shock of the war only heightened the awareness of a crisis that had been smoldering in Europe since the beginning of the century. The writers and scientists who had undermined the confidence in a unified cosmos governed by reason and commensurable with human knowledge — Sigmund Freud, Albert Einstein, Henri Bergson, Benedetto Croce, Vilfredo Pareto, Georges Sorel, Max Weber, Raymond Poincaré — had done their significant work before the war. The "generation of 1914" went into that war with a warped mind, deeply disturbed by doubts about the foundations of its Judeo-Hellenic culture or even animated by the lust to destroy them. It did not suffer from war but glorified it.

If modernism can be defined at all, cultural despair and consciousness of the ambiguity of all values, relativism and decisionism, living dangerously in every sense of the word — these would have to be its ingredients. Under the surface of booming empires, the worm of modernism was gnawing at the core of the white man's dominion even while the proletarians were preparing to take over its middle class culture.

The generational movement of 1914 and after offered nothing but its youth — and that it was prepared to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism. Its dynamism was spent for the sake of being dynamic: "Every article has the thunder and the sound of a proclamation; ...every title is a program; every criticism is a taking of the Bastille; ...every old man is the enemy" (Papini). (No revolutionary, of course, would call his paper *Le Père Duchesne* today.) Or: Robert Musil is quoted to the effect that time was running fast but one no longer knew where to, nor where was up and where was down, forward or backward. "We revolted without any other program than that of insults for those who lied to us, without any other demand than a justice we did not deserve" (Jean Prévost). Such attitudes could lead to some form of fascism (and did, as Wohl shows in more than one case), just as today it may lead to some New Left nihilism. Jean Luchaire, who ended as Hitler's collaborator, had begun his career with the declaration that the new generations were "relativistic, ...technocratic, nonconformist, and aware that their mission was to prepare a new world that was in the process of being born."

To check the one-sided claim of the generational movement, the perfect antidotes are Peter Gay and Janik-Toulmin. They show that the new and the old were not so neatly separated but came intertwined. Both remark, for instance, how "modern" the arch-Beckmesser, Eduard Hanslick, reads today, or how "bourgeois" in their private lives were many of the men who revolutionized our thinking. Janik-Toulmin's thesis is that Wittgenstein has been misunderstood by those who count him as a member of the neo-positivist circle of Schlick — that his real enterprise was to make sayable that which the *Tractatus* condemned to silence. But the possibility of such a misunderstanding shows how closely the "two Wittgensteins" were intertwined. Likewise, "modernization"

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and the "modern sensibility" are the two disparate facets of a culture that can no longer be seen as a unit. The relation between the "two cultures" is precisely the problem that makes writing a cultural history of the past hundred years so difficult. It seems impossible to seize the conflicting tendencies in one set of categories.

The difficulty is reflected in the way these books are organized. They are not histories in the traditional style but employ a guerrilla approach to their theme: unconnected chapters throw different lights on it from various sides, hoping that the elusive subject will jell to a notion in the reader's mind. Peter Gay has a chapter on Freud, another on Brahms, one on Wagner's conductor Hermann Levi, one on Hanslick, one on Berlin Jews. Marshall Berman juxtaposes Karl Marx, Baudelaire, St. Petersburg. Janik-Toulmin go from Lueger and Schönerer to Herzl and Schnitzler, then to Kraus, Schoenberg, and Hofmannsthal, then to Mauthner and Wittgenstein. Schorske calls his method "post-holing": having found no unifying *Zeitgeist* and having rejected the "diachronic chord," he seeks to regain the analytic vitality for intellectual history by using various methods to analyze the literary responses of Schnitzler and Hofmannsthal, the architectural problems of Vienna's "Ring" (the modern boulevards built at the end of the nineteenth century), the new politics of nationalism, Freud's interpretation of dreams, the paintings of Gustav Klimt and Oskar Kokoschka, and the music of Schoenberg — all, incidentally, with rare sensitivity.

Is this an ineptitude of the authors? Or has it become impossible to write history in the grand manner? Does their style follow the elusiveness of the subject, or is the pursuit of synthesis an illusion? Historians often write their socio-economic introduction, only to forget it in the remaining chapters; and most general histories have a chapter on culture almost as an appendix or supplement. Here, the heroic attempt has been made to let socio-political history illuminate intellectual history, and intellectual history illuminate social history. Schorske's analysis of the "Ring" is a brilliant example of how it can be done; another is Berman's story of the Nevsky Prospect in St. Petersburg. But one would like to see the sample integrated in the book. An important link between the economy and the intellectual development for Vienna, for example, might be the subjective theory of value, and in particular marginal utility — which certainly was a Viennese a product as a Strauss waltz; but although Böhm-Bawerk had demonstrable contacts with the modern movement, both personally and intellectually, the cultural significance of his theories has not been analyzed since Bukharin called them "the economics of the rentier." (Menger is briefly mentioned by Janik-Toulmin.)

Another lacuna, surprising in the work of an author who gave us *German Social Democracy 1905-1917,* is Austro-Marxism: Otto Bauer's brilliant discussion of Austria's nationalities problem, Rudolf Hilferding's lucid analysis of finance capital, Karl Renner's pioneering work on law. Victor Adler, the secretary of the Second International, appears briefly in Janik-Toulmin because of his youthful association with Freud on the one hand and with the Pan-German rabble-rouser Georg von Schönerer on the other. To that meeting of two enthusiastic youths, Schorske's student William J. McGrath attributes also the *Grossdeutsch* orientation of the Social-Democrats (which mainstream historians so far had seen as a legacy of the great democratic revolution of 1848-49). Also, the AF of L leaders who issued the call for an international Day of Solidarity on May 1, 1890, would be amused to learn that the May Day parade was a "Wagnerian" dream of Victor Adler. While I am carping, let me also wonder why a book on the Generation of 1914 mentions neither Jean Jaurès, who was shot on the day the war broke out, nor Friedrich Adler, who shot the Austrian Minister of War.

It is the bane of cultural history that the underside of society rarely figures in it.

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Schorske and Janik-Toulmin make up for this lack, however, by their discussion of racist, nationalist, anti-Semitic populism. Not socialism but what later became the Hitler movement, they seem to say, was the real alternative to the bourgeois-bureaucratic compromise regime, with its heavy sprinkling of Jewish influence, that ruled the double monarchy. The evidence is overwhelming that one cannot discuss Viennese culture (or finance, for that matter) without discussing Jews, anti-Semitism, and Zionism.

Mr. Grunfeld's book is an edifying and engrossing celebration of the Jewish contribution to German and Austrian culture. But its ideas are not serious, and its structure is a mystery. What do Freud and Gustav Mahler do in one chapter? Karl Wolfskehl (a follower of Stefan George) and Carl Sternheim, the expressionist satirist in another? Kafka and Kurt Tucholsky in a third? Einstein and Schoenberg obviously had in common that they were constructing "systems," and after quoting Goethe's remark that for Jews, "Energy is everything. Every Jew, no matter how insignificant, is engaged in some decisive and immediate pursuit of a goal," Grunfeld sagely adds: "It seems not entirely a coincidence that it was Einstein who later applied this principle to the whole universe." On a random page (26) he travels, via free association, from Franz Marc (whose ancestors' name was Markus) to Stefan Zweig, to Brecht's *Three-Penny Opera,* whose composer was a Jew, to *Wozzeck,* whose composer was not a Jew but had a Jewish teacher, and the first performance of which was rehearsed 130 times by a Jewish conductor. Meanwhile, the Prussian Academy of Arts had elected Max Liebermann to be its president, while *Der Sturm,* the expressionist magazine, was published by Herwarth Walden (Lewin — we are still on p. 26), whose wife was Else Lasker-Schüler. While all this information is interesting (did you know that Johann Strauss's father was a Jewish innkeeper in Budapest? So much for the "Viennese" spirit of waltz.), it reveals nothing. The author's plaint that he is dealing with a "génération maudite" is justified by his own confusion rather than the *Zeitgeist.* Nor do we learn why, through what historical-sociological function, Jews became so prominent in German culture between 1880 and 1930.

Peter Gay and Schorske answer with a theory on which they converge from different sides: culture was one of the fields that lent itself to creative expansion for quick minds. Jews had always been communicators: theater, press, and lectern offered opportunities in a climate that was alert and critical. Above all, culture also offered social mobility to its consumer; since sponsorship of the arts was a proof of having "arrived," Jewish audiences became crucial for literary and artistic success. Mr. Grunfels quotes a bitter remark by Thomas Mann to the effect that no one will amount to much whose works are enjoyed only by true Teutons. He could have added similar observations by Theodor Fontane, by Gottfried Benn, and there were many more who merely thought so.

The story of Jews in German culture brings out in high relief the dialectics of culture. Some Jews indeed were over-eager to appropriate cultural goods just as they rented fashionable houses on the Ring: as a token of success and legitimation; others had appropriated culture so ardently that they were able to develop it further independently, to bring it up to date, to make it responsive to the needs of new generations. In many ways, the Jewish middle class merely imitated the gentile masters, adopted their ideals and prejudices, copied their houses and customs. But this assimilation occurred when the German bourgeoisie itself had lost its confidence in progress and rationality.

The Austrian bourgeoisie, Schorske says, had never been very courageous. The liberal administration of the 1870s had not been successful; after its defeat in the 1880s

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the bourgeoisie, and with it the Jews, turned once again to the imperial bureaucracy for protection from both the Social-Democratic and the Christian-Social (anti-Semitic) mobs. Culturally, too, it followed the lead of the aristocrats, imitated their tastes and manners, and substituted for its own work ethics the easy-going, hedonistic life styles of a leisure class. Sponsoring the arts, showing sensibility became marks of distinction for those who had no ancestors and no talent for enjoying themselves with horses, cards or women (a failing, Mr. Grunfeld adds, with which Jews were cursed in particular).

Originally, the tastes and convictions of these newly rich and newly ennobled bourgeois would run to an academic idealism (as Schorske shows brilliantly in his analysis of Vienna's *Ringstrasse*). But the dishonest pseudo-baroque and gingerbread architecture of the gay nineties had to arouse shame and embarrassment in their better educated, more refined sons. This generation created a style and a philosophy of its own, partly by completing the liberal tendencies but partly in rebellion against them. Repudiating its bourgeois material origins, it pushed deeper into the uncharted frontier areas of idealism and subjectivity; in search of authenticity it eventually came to reject the traditional aesthetics of beauty in favor of an esoteric realm of private cults. Schoenberg, Hofmannsthal, and Wittgenstein created their own worlds of sensitivity. And it was precisely in this not so vigorous, not so up-to-date Vienna, seemingly a cultural backwater, that the marsh plants of fetid modernism could breed.

Perhaps this theory explains too much. Modernism was cultivated in Bloomsbury as truly as in Vienna. If the underdeveloped class consciousness of the Viennese bourgeoisie explains Klimt, how then does the well-developed class consciousness of the British bourgeoisie jibe with Beardsley or the pre-Raphaelites? However that may be, Schorske not only accounts for the feeling of a generational change without needing to resort to biological or mystical categories. He also lends further substance to Peter Gay's observation that conservative and progressive are not necessarily opposed categories; Klimt found more sponsors among the service nobility than among bourgeois. Among his enemies was Karl Kraus. On the other hand, the Christian Social city administration under Lueger produced some impressive monuments. The most modern building on the "Ring" certainly is the Post Office Savings Bank, erected in defiance of the Rothschilds and the Emperor, with a statue of the anti-Semitic city planner, Georg Coch.

The modernist mood of Vienna may have been decadent and a reaction against what was then the modern temper. But that has not prevented its discoveries and inventions — psychoanalysis, neo-positivism and linguistic analysis, New Criticism, twelve-tone music, expressionism, symbolism, imaginism, futurism, and similar movements — from becoming extremely fertile for the further development of Western civilization. Far from being "reflections" or "expressions" of class interests, these new resources must be treated as forces of production: the so-called superstructure is capable of independent development. Progress is not a unilinear advance toward a predetermined goal.

It is impossible in a review to do justice to the richness and subtlety of Schorske's treatment of the artist. Klimt, Schoenberg, Kokoschka, Hofmannsthal serve his elucidation of the eternal tension between the artist, his public, and his world, the "politics of the unpolitical," the "faith of the atheist," the striving for order in chaos. What especially fascinates him is the artist's refusal to resign himself to the exile of Schiller's "realm of beautiful dreams"; he continues to rebel against any order, even the one he helped to create. Schorske shows that the "explosion" many hold to be characteristic of post-World War I art was well on its way before the outbreak of World War I. As cultural phenomena, world wars and atomic scares may be consequences rather

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than causes of the crisis of the Western world.

Having expressed my admiration for Schorske, I nevertheless have a few reservations. Too much meta-history depends on puns, similes, and metaphors. For instance, tonality is called a hierarchical order, for obviously it assigns to each tone a particular place in the scale. A chromatic, atonal, and a fortiori a twelve-tone order, then, might in jest be called democratic; but Schorske does so in earnest and even bases on this metaphor conclusions that are quite contrary to his material. Schoenberg's *Hanging Gardens* is one of his most subjective compositions and "a cry for help"; to call it "democratic" requires a definition of democracy that does not exist.

Worse is his venture into psycho-history — a pseudoscience that consists in attributing the historian's free associations to a historical figure. Thus, referring to Freud's dream about Carlsbad, a famous spa ("*Kurort*" in German), Schoenberg adds: "a city of re-creation," a pun that then helps to explain why the dream marks a turning point in Freud's career. The trouble with the pun is that it does not work in German, the language in which Freud dreamed. The analysis of Freud's dreams offered by Schorske is ingenious, although it rejects Freud's own confessions. In Schorske's interpretation, Freud substituted an imagined conflict with his father for his failure to challenge political authorities: instead of helping the liberal middle class to promote its political concerns, he fled into psychology. Schorske sees this as typical, and we see it repeated in the psychological novel: the Austrian bourgeoisie allowed its political concerns to be stifled by its economic, social, and cultural interests; its artists retreated into the interior.

This view is obviously based on the assumption that the bourgeoisie ought to be democratic and politically militant. The German and Austrian middle class apparently did not think so. Its failure to gain direct control of the government was largely a matter of choice rather than of weakness. Its imperialistic drive needed the leadership of an imperial bureaucracy.

Likewise, irrationalism appeared in the European mass movements (what Hannah Arendt called "the mob") as a complement rather than an antithesis of capitalist rationality. The self-destruction of reason on the one hand, and the substitution of a false rationality for healthy instincts on the other, seem to share the burden of modernism.

The older Marxist interpretation of modernism considered it an "ideology," a mere "reflection" of the bourgeois mind in the phase of its decline: a rotten system cannot help but produce a decadent art and philosophy. It also assumed that this was the end phase of the bourgeoisie. The books under review here do not assign such a passive role to the artists but interpret their creations as autonomous responses to the state of the world. Thus, the autonomy of the intellect is recognized as a productive force in its own right which follows its own law of development even in its responses to the environment on which it depends.

Secondly, progress is no longer seen as a unilinear advance toward a predetermined goal, even though temporarily retarded by setbacks, but as a dialectical process with undetermined outcome. Just as it is no longer possible to assign one ideology to each class, so it is no longer possible to define with certainty which ideas are progressive in a substantive sense, and which in a merely chronological sense. "All that is solid melts into thin air" — indeed: not only things and conditions but also the ideas about them.

Henry Pachter

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John Berger, *About Looking*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

To understand the need for leftist art critics like John Berger, as well as the reason he is unusual, it is important to recognize the way art criticism embodies and is disembodied by the contradictions of modern society. At present, art criticism has regressed to a species of empiricism which hardly does more than give tautologic descriptions of art forms, just as avant-garde art has become appropriated by a system that now needs art to remain anarchistically apart. Since it is assumed that description can be neutral, a basic presupposition is always that, in carefully describing the art *object*, the critic has somehow "objectively" explained it — a presupposition which results in self-serving pronouncements about "taste" and "quality" that ironically bear witness to the social pretensions of those who make them. Art criticism has become an exercise in positivism which, because it treats art as distinct from all other "empirical" disciplines, has misconstrued the fragmented character of avant-garde art — its rejection of unity in the present but not necessarily in the future — to be proof of how art is always outside any system.

As practiced today by Clement Greenberg, Hilton Kramer, and numerous others, art criticism is guilty of a clarity that obscures. It acknowledges only what is physically observable. As such, contemporary criticism never escapes the early Lukacs' critique of scientism, which showed that the empirical method, so effective in studying nature, had become an "ideological weapon" of the status quo when applied to social products. This usage characterizes art criticism at present, because most critics erroneously assume that the concrete can be isolated in empirical facts of history, without realizing that concrete particulars are inextricably connected to the social process as a whole. By using an empirical description of the art object rather than a concrete analysis which necessarily goes beyond the object to the process which both brings it into being and propels it into the present, most art critics reify the subjective act of creation, the potentially emancipatory aspects of art, and the nonsublimated manifestations of eros in art. Conventional art criticism seals the art object off from the act of conceiving it, only to conclude with a few numinous remarks about the ineffable greatness of art — something which cannot be empirically verified, only "understood."

A refreshingly incisive alternative to the sterility of contemporary criticism can be found in *About Looking*, Berger's seventh book about art. Consisting of twenty-three articles written over the last decade about specific artists, and general aesthetic issues, this collection also includes a few essays about such topics as our changing social perception of animals. Thus, Berger not only elucidates the art discussed by means of extra-aesthetic factors — though never to the exclusion of aesthetic considerations — he also expands the format of his book to negate the formalist segregation of art. Influenced in this respect by Max Raphael, Berger continually shows how a work of art is a storehouse of creative energies awaiting realization, not an "essential" object needing only to be recognized. In approaching the art directly, he continually goes from the work per se to the creative process it contains and the social possibilities it reveals. Like Raphael, Berger contends that the revolutionary meaning of a work does not reside in any intrinsic subject or form, but in the critical consummation of a "meaning continually awaiting discovery and release." In developing this view, Berger is careful to differentiate Raphael's "world of values" in art, with their accent on fostering transcendence through history, from the idealist view of art as a repository of transcendent, ahistorical values. In contradistinction to the idealist, Berger

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considers art to be important insofar as it is continually timely, not because it is supposedly timeless.

Berger's notion of the variegated implications of art is related to his awareness that the perceptual field is dense and open-ended, that we never see one thing, but always things in relation to each other and ourselves. Similarly, Berger posits and demonstrates that there is no a-social perception of art, since the very act of seeing is socially acquired, though not necessarily socially determined. He avoids the restricted perceptual mode of empiricism (or more specifically epistemological realism) which has been subjected to devastating critiques by Merleau-Ponty as well as Gestalt psychology, and goes from an awareness of the contextuality of perception to grounding art socially. In elucidating the social context of art, however, Berger acknowledges that art is not reducible to it, except by means of a vulgar materialism which insidiously "purifies" the perception of art anew. Like Adorno rather than Goldmann, Berger approaches the concreteness of art systematically, yet not for the sake of any closed system to circumscribe the concrete. He shows that important art has the potential to change attitudes and to challenge the critical spirit precisely because it is a superstructural phenomenon that is not just a transparent reflection of society's substructure.

"The Suit and the Photograph," perhaps his most penetrating essay on photography in *About Looking,* couples an admirable sensitivity to the works with a critical rigor that expands them. He focuses on three photographs — one showing peasants going to a dance (1913), one showing peasants in a dance band (1914) and one showing four protestant missionaries (1931) — all by the German artist August Sander, whose aim was a comprehensive photographic biography entitled "Man of the Twentieth Century." Taking his cue from Walter Benjamin, who in 1931 said that Sander's work was so intimately specific that it thereby became theory, Berger discusses how the photos, which at first appear so similar, reveal subtle things about the "expressionless" men they show.

In observing that the social status of each group of men is intimated by the fit of the suits and the posture in which they are worn, Berger notes that the European suit developed circa 1865 was the first ruling class costume to idealize purely sedentary power, that the peasants (who could hardly have afforded such suits much earlier than the first photograph) were accustomed to other clothes. For the middle class men photographed, the suit was ordinary attire, for the peasants it was not. Thus, the physical contradiction of bodies shaped by vigorous effort and clothes designed to idealize inactivity results, as Berger notes, in "what Gramsci called class hegemony" (p. 33). The very acceptance of these clothes condemned the peasants to looking clumsy and socially incongruous, hence "innately" inferior.

To appreciate the unorthodoxy of Berger's perspective, we need only compare his approach to the Sander photographs with that of a self-styled "Marxist" art critic who, however controversial, remains a prisoner of positivism. When writing about these photographs a few months ago, Max Kozloff stated that Sander was quixotic to propose that he could account for a social environment merely by documenting those who composed it.[1] Instead, Kozloff makes the commonplace argument that Sander's

1. Max Kozloff, "Disquieting Norms," *Artforum*, 18:10 (Summer 1980), pp. 76-77. While he was executive editor of *Artforum* in 1975, Kozloff became involved in a heated controversy because he argued that "there is no escape from ideology, either in the creating or interpreting of art." In response to Kozloff's position, the New York dealers and galleries financially supporting *Artforum* pressured the publisher of the magazine into firing Kozloff and editor John Coplans.

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photographs are significant because they convey a "chilly, alienating mood," with the historical value of the work being its "miraculous equilibrium" of the "sentimental and the abrasive." Thus, Kozloff never goes beyond particular observations about the works, yet he simultaneously makes general claims for them by detecting alienation then failing to locate it. Fearing theoretical dogmatism, he arrives at an audacious, but otherwise impotent, empiricism. Consequently, the tension in his critical response really results from an uncertainty about his own position, which leads us to expect more than the formalist disengagement he never really escapes.

In two essays from *About Looking*, "Giacometti" and "Francis Bacon and Walt Disney," Berger deals with the antithetical ways alienation is used and with the necessity of grounding alienation contextually in order to divulge its divergent social consequences. On Giacometti, Berger concludes that no other artist's work could have been so changed and enhanced by his death: "It is as though his death confirms his work" (p. 173). While he lived, Giacometti's feeling of alienation, his view that everyone was doomed to separateness, was deftly expressed by his sculpted figures which are physically so attenutated and "sketchily" surfaced that they appear forever distant, and in a sense unknowable. As Sartre, who was a friend of Giacometti's, noted, these works deal with untraversible distances, with people condemned to be forever apart yet always near, alone yet together (as in Giacometti's *City Square*).[2] In Sartre's evocative discussion of Giacometti's sculpture, however, alienation is continually defined in ontological, rather than social terms. Thus, social fragmentation is translated into a metaphysical condition which seems disassociated from the historical situation to which it is undeniably connected. Nonetheless, however inclined to ahistoricism Sartre's interpretation appears — and, unlike Camus, Sartre continually sought to reconcile *Angst* about the contigency of life with a desire to transcend the historically contingent repression of capitalism — there remains an important dimension of truth to this view when it is seen as a commentary on the absolute "distance" of death. Berger aptly makes this connection in his essay, because as Marcuse and others have noted, a social revolution will not eliminate tragedy but transform it, so that we may confront mortality with a dignity unknown to the "absurd" present. As such, Berger observes that the social isolation and manic individualism of Giacometti's art transcend the social despair which fostered them.

The expansiveness of Berger's critical response, his synthetic approach to the social and ontological aspects of alienation in Giacometti's art, makes his essay an important compliment to Adorno's position on this issue. Adorno, who admired Giacometti's work, contended that committed art gains in strength insofar as it attains autonomy by working on the level of attitudes, rather than on the plane of specific acts. He believed that committed art is superior to the one-dimensionality of tendentious art because its artistic autonomy makes it "inherently ambiguous." Adorno's disregard for intentionality, however, both on the part of the artist and the critic, reinforces an untenably neo-Kantian notion of the art as "essentially" meaningful and by

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Furthermore, Kozloff and Coplans were stridently attacked in the New York press. See, for example, Hilton Kramer's hysterical response, "Muddled Marxism Replaces Criticism at *Artforum*," *The New York Times*, December 21, 1975.

2. Jean-Paul Sartre, "La Recherche de L'Absolu," *Les Temps Modernes* (Paris, 1948). On Sartre's behalf, it should be noted that conventional art critics have denounced his seemingly a-social interpretation as "more ideological than philosophic," because they have detected social radicalism in it. See Hilton Kramer, "Giacometti," *The Age of the Avant-Garde* (New York, 1973), p. 260

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implication a-contextual.[3] Adorno's faith in the political engagement of the autonomy makes him unduly optimistic about the standard critical perception of alienation in art. A frequent response by empirical critics to art addressing tragedy in general, rather than specifically tragic circumstances, is to say that it deals with the human condition *instead of* concrete social conditions. In proclaiming art autonomous, formalist critics have denied any political content to Giacometti's sculpture. In their view, aesthetic transcendence makes the art relevant to all history, yet specifically connected to no period. Adorno's argument for autonomy and against reification of art by politics, while simultaneously maintaining the politically emancipatory dimension of art, has been used in a different sense by formalists to launch facile attacks on any relation of art to politics. Nonetheless, the obvious failure of formalists like Hilton Kramer to write art criticism free of politics — they use the concept of autonomy politically to thwart attacks on the capitalist system — emphatically refutes their own concept of autonomous art. Conversely, Adorno's position on artistic autonomy is reconciled very effectively with a commitment to political radicalism, although his critical affirmation of autonomy is not without difficulties.

The aesthetic dimension which allows Giacometti's art to attack the present system rather than specific things in it, which in being resolved would merely leave the system unresolved, is also what allows formalists to move this art from being an assault on the system to a commentary on man's fate. Only the consummation by critics like Berger of *potentially* revolutionary meaning "continually awaiting discovery and release" can save art from being politically domesticated. As such, the necessarily consummative role of criticism means that art is only semi-autonomous, not "essentially" meaningful in any independent political sense. Adorno and Sartre have not really justified the autonomy of Giacometti's sculpture; they have only given incisive historical reasons for maintaining the concept of autonomy, rather than recognizing art's semi-autonomy — its continuous need to be contextually re-grounded.

To express alienation in the most concrete terms, however, does not necessarily mean that art was conceived to project either ontological distance or social discontent. Berger's essay on the paintings of Francis Bacon makes this clear. As he notes, Bacon is an artist with a fully articulated world-view and considerable technical skill who, in 1971, was named the greatest living artist by *Connaissance des Arts*. Berger shows that Bacon is one of those artists who, in rejecting everything including an alternative to what is, leaves everything as it is. Bacon's alienation is the type against which Brecht warned, an alienation from which one does not return. In Berger's view, Bacon's notion of the absurdity of things has nothing in common with the views of Beckett or Giacometti. While Beckett approaches despair as a result of questioning, Bacon questions nothing because he accepts the worst. As such, Bacon's figures feature wounds which are self-inflicted, a testimony to mankind's hopelessly self-destructive fate. Berger notes that the lack of any thematic development in Bacon's *oeuvre* both reflects his lack of alternative answers and results in the suave refinement for presenting "the worst" which ironically makes it less credible. The conclusion of Berger's essay (which recalls George Orwell's equally devastating critique of Dali) is that Bacon's art does not address loneliness, anguish, or metaphysical doubt, but rather is alienation in its absolute form — a vacuous cynicism wallowing in

3. T.W. Adorno, "Commitment," *New Left Review*, 87-88 (September-December 1974), pp. 78-79: "Sartre's question, why write?; and his solution of it in a 'deeper choice,' are invalid because the author's motivations are irrelevant to the finished work."

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conformity.

It should be added that the hopeless despair conveyed by Bacon's art would hardly be innocuous were most spectators not so content to be exonerated by this art from any meaningful opposition to the present situation. Here Bacon's intent to speak for all social history both conforms to the ahistoricism of his audience and testifies inadvertently to its impossibility by its easy recognition as a certain moment *in* art history. The real failing of Bacon's art is not so much that it is "essentially" bad, but that it is very limited in precisely the way that engenders acceptance of its flaws. Bacon's paintings are powerful but very limited, with the limitations themselves ironically gaining in power from the artistic merits they ultimately overwhelm.

The multifacetedness of Berger's art criticism, his open-ended and self-reflexive approach to the concreteness of art, is fully in evidence in his excellent psychoanalytic analysis of Rodin's sculpture. "Rodin and Sexual Domination" is related to Berger's famous, or rather notorious, BBC television series, *Ways of Seeing,* in which he explored in art the social roles of men and women. Written in 1967 during the festivities for the fiftieth anniversary of Rodin's death, which as Berger observed was to *consume* rather than to understand history, this essay disappropriates Rodin's art from conventional art criticism. He discusses the erotic compression and often fragmentation of Rodin's women figures, who frequently lack assertive "completeness." Even formalist critics are bothered by the feverish eroticism of much of Rodin's sculpture. One critic, Albert Elsen, has spoken of Rodin's "surprising aggressiveness toward the model," but in praising this work he has explained it in purely formal terms as the "logical" continuation of Rodin's belief "that any view of the body was potentially of artistic interest and beauty. Against charges of obscenity and immorality, Rodin's defense was his sincerity of observation as an artist."[4] Another empirical critic, Sir Kenneth Clark, has spoken of Rodin as the greatest sculptor since Michelangelo, yet he has confessed that upon seeing Rodin's late drawings, "this endless belt of sprawling women has a depressing rather than an exhilarating effect on me, and seems to reveal a kind of promiscuity which is foreign to the concentrated passions of the greatest artists."[5]

Far from seeing this aspect of Rodin's sculpture as just a stylistic development or an inartistic flaw, Berger considers the heavily sexual character of these figures to be a motivating force for his art, though in more than the Freudian sense of sublimation. Berger argues that the contorted expressivity of these figures and the way they appear to be almost pushed back into the material of which they are made are connected to how Rodin (nicknames "the old satyr") related to women — an observation confirmed by contemporary accounts, such as the statement by Isodora Duncan that Rodin kneaded women's bodies like clay figures. In contradistinction to the Pygmalion myth, however, Berger states that Rodin did not wish to make either women or statues his equals, but to exercise dominance over them. Thus, the desire to dominate pervades his sculpture and drawings, "because clay and flesh are so ambivalently and fatally related in his mind, he is forced to treat them as though they were a challenge to his

4. Albert Elsen, "Rodin's Drawings and the Mastery of Abundance," in *The Drawings of Rodin* (New York, 1971), p. 21. Elsen is considered *the* world's expert on Rodin.

5. Sir Kenneth Clark, *The Romantic Rebellion* (London, 1973), p. 344. It should be noted that this book was partly financed by Sotheby Parke Bernet, one of the leading art auction corporations in the world. Last year alone, the New York branch of Sotheby cleared $90.4 million in sales. See Rita Reif, "How Auction Sales Are Transforming the Art World," *The New York Times,* July 27, 1980. As Reif notes, "Art is becoming, even more than before, a commodity." (26-D).

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own authority and potency" (p. 183).

Berger's excellent discussion stops short, however, when he concludes that Rodin's art is paradigmatic for the bourgeois sexual mores studied by Freud — on the one hand, the hypocritical repression which made sexual desire febrile and phantasmagoric; on the other, a fearful need to dominate the sexual drive and the women who stimulated it. While Rodin's art does show that he reflected this social contradiction, it also reveals that he did not entirely accept it. The "bourgeois" response to this contradiction would have been a refusal to see it or a nervous contention that it really involved an ahistorical conflict between civilization and instinct. Rodin's aggressive ambivalence toward contemporary culture can be seen in the way he defied it aesthetically, thus causing considerable scandal. Concerning the fluctuating surface of Rodin's sculpture, its explicitly hand imprinted look that fosters temporality, not "timelessness," Rainer Maria-Rilke (Rodin's one-time secretary) wrote: "the gestures of mankind that cannot find reason for existence have become more and more impatient, nervous, and hurried."[6] Rodin viewed himself as a dissident; he condemned the placid official art as a result of bourgeois patrons and "rich bourgeois salons;"[7] and he was seen by contemporaries as one whose art epitomized the malaise and alienation of the late 19th century. Furthermore, while Rodin frequently showed women in ignominious poses, he also showed men in humbled, fragmented, and contorted positions. In fact, Rodin's major work, the *Gates of Hell* (1880-1917), is peopled almost entirely with powerfully expressive male nudes. There can be little doubt that Rodin, who was not religious, selected the subject of Dante's *Inferno*, because the suffering of rebels against ethical codes was something with which he could identify both consciously and unconsciously.[8] Rodin's sculpture justifies Marcuse's observation that eros in art both serves and subverts the established order by calling into question the dominant reality principle.[9] In this case and in others, eros challenges the social system to distinguish between "the real" and "the possible." The return of the repressed in Rodin's art shows that the history of male domination is also the history of the repression of males in order to preserve the social hierarchy. Rodin's sculpture does not merely question what is, it also intimates the possibility of something else — another reason, another sensibility. Thus, Rodin's work completely demonstrates the incisiveness of Marcuse's contention that, compared to the one-dimensionality of propaganda, art is permeated with an affirmation which is often intertwined with pessimism and negation.

When Lenin denounced the historical sin of "Tolstoyism," he was referring to the way Tolstoy's criticism of political oppression was undermined by his own homilies on submission.[10] There is, however, another aspect of Tolstoyism that Lenin did not mention, namely, Tolstoy's idealization of the oppressed and the way this led from commiseration with their history to an ahistorical adulation. By considering the peasants *categorically* superior to their oppressors, Tolstoy indirectly praised the educational deprivations responsible for their "natural" simplicity. He failed to recognize that their virtues were systematically forced upon them by a social order that

6. Rainer Maria-Rilke, *Rodin*, trans. by J. Lemont and H. Jrausil (London, 1946), p. 36.

7. E. Claris, *De L'Impressionisme en Sculpture* (Paris, 1902), p. 32.

8. Albert Elsen, *Rodin's Gates of Hell* (Minneapolis, 1960), p. 56. Even though Elsen's book is checked by positivism, it is nevertheless a good discussion of Rodin's doubts and disaffections. It is easily Elsen's best.

9. Herbert Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension* (Boston, 1979).

10. Vladimir Ilich Lenin, "Leo Tolstoy and His Epoch," in *Collected Works*, Vol. 17 (Moscow, 1963), pp. 51-53.

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denied them intellectual sophistication. Far from being concerned with changing their plight, Tolstoy became increasingly pacific about altering people whom he loved as they were. In this particular sense, Tolstoyism is a frequent and very insidious problem for the left, especially concerning the arts, with Lenin himself being an ironic example of one who confused pre-revolutionary artistic developments with post-revolutionary possibilities in art. One of the most common manifestations of aesthetic Tolstoyism is the view of many orthodox Marxists that low art (whether folk art, "proletarian" art, or primitive art) is the *intrinsic* art of the people, as if a social revolution would only change things materially, not aesthetically or intellectually. Even when low art is used in a revolutionary society (as in Chile under Allende), it cannot be seen the same way because of the self-conscious social transformation it entails. In the present scheme of things, however, low art can only be viewed with an ambivalence which couples admiration of its spontaneity and native strength with a disdain for the social failings conveyed by the narrowness and naivety of its aesthetic limitations.

Berger does not really idealize the lower classes, however much he works on their behalf, yet his essays on the paintings of Millet and on primitive art are not entirely free of aesthetic Tolstoyism, In "Millet and the Peasant," Berger discusses Millet's use of a new subject, the harshness of peasant labor, to force an old language to speak of what it had ignored. While Millet was, according to Berger, too pessimistic to allow strong political convictions, he was supposedly moved to side with democracy by the events of 1848. From 1847, Millet devoted the remaining twenty-seven years of his life to exploring the living conditions of the French peasantry. His choice of subject matter was sometimes nostalgic, but Berger argues it was because Millet saw progress as a threat to human dignity and because he foresaw the subjection of the peasant to the industrial market as a "loss" of history. But as Berger notes, the acceptance of Millet has been paradoxical. Easily one of the most well-known artists in history, Millet did three works, *The Sower, The Gleaners,* and *The Angelus*, which are known by every peasant family in France. *The Sower* has become both a trademark of a U.S. bank and a symbol of revolution in Peking and China, as well as a favorite of some American millionaires who wish to believe life is "simple and free." This disturbing appropriation of a potentially revolutionary picture is seen by Berger as a result of Millet's failing — a failing which occurred when "the language of traditional painting could not accomodate the subject he brought with him" (p. 76).

There can be little doubt that Millet's art, which was innovative both formally and thematically, has a potentially revolutionary dimension. *The Winnower* (1848) and *The Sower* (1850) were seen as seditious because of the looseness of their brushwork, as well as because of their focus on the harshness, even brutality of peasant life. Some of the 19th century critics who responded to the work emphasized its political import: Gautier said of *The Winnower* that it has "everything it takes to horrify the bourgeois"; Dumas complained that Millet's wood cutter was "not the peasant of 1660, but the proletarian of 1859"; and a critic on the left praised Millet's "ingenious savagery."[11] Nevertheless, Millet's work was not seen in overtly social terms by the majority of 19th century critics. The reason for the pastoral interpretation of Millet's pictures (as opposed to the consistently political reading elicited by Courbet's work) was his poetic view of nature along with the rustic, even biblical character of his

11. For an excellent discussion of the political response to Millet's paintings, see T.J. Clark, *The Absolute Bourgeois* (London, 1973).

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peasants. As Rochéry, a contemporary critic noted, Millet was "a true lover of country life and of country people" or, as Van Gogh later state, Millet's people seem to be one with the very earth they till. All of these impressions of Millet's work show that the golden glaze and edifying tone of most of his pictures conciliate, rather than confront, the viewer. Consequently, conservatives like Sir Kenneth Clark can state, as he did on BBC television, that Millet was right to consider himself a-political, because "The patient resignation of his workers, and the feeling that they are part of an unchangeable order of things, speaks exactly the opposite message to that of Marxism."

Millet admired the working classes without caring to change them; hence the quasi-biblical stature he gave them; hence his letter to the leftist art critic Thoré-Burger that he wanted to show peasants doing their "work good-naturedly and simply" as a "habit" for life; hence the objection by Pissarro and Baudelaire that the peasants were too "priestly." It is not surprising that Tolstoy himself considered Millet to be one of the greatest painters ever, because Millet supposedly promoted universal brotherhood by "depicting hard-working peasants with respect and love."[12] Tolstoy's view cannot be reconciled with Millet's public attack on Courbet's leftist politics or with Millet's glee over the suppression of the Paris Commune. To Millet, the lower classes were charming insofar as they were poetically *distant*.

Nevertheless, T.J. Clark was right to state that Millet's peasant was not only the farmer of Virgil's *Georgics*, but also the proletarian of 1860.[13] Only simplistic critics could maintain that Millet's pictures are "essentially" reactionary, that Berger is completely wrong. Insofar as Millet even painted people who did not exist politically, according to French society, he forced an issue into public view that was carefully ignored. As Thoré-Burger once noted, the very people forced to the margins of culture became embarrassingly central to its art. Intentionally or otherwise, Millet made this contradiction a significant part of his work. Millet himself, perhaps experiencing momentary guilt about his own insensitivity, did sometimes strip the arcadian glaze from his paintings. In *The Sower* and *The Winnower*, for example, Millet induced political responses by depicting the peasants with such "ingenious savagery" that viewers had to take a stand for or against their social situation. In these cases, the middle road of Tolstoyism was usually denied.

The sensitive yet narrow view Berger develops of Millet's art is connected to a critical shortcoming in his essay "The Primitive and the Professional." He observes that the use of the word "primitive" is applied to Western European art prior to that of Raphael, to art "curiosities" from the third world colonies, and to working class artists who did not become *professional*. For the ruling classes, "professional" art is the main European tradition — a tradition not defined until the 17th century. Berger considers the primitive to be a craftsman, rather than a fine artist, while he considers the professional to be a former craftsman who has emigrated to the ruling class. According to this view, the professional becomes skilled in a certain set of conventions which supposedly reflect "eternal truths" to the ruling classes, while being mere social conventions to the classes being ruled.

The tendency of avant-garde artists to use primitive styles is interpreted by Berger as a political act to express the experience of other classes. In considering Ford Madox Brown's *Work* (Manchester Art Gallery), Berger argues that the conventions with which he approached his subject pre-empted the possibility of depicting manual work

12. Leo Tolstoy, *What Is Art?*, trans. by Aylmer Maude (London, 1969), pp. 243-265.
13. Clark, *op.cit.*, p. 98.

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convincingly. The first "serious" artists to be primitives appeared in the 19th century. Many were *bohemians* who, in Berger's opinion, defied normal class divisions to suggest that art could come from any class. Artists like Douanier Rousseau and Facteur Cheval were designated by names common to other professions (the customs and postal services), characterized as Sunday painters, and treated as cultural "sports," because they did not undergo a class transformation, thus becoming "professional." These primitives were distinctly unlike amateurs, who, being members of the cultured classes, merely followed professionals with less rigor. The clumsiness of primitive art is, according to Berger, the precondition of its eloquence because what it says was not meant (by the upper classes) to be said. The equivocation among "serious" artists between primitive art and professional art has supposedly led to a dead end. The impasse of formalism today represents in Berger's view "the original problematic of professional art: an art in reality concerned with a selective, very reduced art of experience, which nevertheless claims to be universal" (p. 67).

Berger's account of primitive art is flawed less by Tolstoyism, than by a type of reductionism which all too often undermines the acute perceptions of Claude Lévi-Strauss. This connection is revealing, since in another essay Berger quotes from *The Savage Mind*, where Lévi-Strauss distinguishes between professional art and primitive art.[14] According to Lévi-Strauss, academic art internalizes the execution (the signifier) and externalizes the occasion (the signified), while primitive art internalizes the occasion and externalizes the execution.[15] This implausibly reductive summary, like others by Lévi-Strauss, is based on an overuse which becomes misuse of Saussure's linguistic terminology (which, in presenting a relational view of language, combatted the old substantive notion of language as discreet units of "essential" meaning). Furthermore, as Annette Michelson has shown, Lévi-Strauss's highly reactionary approach to modern art results as much from his apriori assumption that art can be dealt with conclusively by means of a linguistic model, as from his belief in the ahistorical superiority of harmonious Renaissance art.[16] Lacking almost any historical grounding, Lévi-Strauss' categories of professional and primitive not only fail to deal with the concrete particulars of what falls within them, they also overlook "hybrid" developments such as the neo-primitivism of the avant-garde which, as Roland Barthes and others have shown, can hardly be restricted to an "essential" one-to-one relation of signifier and signified. Lévi-Strauss' aphoristic style at first seems connected to Nietzsche's epigrammatic manner, yet it is really antithetical to it. While Nietzsche contended that to avoid intellectual crudity one must make distinctions continuously, Lévi-Strauss tries to make distinctions that are continuous.

Like Lévi-Strauss, Berger is concerned with appreciating cultural achievements outside the West. From a notable concern to understand primitive art, however, Berger proceeds to a conception of primitive art as the inverse of professional art (precisely what Lévi-Strauss has contended). Primitive art starts as an inversion of professional art and then becomes a subversion of it; it goes from being a supposed

14. See "Why Look at Animals?" in *About Looking*, p. 2. In this case, as in *Ways of Seeing*, p. 86, for example, Berger uses Lévi-Strauss' observations to very good effect.

15. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (The Hague, 1970), p. 29. One of the many untenable remarks he makes about art is that "All miniatures seem to have intrinsic aesthetic quality. . . . The paintings of the Sistine Ceiling are a small-scale model in spite of their imposing dimensions" (p. 23).

16. Annette Michelson, "Art and the Structuralist Perspective," in *On the Future of Art*, edited by Edward Fry (New York, 1970), p. 51.

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expression of the repressed to the means whereby repression is ended![17] Berger's simplified approach to this issue is simultaneously too broad to deal with the historical developments of crafts or primitive art and too narrow to understand why these developments do not merely exist in a dichotomous or oppositional relation to the fine arts. The issue of craft versus fine art, for example, is hardly a matter of one being lower class, the other upper class. A revealing example can be found in the Rococo period when, as in most other periods, the ruling class commissioned both craftsmen and "professional" artists to decorate their salons. A major distinction between crafts and the "professional" arts goes back to the Renaissance and the inception of modern capitalism (with its concomitant ideas of specialization), when a distinction was first made between artists who used a theoretical approach to expand the conventions of craftsmanship, as opposed to artisans who worked more within the conventions established by guilds. Rightly or wrongly, the difference between fine artist (or "professional") and craftsman (also a professional) was based on the specific art form being used, namely, whether it was a "decorative" art (furniture, procelain, tapestries, etc.) used to some extent by all classes or a fine art (painting, sculpture) commissioned almost exclusively by the ruling classes. The degree of technical mastery of the craftsman, more than the set of conventions used, determined whether or not he served the ruling classes.

Conversely, the period style of the "professional" arts did not merely serve one class. As Arnold Hauser has shown, for example, the Rococo style in pre-revolutionary France was a fusion of aristocratic elegance and bourgeois intimacy which expressed a subtle dissolution of the established order[18] (although in Bavaria, as in *Die Wies Kirche* or in *Asamkirche,* the Rococo style helped entrench a Catholicism which was endorsed by *all* classes). Furthermore, the most important artist of the French Revolution, Jacques Louis David, did not reject "professional" art, but radicalized it from within. As such, his paintings were recognized by all classes as a focal point of the left. While David did execute a number of broadsheets in a propagandistic vein known to the lower classes, his most effective, and certainly most radical, creations were his "professional" paintings — paintings which disappropriated the fine arts from the upper classes, however short term his achievement.

Berger's discussion of "primitive" art in the 19th century is also attenuated by a belief in class "purity." Many painters like Henri Rousseau did not intend to confront official art with an alternative lower class art. Rather, the educational deprivations

17. A related example can be found in the way Lévi-Strauss starts out with a critique of the "sterile empiricism" of the West, yet ends up acclaiming totemic or magical thinking, which he says uses *bricolage,* "a science of the concrete." From this simplistic contrast he goes on to say that the "real principle of dialectical reason" is to be found in the way the "savage mind totalizes" (*op.,cit.*, p. 245). Needless to say, this view is implausible as much for its retrograde notion of the dialectic as for the way he superficially transposes divergent cognitive modes from one culture to the next. Lévi-Strauss' concept of dialectical thinking overlooks the degree of self-consciousness it entails (as Adorno noted, dialectical thinking is the effort to be both conscious and self-conscious, to consider your critical approach as you use it to consider something else), which is unrelated to the empathetic character of totemic thought. Lévi-Strauss recognizes that totemic thought is not bound by empiricism, yet he infers that because it is different it is superior. He shows no awareness that, unlike totemic thought, dialectical thinking *historically* transcends empiricism, because it assimilates it and then goes on to show its inadequacies — something magical, hence a-historical, totemic thinking can hardly claim.

18. Arnold Hauser, *The Social History of Art*, Vol. III, trans. Stanley Goodman (New York, 1951), pp. 1-37. Also, Hauser argues that the emergence of the modern middle class "put an end to the idea of style as something consciously and deliberately held in common by a cultural community."

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that Rousseau suffered as a member of the lower classes were responsible, in part, for his inability to become a "professional" painter, although he apparently wished to achieve official recognition. Thus, the pristine character of his art, which saves it from the hackneyed formulas of contemporary Academicism, results in a more humanized and expressive painting, but only because Rousseau was *unable* to assimilate Academic conventions. Like the peasants photographed by Sander, Rousseau was a victim of class hegemony even though the consequence of this dominance helped produce an art which, because of its emotional directness and formal uniqueness, greatly excels contemporary upper class art. To merely consider Rousseau's art subversive because it is not "professional" is to overestimate the *intentional* political import of his art. Nor could it be said that the rebuttal to an intellectual hegemony purporting to be aesthetically objective is to be located solely in an art of enhanced subjectivity and spontaneity. Precisely because it circumvents as well as confronts the class hegemony of "professional" art, "primitive" art is not completely free of concessions to historically contingent aesthetic limits — limits which cannot be transcended by indirection.

Concerning the neo-primitivism of the avant-garde, Berger's position is also much too narrow. Artists like Courbet and Gaugin did not merely use primitivism to express the experience of other classes, since their art really synthesized the historical self-consciousness of high art with the emotional immediacy of low art, the "professional" with the "primitive," to produce a fragmented art that was nevertheless more whole than completely harmonious Academicism. Bohemians and avant-garde artists were interested in primitivism for several reasons: as a means of arriving at a pristine cultural situation out of which they felt society would be created anew; as an approach, contemporary with Freud, to the instinctual sexual drives more openly acknowledged by many non-Western societies; as a means of negating the dehumanizing urbanity of Academic art, with its emphasis on slick technical virtuosity and tensionless "beauty"; and as a nihilistic gesture (as in the case of much Dadaist anti-art) which was intended less as a means of revitalizing Western art, than as a way of destroying it. The issue was never one of an "essentially" revolutionary primitive art versus an intrinsically reactionary professional art, as if primitive art were a-contextually significant.

Berger's criticism is most expansive when he deals with particular artists, rather than general issues, in spite of the fact that he relates specific artists to broad social developments extremely well. The strength of Berger's art criticism is his perceptual acuity coupled with his ability to go beyond localized perceptions. The way Berger deals with particular artists is important because of the concrete grounding he achieves — a concrete grounding unknown to orthodox Marxists. Nicos Hadjinicolaou's dismissal of any psychoanalytic or psychological approach in favor of a monolithic "class" interpretation, is based on the hardly plausible view that "one cannot use a problematic centered on the analysis of individuals as a means of interpretating history, this is to falsify the nature of history."[19] Not only does he engage in a narrow *a priorism* concerning the "nature" of history and the individual's "necessary" relation to it. Hadjinicolaou defines art in terms of class ideology even as he denies the artist self-consciousness about intentionality. His only recourse, as is the

19. Nicos Hadjinicolaou, *Art History and Class Struggle,* trans. Louise Asmal (New York, 1978), p. 20. An even more extreme faith in historically determined action can be found in Roger Garaudy's statement that "Cézanne realized already that to watch was to act." See his "Budapest Interview" (1966), in *Radical Perspectives in the Arts,* ed. Lee Baxandall (Baltimore, 1972), p. 208.

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case with other orthodox Marxists, is to the *deus ex machina* of historical determinism paraded as "scientific" criticism. Thus, in contradistinction to Berger, "scientific" Marxists are merely the reverse of conventional empiricists. Both reify art by denying subjectivity in any open-ended sense; one constricts concrete experience to what can supposedly be known about history prior to it, the other restricts concrete experience to what can purportedly be known about it aside from history. John Berger shows the inadequacies of both approaches, however, since he seldom reduces art to a reflection of history, or reduces history to a backdrop for art. By reaffirming the richness of experience, Berger deftly illuminates the revolutionary potential in art and in our present situation — a situation we have not completely chosen, but in relation to which we must continually choose.

David Craven

Anne Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 261 pp. Bibliography. Index.

It is not too much to ask for something new in a new book. Sassoon's *Gramsci's Politics* does nothing of the sort. The topic, Gramsci's concept of the party, is rather stale. This problem is not significantly alleviated by two relevant features that, unfortunately, remain underdeveloped. One is an effort to embed Gramsci's struggle for a new party within the more general framework of a Gramscian concept of politics. However, the effort is not sustained, and at the end the author merely refers to her forthcoming article on the nature of democracy (247). A series of remarks scattered throughout the book, designating Gramsci's approach to be "dialectical," also promises to be interesting. But the question is nowhere discussed explicitly or in detail. The second feature is that the part dealing with the *Prison Notebooks* is much longer than those dealing with the Turin years and with the 1921-26 period, and that the author uses the 1975 critical edition of the *Quaderni del Carcere*. But this is vitiated by the fact, admitted by the author herself, that the concept of the party is not central to the *Prison Notebooks*.

It is not surprising that we find nothing new in the book's approach, since methodological novelty is not easy to come by and can only be the exception rather than the rule. Thus, the approach may be defined as exposition interspersed with frequent and long quotations. Most of the time, such exposition-cum-quotation is unobjectionable, but sometimes the lack of criticism or analysis becomes irritating.[1] Second, this approach of exposition-cum-quotation may be fruitful for most of Gramsci's scattered notes. Yet, it becomes counterproductive for a well organized essay like that on the intellectuals (Notebook 12, paragraph 17), so that the account in the section of this book on "The Organisers of Hegemony: the Intellectuals" (pp. 134-46) turns out to be less enlightening than the original.

1. For example, in a section on "Democratic Centralism versus Bureaucratic Centralism" (162-72), no notice is made of the fact that, according to the author's own quotations, Gramsci is apparently using the term "organic" inconsistently or ambiguously; sometimes (163) organic centralism refers to the type of democratic structure Gramsci advocates, sometimes (165) it refers to the type of bureaucratic centralism he opposes; perhaps the former is the most typical Gramscian meaning, but whether or not the problem can be solved in this way, it should at least be aired.

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An approach to the interpretation of the *Prison Notebooks* which could be claimed to go beyond the ordinary is one suggested by Gramsci himself. Thus, first, "if you want to study...a world view which has never been systematically expounded by its founder...it is necessary as a preliminary to do a detailed philological work conducted with the greatest scruple for exactness, scientific honesty, intellectual sincerity, and absence of preconception and apriorism or *partis pris*."[2] This means burying oneself in Gramsci's notes, and grouping them on the basis of internal evidence. Secondly, a distinction should be drawn between method and substantive theses. According to Gramsci, "the search for the *leit-motiv*, the rhythm of thinking as it develops, must be more important than the casual single claims and separate aphorisms."[3] Applying this to the well-known Crocean background of Gramsci's views,[4] what it means is that it is crucial to understand the spirit animating Croce's work. This *leit-motiv* is the theory and practice of criticism. Combining a Crocean critical approach and a scrupulous textual analysis, attention should be paid to those notes which contain critiques and whose topics are most frequent. Thus one should begin by systematizing Gramsci's notes on Croce, Bukharin, and Machiavelli.

It is widely agreed that three of Gramsci's most important and relevant contributions concerning the superstructure, civil society, and the cultural side of life; mechanism, determinism, and science in general; and the concept of hegemony.[5] But Gramsci's critique of Croce is directly relevant to the first since it centers around the problems of the nature of religion, of intellectual activity, and of economic versus civil history. And Gramsci's critique of Bukharin is directly relevant to the second theme since it centers around the concept of science. Concerning Machiavelli and hegemony, Sassoon has suggested elsewhere that Gramsci's concept of hegemony derives primarily from Machiavelli.[6] This certainly adds strength to the importance of Gramsci's Machiavelli notes. But whether the soundest theoretical lesson is to be learned from an analysis of Gramsci's thoughts on Machiavelli, can only be determined *after* such an analysis.

Does this book put forth a *new thesis*? This has to be answered in the negative, not so much because we have here an *old* thesis, but rather because we do not have one at all, unless the book's central message is that "we therefore cannot arrive at a general theory of party organization by a reading of Gramsci" (161). But if this is so, then one wonders why we should bother with the topic at all. It might be answered that it is worthwhile to do so because this constitutes a new criticism of Gramsci, a rejection of a widely accepted interpretation, or perhaps the interpretation that he was the theorist of the party *par excellence*. However, here we run into the difficulty that the book is not in the least critical. On the contrary, at times it is utterly uncritical. So the quoted

2. Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del Carcere*, edited by V. Gerratana (Turin: Einaudi, 1975), pp. 1840-41.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 1841-42.

4. E.J. Hobsbawn is not exaggerating when, speaking of the relationship between Gramsci and Croce, he says that "the Notebooks are in one sense a long, half-rebellious, half-admiring dialogue with this intellectual father figure." Cf. "The Great Gramsci," *New York Review of Books*, vol. 21, n. 5 (April 4, 1974), p. 39. Cf. also my "Gramsci's Crocean Marxism," *Telos*, n. 41 (Fall 1979), pp. 17-32.

5. Cf. my "Science and Praxis in Gramsci's Critique of Bukharin," *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, n. 6 (1979), pp. 25-56; and my "Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice in Bukharin's Sociology," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, n. 21 (1980), pp. 14-74.

6. See Chantal Mouffe and Anne Showstack Sassoon, "Gramsci in France and Italy — A Review of the Literature," *Economy and Society*, n. 6 (1977), pp. 31-68, and N. Auciello, *Socialismo ed Egemonia in Gramsci e Togliatti* (Bari: De Donato, 1974), pp. 124-25.

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statement is merely another indication of the book's inconclusiveness and of the fact that its level of analysis is inadequate.

Finally, one can ask whether approaches, interpretations, or criticisms (however old) are being put to new use as regards present-day social or political conditions. Thus, one may want to ask about the "revolutionary" party, whether such parties are (in today's Europe) viable entities worth studying or whether they are not part of the problem. Here one cannot ignore misgivings about parties now prevailing in the Italian Left.[7] Analogously one might question the propriety of a discussion of the opposition between "socialist" and "communist" parties that an account of Gramsci's relevant views and activities is bound to contain. Here the difficulty is that this may involve the eternalization of a contrast that might have been appropriate at one time, but which has become counterproductive in the European context.[8]

It would be un-Gramscian to paint a totally negative picture of the present book. In fact, its merits include intellectual honesty, scholarly objectivity, and brief allusions to the possibility that Gramsci contains suggestions for the building of socialism in self-proclaimed "socialist" countries. The problem is that one expects more of a book on Gramsci's politics. His *Notebooks* is the last work to deserve another series of notes as an account. The notes of which the present book ultimately consists do not enlighten anyone.

Maurice A. Finocchiaro

7. See, for example, the discussion among Giuliano Amato, Alberto Asor Rosa, Massimo L. Salvadori, and Giuseppe Vacca in "Il Confronto e la Ricerca nella Sinistra Italiana," in *Rinascita,* May 9, 1980, pp. 29-31.

8. Cf. Leonardo Paggi's "Socialisti Italiani e Sinistra Europea," in *Critica Marxista,* vol. 17, n. 1 (January-February, 1979), p. 31.

Simona Ganassi-Agger, *Urban Self-Management: Planning for a New Society.* White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1979.

Ganassi-Agger's book is an indictment of the alienation inherent in modern urban planning, as well as an argument for citizen participation in the planning process as the first step in the revolutionary transformation of society. Her objectives are: "1. Man must recapture his totality as a social human being by overcoming the fragmentation and partialization to which he is subjected. 2. Man must gain decision-making power within urban social life, demonstrating thereby that he partakes in an active and critical way, in the processes of society" (pp. 50-51). She pursues these themes in a variety of ways: reporting on a comparative study of citizen participation, analyzing the normative implications of contemporary planning, and suggesting a new form of planning.

The international study surveyed citizens' actual involvement in local political and cultural affairs as well as their attitudes towards participation in eight communities: one each in Canada, U.S., Poland, and Czechoslovakia and two each in Italy and Yugoslavia. Participation everywhere was found to be low, and to be closely related to feelings of competence. However, in the North American communities, feelings of competence were highly correlated with socio-economic status; in the other communities, adequacy and consequently participation was much more broadly

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distributed among social classes. There was evidence that in Yugoslavia participation in workplace decision making lent positive encouragement to general civic participation.

Ganassi-Agger draws from these studies the conclusion that the way to involve more people in the political process is not by providing more information and education, but by directly attacking feelings of inadequacy. "Thus the initiatives to be taken must fundamentally respect two requirements. First they must open the decisional processes in such a way that those who participate in them can realize immediately how to act, how to be influential, and, second, they must be moments of egalitarian action that utilize the characteristics, experiences and knowledge that everyone has or has had rather than specialized knowledge or experience, which blocks right from the start people who try to participate and are thereby made to feel inadequate and incompetent" (p. 38). We are promised in a footnote further reports of the comparative study in a book underway. Nevertheless, the material here presented would have been more valuable had it been illustrated by statistical tables. Was it a fear of "technocratic rationality" that prevented such intrusions in the prose?

The second section of the book is a strong indictment of the way in which all of urban planning simply reinforces the alienation of modern life: "Thus, the urban environment, in which the division of labor and the specialization of functions and roles are maximized, as is the division of life in all its daily expressions, becomes the place where man as social being is most alienated. This alienation can be described as double-barreled. Since the person *qua* person is no longer recognized, there is no longer any space for him to express himself in a total way. He can only define himself in places or in decisional processes if he is a member of relevant institutions. And then he can only express partial and specialized opinions that will carry institutional weight not because they derive within the institution to which he belongs" (p. 49). One might expect this effect in capitalist countries, where planning primarily provides support and regulation of private development. What makes this work of particular interest is her evidence that planning as conceived by "Marxist-Leninists" in communist countries, or by European "Evolutionary Socialists" or "Eurocommunists" is similarly dehumanizing.

The basic concept of planning is zoning. To Ganassi-Agger this simply symbolizes the division of labor and of life common to all modern industrial societies. The technocratic approach of dealing with "sectors" and dishing out "services" for specific needs further partializes man, while "systems analysis" merely creates "super-specialists." Planning aims to control people in their communal lives, just as Taylorism, embraced by communists and capitalists alike, controls workers in the service of greater productivity. Both provide evidence for technological determinism: that insofar as the means of production consists of large factories emitting noxious fumes, one will have "technocratic rationality," authoritarian discipline and piecework wages, as well as zoning laws, and long commutation to the suburbs.

However, Ganassi-Agger is not a determinist. What is more to the point is that communists and socialists (East and West) have simply incorporated into their thinking the bourgeois life-style: at work, in the community, and at home. Transferring ownership of the means of production does not eliminate alienation that arises from the division of labor, the division between work and social life, and the powerlessness of individuals in their daily lives. Communist leaders fit so very comfortably into their roles as the new patriarchs.

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The third part of the book consists of suggestions, experiences, and a theory of transformation for overcoming the fragmentation and powerlessness that she sees everywhere. She was herself professionally involved in an experiment in popular participation in planning in Faenza. Initially promising results were sabotaged by the Communist-Socialist administration's defense of the traditional role of expertise and their concern for the interests of the local property owners.

Despite meager practical results, the author concludes on a strongly optimistic note. She argues that professionals should develop a "maieutic" role in planning — a process akin to Socratic dialogue whereby leaders would elicit and clarify the goals of ordinary citizens. This process might well occur first in the United States "because the situation there is so much worse than elsewhere. . . ." Furthermore: "Political party weakness, inefficient and localistic organization and public mistrust combine to create a situation of opportunity in the United States" (p. 207).

Ganassi-Agger demands a great deal of faith. Not only must a process of genuine democratic participation occur; she furthermore expects that the results of such a process would be the creation of ". . . smaller-scale, more humanly satisfying, institutionally opened cities of civic participation" (210). The alienating effects of vastness, of the division of labor, of specialization and technocratic rationality are to be overcome through the new planning process. No such quantities of faith appear to be available in the United States. However, some claim to see in the neighborhood self-help movement a spirit which will eventually overcome the prevailing mood of apathy, cynicism and withdrawal.

There are several noteworthy omissions in the book. Early on, she states that the opposition to her plan by powerful (i.e., business) interests doesn't concern her. Perhaps it should; after one battles the communist party dragons one might find even fiercer capitalist dragons to slay. Similarly, we hear nothing about how our cities are shaped by their roles as headquarters of the multinational corporations, and receivers of products and people of the Third World.

Very little mention was made of women (except in reference to the crossnational participation studies). However, urbanization as a process has led to particularly intense isolation and alienation in the lives of women. Specialization and zoning for different functions has resulted in the separation of areas for living, work, school, recreation and entertainment. The lives of most women transcend the division of labor. Urban space designed by women, which enabled them to exercise freely their multiple roles inside and outside of the paid economy, as well as meeting other human needs (recreation, interaction with adults of both sexes, political participation, etc.) might well provide a setting in which men also could easily perform the roles of paid worker, child rearer, houseworker, etc. Obviously, there are some aspects of the sexual division of labor that cannot readily be eliminated, nor should they be, for functions essential to humanness can hardly be alienating. However, those that are culturally imposed and reinforced by urban design are alienating for men as well as women. A rearrangement of space is a concrete precondition for a future unalienated human existence. If (as Ganassi-Agger assumes) it were the result of a process by which people begin to control their own lives, "Urban Self-Management" may well have revolutionary potential.

Joan Roelofs

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Short Journal Reviews*:

ANARCHIST REVIEW, 1:5

Cienfuegos Press, Over the Water, Sanday, Orkney KW17 2BL, U.K. HENRI SIMON, *"Some Thought on Organization."* Organization is not understood here as something one group creates to liberate others but rather what each creates by themselves in their struggle for their own interests. "The surpassing of particulars, the unification of demands and their transcendence in more general and fundamental problems, the perspectives of the struggle, all of these can only be, at any given moment, the product of the struggle itself." *"Bulgaria Today."* Describes the present-day situation of political repression in Bulgaria today. Neither specific information nor an economic and historical orientation is given but rather the thinking of a generation which has known only the current regime. DAVE POOLE, *"Librado Rivera."* A tribute to an otherwise neglected founding member of Partido Liberal Mexicano and a major contributor to its anarchist orientation. MAX NETTLAU, *"Errico Malatesta."* A rough outline of Malatesta's life written at the end of June 1920 and originally serialized in *Freedom* by the greatest historian of anarchism yet. As the article ends in 1920 an appendix is included which summarizes Malatesta's activities between 1920 and his death in 1932 which is based in part on Nettlau's obituary. ERRICO MALATESTA, *"Syndicalism and Anarchism, Discipline, The Authoritarian Psychosis of the Socialist Party, At Last!, A Bit of Theory,* and *Reply to the Platform."* Important primary sources by an otherwise neglected anarcho-syndicalist many of which have not been published elsewhere and-or have long been out of print. *"The Mates Gang."* A brief history of Italian anarchism in the second half of the 19th century highlighting its series of attempted insurrections and its relationship to the "propaganda by the deed." PAUL AVRICH. *"'The Guard is Tired': Anatoli Zhelezniakov Stormy Petrel."* A brief biography of a young anarchist responsible for dispersing the Constituent Assembly and active throughout the Russian Revolution from 1905 until his death in 1919 fighting against the White Army. JOHN SLADEK, *"Occult Authoritarianism."* Besides the obvious reasons for rejecting occultism based on its anti-scientific bias and its tendency to lead people into even greater ignorance, superstition, intolerance, and compulsion, several particular reasons are also given. Among those cited are its appeal to plain selfishness and its elitism, as well as a submission to a higher supernatural power. *"Anarchists in Fiction."* Short reviews of P.C. Wren's *Beau Sabreur*; Ernest Hemingway's *The Fifth Column, For Whom the Bell Tolls, A Farewell to Arms,* and *Over the River and Into the Trees*; and Herman Hesse's *Steppenwolf.* The attitudes of the authors toward anarchism and anarchists are seen to be: "the most violently reactionary," "privileged liberal," and "the greatest anarchist novel of all times," respectively. *"Do-It-Yourself Radio Station."* The first part describes the circuit and construction of a two-transistor V.H.F. transmitter and suggests a number of uses for it. Part 2 gives a more detailed treatment of these projects and offers some pointers regarding possible directions for development and improvement of the basic circuit. RUDOLF DE JONG, *"The Libertarian Movement in the Netherlands."* Traces the history of this movement from the founding of a social-democratic association in Amsterdam in 1878 by H. Gerard through to the 1960s and the eruption of the "Provo" and "Kaboteur" movements. SHELBY SHAPIRO, *"Freie Arbeter Shtime."* An obituary for the world's oldest continuous Yiddish publication which recently ceased printing in December 1977 after 87 years. What is of as much importance is its continuation as an anarchist newspaper throughout those many, many years. PFM

BLACK ROSE, 2:5 (Spring, 1980)

Box 107, Boston, MA 02103. $6 for 4 issues. PETER CARIANI, *"Cages of the Mind."* An Analysis of dogmatic political and religious doctrine which debilitates both individuals and movements. Five characteristics are identified as commonplace in all these self-stabilizing, self-justifying systems, some of which are reminiscent of Horkheimer's distinction between critical and traditional theory. Seen as deterministic, all encompassing, and exclusive, their assumptions contain the refutation and rationalizations for all competing theories. They include broad, widely held moral generalities, and the world is dichotomized along objective lines, while facets of life are recast in terms of the religion-ideology. The primary danger of these dogmatic modes is

*This section has been compiled by John Fekete, Department of English Literature, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario K9J 7B8. The following have contributed reviews: Pat Akard, John Fekete, Robert John, Michael Lacy, Eileen Manion, Peter Murphy, Mary Papke, Odessa Pierce, Harland Prechel, Robert E. Rucker, Vincent Serravallo, Andrew Wernick.

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seen as the active suppression of unorthodox approaches, experimentation and radical restructuring of thought and social form necessary for further growth. RICHARD MANDEL, *"The Politics of Disease: Cancer in a Metastatic Society."* Discusses why cancer has become such a common disease of 20th century post-industrial society and what is being done about it. The environmental factors which have dramatically increased the human risk of cancer and which point to a rational means of eliminating the disease as a serious cause of mortality is examined at length. *"Conversation with Augustin Souchy."* An anarchist of considerable experience, active in the anti-militarist movement against World War I, Foreign Affairs Secretary for the Spanish anarcho-syndicalist union, the CNT, during the Spanish Revolution, and having first-hand experience with the anarchist movement in South America makes this interview extremely important. However, it is still highly controversial, presenting many issues still open to debate as having already been settled. The interview was prepared during Souchy's North American tour approximately three years ago when he was speaking on behalf of the "reborn" CNT. *"Northwest Passages: Notes From an Anarchist Symposium."* A critical report of the First International Symposium on Anarchism held Feb. 17-24, 1980 at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon. Many suggestions worth serious consideration for those planning future conferences on this subject are provided. PFM

RADICAL AMERICA, 14:1 (January-February 1980)

38 Union Square, Somerville, MA 92143. $10 for 4 issues. LYNN GARAFOLA, *"Hollywood and the Myth of the Working Class."* "Rocky," "The Deer Hunter," "Saturday Night Fever," and "Norma Rae" are some of the movies reviewed as examples of Hollywood's rediscovery of the working class. Key questions such as the relationship of ethnicity, class, and race are examined and the profound nostalgia for old-time values closely related to the rightward drift of the country's political mood today is emphasized. JOHN DEMETER, *"Independent Film and Working Class History."* A review of two examples of non-Hollywood left-wing movies: "The Wobblies," and "Northern Lights." It is pointed out that both show signs that progress is slowly being made toward the creation of a popular Left culture. Some criticisms are given, the most telling of which is their lack of connecting work and political activity to people's everyday lives. RACHAEL GROSSMAN, *"Women's Place In the Integrated Circuit."* A revealing account of the personal and social costs for Malaysian women in the electronics industry in regards to their relationship to the dual exploitation and paternalism characteristic of international capitalism. The power of American imperialism to define "liberation" for Third World peoples in terms of commodities and lifestyle which can only be purchased by their submission to the most brutalizing and wrenching or urban industrial experiences is demonstrated at length. The necessity for a strategy based on class solidarity across national boundaries is called for. FERENC FEHER and AGNES HELLER, *"Hungary, 1956: The Anatomy of a Political Revolution."* A case study of a "pure political revolution because the ruling class totally lost its legitimacy." The emergence of workers' councils to run production as well as the country is seen as the most crucial aspect of the revolution. The councils are not romanticized but rather demonstrate the necessity for leftists to support any democratic revolution while trying to influence it as much as possible. MARTY BLATT, JIM GREEN, and SUSAN REVERBY, *"A Reunion of Shoeworkers: The First Massachusetts History Workshop."* A report of a reunion and celebration for the workers from the waning days of the Lynn, Massachusetts show industry which brought together working people in the community with historians who had studied the community. As a recreation of an old union meeting, a workshop that stimulated further research and a cultural event for most of the participants it was a big success. All this is described as well as some of the difficulties and limitations such an undertaking involves. PFM

RADICAL AMERICA, 14:2 (March-April 1980)

MANNING MARABLE, *"A. Philip Randolph and the Foundations of Black American Socialism."* Examines Randolph's early career as a militant journalist, Socialist Party candidate and trade unionist from 1911 until the late 1920s. The primary consideration is to criticize Randolph's emergent theory of social transformation during this formative decade of political activism and to develop an understanding of the consequences of his sometimes eclectic political practice. The legacy as carried on by Bayard Rustin is also considered. ELLEN SHUB, *"The Anti-Nuke Movement, 1979: A Photo Essay.* MAURICE ISSERMAN, *"The 1956 Generation: An Alternative Approach to the History of American Communism."* The CP's popular-front policies of the late 1930s is examined as one example of the necessity for the party to adjust to the needs of its own cadre in order to survive and grow. In this case the popular-front served as a

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means for many of the party's members to assimilate into American life. Many problems occur because of this limited focus, the most telling of which is that the working class is underrepresented in the sample of party members described. RICHARD WARING, *"What Has America Done With You, Walt Whitman?," Coup De L'Arbre," "Coffe Break,"* and *The Snowman.* Four poems. LINDA POWELL, *"Black Macho and Black Feminism."* A review of Michele Wallace's *Black Macho and the Myth of the Superwoman,* illustrating some of the dangers in the uncritical use of black nationalism. PFM

RADICAL AMERICA, 14:3 (May-June 1980)

CARL BOGGS, *"Gramsci and Eurocommunism."* Addressing the use and misuse of one of the most important Marxist thinkers of our century this article shows how the Italian Communist Party has appropriated Gramsci to justify policies which were strikingly similar to those which he opposed half a century ago. This misuse of sources and texts as well as the illegitimate defense of the policies of the PCI have two functions which are identified and examined here. First, they lend false revolutionary legitimacy to social democratic strategies, and second they deprive us of relevant insights for our own struggle to build a revolutionary movement in the United States today. An appendix considers the relationship of Togliatti to the origins of Eurocommunism. ANN WITHORN, *"Helping Ourselves: The Limits and Potential of Self Help."* Defines self help, describes its historical roots, examines it as a feminist practice, and provides suggestions of its problems and potential. Identifying the magnitude of current self help activity, the necessity for us to have at least an analysis of its political implications and an understanding of its appeal is demonstrated. Self help is seen as one way to formulate a left politics more grounded in daily experience of working class life as well as a means for individual change. LOIS AHRENS, *"Battered Women's Refuges: Feminist Cooperatives vs. Social Service Institutions."* Describes one woman's personal experience with the transformation of a refuge for battered women in Austin, Texas from a feminist, nonhierarchical, community-based organization to an institutionalized social service agency. RENAE SCOTT, *"Notes on Race, Mothering, and Culture in the Shelter Movement."* Excerpts of articles on the battered women's movement by a Boston-area activist who has worked with Transition House, a local shelter, and an area-wide network of battered women's groups. ROSLYN L. FELDBERG, *"'Union Fever': Organizing Among Clerical Workers, 1900-1930."* Analysis of the difficulties and ultimate failure of organizing clerical workers during the first three decades of this century. PFM

RADICAL PHILOSOPHERS' NEWSJOURNAL

Ceased publication with issue number 11. Since beginning publication six years ago the job market in philosophy has deteriorated and consequently most contributors were forced to submit their material to journals "which their department chairpersons, (etc.) regarded as more respectable." In lieu of this, less worthwhile material was received and there was no longer enough material to continue publication. PFM

SOCIAL TEXT, No. 2 (Summer 1979)

700 West Badger Road, Suite 101, Madison, WI 53713. $8 for 3 issues. STANLEY ARONOWITZ, *"The End of Political Economy."* An examination of theories of advanced capitalism, focusing on monopoly capitalism, dependency theory and capital-logic theory. The *science* of political economy remains descriptive and fails to define the conditions of supersession. JOHN MOWITT, *"Of Mice and Kids."* The Walt Disney Mickey Mouse Club show serves as an example of the way in which reception takes precedence over production in advanced cultural technology. This alters Benjamin's notion of the aura to the extent that now the perceiving subject's awe affirms his incapacity to reproduce the object. TERRY EAGLETON, *"Ideology, Fiction, Narrative."* Ideology as a signifying set of practical relations with the real may parallel the "literary." "A 'literary' reading is one which applies certain generalizing conventions to the discourse at issue, prying it loose from its immediate referential context." SUSAN WILLIS, *"Aesthetics of the Rural Slum."* An analysis of Faulkner's "The Bear," which stresses that the text is not an organic unity, but a "tormented disunity" fractured by the tension between the creativity implied in myth and the futility of the attempted mediations. HERNAN VIDAL, *"The Politics of the Body: The Chilean Junta and the Anti-Fascist Struggle."* While the Junta's declaration uses imagery of transcendence, the anti-fascist works of Valdes and Delano sabotage this discourse by emphasizing the perception of the body as the basis of ultimate human perfection. Plus short commentaries on Walt Disney, P.T. Barnum, the W.C. Williams exhibition. PM

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BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, 12:3 (July-September 1980)
PO Box W, Charlemont, MA 01339. $14 for 4 issues. Illustrated. ROBIN BROAD, *"Our Children are Being Kidnapped!"* A light case study in dialogue style, depicting the classical situation of the coercive land expansion tactics of multinational corporations (Del Monte affiliate Philippine Packing Corporation) against the Philippine small landowning laborers. JOSE MARIA SISON, *"The Guerilla is Like a Poet."* Short poem. ROBERT STAUFFER, *"Philippine 'Normalization': The Politics of Form."* An analysis of the Marcos regime serves to illustrate the essential role of symbolic politics in legitimizing repressive developmental ruling systems. The U.S. is seen as the chief transnational ally which also uses symbolic politics as a solution to the dilemma of maintaining world moral leadership while at the same time supporting and depending upon Marcos' martial law. ROBERT L. YOUNGBLOOD, *"The Protestant Church in the Philippines' New Society."* Examines the changing character of the Protestant church's opposition to Marcos' martial law, ranging from moderate, legitimate proposals and councils to "radical" community organizing (liberation theology). CRAIG G. SCHARLIN, *"A Filmmaker and His Film."* Reviews "The Perfumed Nightmare." ROB STEVEN, *"The Japanese Working Class."* A statistical analysis revealing the tactics of dividing the Japanese working class into three factions (labor aristocracy, mass worker, and reserve army) on the basis of sex, age, and education. Such a division coincides with and is legitimized by traditional familial relations and therefore conceals the worker's relation to production and precludes class consciousness. KENZABURO OE, *"A Strange Job."* Japanese short story biting with guilt and irony. Plus book reviews. VS

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY 4:1 (Winter 1980)
REGINAID WHITAKER, *"Reason, Passion and Interest: Pierre Trudeau's Eternal Liberal Triangle."* Criticizes the Canadian PM's political theory and emphasizes the continuity of the early 60s *Cité Libriste* with the vicissitudes of his stated position while in office. Convincingly argues that Trudeau exemplifies not sold-out social-democracy, but the McPhersonian contradictoriness of classical liberal democracy. ANDREW WERNICK, *"Dionysus and the Crucified: Towards a Left Theory."* Within a left-Durkheimian perspective, argues the necessity for a clarification of the Left's ideological self-understanding via the development of "left-theology." Gadawsky and Baum's religious humanism is examined as a convergent Marxist-Christian version of this. Argues that their ecumenicism needs to be complemented-expanded by an encounter with Buddha and Dionysus — with structuralism paradoxically pointing the way to the former and mass culture (rock) to the latter. JOAN DAVIES, *"Approaching Walter Benjamin: Retrieval, Translation and Reconstruction."* Commentary on recently translated Benjamin texts (particularly the *Illuminations* and *Reflections* anthologies) which tries, with some success, to rescue Benjamin from the one-sided tendencies that have claimed him. Missing from an otherwise well-rounded interpretation is any account of Benjamin's development as a theorist and critic. Skates over the difficult question of whether the modernist and Marxist elements cohere. BRIAN SINGER, *"The Later Castoriadis: Institution under Interrogation."* Second and final part of expository essay, generally favorable to Castoriadis' elaboration of "institution" as a crucial — and, in "inherited thought," a missing category of social analysis. MICHAEL FORSTER, *"Marx on the Communist State: A Partial Eclipse of Political Reality."* Surprisingly fresh look at the old chestnut of Marx's theory of the state. Main thesis is that there is a contradiction between the utopian and realist impulses which Marx is too honest to resolve in a false closure. ARTHUR KROKER, *"Hollywood, Hollywood."* Introduces critical reviews by Kroker and FRANK BURKE of, respectively, "Apocalypse Now" and "The Deer Hunter." Both films — and the medium in general — are investigated as complex embodiments of lived filmic reality. The interpretations justify socio-aesthetics as a project, but leave unexamined the problem of whether either, or any film, places a critical distance between audience and the experience reflected on the screen. Reviews by DAVID COOK, JOHN BADERTSCHER, and ROD PREECE of works on Camus, by Grant, and on Burke. Response by RICHARD VERNON to sympathetic review of his work on Sorel by Stanley, which gently refuses Stanley's suggestion that the theory-practice unity in Marxist thought parallels the uncertainty principle in physics. Response by BEN AGGER to Wernick's critique of his essay on Dialectical Sensibility in which the latter's objections are polemically dismissed as élitist, academicist and repressive. More heat than light. AW

CHRYSALIS, A MAGAZINE OF WOMEN'S CULTURE, No. 10 (1979)
108 W. 6th St., no. 330, Los Angeles, CA 90017. $15 for 4 issues. *Chrysalis* is devoted to "a

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tradition of exploring and celebrating our emerging women's culture." In response to charges of neglecting Black and Third World artists, the editors here publish two narrative pieces: RUTHE WINEGARTEN's *"I Am Annie Mae: The Personal Story of a Black Texas Woman"* (oral history of Annie Mae Hunt); DEIDRE McCALLA'a *"At Nineteen"* — and several poems by non-white women writers. Articles include: BRANDON FRENCH, *"'We Used to be Different, But Now We're the Same': Recycling Female Images for the Seventies."* Analyzes and compares female role models in films and TV shows from the 1930s-1950s with those of the past decade (e.g., *I Love Lucy* and *Laverne and Shirley, Adam's Rib* and *Alien*). Concludes that recent productions pay only lip service to the changing status and aspirations of women. In the main, our movies and TV series are as reactionary as ever. KATHLEEN L. MAIO, *"'A Strange and Fierce Delight': The Early Days of Women's Mystery Fiction."* An overview and analysis of early women's mystery fiction and its anarchistic and-or feminist elements and plots which were later "ruled out" in the "Golden Age" of Poe-Doyle formulaic fiction. ROSEMARY CURB, PHYLLIS MAEL, BEVERLEY BYERS PEVITTS, *"Catalog of Feminist Theater."* A 2-part article which includes an introductory essay by Mael on feminist theater; an annotated bibliography of published and unpublished plays and alternative theater productions; an overview by Curb of the first decade of feminist theater; an annotated list of feminist theater groups (concluding with a list of now dormant groups). All works and groups cited were chosen for their focussed dialogue-debate with feminist issues; the listings, thus, cover a wide range of philosophical and political stances. Plus poetry, book reviews, short articles, and an auto-interview by Andrea Dworkin. MEP

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 9:4 (Winter 1979-80)

M.E. Sharpe, 901 N. Broadway, White Plains, NY 10603. $30 for 4 issues. All five essays in this issue are by DAG OSTERBERG, a Norwegian sociologist. *"Notes on the Concept of Material."* A comparison of Marx's and Weber's views is the foil for Osterberg's theory of materiality as the center and medium of social life. This confused, discontinuous rehash of "material determination" depends on treating anything outside the individual's control as a material fact. *"On the Significance of Materialism in Sociology with Reference to Theories of Social Class."* Osterberg again uses his materialist viewpoint according to which social life is not a network of symbolic interaction but a set of social relations taking place through the mediation of material objects (Sartre's *practico-inerte*). He criticizes the prestige and power theories of social class prevalent in modern sociology, then concludes with remarks on the property theory of social class, focusing particularly on individuality and property. *"The Concept of Anomie and Historical Materialism."* A simple short essay demonstrating the obvious: that Durkheim's concern for anomie as the lack of normative regulation offers little for the historical materialist concerned with domination. Osterberg falls back on Robert Merton's treatment to show that it might nevertheless have some use as a Marxian concept to describe the false consciousness of some workers. *"Historical Materialism and Durkheim's Collective Logic."* Focuses on Durkheim's theory of crime and punishment and its dissonance with historical materialism. Durkheim's theory is shown to be fetishistic. *"Sociological Theory and Utilitarianism."* A recapitulation of several sociological critics (e.g., Durkheim, Parsons) of utilitarianism. As usual, Osterberg flits about, touching on Lukacs on his way to a presentation of the contemporary utilitarian Frederik Barth. Osterberg spends most of the rest of the essay dabbling with the concept of collective consciousness. He finishes with the only interesting argument (adapted from Bergson) in the whole issue. Here, Osterberg suggests that the utilitarian interpretations we place on our everyday behavior may merely be "a retrospective illusion generated through reflection." MGL

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 10:1 (Spring 1980)

This issue collects "Essays on Sociology" from VLADIMIR SHLIAPENTOKH, a Soviet practitioner of "concrete sociology." *"Introduction."* Traces the development in the Soviet Union of an increasingly wide gulf between individual expressions of values resonant with the official ideology of the state, and material expression of attitudes that mock these verbalizations. *"The Correlation Between Global and Individual Goal Functions."* This is the only abstract paper in the issue, and the author or his translator appears out of his element. It is a terribly rambling set of ruminations, without theme or thesis, concerning how the goals of a hedonistically rational actor may mesh with those of social units to which he belongs. Typical observations of the author include: that means to a valued end become ends themselves; that an actor's own goals may differ from those of every social group of which he is a member; and that the more general a group goal is, the more adherents it will attract. *"The Formulation of Questions and the Values of Respondents."* In this article, originally published in Moscow in 1973, Shliapentokh describes

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how and why answers to social surveys may be misleading. It is an index of the underdevelopment of Soviet sociology that a 1973 article could concern itself with what are twenty-year-old commonplaces to even the most unsophisticated American pollster. *"Gathering Sociological Information and Problems of Representativeness."* Though Shliapentokh discusses nothing new to any American surveyor, this article might be worth including in an undergraduate sociological methods textbook. It is amusing to note that problems Soviet surveyors experience (e.g., interviewers who cheat by "curbstoning") are identical to those found in the U.S. *"Concepts About the Future of Reading."* In this example of the author's empirical survey work, rather than his methodological efforts in the area, we find the resemblance of Soviet sociology to American work completed by this boring treatment of a trivialized subject matter. MGL

MARXIST PERSPECTIVES, 3:1 (Spring 1980)

The Cliomar Corporation, 420 West End Avenue, New York, NY 10024. $18 for 4 issues. A.G. QUINTERO-RIVERA, *"Notes on Puerto Rican National Development: Class and Nation in a Colonial context."* Focus is on the social processes in Puerto Rico that led to the "national identity crisis" of the 1930s, and on some methodological problems. DAVID ROMTVEDT, *"Maraho Butare, Muraho Rwands."* A poem. THEODORE M. BROWN, *"Putting Paradigms Into History."* A critique of Kuhn's analysis of the structure of continuity and change in the history of science. WILLIAM TABB, *"Zapping Labor."* Examines the policy of subsidizing huge corporations and the waste of energy, damage to the environment and social irresponsibility, and proposes an alternative model of economic growth. JACOB NEUSNER, *"Mishnah On Women: Thematic or Systemic Description."* Illustrates the use of "the subject of a subject delineated by a common theme," by examining a particular case and its choices: the treatment of women in a specific ancient document — the Mishnah. R.G. SAISSELIN, *"Quatremere DeQuincy and The Internal Contradictions of Bourgeois Aesthetics."* "Illart is the opium of the bourgeois and aesthetics its theology." OWEN LATTIMORE, *"The Collectivization of the Mongolian Herding Economy."* Outlines and evaluates the stages of collectivization of the Mongolian herding economy. LUCIA CHIAVOLA BIRNBAUM, *"Earthmother, Godmothers, and Radicals: The Inheritance of Sicilian-American Women."* A case study of Sicilian-American women is used to illustrate how the women of Italy today have formed the strongest women's movement in the Western world. IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ, *"Slouching Toward the Brave New World: Bureaucarcy, Administration and State Power."* Concludes that whatever the nature of the economic system, our epoch bears witness to constant expansion in state power, bureaucratic norms, and administrative domination and disposition of people. HOWARD SHERMAN, *"Eurocommunism, Socialism and Democracy."* Reviews *Eurocommunism and the State,* by Santiago Carrillo. OP

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 3:1 (Summer 1980)

PO Box 156, Jackson Heights, NY 11372. $20 for 12 issues. EDITORS, *"Dossier: The Soviet Auto Strikes, 1980."* Call for solidarity with the 270,000 Soviet autoworkers who struck the Gorky and Togliatti plants in May 1980 in defiance of their bosses, official unions, the party and the criminal code. DOUGLAS A. FRASER, *"At Togliatti, Gorky, There Is No UAW."* Exerpt from the *New York Times* of June 18, 1980. Offers UAW solidarity. MIKHAIL ZOTOV, *"Letter from Togliatti."* Describes strike activities that preceeded those of 1980. WORKERS, TOGLIATTIGRAD MILK COMBINE, *"Appeal to Nowhere."* April 1978 letter provides background information on conditions in Togliatti: corruption and robotization. DANIEL R. FUSFELD, *"The Economic Crisis of the 1980s."* On stagnation, destabilizing elements in the economy, and the "spectre of financial collapse." Foresees a long depression or macroeconomic planning. DAN GALLIN, *"Unions and Transnationals: The Beginnings of an International Response."* On transnational corporate power as a global system that also impinges at local levels, and on the response of international, regional, and bilateral types of trade union organization. Stress on the need to alter the relationship of forces. Calls for better working relations between international unionism and socialism. Plus book reviews. JAF

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 120 (March-April 1980)

B. de Boer, 188 High Street, Nutley, New Jersey 07110. $18 for 6 issues. This 20th anniversary issue is entitled *"Marxism and the Historians."* RAYMOND WILLIAMS, *"Beyond Actually Existing Socialism."* Drawing heavily on Rudolf Bahro's notions on a socialist model of development, Williams insists that material forces must play a strategic role in emancipation and

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cultural revolution. RAPHAEL SIMUEL, *"British Marxist Historians, 1880-1980: Part One."* An analysis of how traditions of religious enthusiasm and scientific rationalism have influenced socialist and communist thought in Britain. VICTOR KIERNAN, *"Blood of Spain."* Reviews Ronald Fraser's *Blood of Spain* and comments on the neglected topic of the differences between revolutions and civil wars. Book review (Rodney Hilton demolishes the main theme of Alan Macfarlane's *The Origins of English Individualism*) and Note (Tamara Deutscher's account of a visit to China.) HP

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 121 (May-June 1980)

EDWARD THOMPSON, *"Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization."* Discusses the expansion of nuclear weaponry within an imperialist framework, and places most of the responsibility for nuclear proliferation on the United States and other capitalist powers. He argues that nuclear weapons possess a menacing competitive dynamic of their own, outside the sphere of politics, and "World War Three could burst out as something that no one (individual or group) willed." WANG XIZHE, *"For a Return to Genuine Marxism."* Argues that the major obstacle blocking the path of China's development is a superstitious belief that the "Gang of Four" were able to transform Chinese society. Maintains that this superstitious belief must be demolished prior to a transformation to a classless society, and that people must realize that they and only they are capable of changing the structure of society. THEODOR ADORNO, *"Bloch's 'Traces': the Philosophy of Kitsch."* A review essay. MICHAEL RUSTIN, *"The New Left and the Present Crisis."* A former editor of *NLR* seeks to identify domestic political issues that confront socialists in the eighties. Rustin argues that the theoretical gains of the past will be lost unless the left is able to confront political economic issues on a practical level which appeals to a cross-section of the population. To accomplish this, the "left" must initially access its own progress and focus on the future of society in active relation to current practical political issues. Interview: ROY MEDVEV, *"The Afghan Crisis."* HP

NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1:2-3 (Fall-Winter 1979-80)

420 West 118th Street, Room 733, New York, NY 10027. $15 for 4 issues. CARL BOGGS, *"Marxism and the Role of Intellectuals."* RICHARD LEWONTIN, *"Marxists and the University."* FREDERIC JAMESON, *"Marxism and Teaching."* IRA SHOR, *"Extraordinary Re-Experiencing the Ordinary: An Approach to Critical Teaching."* JOHN RENSENBRINK, *"A Study in Praxis: The Caucus for a New Political Science."* DAVID JOHNS, *"The Elite University and Corporate Capital."* HARVEY BOULAY, *"The Higher Bargaining In America: Boston University's Faculty Union."* DANIEL ZWERDLING, *"Self-Management in the University."* CHARLES FOX, *"The State's University?: A Response to Michael Brown."* WOLFE-DIETER NARR, *"Bahro as an Event; Bahro Speaks."* HEINE GANSSMANN, *"The Alternative."* STANLEY ARONOWITZ, *"Marxism, Technology and Labor."* This double issue focuses specifically on "The Socialist Academic Between Theory and Practice" and is concerned with developing a perspective and a practice relevant to the institutions of higher learning. Articles and reports on the theory of the intellectual, the role of Marxists in the university, the use of the classroom situation to develop forms and contents which are both liberatory and critical, the organization of professionals into radical caucuses, the structure of higher education and the possibilities for self-management are just a few of the areas examined. PM

POLITICAL THEORY, 8:1 (February 1980)

Sage Publications Inc., 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. $16.50 for 4 issues. ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, *"Herbert Marcuse: 1898-1979: A Personal Reminiscence."* CUSHING STROUT, *"Tocqueville and Republican Religion: Revisiting the Visitor."* Reviews four interpretations of Tocqueville identified by Robert Nisbet and proposes a fifth interpretation based on republican religion as the centerpiece of Tocqueville's view of America. The article quickly becomes a thinly-veiled vehicle for airing liberal fears about the current state of the nation. Happily concludes that with Watergate behind us our liberal constitutional system has "pulled us back from the political abyss." PETER DENNIS BATHORY, *"Tocqueville on Citizenship and Faith: A Response to Cushing Strout."* Correctly maintains that Strout's argument "wanders," gives a "misleading picture" of Tocqueville, and lacks textual support. Bathory offers a solid interpretation of Tocqueville as a participatory democrat who was concerned about the possible withering of the public sphere, the elimination of grass-roots political participation through political centralization, and the loss of civic virtue, all of which are essential to a healthy democracy. ADRIAN M.S. PIPER, *"Property and the Limits of the*

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Self." Challenges the logical consistency of Hegel's doctrine of the necessity of private property advanced in *The Philosophy of Right*. Identifies three conceptions of the self and their corresponding implications for the relationship between the individual and the state. Concludes that Hegel's advocacy of private property and the "acquisitive" individual eliminates the possibility of self-transcendence and the ideal of an ethical order. ARLENE W. SAXONHOUSE, *"Men, Women, War, and Politics: Family and Polis in Aristophanes and Euripides."* Illustrates the relationship between the public and private spheres through an interpretation of *Lysistrata, Ecclesizusae,* and the *Trojan Women* that focuses on the role of women. Each of these plays reveals a different form this relationship can take. In the *Trojan Women* the public sphere dominates, in *Ecclesiazusae* the private sphere displaces the public, in *Lysistrata* a balance between the two is sought. Interesting discussion but no effort is made to show how this informs the contemporary imbalance. CHRISTINE SWANTON, *"The Concept of Interests."* Abstract philosophical analysis of the concept of something *being in someone's interests*. Easily dispatches the subjectivist position that individuals are the final arbiters of their own interests. Rather than support the opposite "normative" concept of ideal interests that all should pursue, attempts to provide criteria by which the two positions can be "harmonized." Never identifies the primary issue that separates the two positions as the problem of false consciousness. Final position amounts to an over-rationalized cost-benefit analysis where desired ends are weighed against the cost of pursuing the ends. BRUCE DOUGLASS, *"The Common Good and the Public Interest."* Draws a distinction between the "common good" and the "public interest" through a brief historical account of each concept. Aligns himself with those who reject the privatized, atomistic, individualist nature of liberal political philosophy in favor of a moral justification for public policies based on an evaluation of the "common good." Morality is to be reinjected into politics. RJ

POLITICAL THEORY, 8:2 (Mau 1980)

CAROLE PATEMAN, *"Women and Consent."* Uses the example of rape to reveal the contradictions of liberal democratic theory on the issue of consent. Since consent is the basis of legitimacy, yet is merely hypothetical or presumed, it only serves to conceal power relations and domination. The contrived legal decisions in rape cases perpetuate sexual domination and disclose the bankruptcy of liberal consent theory. GOERGE WINDSTRUP, *"Locke on Suicide."* A plodding piece which concludes that Locke sanctioned suicide "when properly determined by the calculus of pleasure and pain" and when the "torments of survival are thought to outweigh the pains of death." ARTHUR DiQUATTRO, *"The Market and Liberal Values."* Makes the analytical distinction between aggregate and distributive aspects of the market. Compares liberal capitalism with market socialism on the role of the market and implications for equality. Maintains that liberal capitalism is inefficient in both aggregate and distributive capacities. Concludes that only decentralized market socialism based on worker control can maximize production and equality. MARK E. KANN, *"Challenging Lockean Liberalism in America: The Case of Debs and Hillquit."* Analysis of the thesis advanced in Louis Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America* that socialists failed by being assimilated into or isolated from the American Lockean political mainstream. Maintains that the careers of Debs and Hillquit do not conform to Hartz's thesis because they were neither assimilated nor isolated. Attributes the success of Debs and Hillquit "to the fact that they self-consciously translated Marxian concepts into familiar Lockean terms. Explains the failure of the New Left to build a popular movement on an inability to express Marxist insights in the Lockean vernacular. OSCAR J. HAMMEN, *"A Note on the Alienation Motif in Marx."* Partial rehash of the Young-Old Marx debate. Maintains that Marx's use of philosophical concepts (alienation, species being) was a tactical device meant to win support among the Young Hegelians to bring about an alliance with the proletariat. Failure to convert the philosophers led Marx to abandon philosophical concepts for material analysis. Neglects to show the relevance of this "tactical" interpretation for the Young-Old debate. Communications and reviews plus *"Jürgen Habermas: An International Bibliography."* RJ

QUEST: A FEMINIST QUARTERLY, 5:2

PO Box 8843, Washington, D.C. 20003. $9 for 4 issues. JUDY CHICAGO, interviewed by ELIZABETH HESS, *"It Is Art . . . But Is It Political?"* Chicago discusses the ways that she thinks art can influence political change. ANN MARKUSEN, *"Who Were Your Grandmothers, John Hanson?"* Vehemently attacks John Hanson's supposedly left-wing film, *Northern Lights*, for its portrayal of women's roles in pre-World War I Dakota farming communities. KAY

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WHITLOCK, *"Power Brokerage and Single Issue Politics in NOW."* Argues that, at the national level, "patriarchal power relations" influence NOW's programs, priorities, and approach to issues, in violation of what ought to be a feminist concern with process and means as well as ends. Whitlock goes so far as to suggest that NOW has become "a mirror-image of institutions which oppress women in the larger society." SIDNEY OLIVER, *"Feminism, Environmentalism and Appropriate Technology."* Examines some of the beliefs which radical feminists and ecologists hold in common, and argues that feminists should not confine themselves to "women's issues," but should forge links with environmental groups which have compatible goals and explore theoretically the connections between the domination of nature and the exploitation of women. Plus book reviews. EM

RADICAL AMERICA, 14:4 (July-August, 1980)

38 Union Square, Somerville, MA 02143. $10 for 4 issues. DAVE WAGNER and PAUL BUHLE, *"Worker's Control and the News: The Madison, Wisconsin PRESS CONNECTION."* An interview with the production coordinator of this worker-run newspaper originated by striking employees of Madison's two dailies. First published as a weekly strike paper, the *press connection* quickly became a cooperatively owned and produced daily. Describes the day-to-day pressures of putting out a newspaper by cooperative effort as well as: the relation of this recent political development to the student struggles of the 60s and to present community attitudes and labor struggles; the political thrust of this "people's paper" approach; workers' ownership as a political strategy and an economic policy; and why this strike paper failed where others have succeeded. JOANNE BARKAN, *"Eight Hours a Day at Fiat: Conversations with Italian Auto Workers."* Discussions of the experience of the Italian industrial working class in the past half-decade, taking into consideration the impact of Italy's "Hot Autumn" of 1969. The relation of the militants of that period to the older workers, and how the younger working class has been integrated into Italy's industrial proletariat, are examined. The personal dimensions of life in the factory are elucidated and ramifications for auto workers throughout the world of technological innovations in both manufacturing and management are presented. BARBARA TAYLOR, *"Lords of Creation: Marxism, Feminism, and Utopian Socialism."* A much needed defense of the importance and relevance of Utopian socialism with specific emphasis on its attitudes toward feminism. Argues that this early socialist tradition should be taken seriosly and questions whether or not Marxism actually represents a narrowing of these early concerns. SHEILA ROWBATHAM, *"In Search of Edward Carpenter."* Presents the ideas and practice of this important socialist and champion of homosexual rights. Theorizing against the restrictions of Victorian bourgeois morality, he applied his analysis in his own life by setting up a household which gathered together a wide range of rebels. There he worked at a simplified life which included gardening, sandal-making, and active participation in the local socialist movement. REEBEE GAROFALO and STEVE CHAPPLE, *"The Pre-History of Rock and Roll."* A brief historical overview of the preconditions of rock music explains the convergence of a myriad of forces in the early fifties. The complexity of the process dates back to the late thirties and the initial challenges to the music publishing establishment as well as changes within the performance hierarchy. The main issues examined range from changes in broadcasting and the role of local radio and the independent deejay through such diverse variables as population migrations, material shortages and technological advances. PM

REVIEW OF RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMICS, 12:1 (Spring 1980)

URPE, 41 Union Square West, Room 901, New York, NY 10003. $25 for 4 issues, $15 low income (includes membership in URPE). PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, *"The Falling-Rate-of-Profit Theory of Crisis: A Rational Reconstruction by Way of Obituary."* Another discussion of the Marxian falling rate of profit thesis and its modern neo-Marxist variants. The author concludes that it *cannot* be demonstrated theoretically that the organic composition of capital leads to a fall in the rate of profit; also rejects the necessity of underconsumption. Marred by an overkill of formulas and axioms. VAL BURRIS, *"Capital Accumulation and the Rise of the New Middle Class,"* an informative and non-dogmatic article on the middle class in the U.S. Rejecting various "technological" explanations, the author attempts to link changes in the class structure with the historical contradictions of capitalism and the adaptive mechanisms that ensue. Concludes by suggesting that (following O'Connor) the middle class as a stabilizing force has reached its limits as we enter a period of diminishing growth. NORA LUSTIG, *"Underconsumption in Latin American Economic Thought: Some Considerations."* After a discussion of the various theories of underconsumption in which the author distinguishes "market insufficiency" and "realization crisis" variants, the writings of selected Latin American underconsumption theorists (Furtado,

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Pinto, Serra and Tavares, and Vuskovic) are criticized. The argument is both an empirical critique and, predictably, a theoretical dispute with their focus on the distribution of income and the structure of demand rather than on the social relations of production and the characteristics of the accumulation process. MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, *"The Decline of the Communist Party and the Black Question in the U.S.: Harry Haywood's Black Bolshevik."* A review article dealing with Haywood's autobiography; an insightful account of the CPUSA in the 30s and their handling of the "black question." Plus book reviews, notes. PA

SCIENCE FICTION STUDIES No. 22 (November 1980)

Arts Building, McGill University, 853 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T6. $10 for 3 issues. Theme: Science fiction and the non-print media. DONALD F. THEALL, *"On Science Fiction as Symbolic Communication."* A theoretical reflection on science fiction as popular writing evolving into challenging art form, as utopian writing tied up with future history, and as a literature increasingly oriented to social problems. Commentary on *Star Trek, 2001,* and *Futurological Congress.* Sees Science fiction as an important means of knowledge. MICHAEL STERN, *"Making Culture into Nature; or, Who Put the 'Special' into 'Special Effects'?"* In the light of post-structuralist theories of textuality, focuses on the ideological concentration and distraction of attention involved in selecting some technical effects as "special" while naturalizing others. MARK SIEGEL, *"Science-Fiction Characterization and TV's Battle for the Stars."* Argues that, by contrast with fictional representation, TV success depends on mythic personality stereotypes. CHARLES ELKINS, ed., *"Symposium on* Alien." Sic papers on the ideological implications of the horror film, by JACKIE BYARS, JEFF GOULD, PETER FITTING, JUDITY NEWTON, TONY SAFFORD, CLAYTON LEE. MARK SIEGEL, *"'The Rocky Horror Picture Show': More Than a Lip Service."* Argues that the film serves to restore equilibrium in the arena of sex roles undergoing transformation. ANDREW GORDON, *"'The Empire Strikes Back': Monsters from the Id." Empire,* like *Star Wars,* deals with the primal anxieties raised by stock mythical and fairy-tale material, especially variations on castration anxiety and the fear of being abandoned by the mother. FREDRIC JAMESON, *"SF Novel-SF Film.* Reviews seven texts from the Gregg series, representing permutations on the relationships between novel and filmic text. PAMELA ANNAS, *"Science Fiction Film Criticism in the U.S."* Reviews 14 books of SF film criticism, finding very little political awareness or sophistication. STANISLAW LEM, *"On Science, Pseudo-Science, and Some Science Fiction."* Reviews seven books, with brilliant acerbic wit and a hopefully agnostic intelligence. CHARLES ELKINS, *"Recent Bibliographies of Science Fiction and Fantasy."* Stimulating review of six technical books, touching on the boundaries between fantasy and SF. Plus book reviews, notes, and correspondence. JAF

SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 5:3 (Spring 1980)

University of Chicago Press, 5801 Ellis Ave., Chicago, IL 61637. $18 for 4 issues. M.Z. ROSALDO, *"The Use and Abuse of Anthropology: Reflections on Feminism and Cross-Cultural Understanding."* Reexamines the cross-cultural ascription of male dominance to a universal division of human societies into asymmetrical public and domestic spheres. Argues that to universalize such an opposition is to project 19th century assumptions about gender-determined social organization onto all other social forms. TERRI BRINT JOSEPH, *"Poetry as a Strategy of Power: The Case of Riffian Berber Women."* Describes the songs composed and sung by young, marriageable Berber girls. These songs are their only mode of publicly addressing the community and trying to pressure their fathers to take their wishes for a particular marriage partner into account. But their very existence indicates that these girls have more scope for expressing their own wills than has previously been assumed. TANIA MODLESKI, *"The Disappearing Act: A Study of Harlequin Romances."* Analyzes the Harlequin romance formula and suggests that women readers use them to resolve anger and confusion aroused by men in their own lives. BERENICE A. CARROLL, *"Political Science, Part II: International Politics, Comparative Politics, and Feminist Radicals."* Reviews recent debates on the relationship of development to women's status and reviews the literature on the collisions of feminism with other theories of social change. MEREDITH GOULD, *"The New Sociology."* Reviews recent feminist publications which have challenged methodological limitations and prevailing androcentric sociological categories. H. DIANE RUSSELL* *"Art History."* Reviews attempts to locate and evaluate the work of women artists of the past, debates over the influence of gender on visual imagery, analyzes the ways women have been portrayed in the visual arts, and feminist challenges to received notions of the nature of art. WENDY MARTYNA, *"Beyond the 'He-Man' Approach: The Case for Nonsexist Language."* Notes the deep-seated resistance to changing sexist language usage and argues the importance of making such changes. MYRA H. STROBER and DAVID

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TYACK, *"Why Do Women Teach and Men Manage? A Report on Research on Schools."* Strober and Tyack are initiating a historical review of the conditions under which women entered and men left teaching. M. ELIZABETH TIDBALL, *"Women's Colleges and Women Achievers Revisited."* Notes the correlation in the biographies of successful women between achievement and the attendance at a women's college or a college with a relatively high proportion of women faculty. JENNIFER M. JONES and FRANCES H. LOVEJOY, *"Discrimination Against Women in Australian Universities."* Documentation of a consistent pattern of discrimination against women in Australian universities which is similar to that found in North American institutions. Plus book reviews, letters and comments. EM

SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 5:3 (Spring 1980)

Supplement, Special Issue: "Women and the American City." JO FREEMAN, *"Women and Urban Policy."* Notes that little attention has been given to the sex composition of the inner city, and argues that policies are needed which guarantee women employment, child-care, and access to other services in urban areas. ANN R. MARKUSEN, *"City Spatial Structure, Women's Household Work, and National Urban Policy."* Analyzes recent urban policy initiatives, noting that women's specific needs are not taken into account. Also looks at some of the recent challenges to patriarchally structured urban space and argues that the inefficient single family dwelling unit remains prevalent, less because of the needs of capitalism than because of those of men to preserve their dominance. ELIZABETH EWEN, *"City Lights: Immigrant Women and the Rise of the Movies."* Examines the role played by silent films in acculturating Italian and Jewish immigrant women in New York City. MARILYN GITTELL and TERESA SHTOB, *"Changing Women's Roles in Political Volunteerism and Reform of the City."* Survey examines the extent of women's participation in various types of urban reform movements from the early 19th century to the present. GALEN CRANZ, *"Women in Urban Parks."* Reviews city planners' changing conceptions of the ways girls and women use park facilities from 1850 to the present. SUSAN SAEGERT, *"Masculine Cities and Feminine Suburbs: Polarized Ideas, Contradictory Realities."* Examines the symbolic identification of women with suburbs and men with cities in relation to data which provide some indications of actual, everyday experiences. MARSHA HURST and RUTH E. ZAMBRANA, *"The Health Careers of Urban Women: A Study in East Harlem."* Ghetto women have specific health care needs which are not met by services available to them. ELIZABETH W. MARKSON and RUTH B. HESS, *"Older Women in the City."* Discussion of the myths and realities of elderly women's lives in cities. MARGARET GORDON, STEPHANIE RIGER, ROBERT K. EBAILLY, and LINDA HEATH, *"Crime, Women, and the Quality of Urban Life."* Gordon et al. conducted in-depth interviews in several cities to assess the extent of women's fear of street crime, especially rape, and the effects such fears have on their everyday lives. HELENA Z. LOPATA, *"The Chicago Woman: A Study of Patterns of Mobility and Transportation."* Notes that transportation systems are developed on the assumption that they are primarily used by men commuting to and from work. In planning transport facilities, no one has thought of the special requirements of women with young children, or the needs of elderly women. DOLORES HAYDEN, *"What Would a Non-Sexist City Be Like? Speculations on Housing, Urban Design, and Human Work."* Attacks the restrictions which available "one-family" housing places on women, examines some of the past attempts made to design cooperative housing, and proposes a mode of organizing collective housing with all necessary social services provided. GERDA R. WERKERLE, *"Women in the Urban Environment."* A review essay of the literature covering the private-public dichotomy, collectivization of housework, housework in the single family dwelling, and the relationship of women's changing roles to their use of urban space. Plus book reviews, letters and comments. EM

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 9:2 (March 1980)

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co. Inc., 52 Vanderbilt Ave., New York, NY 10017. $24.50 for 6 issues. FELIPE GARCIA CASALS, *"Theses On the Syncretic Society."* An article purportedly written by a prominent official in an Eastern European country, using a pseudonym. The author relies on a combination of Parsonian structural-funcitonalism and an Althusserian analysis of socialism as a syncretism of capitalism and communism. Much of the article is an examination of "premature socialism" and how it differs from capitalism and communism. DAVID JORAVSKY, *"Comment On Casals."* Attacks Casals' implicit acceptance of an evolutionary scheme of society moving to higher and better states. Joravsky is critical of Casals' philosophizing, misuse of terms, and in turn presents his own challenge to Stalinist systems and ideology. JUDITH STACEY, *"China's Socialist Revolution, Peasant Families, and Uses of the Past."* A feminist examination of the peasant family in China. The peasants rather than proletarians are agents of the communist

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revolution. A danger is identified in that the revolution may be a return to traditional ideas and thus threaten the revolutionary cause. THOMAS E. WEISSKOPF, *"The Relevance of the Chinese Experience for Third World Economic Development."* Ten elements of Chinese developmental strategy are discussed as they relate to other third world countries. As few countries have all ten elements, the presentation in fact lacks the intended scope. KOSMAS TSOKHAS, *"The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence on the Soviet Union."* Chronicles the increase of Soviet influence in Cuba and the concomitant contradictions. Growing dependence, increasing bureaucracy, and authoritarian politics have reduced the possibility of change toward a communist mode of production. DANIEL CHIROT, *"The Corporatist Model and Socialism."* Argues that corporatist theory permeates developmental theory. Corporatism is seen to be stronger than ever, and the example of Romania illustrates that it did not die out after the 1930s and 1940s. VICTOR ZASLAVSKY, *"Socioeconomic Inequality and Changes in Soviet Ideology.* Argues that inequality not only still exists, but shows little sign of decreasing in the era of global stability. RER

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 9:3 (May 1980)

SAMUEL POPKIN, *"The Rational Peasant, the Political Economy of Peasant Society."* An examination of the impact of colonialism, the expansion of markets, and the formation of central states as they effect peasant societies. Popkin discusses the usual interpretations (moral economy), then presents his own which he calls political economy. This is actually a critique of the "goodness" often associated with traditional society, and a defense of "modernization," and its stability. CHRISTOPHER A. ROOTES, *"Student Radicalism, Politics of Moral Protest and Legitimation Problems of the Modern Capitalist State."* Student involvement without political incorporation is attributed to mass higher education and the formation of a new class. The problem of legitimation is said not to be one of ideology, but one of pracitcal action. The crisis is seen as a moral one (from Habermas), which opens to a discussion (via Keniston and Kohlberg) of moral developmental psychology. HOWARD M. WACHTEL, *"A Decade of International Debt."* The first in a series of articles on global political economy. Relates the increase in the number of banks with branches in foreign countries and the increased debt of countries which import oil to the political independence of LDCs. The debt can lead to the economic destruction of other LDCs which must import oil. JOHN DAVID, *"Social Anthropology and the Consumption of History."* A review essay of John W. Cole and Eric R. Wolf, *The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine Valley*; Sydel Silverman, *Three Bells of Civilization, The Life of an Italian Hill Town*; Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider, *Culture and Political Economy in Western Sicily.* A middle-of-the-road review that informs the reader about the contents of the books but offers little else. RER

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 9:4 (July 1980)

DRISHAN KUMAR, *"Thoughts on the Present Discontents in Britain."* Notes the general view of and economic crisis in British Society, cites the common polarities of problems (multinational corporations versus nationalism) and proposed solutions (growth versus no-growth, manufacturing versus services), and concludes by suggesting a transition from a formal economy of industry to an informal one of household. This article is basically a review of the literature until the last section on households, decentralization and energy. SHARON ZUKIN, *"A Decade of the New Urban Sociology."* Reviews traditional ways of looking at urban society, examines the new critical trend in urban studies which is often historically oriented, connected to political economy, and concerned with the environment and dependency theory. The work of Castells and Harvey is used to develop a framework of capitalist urbanization that is basically an economic view with nothing especially new or radical. TREVOR PATEMAN, *"How To Do Things with Images."* An essay showing how concepts and theories which have been developed within contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of language can be applied to the case of magazine advertising images. It may be of interest to those familiar with Roland Barthes' work or who have an interest in advertising, or philosophy of language. JEFFREY C. GOLDFARB, *"The Repressive Context of Art Work."* An examination of art as a social process that has been repressed in both the East and West, and how freedom is differently realized by art in these two domains. Also argues that much of the symbolic value of art is lost when it goes from one political-economic system to another. CATHERINE GALLAGHER, *"The New Materialism in Marxist Aesthetics."* A review essay of Raymond Williams' *Marxism and Literature*, and Terry Eagleton's, *Criticism and Ideology.* Both try to provide a materialist analysis of literary theories, humanist and Althusserian respectively. A good review essay, particularly of the Williams book. Plus book reviews. RER

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